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ABSTRACT
Situated within strategic aspects o f International Relations, this thesis asks whether the 
West still needs warriors. The West has always had and needed warriors, and six warrior 
ideal types are analysed. Three o f these are premodern and three are modern.
Warriors are defined as soldiers with a personal and existential commitment to master and 
experience warfare, who are willing and able to kill and sacrifice their life in combat. It is 
argued warriors are principally individual types, and whereas there are many soldiers, few of 
these are warriors.
The thesis presents a social theory o f who and what the West is, analysing how this is 
translated into security paradigms that conceive for example whether security ought to be 
pursued for only the West, or whether it ought to be pursued for all o f mankind.
A further context issue is the relationship between war and combat. The character of war is 
changing and becoming ever more instrumental. Combat, meanwhile, is existential and 
unchanging, consisting o f the same basic features and social structure it did in Homeric 
times.
To ask whether the West needs warriors is thus to ask both an instrumental and an 
existential question. The existential features have to do with whom the West conceives 
themselves as; the instrumental features about what the West needs. Warriors are both a 
type o f human being embodying qualities like manliness and courage, and instruments 
towards the attainment o f  security for Western states. To an extent, social developments 
have eroded the esteem in which warriors are held, because society is sceptical o f the 
deliberate use o f force. Yet at the same time, the security agendas conceived by the West 
are more expansive than ever, which leads to a greater need for warriors.
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C h a p t e r  1 :  I n t r o d u c t i o n
General introduction
Thesis question
This thesis is situated within International Relations, focusing on its strategic aspects. The 
overall research question is ‘does the West still need warriors?’ This thesis is not only about 
warriors as such. Rather it is about the relationship between warriors and the character of 
war and society in the contemporary West, and whether there is a need and a place for 
warriors. Notwithstanding this general focus, the thesis explores what the concept o f the 
warrior refers to in great detail through two historical chapters, as well as a definition o f 
warriors in this chapter.
Warriors in this context mean something different from soldiers, and so the thesis 
is not about military power as such. Indeed the utility and legitimacy o f military power is 
taken as a given.1 A major finding o f this thesis is that there is a significant existential 
difference between being a soldier and being a warrior, and the thesis ultimately addresses 
what the difference between soldiers and warriors entails for the West at war.
W arriors and soldiers
Initially we can think o f warriors as the last people in the West who do war in a way that is 
different from the soldierly equivalents o f emergency firemen. They do it as a permanent 
job and condition o f life, touring the hot spots o f the world, often covertly.
The difference between warriors and soldiers is poorly theorised in International 
Relations, Strategic Studies, or War studies. It is necessary to conceptually distinguish 
warriors from soldiers because historically the warrior and the soldier have been two 
different qualities that have sometimes merged. When we think o f Homer’s world we are 
inclined to think in terms o f warriors and the same goes for the Samurai. W arriors’ evoke 
associations to wax-fighting, certainly ruthlessness and the notion o f a particular code of 
conduct in war. However, other contexts like the large armies o f Imperial Rome, the armies 
o f the 30-Years War, or the two World Wars inspire us to think o f soldiers. A soldier 
remains the basic military unit in the context o f state-based military establishments with a
1 For more on the legitimacy o f  the use o f  force, see in particular Michael Howard, 'Restraints on war: studies in 
the limitation of armed conflict (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), Michael Howard, George J. 
Andreopoulos and Mark R.Shulman, The laws of war: constraints on warfare in the Western world (New Haven Yale 
UP, 1994), Michael Walzer, Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with historical illustrations, 2nd ed. ([New York]: 
Basic Books, 1992). For more on the utility o f  force see: Robert Arts, T o  What Ends Military Power?' 
International Security 4, no. 4 (1980), Rupert Smith, The utility of force (London Allen Lane, 2005).
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relatively high level o f precision in training and discipline. Whereas the warrior seems to be 
associated with an individual, the soldier is often thought o f within the context o f an army, 
as soldiers.
In ancient times the imagination was shaped by epic works o f literature, like 
Homer’s Iliad. Homer brings to life two warriors in particular, Achilles and Hector, who 
have strongly shaped the Western conception o f what a warrior is. For this reason Homer 
cannot be ignored in this thesis. Today, however, the popular imagination is much more 
enthralled by movies than epic literature, particularly war movies.
In one o f the most credible war movies o f the last decade, Ridley Scott’s Black 
Hawk Down, based on Mark Bowden’s book, we find the distinction between warriors and 
soldiers played out.2 The Battle o f Mogadishu was a tactically successful, yet strategically 
disastrous, and very costly raid in downtown Mogadishu in October 1993 where American 
Rangers and Special Operations Forces (SOF) apprehended two o f warlord Mohamed 
Farrah Aidid’s top lieutenants. The Somali militias succeeded in downing two helicopters 
and the ensuing battle and rescue operation left 18 American servicemen dead and 73 
wounded. Hundreds o f Somali militias and civilians were killed in what was the most 
intensive fire fight for American forces since Vietnam.
The movie opens with a captivating quote attributed to Plato; “Only the dead have 
seen the end o f war”, which also emblazons strategist Colin Gray’s book Hnother Bloody 
Century? This quote, however, does not exist anywhere in Plato’s work. Instead it can be 
found in General Douglas MacArthur’s farewell address to the 1962 graduates o f the US 
Military Academy W est Point’. Macarthur attributed it to Plato, perhaps not as a fault o f 
his own since the quote can also be found imprinted on the wall o f the Imperial War 
Museum in London. The quote actually originates from the Spanish philosopher, poet, 
essayist and novelist George Santayana (1863-1952) who studied at Oxford during World 
War I.4 Regardless o f its origin, however, the quote is interesting because its double 
meaning directs our attention to the relationship between war, warriors and death.
Firstly, a very likely result o f war for the individual is death. Existentially speaking, 
if you keep doing it long enough the odds catch up on you. Unlike any other activity 
undertaken by man, the craft o f warriors and soldiers has an endpoint that separates it from
2 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk down : a story of modem war (New York: Adantic Monthly Press, 1999), Ridley 
Scott, Black Hawk Down', (United States: Columbia, 2001).
3 Colin S. Gray, A.nother bloody century : future warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005).
4 Suzanne Bernard, Did Plato write "Only the dead have seen the end of war" ? (August 31 2002 [cited June 09 2008]); 
available from http://plato-dialogues.org/faq/faq008.htm.
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all other exploits; war ends in premature and violent death. Secondly, instrumentally 
speaking, the phenomenon o f war on earth will not end with a Kantian eternal peace. War 
has always been here and, it is suggested, always will be here. Only the dead have seen war 
end.
This rather dystopian premonition o f the future does not match Plato’s philosophy 
well, because for him war was a mere tool to defend the state, and death in battle was not 
o f much consequence, since it merely meant disbanding the body and returning to the 
world o f pure forms.5 Santayana’s quote, on the other hand, suggests a rather less detached 
and more compassionate interest in war, with tragic overtones.
The quote becomes even more interesting in the context Ridley Scott evoked it in. 
For both Plato and Santayana war was a more or less necessary (Plato) or increasingly 
disturbing (Santayana) phenomenon. However, by the time Ridley Scott inserted his quote 
(pre 9/11 2001), war seemed to have become an aberration in the minds o f a majority o f 
people in the W est.6
This thesis is to a large extent about these generic tendencies o f war in the West in 
our contemporary era. But even more so, it is about the people who embody Santayana’s 
warning - those who still do war in the West, to an extent the soldiers, but principally the 
warriors. And there are warriors in Ridley Scott’s movie. The seasoned veterans o f Delta 
Force7 are portrayed in stark contrast to the more gung-ho, inexperienced and young 
Rangers.8 The Rangers, in turn were warriors in comparison to the other UN soldiers 
assigned to the mission.
The distinction between soldiers and warriors is a difficult one, and I will return to 
it in great detail later in this chapter. When it comes to Delta Force and similar Special 
Operators, they characterise the warrior type. The hypothesis is that to the extent there are 
warriors in the West, they are most often found in Special Forces type units. Gwynne Dyer 
describes this kind o f  individual:
5 Plato’s discusses war at some length in The Republic, which will be analysed in greater detail in chapter 5.
6 Christopher Coker, War and the 20th century : a study of war and modem consciousness (London: Brassey's, 1994), 
Colin Mclnnes, Spectator-sport war: the West and contemporary conflict (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002).
7 Delta Force is a unit that was formed in 1979 by Colonel Charles Beckwith to become the primary anti­
terror unit o f  the United States military, modelled on the British SAS.
8 The 75th Ranger Regiment is sometimes, incorrectly, referred to as a Special Operations Unit. Whereas the 
Rangers, as they are popularly referred to, frequently work in support o f  SOF like Delta Force, they are 
strictly speaking not a Special Operations Unit. Instead they are elite airborne infantry with significant 
unconventional warfare training.
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There is such a thing as a “natural soldier”: the kind who derives his greatest 
satisfaction from male companionship, from excitement, and from the conquering of 
physical obstacles. He doesn’t want to kill people as such, but he will have no 
objections if it occurs within a moral framework that gives him justification — like war 
— and if it is the price of gaining admission to the kind of environment he craves. 
Whether such men are bom or made I do not know, but most of them end up in 
armies (and many move on again to become mercenaries, because regular army life in 
peacetime is too routine and boring).
But armies are not full of such men. They are so rare that they form only a modest 
fraction even of small professional armies, mosdy congregating in the commando-type 
special forces.9
This is not to  say that members o f  Special Forces units are by virtue o f their unit 
membership all warriors. Instead, this is to suggest that the overall likelihood o f finding the 
particular kind o f individuals I will define as warriors is somewhat larger in Special 
Operations units. In other words, such membership is not in any way a necessary qualifier 
to speak o f warriors. However, Special Forces units exemplify a pronounced lifeworld for 
warriors.
The concept o f lifeworld’; will permeate this thesis. I use the term as Jurgen 
Habermas has developed it. A lifeworld is a social fabric infused with meaning. Social 
groups create and reproduce the lifeworld to make sense o f the objective world o f facts, 
the normative world o f right and wrong, and the individual psychological world in social 
action. A lifeworld is limited in scope; it does not have the scope o f Benedict Anderson’s 
celebrated concept o f nationalism as an ‘imagined community.’ Anderson explains how 
people make up communion in their minds, mostly people who will never m eet.10 This 
social fabric has stronger coherence than an imagined community does because it is based 
on face-to-face interaction and lived memories.
Habermas incorporates insights by Durkheim and George Herbert Mead to add to 
the original concept from Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. Whereas Husserl 
emphasized subjective meaning in individual or group life, Schutz refined this idea to 
comprise a social horizon that changes when the actor moves in the social world. The 
lifeworld is thus made up o f a shared, but malleable, conception o f culture and language. 
Habermas also incorporates Durkheim’s concept o f collective consciousness, which
9 Gwynne Dyer, War (London: Bodley Head, 1985), 117.
10 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London Verso, 1991).
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describes a continuous process o f legitimate regulation and stabilization o f group identity. 
This feature o f  the lifeworld cements social cohesion.11 Mead’s contribution emphasizes 
the socialization o f individuals; “Individuals develop their personalities, their identities and 
their social roles with the aid o f the ever-present help o f lifeworld knowledge. Those who 
cannot make use o f this help may suffer from psychopathologies o f a more or less serious 
kind.” 12 This thesis visits many Western warrior lifeworlds, some as ad hoc examples and 
others in more depth in chapters five and six.
Definition of soldier
Warriors should be distinguished from civilians and soldiers by many traits. Two are 
necessary but not sufficient: they are willing to die and to kill, and do not shirk from either. 
These points are critical to understand warriors, because they distinguish them from soldier 
s who also wear uniform, and get paid ultimately for risking their lives, but who do not 
have a personal commitment to experience combat. The Oxford English Dictionary traces 
the word ‘soldier’ back to ca. 1300 (‘sauder’), defined as “one who serves in an army for 
pay; one who takes part in military service or warfare.” 13
There are many kinds o f soldiers in the world, just as there are many kinds of 
different military establishments. It is not possible to define soldiers positively in terms o f a 
single variable, such as institutional attachment, and thereby distinguish them from other 
armed actors. Instead a typology extrapolated from an ideal type is methodologically 
suitable. An ideal type soldier is someone who is a member of a state military establishment, is 
clearly identifiable as such, and is at least in part motivated by the ethos of a public servant, and whose use 
of arms can reasonably be attributed to a greater political cause.
These variables are addressed in turn, with counter-examples for illustration, and 
discussion o f  borderline cases. The discussion demonstrates the fluid boundaries between 
soldiers and other types o f fighters. Since soldiers are the paradigmatic expression of the 
state’s legitimate monopoly on violence, these other fighters often challenge the state 
structures, usually outside the W est.14 The conceptual challenges are so significant that a 
universal definition o f soldiers, such as the ideal type, is rare in the real world. This does 
not detract from the fact that some soldiers are more soldiers than others: soldiers who 
represent m ost or all o f the features o f the definition possess a normative and legal status
11 Gerard H Fairdough, 'Habermas' concept o f  "Lifeworld'", Systems Practice 4, no. 6 (1991): 550-51.
12 Ibid.: 551.
13 J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, 'Soldier', in The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 954.
14 Rune Henriksen and Anthony Vinci, 'Combat Motivation in Non-State Armed Groups', Terrorism and 
Political Violence 20, no. 1 (2007).
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which is stronger than that o f aspiring or putative soldiers who represent these to a lesser 
extent.
A military establishment: The ideal type soldier is a member of state based 
military, either as a professional officer or NCO, a conscript, or as a reservist. The reservist 
is technically only a soldier when on active duty. ‘Soldier’ in this context is a generic term, 
not meant specifically as army, but equally marine, airman or sailor. A counterexample is 
someone who is a member o f a private warlord organisation, which typically exists as an 
end in itself and where the members o f the organisation are people, government and army 
all in one.15 Another example is any terrorist organisation without cohesion, so fragmented 
as to lack a centre o f gravity from where concessions o f defeat can emerge, or to which 
propositions o f negotiations can be directed.16
The challenge with this variable has to do with non-state contexts, when the 
institutionalisation o f the army is not very strong, either because of lacking professionalism, 
funding, organisation or other characteristics related to the degree o f institutionalisation. 
When addressing insurgencies, for example the Vietcong during the Vietnam War, it 
becomes difficult to determine with any precision whether the insurgent organisation can 
be attributed the status o f a military establishment. In some respects the Vietcong were 
highly organised, into three-man cells with detailed de-briefings and links to political cadre 
who were in charge o f organisation and motivation.17 O n the other hand, the Vietcong did 
not wear uniforms or belong to an army formally, living among villagers and often 
operating at night.
The main point here is that the soldier becomes a soldier through belonging to a 
military organisation, which to some (and preferably large) degree controls the soldier. The 
soldier’s actions are thus not private and personal, but public and social, which gives the 
community ownership and responsibility for both celebratory conduct and transgressions 
conducted by the soldier.
Clearly identifiable: The ideal type soldier wears a uniform; which demonstrates 
his allegiance and belonging to a political group; rights and duties under international law; 
and whether he is a combatant or not. The identifying marks are a uniform and a flag on
15 Anthony John Vinci, Warlords in the International Order: A Neorealist Approach' (PhD Thesis, London 
School o f  Economics and Political Science, 2007).
16 A1 Qaeda may be an example o f this insofar as it has developed into a network which is barely organised. 
Osama Bin Laden, if  he is to be counted as the organization’s leader, is probably not able to effectuate any 
sort o f  command and control anymore.
17 William Darryl Henderson, Why the Vietcong fought — A  study of Motivation and Control in a Modem Army in 
Combat (London: Greenwood Press, 1979).
15
that uniform. A counterexample is an insurgent who fights for a military establishment, like 
the Tamil Tigers, with a clear command structure, tangible political goals and a degree of 
professionalism. Despite this, however, a branch o f the Tamil Tigers called the Black 
Tigers, specialise in suicide attacks against military targets. This is not a clear-cut case of 
terrorism, even though the tactic is suicide bombing, since the target is not civilians. The 
suicide bomber is in this case more akin to a precision guided weapon. Yet the suicide 
bom ber is not identifiable, which undermines his status as a soldier.
Several objections can detract from the ideal type. For example, historically the 
uniform was invented in the late 18th century, when the physical control o f vast armies in 
linear and regularised manoeuvres necessitated a degree o f precision in identifying who 
belonged to what army, which would be impossible without uniform. However, the form 
o f warfare involved civilians to a very small degree compared to today, and engagements 
were transparent, sometimes to the point o f  being agreed beforehand. Nonetheless, today 
the identification through uniform is a legally sanctioned indication o f who is a legitimate 
combatant. The use o f uniforms is one o f several possible manifestations o f a longstanding 
practice in warfare; to state your intentions on the batdefield. In the past, stating intentions 
have been done in many ways, such as posture, which was an important feature o f fighting 
in the Iliad. The warriors there did not sport uniforms so much as fighting gear, but the 
posture and bragging before individual duels served not only to explicate who was fighting, 
but to put the entire genealogy o f the warrior’s kin at stake, thus reinforcing group 
belonging.
In non-state situations, like insurgencies, the government or ‘forces o f order’ as 
Van Creveld calls them, are typically militarily superior.18 Asymmetric tactics thus become 
not a choice but a necessity for insurgents. Unfortunately, this often leads to inhuman 
tactics. As a Blackwater contractor complained after a September 16, 2007 controversial 
shooting in Baghdad, which left 17 Iraqis dead: “How long does it take for a dead terrorist 
to become a dead civilian? As long as it takes to remove an AK-47 from the body.” 19 The 
contractor has a point, but his own legal status as combatant is not very clear either, even 
though he is sub-contracted by the U.S. government.20
18 Martin L. Van Creveld, The changing face of war: lessons of combat, from the Marne to Iraq (New York: Presidio 
Press, 2006), 224.
19 Paul von Zielbauer and James Glanz, 'Under Siege, Blackwater Takes On Air o f  Bunker', New York Times, 
October 25 2007.
20 The Blackwater mission in question was in protection o f  a U.S. State Department convoy.
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The problem is that an attacker who lives among civilians, hides among civilians 
and claims to be a civilian, only to suddenly attack from this favourable position, and 
thereafter immediately re-enter the status as a civilian, operates in an extremely dubious 
zone of legitimacy. One must not confuse this practice with skill, fieldcraft and deceit as 
tactical means in combat, such as in an ambush, for example, which is legally justified. 
However, it is not legal and just to use civilians as terrain. It is nonetheless an increasing 
trend.21 W hen civilians step out o f the theoretically pacified zone and de-pacify it, the 
military establishment against which these civilians are fighting in more cases than not 
resort to retributive actions towards the civilians among whom the guerrilla, insurgent or 
terrorist is hiding.
One could argue that the use o f  uniforms is a Western bias, which (legally if not 
tactically) steers armed conflict towards set-piece battles where Western conventional 
superiority can be brought to bear. However, Western state military personnel also on 
occasion avoid using uniforms. Intelligence operators are typically the first to enter hostile 
zones, and they are not identified by uniform. They prepare the ground for SOF, who 
themselves on occasion work out o f uniform. In terms o f the SOF they are clearly soldiers 
in all respects except lacking uniform on occasion, whereas the intelligence operators are 
conventionally identified as something else than soldiers. This is to a large degree a legal 
question, including whether a person can evoke rights o f protection under the Geneva 
protocols if  captured.
Motivated in part by the ethos of a public servant: The ideal type soldier is not 
necessarily personally motivated by public service. Instead, he or she is serving with the 
knowledge that as far as can be determined, violence is perpetrated in the name o f a public 
cause. It is socially sanctioned; it is not a private act. Personal motivation can be extremely 
subjective, and it is rarely attributed mainly with reference to abstract notions of citizenship 
or duty to the collective group. However, this is not to say that this feature is not 
important. Instead, the public legitimacy o f the military establishment is something the 
soldier is aware of, to the detriment o f his or her motivation if it is not in place. 
Furthermore, if the ‘home audience’, who the soldier represents in combat, challenges it 
this has very strong adverse effects on the soldier’s combat motivation. Thus the 
motivation has to do with the legitimacy of the use o f violence, which the soldier needs to 
trust is taken care o f by the political authorities he or she serves. Legitimacy under
21 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and consent: the wars for the twenty-first century (London: Penguin, 2008), chapter 3.
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international law is not so much the question, as whether the cause represents the home 
community, and is thus notionally political.
A counterexample to this would be Slobodan Milosevic’s mobilisation o f criminals 
to do the dirty work o f executions, rape and ethnic cleansing in the Balkan Wars o f the 
1990s. Arkan’s Tigers, one of the more infamous o f these groups, did not act in pursuit of 
the public good. Similarly, in October 2002 Saddam Hussein released about 100,000 
convicted prisoners from jail, probably to create havoc for the invading forces after the 
combat phase.22 These people would be hard to distinguish from insurgents by externally 
identifiable criteria, but were (most likely) not politically motivated.
In terms o f borderline cases, private military companies (PMCs) are illustrative. 
Frequently, these people come from a professional career in Western military 
establishments, very often with Special Forces backgrounds. Their professional abilities as 
well as the institutionalisation o f their employer’s company along the lines o f military 
organisations may both be impeccable. Their loyalty to their country may be as well, and 
many PMCs only accept contracts that are either direcdy from the country they come from 
(e.g. UK or US), or is compatible with that country’s foreign policy objectives.23 The 
difference comes in the motivation superstructure that the institution they belong to 
espouses. As an institution, a private military company is geared towards profit, and does 
not institutionalise concerns about long-term effects the way state military establishments 
must do. For example in wars among the people the risk o f alienating the local population 
is a greater concern for militaries than PMCs.
Use of arms reasonably attributable to a greater political cause: The allied 
cause in World War II perhaps best illustrates the ideal type soldier’s fight for a greater 
political cause. Even though one can make arguments about victor’s justice, the cause, as 
far as the allies were concerned, was one o f almost Manichaean clarity. Liberal democracy 
was defended against an onslaught by Fascism and Nazism and needed to be repulsed. 
Similarly for Germans on the Eastern Front, the fight against Communism was for reasons 
o f indoctrination and partially genuinely held beliefs o f a just cause. The clashes between 
the behemoth armies in World War II were not necessarily only about moral transparency, 
but could be termed political simply by virtue o f their ideological potency and their huge 
scope. If some engagements were not political, it was not for being sub-political (private or
22 GlobaIsecurity.org, 'News Briefing - Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III: Opening statement', in Washington File 
(Baghdad: U.S. Department o f  Defense, 2003).
23 P W Singer, Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 119.
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tribal), but extra-political or existential (for example the war o f extermination on the 
Eastern Front).
A counterexample of what could be attributed as a political cause by a dispassionate 
observer is on the one hand genocide, which is not war, or on the other hand feuds, which 
are private. Coker refers to anthropologist A nton Blok’s concept o f ‘social substitutability’ 
to make an existential (aside from the political) case for distinguishing war from private 
violence.24 W hen violence is socially substitutable, the violence is directed at members o f 
the other group as members. In other words, the violence is not directed at them personally, 
but because they are members o f that group, fighting in a collective cause for that group. 
O ne can take social substitutability too far as well, as Coker discusses at length, when 
membership o f that group becomes an objective cause for extermination rather than war, 
as is the case in genocide.
A borderline case is A1 Qaeda’s strategic campaign against the West, which has 
demonstrated tangible goals like American withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, and Spanish 
withdrawal from Iraq. Nonetheless, conceding that their campaign has strategic elements 
does not detract from their status as terrorists, or from the fact that their ultimate goal is 
utopian.
In  conclusion, the definition o f a soldier is a composition o f different criteria, 
where more than one ought to be in place. As the previous analysis shows, the term has 
subjective dimensions relating to the normative and legal baggage o f distinguishing 
between soldiers and other combatants. For this reason, we must interrogate the term 
beyond what the Oxford English Dictionary does. Conversely, it is equally important not 
to fall prey to relativism and leave the term to personal preference. The following definition 
o f warriors builds substantially on that o f a soldier.
Existing definitions of warrior
Before defining warriors it is necessary to address the use o f the word ‘warrior’ found in 
some o f the literature on strategy and war, to clarify how the following definition departs 
from these.
The Oxford English Dictionary traces the word ‘warrior’ back to 1297 (‘Kni3tes & 
oper worreours’), defined as someone “whose occupation is warfare; a fighting man, 
whether soldier, sailor, or (latterly) airman; in eulogistic sense, a valiant or an experienced
24 Christopher Coker, The warrior ethos: military culture and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2007), 75-79.
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man o f war.” 25 Two components in this definition stand out: First, it designates a strong 
commitment to war - as the word itself does - and the conduct o f warfare, where skill and 
experience is significant, but where valour can compensate both. Secondly, the definition 
claims a warrior can be a soldier as well. The O ED  definition is not sufficient to serve as a 
phenomenological definition o f warriors or soldiers for further analysis because it is too 
vague and does not explain what the main tenets mean precisely. For example, what does it 
mean that a warrior is “a fighting man” or an “experienced man o f war”? These tenets are 
retained in the definition following below, however they are further developed and refined. 
Additionally, it is necessary to address the balance between restraint and initiative inherent 
in any intuitive warrior concept most people carry with them. A warrior, or any 
experienced soldier, must contribute actively while at the same time have sufficient self- 
control not to turn into a berserker.
In International Relations a select few writers have confronted the phenomenon of 
warriors. One example is the American commentator and journalist Robert Kaplan in his 
Warrior Politics26 which is not so much about warriors as it is about the ‘haves and have- 
nots’ and those fighting for the respective sides. Kaplan does not formulate his own 
concept o f warriors, but quotes Ralph Peters, an ex-U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel turned 
commentator. Peters refers to warriors as “erratic primitives o f shifting allegiance, 
habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by 
our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like.” 27 In this essay 
and in a later essay, Peters expands these introductory remarks into a typology over the 
origins o f warriors “drawn from five socio-psychological pools.” 28 The five pools are 
comprised o f the following backgrounds;
1. Warriors who come from the underclass, losers who become ‘somebody’ 
through exercising violence. Most will quit, but some will have to be killed.
2. ‘Course-of-conflict-joiners’; young men who only sign up for a program of 
violence when other options are closed off. Although some may acquire a 
taste for killing and destruction, most of these ‘what-choice-did-I-have?’ 
fighters gladly attempt to reintegrate into a society upon which peace has been 
imposed.
25 J. A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, ’Warrior, in The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
935.
26 Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior politics: why leadership demands a pagan ethos (New York: Random House, 2002).
27 Ralph Peters, Fighting for the future: will America triumph? (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1999), 32.
28Ralph Peters, 'The N ew  Warrior Class Revisited', Small Wars and Insurgencies 13, no. 2 (2002): 18.
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3. Opportunists, entrepreneurs of conflict, charismatic people asking ‘what’s-in- 
it-for-me?’ They can be cruel when winning, but rarely put up a fight when 
losing.
4. Hard core believers, either in a cause, religion, or an individual leader. They 
fight hard.
5. Mercenaries, people who fight primarily for personal profit.29
There are many problems with Peters’ typology o f warriors. The main one is why he 
chooses to call these people warriors, rather than just ‘fighters’. There is little to indicate 
they are warriors o f the commonly used meaning,30 since they are neither particularly good 
at, nor committed to fighting, nor do they evoke any kind o f warrior ethos. Furthermore, 
Peters does not specify what makes the people from these five ‘socio-psychological pools’ 
fight, compared to their great many peers who do not fight, but come from the same 
demographic groups.
Peters’ former employer, the U.S. Army, has attempted to institutionalise a form of 
warrior ethos to influence how non-infantry soldiers behave in war zones.: “Soldiers who 
five Warrior Ethos put the mission first, refuse to accept defeat, never quit and never leave 
behind a fallen comrade. They have absolute faith in themselves and their team. They are 
trained and equipped to engage and destroy the enemies o f the United States in close 
combat.” 31 However, the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
approaches Peters’ level o f sweeping generalisation because it defines any soldier as a 
warrior first. TRADOC’s conception o f a warrior is thus rather more a statement of 
aspiration than fact. Although not stated explicitly, TRADOC’s definition suggests the 
warrior component is a kind o f raw material, which can be streamlined and incorporated 
into soldiers’ commitment to military values. A t the heart o f such a view is the idea that 
anyone can be trained to become a warrior, one is not bom  a warrior.
Shannon French, who teaches military ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy, provides a 
contrasting and more academic approach to what constitutes warriors. The primary 
weakness with French’s argument is her concept o f the warrior. She does not define it, but
29 Ibid.: 18-19.
30 As reflected in the O ED  definition above.
31 Joshua J. LaMotte, The Warrior Ethos and Basic Combat Training (2004 [cited June 09 2008); available from 
http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/OQM G/Professional_Bulletin/2004/Spring04/The_warrior_Ethos_an 
d_Basic_Combat_T raining.htm
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seems simply to equate warriors with American service members.32 Despite different 
subcultures — and thus different warrior codes —, “they are all American warriors, sworn to 
uphold and defend the values o f the Constitution.” 33 In this reading, all American soldiers 
become warriors because it is necessary for them to have a code. She concludes warriors 
need a code to ensure restraint in war, which in turn safe keeps the warrior’s mental health. 
Warriors “respect the values o f the society in which they were raised and which they were 
prepared to die to protect. Therefore it is im portant for them to conduct themselves in 
such a way that they will be honoured and esteemed by their communities, not reviled and 
rejected by them.” 34 French’s arguments, in terms o f restraint, are sound, but like the 
warrior ethos propagated by TRADOC, it comes out rather more as an aspiration than an a 
lived ethos. Another critique against her warrior conception is that she does not address 
the active side o f the warrior ethos, which is to  say aggression, commitment, skill and 
courage; qualities that are crucial for the instrumental nature o f the warrior’s job; to 
succeed in combat. As John Kiszely puts it: “To be capable o f warfighting, an army needs 
to have as its characteristic cultural spirit, or ethos, one which is warfighting-oriented, and 
its soldiers need to have a self-perception as warriors. Lose the warrior ethos and you lose 
the fighting power.” 35
Christopher Coker’s work on warriors is the m ost theoretically sophisticated 
available.36 Coker’s approach is very wide ranging, informed by history, literature and 
philosophy, and for that reason is influential throughout this thesis. His conceptual prism 
o f the concepts agency, subjectivity and intersubjectivity is particularly useful, and these concepts 
together amount to the existential lifeworld o f warriors. They structure the historical 
treatment o f six ideal type warriors from Homer to Special Forces in chapters five and six. 
The approach here departs from Coker’s in pursuing a more systematic definition o f 
warriors, which in turn informs the argument throughout the thesis.
The O ED  definition raises the most central tenets o f a tentative definition o f 
warriors, but it is insufficiently fleshed out and too subjective to stand on its own. Ralph
32 Soldiers in this context is understood as someone serving in the military. In the United States the term 
soldier typically refers to members o f  the US Army, while men in the Marines are Marines, in the Air Force 
they are Airmen and in the Navy they are either Naval Aviators or Seamen. Internationally however, soldier 
is the term commonly used for anyone who is a member o f  a state-based military establishment, whatever 
their trade is inside this establishment.
33 Shannon French, The code of the warrior{Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2003), 15.
34 Ibid, 5.
35 John Kiszely, 'Learning about Counter-Insurgency', RUSI Journal December (2006): 19.
36 Christopher Coker, The future of w ar: the re-enchantment of war in the 21st century (Oxford: Blackwell 2004), 
Christopher Coker, Waring war without warriors?: the changing culture of military conflict (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
P ub , 2002), Coker, Warrior Ethos.
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Peters’ definition resonates with a particular perspective on warriors, where they are 
identified as someone less disciplined and less admirable than soldiers, who are held to be 
more disciplined and restrained. However, such a view on warriors does not resonate with 
the self-control and holistic approach to war which the “experienced man o f war” from the 
O ED  definition emphasizes, which also features in French and Coker’s work, and which 
resonates with intuitive associations to the Samurai for example. French, however, focuses 
exclusively on restraint, which presupposes that initiative and combat performance come to 
soldiers by default, which they do not. This initiative separates warriors from bystanders in 
combat.37 Coker’s concept o f the warrior is the strongest and resonates throughout the 
thesis, but it needs clearer definition to serve as a starting point. The following is thus an 
idiosyncratic amalgam of sustainable tenets o f existing warrior definitions and 
interpretations, which can serve as a starting point for more precise debate about what 
precisely a warrior is, and will be a foundation for the further thesis.
Warrior definition
The preceding discussion of existing definitions o f warriors and soldiers leads to a 
definition o f a warrior as a soldier with a personal and existential commitment to experience and 
master warfare, who is willing and able both to kill and to sacrifice his life in combat.
Soldier
There is no commonly accepted definition o f war, but most commentators refer to it as 
organised collective violence, sometimes specified as having a political purpose, yet 
acknowledging that it has cultural, existential and metaphysical dimensions.38 To say that it 
is organised does not necessarily imply the Clausewitzian setup where states are the 
principal actors, and warfare is an instrument o f their policy. Nonetheless, his framework 
remains the most commonly agreed conception o f war as an institution o f  international 
society.39 It should be borne in mind that the extraordinary successes o f Western ways of 
organising violence strongly inform the Clausewitzian framework. To say that a warrior is a 
soldier harbours a number o f implications, most o f which were addressed above. With 
respect to warriors, this question is im portant because the soldier status is the institutional
37 Rune Henriksen, Warriors in combat - what makes people actively fight in combat?1 Journal of Strategic 
Studies 30, no. 20 (2007).
38 Coker, Future of War, 6, Azar Gat, War in human civilisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 
17, Gray, Another Bloody Century, 37, Colin S. Gray, Modem strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
chapter 1,2.
39 Hedley Bull, The anarchical society : a study of order in world politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002), chapter 8.
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superstructure that distinguishes warriors from criminals, lunatics, terrorists, freedom 
fighters, warlords, insurgents and other categories o f fighting men and women. This is, o f 
course, a normative question as well as a political one.
To say that any warrior needs to be a soldier is to distinguish warriors from 
unlawful combatants and private actors. His political community sanctions a soldier to 
fight. It is necessary, but not sufficient for a warrior to be a soldier. A warrior is necessarily 
a soldier first, but very few soldiers are warriors. In addition, to say that a soldier is a 
warrior is to distinguish him from mercenaries, because the soldier is ultimately serving a — 
usually political — cause. If one asks soldiers whether they are motivated to sign up 
primarily by a cause, that is usually not the case. Sergeant Colbert of 1st Recon Battalion, 
USMC, testifies to embedded reporter Evan Wright a typical attitude on the eve o f the Iraq 
2003 war:
As a professional warrior, politics and ideology don’t really enter into his thoughts 
about why he is here in the desert, waiting to invade a country. “I’m not so idealistic 
that I subscribe to good versus evil. We haven’t had a war like that since World War
II. Why are we here now? I guess it’s to remove this guy from power. I’m not opposed 
to it, and I wasn’t going to miss it.” For him it is a grand personal challenge. “We’re 
going into the great unknown,” he says. “Scary, isn’t it?” he adds, smiling brightly. “I 
can’t wait.”40
However, following unambiguous attacks like Pearl Harbour and 9/11, people do sign up 
to take revenge and /or defend their country. The professional football player Pat Tillman’s 
giving up his multi-million dollar contract to join the U.S. Army Rangers after September 
11 is a case in point.41 Usually, even if the cause does not figure as a primary reason to sign 
up, it is present as a subtext, as Samuel Hynes explains with reference to World War II.42
Personal commitment
The commitment to war must be personal. Being a warrior is an individual aspiration, 
certainly within the West, whether that is expressed in an explicitly formulated ethos by a 
unit o r by virtue o f coming from a particular background, for example in having been 
raised to be a warrior. This commitment does not necessarily have to be voluntary at the 
outset. It can arise a posteriori after having experienced combat as a drafted soldier.
40 Evan Wright, Generation kill (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 31.
41 Tillman was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan: Joe Garofoli, 'Tillman wants accountability in son's 
death', San Francisco Chronicle, May 16 2008.
42 Samuel Lynn Hynes, The soldiers' tale: bearing witness to modem war (London: Pimlico, 1998), 112.
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The Vietnam Veteran Dave Nelson is a good example o f someone who was raised 
into being a warrior from an early age. His father, a Ranger who was in charge o f the 
‘Expert Jungle Trainer’s School’ in Panama when Dave was 12, allowed his son to socialise 
with the troops, live alone, survive in the jungle, and parachute from age 13:
I was really into the military concept. I was into parades and the pride and the honour 
and the glory that these guys shared (...) there was a lot of pride and camaraderie. I 
got to ride in tanks and shoot guns. I got to ride on helicopters and planes. My father 
exposed me to everything about being a warrior. He taught me to shoot when I was 
six (...) I could live alone in the woods at ten. He taught me to survive on my own.43
Admittedly, Nelson is a rare case o f  someone explicitly raised as a warrior, but in certain 
parts o f  the United States, it is very common for young men to have fathers and 
grandfathers with military and even combat experience. Moreover, one can imagine that 
some o f these fathers and grandfathers came to master war in N orth Africa, Europe or the 
Pacific without necessarily volunteering first.
Existential com m itm ent
The essential difference between a soldier and a warrior is an existential commitment to 
war and combat. Being a warrior cannot be reduced to instrumental considerations, 
because o f a number o f in-exhaustive reasons such as:
The experience of combat incurs extraordinary personal suffering and deprivation, such 
as hunger, cold, disease, wounds, lack of sleep, etc. It also often leads to serious trauma, 
which is a fact many soldiers now are fully aware of in advance, yet seem to accept.
The status accorded to warriors, as special people, which is intermixed with a 
combination of suspicion and admiration from the general public.
Sacrificing one’s life is a gift, not a duty, and the willingness to consistendy pursue life- 
threatening situations is antithetic to instrumental gains.
To say that a commitment is existential is to define it as irreducible to biological drives or 
instrumental calculations o f benefit to the individual.44 Arguably, soldiers and warriors can 
experience these existential factors relatively similarly; it is the order o f magnitude in the 
willingness to commit to such a lifeworld that distinguishes the two.
43 J. T. Hansen, A. Susan Owen and Michael Patrick Madden, Parallels: the soldier’s knowledge and the oral history of 
contemporary warfare (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992), 16.
44 Existential psychologists hold that if  we try to understand man as a bundle o f  discrete drives or a 
composite o f  reflex patters, we may end up with brilliant generalisations but we have lost the man to whom  
these things happen. 'Existential psychology', in International Enyclopedia of Social Sciences vol 13, ed. David I.
Sills (London: MacMillan, 1968), 76.
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M astering w ar
Warriors excel in the battlefield because o f superior skills combined with the necessary 
ruthlessness and decisiveness to translate these skills into practice. This excellence is often a 
result o f professionalism in preparation and training, but also a result o f on-the-job-training 
acquired in combat. O n the one hand, combat experience clearly is the essence o f a 
warrior’s lifeworld, but on the other hand it is also possible to conceive o f warriors as being 
warriors prior to combat, for example Nelson in his youth. The foundation and ultimate 
test, however, remains combat performance.
Among the skills required in combat, some are universal: situational awareness, 
keeping calm under pressure, and capability at handling weapons o f war, and qualities like 
willpower and determination, which it takes to be able to master any art thoroughly. 
However, the special determination required o f warriors is that o f performing excellently 
while simultaneously being under a great variety o f pressures, specifically being surrounded 
by death and destruction, suffering deprivation and staying operational in hopeless climatic 
and terrain conditions. Nelson exemplifies the kind o f self-discipline it took to master the 
difficult conditions in Vietnam sufficiendy well to challenge the enemy in his own 
backyard:
We took very litde food. If you know what you’re doing you really get into it, you can 
do it. We used to eat their food. I’d find caches of rice. I used to live off small birds 
and snakes. If you’re out there a period of time, you develop an odour which is 
undetectable. You can see someone drawing a cigarette for about a mile. Plus — human 
beings stink. You can smell another human being. You could smell Americans because 
of the garbage they ate — especially C-rations.45
One other veteran validates Nelson’s extreme professionalism; he describes the frustration 
o f always feeling the enemy knew where they were, without having the similar edge 
themselves: ‘W e rarely found Charlie. He could smell us. Some o f us felt the C-rations we 
had to eat caused our body odour to be easy to detect. He always hit us when we least 
expected it.” 46
Some qualities vary with the character o f war, such as the particulars o f the tactics 
and weapons used. In Homeric times, mastery o f war required physical skills in hand-to- 
hand combat with spears and swords, where hacking and thrusting was very hard labour. In
45 Hansen, Owen and Madden, Parallels, 22.
46 Ibid., 69.
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later times, firearms have taken over. For Franklin Miller the opportunity to handle 
firearms was definitely a positive experience:
But when I got to TMam and they put a gun in my hand — Whoa! It was like a religious 
experience. I was bom again.
I want to make it clear that I never threatened anybody with a gun. Not one time. But 
I loved it because a gun made you everybody's equal... Body size and muscle were no 
longer factors. So I made it my business to become an expert with weapons... So I 
got very, very good with weapons. All weapons. When you're good... you send out 
vibes unintentionally to people around you. You’re a bad motherfucker. You know it 
and they know it.47
Founding member o f the most elite unit in today’s American military — U.S. Army Special 
Forces Operational Detachment—Delta, popularly known as ‘Delta Force’ — Command 
Sergeant Major Eric Haney, concurs about the primacy o f shooting skills: “But the mastery 
o f this skill is ground zero for the Delta Force operator. Without it, he would be some 
other type of being. Because when it gets right down to it, a Delta operator is an extremely 
skilled killer.48 For Haney and his. colleagues shooting was part talent, but mostly hard 
work, drill:
We did it over and over and over. Soon the fun went out of it, and it became work.
And about that time, it became painful. The .45 is a powerful pistol with sharp recoil, 
and the tight grip we used meant we absorbed the full force of the recoil in our hands 
and arms.
Soon, like everyone else, I had a large, painful blister in the web of my thumb from 
the pounding of the gun in my hand... After a while the blister turned into a big callus 
that stayed on my hand for the next eight years. The surest way to identify a Delta 
Force Assault Team member is by that telltale callus on his firing hand. They all have 
one.49
This repetition is testimony to the commitment to professionalism in Delta Force, where 
the most challenging scenario would involve shooting free hostages in tight dark situations 
like inside buildings, aircraft and vehicles. “We were training to rescue hostages, and if  we 
couldn’t keep from hitting them in a fight, we weren’t doing our job. I f  we were no better
47 Franklin D. Miller, Reflections of a Warrior (New  York: Pocket Books, 1991), 112.
48 Eric L. Haney, Inside Delta Force: The Real Story of America’s FLlite Military Unit (London: Corgi, 2002), 134.
49 Ibid., 139-40.
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than that, then a squad o f infantry could do the job. They could just go in and kill 
everybody.” 50
Experiencing war
Warriors have a yearning to be tried in batde. A curiosity as to this ultimate test o f 
manhood and prowess is combined with a desire to display courage rather than cowardice, 
and critically; not shying away from wherever the fighting is hardest. In most contemporary 
militaries, that involves some degree o f voluntarism. The fast track to combat is often 
volunteering in some kind o f elite or Special Forces unit. Mark Bowden describes the 
excitement among the U.S. Army Rangers deploying to Somalia with Task Force Ranger:
[The Rangers] couldn’t wait to go to war. They were an all-star football team that had 
endured bruising, exhausting, dangerous practice sessions twelve hours a day, seven 
days a week — for years — without ever getting to play a game. They yearned for 
battle... It was THE test, the only one that counted.
Sergeant Mike Goodale had tried to explain this to his mother one time, on leave in 
Illinois. His mom was a nurse, incredulous at his bravado.
“Why would anybody want to go to war?” she asked...
“You want to find out if you can really do the job,” he explained.51
H is life
The gender aspect is crucial to any study o f  warriors, since they are virtually always men. 
There are two relevant dimensions to this question in this context: First, to which extent 
have there been female warriors in history and have they performed well in combat? 
Second, are women fit to be warriors today?
Surveying the history o f women warriors, military historian Martin van Creveld 
finds that throughout history, women have been instigators, and victims o f war, and they 
have been a cause over which men have fought. However although there are some 
individual examples52, very few women have participated in what Clausewitz calls ‘the cash 
payment o f war’.53 The 18th and 19th century kingdom of Dahomey in West Africa (present 
day Benin) is an exception. Dahomey King Agadja had a large standing army including
50 Ibid., 141.
51 Bowden, Black Hawk Down, 8-10.
52 Notable early examples are those mentioned in the anonymous Roman tract entitled Women Intelligent and 
courageous in warfare, o f these possibly five were historical figures. See Martin L. Van Creveld, Men, women, and 
war(London: Cassell & Co., 2001), 68-70.
53 Ibid., 13.
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some all-female units. This was a special situation where the whole society was 
militarised.54
In our recent history’s age o f total war, women have participated rather more. 
Particularly, they have fought in irregular resistance movements such as in Yugoslavia and 
Italy in World War II, more than as regular combatants, although the latter has also been 
the case. In the Western and German militaries, women were not combatants, but in the 
Red Army, they constituted 2-3 per cent. Among these, the vast majority were engaged in 
support roles like cooking, nurses and food preparation. Some women did serve as pilots 
and initially filled three all-female air regiments (two bomber and one fighter).55 A 
significant number o f fighter pilots were women, 12 percent at the war’s end, including two 
aces credited with a dozen kills each.56 Relatively speaking a large number o f Soviet women 
went through sniper school, but there is little evidence as to whether the majority actually 
served in combat in the same way that women conscripts in Israel traditionally have had 
weapons training, though not served in combat.57 Nevertheless, there are reports o f one 
sniper killing an entire company o f Germans over 25 days.58 Conversely, the expert 
German Jaeger sniper Sepp Allerberger engaged a company of women snipers in combat in 
April 1944, and accounted for 18 o f them.59 Van Creveld calculates the number o f Soviet 
women to have received weapons training to be about 0.7 per cent o f  the uniformed Red 
Army, and he suggests there was at least one line regiment composed o f women.60
The historical record indicates that there have not been many women warriors, 
partially because only societies at a state o f total war tend to mobilize them. When 
mobilised most women serve in support positions, some in irregular units, and a few 
participate in combat, proving themselves in a few exceptional cases to be capable warriors.
Another feature o f this issue is whether women are fit to fight in today’s frontlines. 
Are they marginalised out o f combat units for moral and normative reasons, or is this 
related primarily to physical capabilities? According to some research, the latter is
54 Joshua Goldstein, War and Gender. Hon/ Gender shapes the war system and vice versa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 60-61.
55 Ibid., 66, Van Creveld, Men, women, and war, 140-44.
56 Goldstein, War and Gender, 68-69.
57 Van Creveld, Men, women, and war, 141.
58 Goldstein, War and Gender, 69. Goldstein also cites a report about a female Soviet sniper being decorated 
for killing over 300 Germans. Presumably it is Ludmilla Pavlichenko who was credited with killing 309 
Germans, although the accuracy o f  that number is disputed.
59 Shooting from treetops (thus failing to find cover or escape route) the women demonstrated 
marksmanship, but lacking elementary fieldcraft, which suggests limited combat experience. Sepp Allerberger 
and Geoffrey Brooks, Sniper on the Eastern Front: the memoirs of Sepp Allerberger, Knight's Cross (Barnsley, South 
Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2005), 70-71.
60 Van Creveld, Men, women, and war, 142.
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substantially to blame both when it comes to physical strength and proneness to injury. 
Research conducted by the U.S. Army over the last few years shows average female US 
Army recruits have 55 per cent o f the upper body and 72 per cent o f lower body strength 
o f the average male. Overall, one study found that only the upper 5 per cent o f women are 
as strong as the median male.61 Similar findings apply when it comes to running medium 
and long distances.62 In addition, men respond faster to hard exercise because they have 
relatively more muscle mass. Another important factor that has to do with toughness in the 
field is proneness to injury. Among the Soviet women who fought during World War II, 
many suffered severe health problems. Creveld quotes one woman: “we were all sick... all 
o f us are still [c. 1980] sick... the female body is not built for such hardships... the war not 
only robbed us o f our youth, it has also kept many o f us from having children.” 63 More 
scientific contemporary findings back up the anecdotal evidence from World War II: “At 
West Point during the early 1980s, women suffered ten times as many stress fractures as 
did m en ... injury also caused women to sustain five times as many days of limited duty as 
m en... In Canada, only 1 per cent o f  women who entered the standard infantryman’s 
training graduated.” 64
Some would argue that physical fitness is not as important in the military today, 
with mobile and airmobile infantry and cavalry and substantial use o f airpower. There are 
two counter-arguments to this. First, the use o f forced marches to test overall toughness 
and willpower is the most reliable indicator o f combat performance hitherto invented, as 
the selection procedures for Special Forces indicates. Secondly, the Afghanistan theatre has 
proven extremely physically challenging, with Norwegian Special Forces sometimes 
carrying 180-pound backpacks in 60 degrees centigrade conditions.65 Veteran from Korea 
and the most highly decorated officer in Vietnam, David Hackworth’s insight still rings true 
on this note:
I do know from eight years of ground combat that few women could endure its 
savagery for long... Ground war is not dead. The line doggies will still engage the 
enemy eyeball to eyeball, belly to belly. And in that setting women are disadvantaged.
61 Goldstein, War and Gender, 161-62, Van Creveld, Men, women, and war, 152-3.
62 Presidential Commission on the Assignment o f  Women in the Armed Forces’, Report to the President, p. C- 
64 Quoted in Van Creveld, Men, women, and war, 153.
63 Swetlana Aleksijewitch, Der Krieg hat kein weibiliches Gesicht (Hamburg: Galgenberg, 1989), 165. quoted in 
Van Creveld, Men, women, and war, 142.
64 Van Creveld, Men, women, and war, 194. Original italics
65 Jahn Ronne, En flik av spesialstyrkene (Forsvarsnett - official Norwegian Defence Portal, 2002 [cited June 13 
2008]); available from http://w ww.m il.no/start/article.jhtml?articleID=21667.
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Brawn will count for more than computer smarts for a while yet. A 110-pound woman 
with the heart of a lion can’t pack out a wounded 200-pound comrade.66
Despite this, Joshua Goldstein is entirely tight in reminding us that if winning wars 
came down to physical strength alone, then the American army in Vietnam would have 
easily been victorious, much like any Western force engaged in counter-insurgencies in the 
developing world. The point is one o f strategic context. Western militaries fight far from 
home and in an expeditionary fashion, most often in campaigns where the enemy does not 
have to win, only avoid losing. With limited budgets, political will and manpower, Western 
militaries are forced to make sure every individual who is willing to fight is not just an able 
individual, but a very capable one. This is in part the reason for the relative doctrinal surge 
o f SOF in postmodern militaries. That said, not all roles are infantry roles, and women 
serve with distinction as everything from intelligence operators to fighter pilots, so there is 
little doubt that Western women can be and are warriors, but they remain few in numbers. 
Thus, the following thesis focuses almost exclusively on men.
W illing and able to  kill
The willingness and ability to kill in combination with the same willingness to sacrifice life 
in combat is the ultimo ratio o f the warrior. Aggressiveness is the benefit a warrior offers 
over a soldier in offensive situations. Ruthlessness underwrites killing, but that is not to say 
wanton killing. For Nelson, precision and restraint in killing was imperative:
I could not tolerate the abuse of civilians — especially not children and women. It was 
a very personal thing with me... it went against everything I had been taught. That 
made my decision to be a sniper. Killing clean shows respect for the enemy, but to kill 
civilians or to lose control of your self and your concepts in life in combat is wrong... 
that is respect for your enemy... that’s the concept behind the warrior. Kill cleanly, kill 
quickly, kill efficiendy, without malice or brutality.67
O n the other hand, while restraint in killing is critical, it is equally important to be able to 
kill, and that cannot be taken for granted even in Special Forces units, as Miller reminds us:
66 David Hackworth, Newsweek, August 5,1991. Quoted in Goldstein, War and Gender, 159.
67 Hansen, Owen and Madden, Parallels, 21.
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Contrary to popular belief, not all Special Forces soldiers were “bad to the bone”. .. It 
was during my time with RT68 Vermont I found out that not all Special Forces troops 
were shooters. I ran across many really good, squared-away individuals who just 
weren’t killers. These guys would go out on missions and gather outstanding 
intelligence, but the fact that they couldn’t bring themselves to shoot the enemy 
caused them grief. It wore on them... to the point where they didn’t want to go out 
anymore. They’d take any job in the camp that prevented them from going out 
again.69
The same logic applies to snipers, it is a job, which requires a special constitution as it is 
difficult to pull the trigger but it can also be difficult to stop firing, which leads to risks of 
discovery.70
W illing to  risk sacrificing life
The aggression necessary to kill counter-balances the willingness to give one’s life for 
comrades or for the mission, balancing activating and initiating qualities with restraining 
ones. It is harder to define the ultimate willingness to sacrifice life — let alone the ability — 
because it can only be proven by acts, which almost certainly lead to death. Warriors want 
to survive, not to die, yet to be willing and able to risk life in combat is an essential balance 
to the willingness to kill. I f  killing is not in pursuit o f a higher cause and combined with at 
least a miniscule risk o f death; then killing is more appropriately called murder and 
slaughter, respectively. This idea has to be considered in the greater context o f war, rather 
than in detailed situations o f combat. In combat a successful ambush may actually be 
reminiscent o f slaughter, but the context o f war, wherein there is risk, makes it properly 
referred to as combat rather than slaughter. Reflecting on an (ultimately climactic) 
upcoming forward air control mission atop Takur Ghar Mountain in Shah-i-Kot valley 
during Operation Anaconda, U.S. Navy SEAL “Slab” “figured the chances o f running into 
an enemy were probably “ 100 percent.” But they would be in “onesies and twosies or a 
small patrol o f four guys.” He weighed the risks, and they seemed reasonable. Besides, he 
thought at the time, this is not how we work, reducing risk to zero — otherwise, send 
accountants up there.” 71
68 Recon[naissance] Team. These teams ran cross-border reconnaissance missions into Laos and Cambodia 
for M ACV/SOG, often with complete deniability from the U.S. government, which added to the risk, and 
status.
69 Miller, Reflections of a Warrior., 89.
70 Allerberger and Brooks, Sniper on the Eastern Front, 14, David H. Hackworth, About face (London: Guild 
Publishing, 1990), 680, Haney, Inside Delta Force, 169.
71 Malcolm MacPherson, Robert's Ridge (London: Bantam Books, 2005), 4. Original italics
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Restraint in this context is an extremely important quality, which operates at several 
levels at the same time. The most basic level is that o f the individual itself. An ideal type 
warrior exhibits such restraint that the use o f violence is not excessive or uncontrolled. 
This is not only a normative aspiration, but also an observable fact in many warriors.72 
Unfortunately, the precise source o f the holistic balance between aggression and restraint in 
not only theoretical ideal type warriors, but also practicing human beings, is a bit o f a 
mystery. The same mystery applies to the impossibility o f predicting who will perform well 
in combat, and who will either succumb to the pressure, or lose control and go berserk.73 
O ne reason why theoretical explanations lose traction when approaching certain aspects o f 
combat is that combat has what Roger Spiller calls a hidden side, which is the providence 
o f the participants only, and which even for them remains implacable and virtually 
impossible to put into words.74 Some o f this hidden side is referred to as the combat 
sublime in chapter four.
Restraint also operates at the unit level and at the social level. At the unit level, it 
materialises as professionalism, which is necessary to trump hot tempers, danger and the 
temptations o f overwhelming force, to channel military force into long-term results. 
Norwegian forces holding their fire while having their camp in Meymaneh Afghanistan 
attacked and almost overrun by a large group o f armed demonstrators is one example. The 
British in N orthern Ireland prioritising de-escalating measures over eliminating IRA 
members is another.75 Finally, at the social level the actions o f  warriors are intrinsically 
bound to  their societies, because it is on behalf o f society they fight. Society’s sanction is 
what morally and socially validates the use o f violence. I f  society does not sanction the 
individuaFs violence it is defined as personal and private, and society must and will reject 
the fighter, among other things because other societies will misunderstand the use of 
violence to be a social act, and this brings shame and danger upon the society o f the 
wayward fighter. In one example, the Canadian government disbanded their Parachute 
Regiment in 1995 to demonstrate distance to Regiment members’ mortal abuse o f a Somali 
child in 1993.76
72 See for example “the natural soldier” p. 13, Larry Thome p. 195, and Mad Mark p. 214
73 Henriksen, 'Warriors in combat - what makes people actively fight in combat?1
74 Roger J. Spiller, A n  instinct for war: scenesfrom the battlefields of history (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press o f  
Harvard University Press, 2005).
75 Tor Arne Andreassen, 'De norske skuddene i Afghanistan', Aftenposten, 10.06.2006, Van Creveld, The 
Changing Face of War, 233.
76 David Bercuson, Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1996).
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Methodology and plan of thesis
The words in the research question largely structure this thesis. The methodology is inter­
disciplinary, focusing on both the macro perspective (the West) and the micro perspective 
(individual experiences).
This thesis generally follows a social science approach, which primarily means that 
the character and behaviour o f warriors are considered social phenomena, which should be 
studied using commensurate concepts and methods, rather than psychological approaches 
for example. The research question ‘Does the West Still Need Warriors’ implies an 
engagement with the wider international society (‘the West’) outside the military realm as 
well as with instrumentality (‘need’) and history (‘still’), which in each case requires 
engagement with different literatures.
In addition to these perspectives, the distinction between the existential and the 
instrumental dimensions o f warriors is crucial. While the War Studies literature frequently 
discusses instrumental utility, the existential features tend to be the subject o f literature and 
philosophy, and first-person participant accounts. The latter, as Samuel Hynes tells us, are 
stories. Stories are not objectively verifiable as true. Instead, what is important is that they 
offer the perspectivism inherent in individual experiences, and makes them meaningful. 
The issue o f meaning is an existential property, which is better illustrated by stories, and 
myth, such as Homer’s work, rather than by rigorous social science methodology. In this 
there are substantial concessions to the construction o f meaning done by ‘the man who 
was there,’ as Hynes puts it.77 Nonetheless, the individual experience perspective will be 
combined with social scientific generalizations to provide a rigorous analysis o f the 
relationship between warriors and their social context, to ultimately substantiate the 
argument in the conclusion.
More specifically, the chapters will be using the following methodologies: Chapters 
One, Three and Four use War Studies, Social Science (sociology, psychology and political 
science) and personal accounts to define the nature and character o f warriors, war, and 
combat. The focus on warriors is following from the research question in a thesis such as 
this, whereas the study o f war and combat are necessary to analyse the instrumental 
infrastructure (war) and existential lifeworlds (combat) that use and shape warriors. 
Chapters Three and Four analyse the difference between war and combat. It is argued that 
the properties o f combat are closely related to what makes warriors who they are, because
77 Hynes, The Soldier's Tale, chapter 2.
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combat is a qualitatively different experience from anything else. Combat is nonetheless 
enveloped by war, and is influenced by the increasingly instrumental way in which war is 
fought.
Chapter Two engages with the question o f who and what the West is. The first part 
o f  the chapter develops a social theory o f the West. This leads to an articulation o f three 
social imaginaries in the second part. Social imaginaries are Charles Taylor’s concept for 
ways o f imagining the social realm, using social theory in combination with political theory. 
These three social imaginaries in turn generate three security paradigms. The identification 
o f these paradigms in part three relies on security studies literature. The chapter thus details 
three ways o f imagining the West, and the consequential expectations and ambitions for 
security.
Chapters Five and Six are historical chapters that they rely on literature and 
philosophy. These two.chapters offer examples o f six eclectic Weberian style ideal type 
warriors and relate to the ‘still’ feature o f the research question. These chapters 
demonstrate that the West has always had and needed warriors in the past. The six ideal 
type warriors are: the Homeric heroes, Plato’s guardians, the Medieval knights, 
stormtroops, citizen warriors, and special operations forces. These types are not by any 
means exhaustive o f the Western experience. Rather, relatively few are chosen to make it 
possible to engage with them in some depth. As mentioned earlier, Coker’s conceptual 
prism agency, subjectivity and intersubjectivity is used to stratify their existential lifeworld.
Chapter Seven pulls the definition o f warriors, the social imaginaries and security 
paradigms, the context o f war and combat, together with the ideal type warriors, to address 
the contemporary existential and instrumental need for warriors. It analyses the existential 
need for warriors from the international to the domestic levels and down to the micro level 
o f the warriors themselves, and ends with a consideration o f dysfunctions and the 
consequences o f what happens when the warrior refuses to fight. Chapter six on modem 
ideal types discusses the instrumental need for warriors at the micro level, but the 
instrumental need for warriors at the macro level is analysed in relation to the security 
paradigms in chapter two. A contemporary mini-case o f warriors in counter-terrorism 
follows. The methodology in this chapter is reflective o f the wide range o f approaches 
throughout the thesis.
Finally, it is argued that we still need warriors, and if anything, we have to few of
them.
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C h a p t e r  2 :  W h o  i s  t h e  W e s t ,  a n d  w h a t  d o e s  
t h e  W e s t  w a n t ?
Introduction
This chapter explores the issue o f what the West is. The characteristics o f Western 
civilization have ramifications for how the West conceives security and the means used to 
achieve it. Charles Taylor’s concept o f ‘social imaginaries’ is a useful way to demonstrate a 
link between the character o f the West and different conception of security. As Taylor puts 
it: “ In order to have a sense o f who we are, we have to have a notion o f how we have 
become, and o f where we are going.” 78 The first section o f this chapter identifies the most 
central vectors o f a social theory o f the West; rationalization, specialization and 
secularization, with the attendant effects and reactions that these processes have ignited.
Three social imaginaries in particular represent deeply entrenched worldviews of 
humanity in general and the West in particular. Most Westerners pledge allegiance to either 
o f these semi-consciously, and these allegiances have security implications. For this reason, 
part three details security paradigms that are commensurate with the social imaginaries 
analysed in part two. These security paradigms outline a broad political context for the use 
o f warriors discussed in chapter seven.
W hat is ‘the W est’?
The concept o f the West is academically elusive, yet o f obvious practical value and cultural 
resonance. As the Oxford English Dictionary shows, the word ‘west’ is as old as the 
English language, and from the 9th century indicated the direction o f the horizon where the 
sun sets.79 The notion o f the West as a civilization with some coherence only arose in the 
19th century in a self-conscious manner.80 Historically, the concept o f the West begins with 
Western Christendom following the breakup o f the Roman Empire into Eastern and 
W estern parts, where the Western part paid allegiance to Rome and the pope. A schism in 
1054 saw the two churches falling out in mutual excommunication. In 1204, the Western
78 Charles Taylor, Sources of the self: the making of the modem identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1989). quoted in Anthony Giddens, Modernity and self-identity : self and society in the late modem aee (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1991), 54.
79 J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, West', in The Oxford Tinglish Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
161.
80 Alastair Bonnett, The idea of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 5,6.
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crusaders sacked the seat o f the Eastern Church, Constantinople. This reinforced suspicion 
and hostility.81
Today a coherent definition o f the West is elusive. A couple o f factors suffice to 
illustrate the difficulty. Are Australia and New Zealand by virtue of their unmistakable 
Western culture and heritage Western? Is Russia Western, who throughout the Cold War 
constituted ‘The Enemy’, yet throughout the 19th century was culturally and intellectual a 
part o f Europe? Is established liberal democracy a major characteristic o f the W est — as 
Colin Mclnnes suggests82 — when many continental European countries have had very 
brief historical experience with this form o f political organisation? Alistair Bonnett reaches 
a very reasonable conclusion when he argues:
People use ‘the West’ to articulate and structure their thoughts. It is a category, an 
intellectual resource that helps map out the big picture; that gives coherence and 
statue to what, otherwise, can appear eclectic and tendentious opinion. The fact that 
contradictory things are said about the West does not imply its redundancy but its 
extraordinary intellectual and political utility.83
In the following section, the work o f Agnes Heller, Stephen Toulmin, Max Weber and 
particularly Charles Taylor is used to devise a social theory o f the West.
A Social Theory of Western Modernity
Agnes Heller highlights the role o f ideas in the story o f the West when she argues that 
Europe’s autobiography begins with “the love o f freedom” and culminates in the “grand 
narratives.” 84 She sees freedom as a foundation, but one which grounds nothing. This 
paradox structures her theory o f modernity. Europe’s speciality is, in a sense, specialization, 
understood as more than just a division o f labour, but as a proliferation o f lifeworlds, 
which are both complimentary and competitive. Europe has no core, as Bonnett alluded to 
above, and any attempt to define an essence would be futile. Thus, Heller focuses instead 
on intangibles like ‘dynamics,’ ‘constituents’ and ‘logics’ o f modernity. A similar approach 
characterises Toulmin, W eber and Taylor’s views on Western modernity.
By synthesising these theorists, we can identify three vectors o f modernity. They are 
rationalisation, inspired by Weber; specialisation inspired by Toulmin; and secularisation 
inspired by Taylor. Each o f these separately and together constitute three social
81 Ibid., 23.
82 Mclnnes, Spectator-sport war 3.
83 Bonnett, The idea of the West, 6.
84 Agnes Heller, A. Theory of Modernity (Oxford: Blackwells, 1999), 12.
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imaginaries; they in turn ground three major security paradigms. The West has always been 
a realm of self-questioning, critique, subversion and debate: in short a market place o f 
ideas. Consequendy, the three vectors have inspired counter-reactions. Western social 
history is for that reason characterised by pendulum swings between dominating vectors, 
accelerating effects and reactions that sometimes reinforce and sometimes temporarily 
reverse the original vector, and so on. Table 1 details these effects and reactions.
Table 1: Western vectors of modernity
V ector Rationalization Specialization Secularization
Effect Disenchantment Disembedding Disenchantment
R eaction/R einforcem ent Romanticism Insecurity/ Authenticity
Individualism desire
Rationalization and disenchantm ent
In his interpretation of Max Weber, Raymond Aron argues the main phenomenon that 
characterises the modern age is that o f ‘rationalization’. Rationalization is the process in 
which ever increasing aspects of society become subject to ^weckrational thinking and 
behaviour, when the meaning of an action derives entirely from its utility. Zmckrationai, or 
rational action in relation to a goal, is what is called ‘instrumental rationality’ today. This 
type o f action is used by an engineer who wants to build a bridge, or a general who wants 
to win a batde. It is contrasted with Weber’s three other action types, which are wertrational 
(action based on values); affective action (action based on emotion); and traditional action 
(action based on customs and beliefs).85
For Weber, rationalization in the modern world is encroaching upon other forms 
of action; it colonizes areas formerly dominated by value rationality and affective action. As 
Aron puts it; “Society as a whole tends towards 3weckrational organization, and the 
philosophical, existential, human problem is to define that sector o f society in which 
another type of action can and should exist.” 86 In a striking delivery to colleagues in Vienna 
in 1909, Weber warned against the proliferation and consequences of rationalization:
85 Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought 2: Pareto, Weber, Durkheim, trans. Richard Howard and 
Helen Weaver (Middlesex: Penguin, 1970), 186-87.
86 Ibid., 188.
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When a purely technical and faultless administration, a precise and objective solution 
of concrete problems is taken as the highest and only goal, then on this basis one can 
only say: away with everything but an official hierarchy which does these things as 
objectively, precisely, and “soullessly” as any machine.
Imagine the consequences of that comprehensive bureaucratization and 
rationalization which already to-day we see approaching. Already now, throughout 
private enterprise in wholesale manufacture, as well as in all other economic 
enterprises run on modem lines, Reichenhaftigkeit, rational calculation, is manifest at 
every stage. By it, the performance of each individual worker is mathematically 
measured, each man becomes a little cog in the machine and, aware of this, his one 
preoccupation is whether he can become a bigger cog.. .we are proceeding towards an 
evolution which resembles that system in every detail, except that it is built on other 
foundations, on technically more perfect, more rationalised, and therefore much more 
mechanized foundations... but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to 
keep a portion of mankind free from this parcelling-out of the soul, from this supreme 
mastery of the bureaucratic way of life.87
Heller and Jon Elster argue Weber is primarily referring to institutions when he speaks 
about rationalization.88 The proliferation o f institutions is itself a development closely tied 
with specialization and its concomitant lifeworlds, or as Weber calls them; value spheres. 
Weber lists science, politics, art, religion, law and economy as the major modern value 
spheres. Each o f these has its own norms and rules, and a person must choose among 
them, and can be loyal to only one.89 Which to choose is an existential choice for the 
individual, which is part o f the specialization of modernity, and it stratifies the world of 
values because it is problematic to criticize social action in one value sphere with norms 
from that o f another. Even though basic values may be the same, they normatise 
differently in each sphere.90 Chapter three and four detail how the lifeworlds of war and 
combat differ in this respect.
A complimentary development, which is produced in parallel with rationalization, is 
‘disenchantment’. Disenchantment is at the same time a reaction to and a constituent part 
o f rationalization and it denotes the replacement of magic, meaning and wonder with
87 Max Weber quoted in Alan Sica, 'Rationalization and culture', in The Cambridge Companion to M ax Weber\ ed. 
Stephen Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 53.
88 Jon Elster, 'Rationality, economy, and society', in The Cambridge Companion to M ax Weber, ed. Stephen Turner 
(Cambridge Cambridge UP, 2000), 22.
89Heller, A  Theory of Modernity, 37.
90 See Christopher Coker, Empires in conflict: the growing rift between Europe and the United States, Whitehall paper 
series ; 58. (London: RUSI, 2003), 2,48.
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technical, rational, utilitarian thinking. As far as a holistic lived experience is concerned, the 
concept evokes the reductive void and disillusionment left by rationalization. Yet, it also 
means “abandonment o f fanaticism, madness and legitimation through charisma.” 91
The fate of our age with its characteristic rationalization and intellectualization and 
above all the disenchantment of the world is that the ultimate most sublime values 
have withdrawn from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystical life or 
into the brotherhood of immediate personal relationships between individuals.92
Disenchantment reinforces the integrity o f the human individual in the world because it 
contributes to what Taylor calls the ‘buffered self, one which is not infiltrated by demons, 
spirits and magic forces: “More radically, they do no longer impinge; they don’t exist for 
him” .93 The same goes for desires, which although they impinge as inclinations, are 
“deprived o f any higher meaning or aura... We ought to be able to stand back from all o f 
them, and determine rationally how we should best dispose them.” 94 Weber expresses a 
suspicion that this involves some reduction o f life quality. Here he was inspired by Schiller 
who portrayed the dangers o f too much instrumental rationality, or too little: “A man can 
be at odds with himself (and his humanity) in two ways: either as a savage when feeling 
predominates over principle; or as a barbarian when principle destroys feeling.” 95
Romanticism, o f which Schiller was a major figure, was the most concerted 
response to the rationalization of modem life. The Romantics expressed a burning 
dissatisfaction with the reductionism it involved. This was particularly noticeable in 
Germany, which became a kind o f laboratory for the Counter-Enlightenment.96 As Heller 
puts it; “Romanticism soon discovers the ugly side o f enlightenment. Everything solid 
melts into air. For the men and women o f romanticism, life is not a technological problem 
to be solved. It needs to be lived.” 97 The Romantics complained about the “disengaged, 
disciplined, buffered self, and the world it had built.” 98 The buffered self represented a 
division o f emotions from reason and o f humans from nature.
Just at the age when the steam engine transformed Europe, Christopher Booker 
explains how there was a nostalgic yearning for the age o f transcendental spiritual certainty.
91 Heller, A  Theory of Modernity, 37.
92 Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From M ax Weber: Essays in sociology (New York,:
Oxford university press, 1946), 155. Quoted Coker, Future of War, 4.
93 Charles Taylor, A  SecularAge (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press o f  Harvard University Press, 2007), 135.
9* Ibid.
95 Schiller quoted in Coker, Future of War, 27.
96 Michael Howard, Uberation or Catastrophe: Reflections on the history of the twentieth centuiy (London: Hambledon 
Continuum, 2007), 9.
97 Heller, A  Theory of Modernity, 45.
98 Taylor, A  Secular Age, 314.
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A renewed interest in medieval themes and imagery exemplified this: from Walter Scott’s 
novels through Tennyson and to Gothic architecture.99 The nineteenth century was two 
sided; spectacular material success led to a loss o f a transcendentally inspired Self. It was 
‘‘an age in which Matthew Arnold could hear faith’s ‘melancholy, long, withdrawing roar’; 
in which Nietzsche could confidently proclaim ‘God is dead’. One o f the more obvious 
underlying reasons why Darwin’s theory o f natural selection was so welcomed was that it 
made the whole evolutionary process seem impersonal and self-referential, rather than 
dependant on an imaginary transcendental power or guiding mind.’’100 Indeed, many of the 
m ost central nineteenth century theorists espoused a worldview where the mainsprings of 
our being are deep under the surface and denied by the rationalist Enlightenment, yet 
immanent rather than transcendental. Darwin (evolution), Marx (historical materialism), 
Nietzsche (will to power, reversal o f values) and Freud (unconscious, sub-conscious) are all 
examples o f this.101 Marxism was Romanticism’s most conspicuous and lasting legacy. It 
drew on the same yearnings for authenticity, which in an earlier age had found religious 
expression, and projected them unto the material world, where the resolution o f the plot 
(dialectical materialism) was set in the future.102 Romanticism’s revival came in the 1960s, 
which was another pivoting moment, with expressivism as insistent as that o f 
Romanticism, but much more popular in scope and anti-elitist in agenda.103
Specialization
In Heller’s and Toulmin’s work, specialization o f disciplines is another major vector o f 
modernity. Specialization refers both to a process o f social disembedding and de­
localisation104 o f social positions and institutions; it is a modem social arrangement which 
steamrolls over all traditional social arrangements. Three different logics are at work 
according to Heller, which correspond well with the abovementioned value spheres; the 
logic o f technology, the logic o f functional allocation o f social positions, and the logic of 
political power.105 Each o f the logics derives ‘ethical power’ from its values. Ethical power
99 Christopher Booker, The Seven Basic Plots: Why we tell stories (London: Continuum, 2004), 654.
100 Ibid., 657.
101 Taylor, A  Secular Age, 369.
102 Booker, Seven Basic Plots, 658.
103 Taylor, A  Secular Age, 473.
104 Disembedding and de-localisation are processes where social interaction is lifted out o f  the face-to-face 
interaction that characterises traditional societies. Mechanisms such as money and the internet make 
interaction more abstract and independent from time and place. Thus, these interactions are disembedded from 
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is effective and can assert normative influence, as long as individuals respect it as more 
im portant than their own self-interest.
The logic o f technology is predicated on rational action and problem solving as a 
way o f thinking. As Heidegger said, albeit polemically; the essence o f technology is not 
technological. Instead, technology is instrumental in revealing the world to us; specifically 
by making nature an energy supply. Similarly, man can be made into a reserve. Thus, it 
opens up unlimited possibilities for modem man, and unlocks the risk o f alienation as well:
The essence of technology is verily not technological. It does not reside in the 
machine, the thing. It resides in the way modem men think. To simplify Heidegger: 
modem men are thinking in terms of subject/object. The world is the object, men are 
the subjects. The subject treats the world as the arsenal of things for human use. Men 
themselves are objects for use. The whole universe is instrumentalized or is in waiting 
as a “standing reserve” for subsequent instrumentalization.106
Technology and science reinforce each other since the application o f technology must 
subscribe to the correspondence theory o f truth, which in turn makes science a hegemonic 
paradigm and an overall source o f truth and explanation o f our world.107 Accumulation of 
knowledge is an important feature o f this, but only knowledge o f a practically useful kind. 
This leaves poetry, philosophy and aesthetics somewhat marginalized, a realm for anti- 
Enlightenment subversive protesters.108
Heller’s second logic — o f functional allocation o f social positions — breaks with 
traditional society, where identity and social roles are permanendy assigned at birth. In 
modernity, roles are allocated according to the impermanent function one has in society. 
This is the logic o f civil society. Heller calls it ‘the heart o f modernity’, because o f its 
diversity, and because its basic institution is the market; specifically; private property, 
private law, and human rights.109 The market logic spins around the axis o f individual free 
choice, most obviously in monetarization, which quantifies worth. Unsurprisingly, the 
Romantics complained vigorously against such a crass idea. Hegel also saw modernity as a 
“spiritual animal kingdom” 110 because humans become specialized — like animals who can 
only do one thing — including spiritually. This is against their essence, he claimed, for man 
as a spiritual being is by essence universal.111 Instead, modernity ushers in meritocracy,
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whereby people can become equal to their erstwhile superiors, albeit in a piecemeal 
fashion. This new social mobility is a further instance o f specialization.
Because o f its relative autonomy and freedom from interference, civil society in a 
democracy is a space of ‘social power’, according to Marshall Hodgson.112 It is the arena o f 
public opinion, an organic self-reproducing discourse ranging across any conceivable topic, 
while embodying norms o f acceptable discourse. Jurgen Habermas describes how the 
public sphere arose from the 16th century onwards, as the state was ousted from a free- 
floating public space where people wanted to  express opinions without fear o f 
censorship.113 This space o f discussion could potentially involve everyone, and it was 
defined as extra-political, explicitly outside — albeit in dialogue — with the state.114 By the 
eighteenth century the “public sphere thus represents an instance o f a new kind: a 
metatopical common space and common agency... grounded purely in its own common
. . :  . .  . >>115actions.
An important but little appreciated dimension o f civil society is the notion o f 
‘collective rationality,’ which refers to the inclination citizens have towards a social duty or 
an interest in contributing to — and maintaining — the social fabric, recognizing at least 
semi-consciously that society benefits if individuals adhere to the collective’s norms. A 
strong sense o f collective rationality, along with sufficient order and shared history 
contributes to social power, such that a society maintains societal coherence even after 
receiving heavy blows. The Germans sweeping up of the streets to clean up the 
neighbourhood immediately after Allied bombing raids is an example o f a society that has 
social power. Widespread looting in Baghdad immediately after the American invasion in 
2003 shows lack o f social power, because the fabric o f civil society is short o f critical mass 
where it could make a difference. Instead, what remains are individuals following self- 
interest. Hodgson, referring to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is careful to 
denote that this has nothing to do with individual abilities, but is a matter o f social 
organisation:
Individual Europeans might be less intelligent, less courageous, less loyal than 
individuals elsewhere; but, when educated and organized in society, the Europeans
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were able to think and act far more effectively, as members of a group, than could 
members of any other societies.116
Toulmin sees the rise o f academic disciplines as a typical and im portant instance o f social 
power and collective rationality. The natural sciences o f the 17th century, in particular, 
enjoyed progress in a social environment that welcomed a pursuit o f scientific truth. But 
such social relations needed institutions to be productive, and they existed in the form o f 
universities which divided professions into academic disciplines. As Toulmin recognises, it 
is not so much the intellectual focus as the style o f social organization in which the work is 
done, that matters.117 The relative non-interference o f government, financial interests and 
religious dogma in universities all contribute to such an environment.
The third logic o f modernity discussed by Heller is the logic o f ‘political power’, 
which is related to domination. Weber, ever the realist, virtually echoed Machiavelli when 
he observed that: “Anyone who goes in for worldly politics must, above all, be free of 
illusions and acknowledge one fundamental fact: to be resigned to the inevitable and 
eternal struggle o f man with man on this earth.” 118 In another passage, Weber very 
explicidy defines what ‘political’ means and its parameters:
If one says that a question is a “political” question, or that a minister or official is a 
“political” official, or that a decision is determined “politically,” what is meant in each 
case is that interests in the distribution, preservation, or transfer of power play a 
decisive role in answering that question, determining this decision or defining the 
sphere of activity of the official in question. Anyone engaged in politics is striving for 
power, either power as a means to attain other goals (which may be ideal or selfish), or 
power “for its own sake,” which is to say, in order to enjoy the feeling of prestige 
given by power.119
Political authority is in part derived from man-made constitutions in the modem 
age.120 The self-conscious crafting o f the constitution is symbolic o f the willingness of 
citizens to submit to their own laws. It is this voluntary aspect which makes Weber’s 
definition o f the state so prescient for democracy: “Just like the political associations which 
preceded it historically, the state is a relationship o f rule (Herrschaft) by human beings over
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human beings, and one that rests on the legitimate use o f violence (that is, violence that is 
held to be legitimate). For the state to remain in existence, those who are ruled must 
submit to the authority claimed by whoever rules at any given time.” 121 This legitimation 
must continuously be re-confirmed by modem political institutions.
Specialization is dialectically linked to social disembedding and both processes 
spawn individualism. As Giddens observes, one o f the major features o f modernization is 
the separation o f space from time, a logical by-product o f the invention o f ‘empty’ time. 
Empty time is time in the abstract, lifted from local events, pace and place.122 Taylor 
describes how in archaic societies, distinctions between religious, political and economic 
institutions make no sense, since the pre-modem counterparts o f these lifeworlds were all 
integrated in a localized space, where living was inherently social:123 “In a world of 
indigence and insecurity, o f perpetually threatening death, the rules o f family and 
community seemed the only guarantee o f survival. Modem modes o f individualism seemed 
a luxury, a dangerous indulgence.” 124
Later in medieval times the world was divided in two; the city o f God and the 
earthly city, each with their appropriate activities. This duality is done away with through 
what Taylor calls ‘the Reforms’. This is a three-part package with: (1) the eleventh century 
Hildebrand reforms featuring individual confession and communion; (2) the Protestant 
Reformation’s head-on attack on the notion that certain people or institutions are closer to 
G od than others, with concomitant reinforcement o f everyday life as fully Christian; (3) the 
general trend o f disenchantment which denies that there is such a thing as concentrated 
sacredness contained in places, people, times, actions, sacraments etc.125 This process 
gradually replaces the duality with an anthropocentric shift to a situation where any 
conceivable manifestation o f  belief or unbelief becomes possible. In other words: a 
fragmentation into spiritually disconnected lifeworlds.126
Following World War II this process has accelerated and intensified, now 
constituting what Taylor calls a spiritual super-nova, “a kind o f galloping pluralism on the 
spiritual plane.” 127 By this, Taylor means a process, which started with the antagonistic 
dualism o f humanism versus Christianity. This antagonism created a dynamic; “something
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like a nova effect” which offered an ever-widening gamut o f moral and spiritual 
positions.128 Elites, who were unhappy with the choice between deity and unbelief, and 
wanted a third way, generated this widening gamut. Increasing cross-pressures created ever 
more third ways.129 The nova effect became ‘super-nova’ after World War II: with 
increasing wealth and individual choice came increasing opportunity to seek individual 
happiness.130
Individualism is part o f this story; in particular, the rise o f the modem bounded, 
buffered self, which by virtue o f not being porous and sensitive to an enchanted world is 
able to close out anything outside the m ind.131 Accompanying the buffered self is a general 
interiorization, which introduces a new language o f inner experience and exploration, 
leading to: “Montaigne, the development o f the modern novel, the rise o f Romanticism, 
the ethic o f authenticity, to the point where we now conceive o f ourselves as having inner 
depths.” 132 Disenchantment and the Reforms are central to this story as well: “this first 
individualism develops through that o f self-examination, and then self-development, 
ultimately to that o f authenticity. This naturally generates an instrumental individualism, 
which is implicit in the idea that society is there for the good o f individuals.” 133 If we add 
empty time and the Protestant view o f time as a resource that should not be wasted, a lot 
o f the “buffered identity o f the disciplined individual” is in place.134 This whole journey is 
neatly summed up by Bauman who says that “individualization consists o f transforming 
human identity from a given to a task.” 135
The primary existential point about individualism is that life is ephemeral. After the 
death o f G od and the loss o f external foundations for meaning, the problem is less fear o f 
death than existential anxiety about no t having lived and exhausted the many possibilities 
o f modern life before death. Such existential tension is at the core o f every major Western 
discourse. As Richard Rorty puts it, poetry attempts to achieve self-creation by means of 
recognizing contingency, while philosophy tries to achieve the universal through 
transcending contingency.136 Heller sees the modern condition as being thrown into
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freedom, and to be thrown into freedom is to be thrown into nothing.157 Existential 
philosophy has explored at length the uneasy situation this constitutes for the newly 
liberated individual. As Nietzsche has once said, it is easy to dance in chains.138 The 
liberation from the chains, a mixed blessing though it may be, owes everything to 
secularization.
Secularization
The third vector o f modernity is secularization. In an effort to distance himself from what 
he calls the too simple ‘subtraction story’ where secularization is a result o f science’s 
unmasking o f religion, Taylor provides an extraordinarily detailed and nuanced account o f 
secularization in the West.
Secularization refers to three different phenomena. They include: (1) religion’s 
retreat from public places where our activities, norms, principles, and politics no longer 
refer to God; (2) a reduction o f religious beliefs and practices such as church attendance; 
(3) altered conditions o f belief; a move from a society in which belief is unchallenged to 
one where belief is only one among many options.139 A crucial distinction here is between 
immanence and transcendence, where the ‘immanent frame’ is the one we live in when the 
transcendent otherworldly element is replaced by what Taylor calls ‘exclusive humanism’, 
which is to say a humanism accepting no other agenda than human flourishing.14(3 
Exclusive humanism needed two conditions: the already discussed negative process of 
disenchantment, and the positive process o f producing a framework o f values that could 
encompass our highest moral and spiritual aspirations without involving G od.141
The Protestant Reformation plays a major role in Taylor’s story in that it crystallizes 
and accelerates some existing processes, and adds others. Three processes in particular 
stand out. Firstly; autonomous changes in popular piety where scholastic disagreements led 
to individual interpretations o f faith from the Middle Ages onwards, which in turn led to 
the revolutionary concept o f individual faith. The Reformation dramatically intensified this 
aspect, as Luther explicitly made individual faith doctrine.142 Secondly, the rise o f new elites 
and the bourgeoisie who replaced warrior values with commercial activity. Thirdly, the new
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elites displayed an increased activism in changing nature and human society. A new 
relationship with nature emerges with disenchantment, where nature is conceived o f as a 
resource to be exploited and manipulated, an attitude that extends into human society as 
well. A new world order featuring a series o f social programmes emerges, including new 
poor laws; censorship o f popular culture such as carnival; increased government 
intervention in the name o f both improvement and domination; more professional 
government structures including bureaucracies; and increased discipline in terms of 
methods and procedures in everything from etiquette to warfare.143
By the late 19th century the combination o f these developments, contribute to fully 
formed secular alternatives to religion. Nevertheless, as Taylor painstakingly reminds us 
throughout his study, this is not a process o f emptying; when religion is retreating, several 
o f its dimensions are left as residues that are modified rather than replaced. One o f Taylor’s 
claims is that humans have a more or less constant need for meaning and existential 
fulfilment. Thus, when religion no longer does this job, man craves other forms of 
authenticity.
The concept o f  authenticity is important because it is sufficiently general to traverse 
several lifeworlds. It suggests an intimate relationship with truth, albeit in a more holistic 
and grounded, organic respect than the hard and technical correspondence version o f truth 
we know from science, which at any rate has received some battering in the 20th century.144 
Authenticity also resonates with ethics, implying that it is charged with values, in contrast 
to instrumental rationality for example. Authenticity suggests something indivisible, 
unquantifiable and not least something that is in harmony somehow with “what ought to 
be” .
The scene for authenticity was only really set post World War II, after virtually all 
other similar ideals in the repertory had exhausted or discredited themselves. The 
secularization process had progressed very far by the nineteenth century, but it took the 
world wars for nationalism to lose traction. Nationalism is also a concept, which is deemed 
grounded, and value oriented, and authenticity retains nationalism’s virtues but not the 
baggage o f its vices. Zaki Lai'di points out that the move from Christianity (theology) to 
nationalism (teleology) did not reduce the demands for meaning145, and we should not 
expect them to fall after the age o f nationalism either.
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The post-war yearning for authenticity is deeply embedded in individualism. A 
simplified expressivism infiltrates everywhere and becomes widely available as an existential 
option for all o f society. It typically calls for people to “do their own thing” and to “find” 
or “be themselves.” Therapeutic practices geared towards self-discovery or realization 
multiply.146 Taylor relates this to  the rebellion against structures, particularly the social 
structures o f the 1950s, which were built around the patriarchal and nuclear family. This 
society was “castigated as conformist, crushing individuality and creativity, as too 
concerned with production and concrete results, as repressing feeling and spontaneity, as 
exalting the mechanic over the organic.” 147
The social revolution o f 1968 is the most readily identifiable climax o f this 
celebration o f subjectivism. The consequences are many, but in terms o f spirituality it has 
led to a privatization o f religion, and as Taylor says; a trivialization as well. Religious 
practices are relativized into one among many other life-style options. Despite 
authenticity’s conceptual versatility, it does not carry sufficient traction to compensate for 
the loss o f  meaning, since its manifestation is private and relativized, and thus fragmented. 
It strongly denotes freedom without responsibility.
In this respect, Taylor makes some interesting observations about war and warriors. 
Warriors become existential front figures for anti-humanist thinkers’ celebration o f the 
great, the exceptional and the heroic. Their position is a rebellion against both the 
alienating industrialized world dominated by utilitarianism on the one hand, but equally 
much against the self-centred and hedonistic 1968 generation. Nietzsche is the dominating 
figure in his rejection o f the utilitarian idealization o f health and a long life, over death and 
cruelty.148 For Nietzsche, Ernst Jiinger and others, the liberal celebration o f peace would 
extinguish human greatness, heroism and defence o f the weak, which to their mind could 
only find expression in war.149
The social theory o f the West presented here addresses most o f the tendencies and 
existential currents important for the further story. The next section focuses more explicitly 
on values and how they manifest themselves in social imaginaries, which is traced into 
security paradigms in the final section.
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Social imaginaries
It is not easy to conceptualise the West in a politically and ideationally coherent way. The 
ideological dimension, all-important in most o f the wars and conflicts o f the 20th century, 
was infused with ideas that largely were conceived in the 19th century. Ideationally the 
West has never been at peace with itself, but has always been a battleground o f ideas.150 At 
the same time, the major ideological contests have exhausted themselves such that 
liberalism is the only ideology left, tempered by conservative and progressive values in local 
context, and challenged marginally by Islamic fundamentalism. While ideologies do not 
drive Western public programmes or the social imagination so much anymore, there is still 
a plethora o f  ideas, most o f which are residues from past ideological battles. These ideas 
can be distilled to identify some consistent repertoires and manifestations o f social 
imagination.
The concept of social imaginaries
How should one conceptualise collective self-understandings o f what social life is about in 
the contemporary West? There are different ways to imagine the whole o f society.151 
Taylor’s concept o f ‘social imaginaries’ is a helpful start.152 An awkward sounding concept 
though it is, it is nonetheless unsurpassed because it embraces social and moral ideas and 
incorporates both theory and lived experience. Rather than addressing pure abstractions, 
the concept covers practical and normative dimensions as well. A social imaginary is;
something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may 
entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking 
rather of the ways in which they imagine their social existence, how they fit together 
with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which 
are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations.153
Its major strength is that it accords power to ideas without identifying particular axioms. It 
recognises that ideas are operative in society without explicidy being pursued as 
programmes. This means there may be coherent strands in the social imagination that 
encompass the ideas o f intellectuals and the allegiances o f the masses. As Taylor says:
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“Humans operated with a social imaginary, well before they ever got into the business of 
theorizing about themselves.” 154 It is different from social theory because it is as much 
lived as thought. Yet it is an “imaginary”:
(i) because I’m talking about the way ordinary people “imagine” their social 
surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, it is carried in 
images, stories, legends, etc. But it is also the case that (ii) theory is often the 
possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is 
that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society... (iii) the social 
imaginary is that common understanding which makes possible common practices, 
and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.155
For this reason, a social imaginary does not have the strength o f an imperative, but it 
resonates with an inclination, a way o f thinking that people espouse. In particular, it 
subconsciously addresses those who are part o f the social imaginary — the ‘we’ — and what 
scope o f ambition we should have in addressing lives o f others. This is the stuff o f foreign 
policy at one level, or a penchant for compassion or xenophobia at a more basic level. In 
some ways, this is a very general practiced (not just thought) notion o f what, whom, and 
how much we should engage in the world. It is a feeling, a sensibility and a temperament, 
which brings some coherence to any individual social imaginary. The following discussion 
will provide examples.
Instead o f further pursuing the particularities o f Taylor’s conception o f a social 
imaginary, this concept will be used as a denominator o f a particular “meta-debate” in the 
West; that between communitarianism, cosmopolitanism and liberal internationalism. The 
debate is ‘meta’ because it transcends the particularities o f specific political theories and 
ideologies in its scope. It is a debate between social imaginaries, which are as much lived as 
thought. Yet it addresses the basic assumptions underlying theories and other — not 
irrelevant but pre-theoretical — aspects o f human nature; like temper and emotional 
loyalty.156 At the same time, the concepts in the debate are sufficiently defined to categorize 
social and political relations. The debate is a ‘debate’ because it is the wider framework 
against which particular theories have been formed, and because these particular theories
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often clash through their irreconcilable assumptions, which can be fleshed out in the 
antonyms o f ‘communitarianism’, ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘liberal internationalism’.
At the most basic level the distinction between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism relates to where moral value is ascribed. Cosmopolitans ascribe moral 
value to both humanity as a whole, or to the individual. Communitarians, on the other 
hand, ascribe moral value primarily to a community. More precisely, Chris Brown argues, 
“Communitarian thought either denies that there is an opposition here, or is prepared 
explicitly to assign central value to the community; cosmopolitan thought refuses this 
central status to the community, placing the ultimate source o f moral value elsewhere.” 157 
Liberal internationalism is a pragmatic hybrid between these two, in that it tries to reconcile 
the concerns o f communitarians and cosmopolitans. It is communitarian at home, and 
cosmopolitan in its ambitions abroad, which by necessity makes it pivot around the state as 
the central unit that constitutes the distinction between domestic and international.
In the following, I will detail the precepts o f these three social imaginaries, relying 
on the work o f international political theorist Chris Brown, and I will discuss to which 
extent they are operative within the West at the level o f international relations. This will 
serve to specify further the political foundations for what warriors are used for, and what 
kinds o f values they are meant to reflect, in the West.
C osm opolitanism
‘Cosmopolitanism’ is a word with classical Greek roots, specifically in relation to the Stoics 
who saw the universe as one divine order (cosmos) with “one rational human nature, and 
therefore one appropriate attitude to all men. The Stoic is a citizen o f  the cosmos not of 
the polis.” 158 A main feature o f cosmopolitan thought is this refusal to assign ultimate 
value to existing political structures, like the state. It is thus universalistic in scope.159 
However, as Brown reminds us, this does not mean that cosmopolitans by necessity are 
proponents o f world government.160 Furthermore, neither does it mean that all 
universalistic positions are cosmopolitan.
The main thinker associated with cosmopolitan thought is Immanuel Kant. Kant 
takes a ‘deontologist’ position in moral theory. This means the morality o f an action based 
on its moral principles and moral motives. This is opposed to the ‘consequentialist’
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position o f most utilitarians, exemplified by Jeremy Bentham, where the morality o f an 
action is judged by its outcome, its consequence rather than on the primary motivation, 
which is irrelevant.161 Although they are both cosmopolitan positions, Kantians and 
utilitarians also differ on the centre o f gravity o f morality. For Kantians the human agent is 
the focal point. Utilitarians, on the other hand, view happiness as ultimately impersonal.162 
Both positions, moreover, have in common their view o f the state as the most satisfactory 
way o f organising politics and social life, but “the driving force o f political, social and moral 
life lies elsewhere, in the pursuit of utility or in following the dictates o f the categorical 
imperative wherever they may lead.” 163 Therefore, whereas the political community is an 
end in itself for communitarians, it is merely a means for cosmopolitans.
Communitarianism
For communitarians, the essentially instrumental view o f the state (or any other political 
unit in question) espoused by cosmopolitans is deemed insufficient and is testament to a 
fundamental misapprehension o f what it means to live in a community. The 
communitarian position does not have a clear-cut genesis since, as Raymond Williams once 
put it, the remarkable thing about ‘community’ is that it always has been.164 
Communitarians share the idea that groups have a fundamental right to organise 
themselves into communities which by definition are o f an exclusive nature. Indeed, value 
stems from the community, which is where individuals find meaning in life by virtue of 
membership to it.165 A basic assumption with this position is that individuals have no being 
outside, or before, community; life is inherendy social and embedded in culture.
Johann Gottfried Herder, one o f  Kant’s main critics, was an early proponent of 
communitarianism. Instead o f focusing on the juridical-political state, Herder conceived of 
the nation as a more organic unit, grown from the interaction o f its people with history. 
Nationalism pivoting around language and culture is a very typical contemporary and 
modem  expression o f this position. Still, as Herder pointed out, it does not necessarily 
follow those different cultures cannot live peacefully in a culturally plural world.166 This is 
necessary for nationhood to come about at all, since as Frederick Barth has explained, 
borders do not register existing estrangement; they are constructed before the 
estrangement exists. Instead, the estrangement is a product o f either a conflict or some sort
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o f active community building through identification o f difference between one group and 
the other, or bo th .167 Richard Sennett argues:
The image of the community is purified of all that may convey a feeling of difference, 
let alone conflict, in who Sve’ are. In this way the myth of community solidarity is a 
purification ritual... What is distinctive about this mythic sharing in communities is 
that people feel they belong to each other, and share together, because they are the same. ..
The Sve’ feeling, which expresses the desire to be similar, is a way for men to avoid 
the necessity of looking deeper into each other.168
This tendency is not necessarily a bad thing, unless the process o f purification turns into 
rampant chauvinism, where it could even contribute to genocide. In a more moderate 
manifestation, it contributes to existential cohesion and harmony for society, or social 
power.
The opposite, constant self-investigation, or asking “who are we?” is problematic in 
the same way a constant problematizing o f who ontself is leads to neurosis or pathology in 
individuals. Hegel was an early proponent o f the view that it was healthy for the state to 
achieve some kind o f clarity on this issue, explicidy tying it to the state’s ethical health.169 
Philosophically speaking Kant is the leading proponent of cosmopolitan sentiments, 
whereas Hegel is the chief o f the communitarian tribe.170
Hegel shares Herders view that it is impossible to think o f individuals detached 
from the social and cultural life o f communities. Richard Falk agrees, and points out that 
the basic energy behind patriotism, and one can add any kind o f communitarianism, is 
emotive; “understood as love o f country, an affirmation o f a bonded political community 
o f fellow citi2ens sharing memories and identities, as well as a willingness to make sacrifices 
for the sake o f the collective well-being, and especially the security and survival o f the 
country.171 Security and survival are key constitutive factors o f communitarian identity 
since they reinforce the difference between those who are on the inside and those on the 
outside. Furthermore, communitarians will place an existential value on the coherence and 
sovereignty o f the community, because its destruction or fragmentation involves social and 
moral loss o f great significance. This is not necessarily a point for cosmopolitans.
167 Bauman, Uquid modernity, 177.
168 Richard Sennett, The corrosion of character (London: Norton, 1998), 138.
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Liberal internationalism
The story o f liberal internationalism is a lot more complex than the two previous social 
imaginaries. Liberal internationalism consists o f the international application o f liberal 
principles.172 It has been associated with four main pillars: democracy, free trade, 
international institutions and human rights. It deserves attention because it represents a 
blend between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism: which reflects the tensions 
inherent in any potential merger between the two, yet as the history o f the last couple of 
centuries has demonstrated, it carries a lot o f ideational weight in its own right. It is less of 
an ideal type than the other two, and more o f a (still vibrant) ideology; or as Michael 
Howard has called it, a liberal conscience that has permeated the W est.173
In fact, liberalism is the only major surviving ideology, having fought off the 
competitors; Fascism, Nazism and Communism in large scale hot and cold wars during the 
20th century.174 This victory was the backdrop to Francis Fukuyama’s argument about the 
End o f History.175 He did not believe that history had ended as such, whether in 
historiographical terms or in terms o f world conflicts and events. Instead he recognised 
that in respect o f ideological and collective struggles, liberalism reigned alone as a major 
system for organising economic and political relations after the end o f the Cold War.
In his Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull discusses three social imaginaries, which 
resemble the above significantly, though he calls them “ideal-typical doctrines.” 176 They are 
the orthodox or conservative, the revolutionary, and the liberal or progressivist views. 
Focusing on the seemingly irreconcilable dilemma o f prioritising between order and justice, 
Bull argues the orthodox view favours order whereas the revolutionary view favours 
justice, and the liberal view tries to reconcile them by pursuing both and denying any 
contradiction between them .177 Bull’s argument is particularly prescient because in the 
liberal imagination it is difficult to favour one over the other, while in practice, one must 
acknowledge the somewhat inevitable conclusion Bull comes to:
World order, or order in the great society of all mankind, is similarly the condition of 
realisation of goals of human or cosmopolitan justice; if there is not a certain
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minimum security against violence, respect for the undertakings and stability of rules 
of property, goals of political, social and economic justice for individual men or of a 
just distribution of burdens and rewards in relation to the world common good can 
have no meaning.178
Bull foreshadows the much more explicit debates that followed in International Relations 
about normative features o f international order.179 Normative concerns for justice seem to 
be inherent in any cosmopolitan argument in the sense that they call for improvement of 
the human condition through either revolution or institutional change. Liberalism’s 
underlying assumption is that not all humans are free. Two things are needed to achieve 
freedom: Firstly, individuals and nations must be enlightened and self-aware o f the 
demands o f  liberty. Secondly, people must live under enlightened institutions that allow 
genuine political choice.180 This allows for not only political but social freedom and a free 
market o f ideas, which is important for economic, political and social progress. Together 
these two pillars contribute to civil society, which is often identified as the distinction 
between liberal democracies and other less complete democracies. As such one o f its main 
focuses is on ruling regimes. For liberal internationalists, democracy is a goal in itself 
because democratic regimes do not wage war against each other.
Democratic Peace Theory is the closest to a law-like observation in International 
Relations; it has been explained theoretically, celebrated normatively, measured empirically 
and critici2ed. Theoretical explanations focus on the institutional constraints inside 
democracies to explain peace. Normative explanations rest on the ideas and norms held by 
democracies.181 In a recent study, John Owen agrees that ideas play a major role and 
concludes that there is an identifiable mechanism to the democratic peace following from 
these ideas:
Fundamentally it is the liberal ideas undergirding liberal democracies. Liberalism says 
that all persons are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being, and 
that freedom and toleration are the best means to these ends. The liberal commitment
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to individual freedom gives rise to foreign policy ideology and governmental 
institutions that work together to produce democratic peace.182
O f course although democracies have created a zone of peace between them, this does not 
mean democracies are not warlike in the encounter with autocratic and dictatorial regimes. 
Aside from democracy, trade is the second pillar that can help assuage the disease of war. 
Increasing trade and thus mutual interdependence between democracies, makes war cosdy 
and peace more likely.
A third pillar of great importance to the prevention of war is the existence of 
international institutions like the League of Nations and later the United Nations. The 
formation of international institutions is the international counterpart to the domestic 
reform from autocracies to democracies.183 The EU is today a real world example o f how 
the three pillars of economic interdependence, international institutions and democracy 
lead to peace.184
A fourth and more recent pillar that has been pursued by liberals is that of human 
rights. I will come back to the issue of human rights in more detail later. Liberals are 
divided over the issue o f human rights since they typically pay allegiance to both the 
orthodox idea of sovereignty and non-interventionism, which is strongly embodied in the 
UN-charter, and yet at the same time they support human rights.185 In certain instances, 
these two institutions are in conflict, often over order versus justice, as Bull observed.
Table 2: Western social imaginaries
Source o f  so c ia l S cop e o f  am b ition  for T yp ica l secu rity
im agin ary so c ia l im aginary p arad igm
Communitarianism Local /  National +— ► Local /  National Realist
Liberal
internationalism
Local /  National _ __Transnational /
Universal
Liberalist
C osm opolitan Transnational/ + 
Universal
E Universal Human Rights /  
Human Security
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Conclusion
Cosmopolitanism, communitarianism and liberal internationalism are three social 
imaginaries that conflict on a number o f different questions, all o f which are inherently 
normative. They are important because they represent views that are divisive within the 
West. This is certainly the case in terms o f individuals in an era when nationalism 
decreasingly carries the burden o f social cohesion and social power. States increasingly 
reflect this tendency in their foreign policy and take sides as to which social imaginary they 
ascribe to. Canada and Norway exemplify this, both o f which officially subscribe to human 
security as a foreign policy doctrine. This has profound consequences for security because 
different social imaginaries ‘securitize’ differently, to use Barry Buzan’s phrase.186
Security Paradigms
The question here is how the more general social imaginaries are translated into specific 
security paradigms. It will be argued that cosmopolitans increasingly subscribe to a human 
security and human rights based paradigm. Communitarians support the conventional 
national and /o r state security approach, which is dominated by political realism. Liberal 
internationalists with their typical interventionist persuasion support what is today known 
as the expanded security concept, which deals in a variety o f security risks whose sources 
are many and complex, but which require attention.
It needs to be pointed out from the start that these three paradigms are not direcdy 
comparable in their basic make-up. They do not operate along exactly the same tangent but 
have different relationships to power, the state and practical applications o f security. The 
cosmopolitan paradigm, for example, is more o f an agenda than a comprehensive 
paradigm, in that it is all but divorced from power, struggles to materialise itself without the 
assistance o f governments, and materialises more than anything in agenda setting and 
pressure activism. The national-security paradigm on the other hand, has always enjoyed a 
close relationship with the state’s unprecedented power, and its relationship with state 
structures, military establishments and security policy has been honed over the centuries. 
The liberal security paradigm again tries to reconcile an increasingly expansive security 
agenda advocated by cosmopolitans, specifically in the form o f humanitarian interventions, 
with realist state-centricity, to produce an amalgam o f state power, interventionist ideology 
and cosmopolitan moral imperatives.
186 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security : a new framework for analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner Pub., 1998).
59
C osm opolitan  security: H um an  Rights and the H um an  security agenda
The international Human Rights Regime is not a security paradigm in itself, but it easily 
lends itself into aspirations for one. Human security is an academic and increasingly a 
foreign policy approach to operationalising the security implications o f putting human 
rights at the forefront. Several countries including Canada, Ireland and the Scandinavian 
countries, have made human security an explicit and dominant guiding principle o f their 
foreign policies. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy argued in 2001 that Canada 
explicitly sought to develop a “new foreign policy paradigm” based on human security, and 
that this had been very successful: “Today at every forum I attend or meeting I participate 
in, states o f all station and tradition are using the term, and more important, are accepting 
the usefulness o f  the idea.” 187 There is some dispute as to whether the concept o f human 
security adds any conceptual value to that o f human rights. A t any rate, human security is 
explicidy concerned with the security aspects o f the cosmopolitan worldview.
The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights was declared in 1948 in a political 
climate eager to find means to prevent the kind o f mass atrocities that had occurred during 
the recent World War. Specifically, there was need for a conceptual legitimation to 
intervene inside states to prevent genocide, despite the strong standing o f the sovereignty 
principle in international law. Genocide, a modern phenomenon, was usually conducted 
under the guise o f war, and perpetrated by a state against groups o f its own people, as was 
the case with the Armenian genocide, Stalin’s mass killings o f Ukrainians and Hitler’s 
Holocaust. In its fairly liberal bias the Declaration came out purporting to create positive 
law.188 This is problematic, particularly in terms o f enforcement, Chris Brown explains:
International human rights legislation has not involved the creation of effective 
enforcement machinery, for the obvious reason that not enough of the states involved 
actually wished to see human rights law enforced; indeed even some states with a 
record of general respect for human rights have hedged around ratifications of 
international agreements with extensive formal reservations... The enforcement of 
human rights by the international community has been determined, in practice, by the 
foreign policy imperatives of the major powers and political, commercial and financial 
considerations frequently get in the way of a high-priority, even-handed policy on 
human rights.189
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In theory and practice this subordinates the positive law account o f human rights to a 
morally stronger, but politically and practically weaker, essentialist and Universalist notion 
o f human rights, whose “provisions reflect the general moral standards o f humanity” .190 
The universalism o f human rights clashes with the positivist rights tradition in state based 
legal systems. This is above the case since the particularistic rights discourse was conceived 
o f as reciprocal; membership in a political community implied not only rights, but also 
duties. The reciprocal and particularistic strand would develop within a confined 
community ruled by law, where rights and duties were enforceable. The Universalist strand, 
on the other hand, did not have any such infrastructure attached to it, and could for that 
reason be considered universally hum an.191
The case o f the slave trade illustrates the difficulties o f enforcement. Although 
formally abolished at the Congress o f Vienna in 1815, which meant an end to  transactions, 
the active enforcement o f the ban with formal outlawing only happened in 1926.192 The 
British anti-slavery movement in the nineteenth century is what Coker considers the 
inauguration o f ‘global civil society’, so in vogue today. Starting as a missionary and 
Christian creation, global civil society proponents are decidedly more secular today; but no 
less driven by morality, which is the key instigator o f action, and renunciations o f injustice. 
O f equal importance, its scope has increased dramatically from N G O s to charities through
• * 193to citizen protest groups.
Charles Taylor identifies a clear increase o f altruism on a global scale today.194 As a 
result, there have been calls to both broaden and deepen the agenda for security. This 
entails, according to Krause and Williams, a focus on a “wider range o f potential threats, 
ranging from economic and environmental issues to  human rights and migration”.195 
Deepening it involves “either moving down to the level o f individual or human security or 
up to the level o f international or global security, with regional or societal security as 
possible intermediate points.” 196 For some, the language o f security has turned 
unapologetically cosmopolitan, which is exemplified by the new concept o f ‘human 
security,’ first introduced in the U N D P 1994 “Human Development Report.” This report
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defined human security in a twofold manner as “ [FJirst, safety from such chronic threats as 
hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns o f  daily life— whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.” 197
Roland Paris finds the ambitions enormous: “the scope o f this definition is vast: 
Virtually any kind o f unexpected or irregular discomfort could conceivably constitute a 
threat to one’s human security.” 198 It is strongly reminiscent of Johan Galtung’s concept o f 
“structural violence” : the inability for everyone to realise his or her full potential.199 This 
new agenda challenges both the policy objectives and basic assumptions o f the realist 
paradigm. “The theoretical targets being debated are the conceptualizations o f security (state 
security) and threat (military force) and the assumption o f anarchy (the security dilemma) 
that have characterized neorealist scholarship in security studies.” 200 However, while 
sometimes agreeing on the targets pursued, human rights advocates often struggle to 
operationalize means to protect them, frequently conceding this dimension to liberal 
government security agendas who can apply power on their behalf.
Human security focuses on the individual human being as the reference point, and 
it does not necessarily limit its concerns to politically inspired violence, or direct violence at 
all for that m atter.201 In this sense, there is a continuum from the traditional national 
security paradigm’s concern with ‘threats’202, through talk o f ‘risks’203 and within some 
strands o f human security; ‘vulnerabilities’.204 Such vulnerabilities are not obviously solved 
by use o f military force, because they are “not clearly perceived, often not well understood, 
and almost always a source o f contention among conflicting views”.205 Concretely 
speaking, vulnerabilities can develop into what Liotta calls ‘creeping vulnerabilities;’ that 
tend to be (if at all) addressed through crisis responses rather than long term strategic 
planning. Examples o f such issues are different levels o f population growth, spread o f 
disease (such as HIV/Aids), climate change, water and food shortage sometimes related to
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failing crops or soil erosion and desertification and increased urbanization and pollution in 
mega-cities and natural disasters.206
Academically there has been little shortage o f criticism o f the concept o f human 
security. Barry Buzan has argued that if the referent point is collectives then we ought to 
think o f ‘identity security’ or ‘societal security’ because they are less reductionist concepts. 
If  the referent object is the individual human being, the concepts adds nothing o f analytical 
value over simply referring to human rights.207 Furthermore, he adds; “The idea also risks 
mixing up the quite different agendas o f international security, on the one hand, and social 
security and civil liberties, on the other.” 208 For Buzan, it is imperative to maintain the 
attention on the level of social collectives:
While a moral case for making individuals the ultimate referent object can be 
constructed, the cost to be paid is analytical purchase on collective actors both as the 
main agents of security provision and as possessors of a claim to survival in their own 
right. Individuals are not free standing, but only take their meaning from the societies 
in which they operate: they are not some kind of bottom line to which all else can or 
should be reduced or subordinated.209
Others agree and point to the vagueness o f the concept. Paris finds human security to 
“encompass everything from substance abuse to genocide.” 210 And this has been 
augmented by the 2003 U N  sponsored “Commission on human security”, which defined 
human security “the vital core o f all human lives” 211, leaving it up to different cultures to 
interpret what precisely that involves.212 Human security is seemingly the equivalent o f 
‘peace;’ difficult to be against, precisely because it is difficult to agree what it is about; the 
peace o f one person may not be the same as the peace o f another. It is hard to imagine the 
materialization o f  some kind o f generally shared conception o f human security within 
practical and political reach anytime soon. Communitarian security, by contrast, does not 
require intellectual effort to envision.
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C om m unitarian security: national security
Historically the communitarian logic has been the main contributor to the development o f 
security paradigms, whether the group is a war-band, a tribe, or village, or later feudal 
entities or city-states. The modem  state has been the principal actor in international affairs 
since the late Middle Ages, and has been the dominant wager o f war for that reason. After 
the French Revolution and the rise of nationalism and conscription, it became more logical 
to speak o f ‘national security’, and this is an expression that has been with us ever since. 
National security is the security o f some, over others; it is security for ‘us’ that is those who 
are members of a particular nation state. This means that in legal terms the individual was a 
reference point insofar as he or she was a member o f a state. Exceptions to this general 
rule were pirates, who were considered stateless, and diplomats, who were considered
213immune.
The modem period between the Peace o f Westphalia and World War II was 
dominated by the national security paradigm, which has distincdy communitarian 
overtones. According to Realists, who are the kings and queens o f security studies, this 
group-based conception of security has universal validity.214 During the Cold War, security 
studies students tended to focus on issues that could be influenced by national leaders.215 
Their most central concern was military power. Even though this was not the only source 
o f national security, it was the most important one. Diplomacy, arms control and crisis 
management were also studied, but mosdy because they had a direct bearing on the 
character and likelihood o f war.
While acknowledging the prima facie validity o f  attempts at expanding the security 
agenda to cover disease, international crime, drugs and environmental issues, realists argue 
this threatens the coherence o f the national security paradigm’s focus on military 
dimensions. For Steven Walt, “ [a]ny attempt to understand the evolution o f human society, 
let alone the prospects for peace, must take account o f the role o f military force.” 216 Thus, 
the state-based approach to security is the “the study o f the threat, use, and control o f 
military force.” 217
So what is the nature o f the unit that concerns national security? The paradigmatic 
symbiosis between the nation-state and security is problematic; it creates two different
213 Brown, Sovereignty, rights, andjustice, 115.
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security problems; that o f the classical and the inverted security dilemmas. In the classical 
security dilemma, the state is considered an autonomous rational actor surrounded by an 
environment o f insecurity. O ther states may interpret the pursuit o f security for the first 
state as offensive, however, which may lead to arms races, scepticism about both intentions 
and capabilities and ultimately war. The state is the appropriate authority to provide 
security in this situation and enlists the citizens in a contractual obligation, often in the 
form o f military conscription. “Contractual obligations between citizens represent the limit 
(underwritten by the authority o f the state) o f effective coordination for collective action 
(or o f “community”). The security o f “citizens” is identified with (and guaranteed by) that 
of the state; and, by definition, those who stand outside it represent potential or actual 
threats.” 218
Conversely, however, there is also the inversed security dilemma, which stems from 
the potential threats to a state’s internal coherence generated by a plurality o f domestic 
communities. This puts the state community at odds with more local and regional 
communities inside the state. As Bauman argues: “The nation-state, after all, owed its 
success to the suppression o f self-asserting communities; it fought tooth and nail against 
‘parochialism’, local customs or ‘dialects’, promoting a unified language and historical 
memory at the expense o f communal traditions; the more determined the state-initiated 
and state-supervised Kulturkampfe, the fuller the nation-state success in the production o f a 
‘natural community’.” 219 In this view, and also supported by some research on nationalism, 
the nation is rather more a product o f the state, and its constructive nation-building and 
cohesive strategies, than the other way around.220 This naturally raises the coherence o f the 
state as a nation-state into a security issue as well, which can be exemplified in many 
different issues today, such as the difficulties o f reconciling ethnic groups in the Balkans 
and in Iraq on the one hand, or the issue o f home-grown terrorism in Europe on the other.
This is not to say that national security needs to be associated with identifiable or 
limited security threats domestically or internationally. It can also be associated with the 
wider national interest. A national interest has a much larger scope than national security, 
and interests can in themselves lead to security concerns through their sheer scope. A 
recent relevant example o f this is American neoconservatives, who see national security as 
too narrow a focus for American foreign policy. As a leading neoconservative, Irving
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Kristol, has put it, American foreign policy should be about “the national interest o f a 
world power, as this is defined by a sense o f national destiny... not a myopic national 
security.” 221 It follows from this that national security is merely a sub-section o f national 
interest, a vehicle to ensure the accomplishment o f the latter.
L iberal security: the new  security agenda
A liberal security paradigm has grown out o f the end o f the Cold War. There are four 
reasons for this, and they have to do with real world events, theory, scope and 
institutionalisation.
Firstly, dramatic changes in the distribution o f power in the world led to new 
security concerns. The end o f the Cold War meant a strong decrease in the chance o f high 
intensity interstate war involving any Western state. Instead, an expanded security agenda 
developed in response to the problems associated with a plethora o f weak and failing states 
in areas that saw a withdrawal o f superpower sponsorship. The breakdown o f state 
structures in these societies made them relapse to a pre-modem condition, according to 
Robert Cooper. Among the plethora o f problems affecting this part o f the world, Cooper 
cites the fact that all major drug-producing areas are situated in countries of this category: 
“The pre-modem world belongs, as it were, in a different time-zone: here, as in the ancient 
world, the choice is again between empire or chaos. And today, because none o f us sees the 
point o f empires, we have often chosen chaos.” 222 Nonetheless, this semi-permanent 
condition in many areas o f the world has become a breeding ground for security concerns 
that liberal states cannot afford to ignore. This has led to interventions: some o f them 
humanitarian, all o f them difficult.
Secondly, in theoretical terms the realist state-centric paradigm struggled to make 
sense o f an evidently unipolar world that did not correspond to balance o f power and 
polarity theory. O ther paradigms were needed to make sense o f an increasingly confusing 
and chaotic world. As Mark Leonard and Tom Bentley put it in the mid 1990s:
We have not found a name to describe the era we are living in, still less to understand 
how it might work. George Bush’s triumphant declaration of a new world order in 
1990 soon gave way to a widespread sense of disorder, fuelled by ethnic warfare, 
resurgent nationalism and disintegration. The end of the nation state, global corporate
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rule and a clash of civilizations have all been predicted... The level of analytical 
confusion has reached the point where the American journal Foreign Policy has 
offered a cash prize to anyone who can invent a new term to encapsulate the age.223
Two American political scientists offered big ideas to make sense o f the chaos: Fukuyama 
with his aforementioned End o f History thesis, and Samuel Huntington, with the idea o f 
an impending clash o f civilization.224 Fukuyama’s idea has been controversial, but still 
reflects the degree to which liberalism has not yet been challenged on the system level. The 
only systemic challenge comes from Islamic fundamentalism, but in its scope it is nowhere 
near an existential threat, though significant in its own right, and certainly does not have 
any whole civilization to back it up. The theoretical appreciation o f the contemporary 
world has achieved little in the way o f clarification since Leonard and Bendey’s complaint 
in the 1990s, and is decidedly plural, perhaps too much so.225 In a plural theoretical world, 
liberal internationalism, or rationalism as it is sometimes called,226 is a way to reconcile 
simultaneous demands for order and justice.
Thirdly, the liberal security paradigm is global in scope. The end o f the Cold War 
raised the liberal security concerns from a secondary (to World War III) to a primary 
concern. As a secondary concern, it had been involved with small wars and UN operations 
in the third world, more often than not in the context o f de-colonisation. In the 1990s 
however, the liberal security paradigm came to prominence and developed together with 
the concept o f globalisation, which contributed to the former’s genuinely global oudook. 
The liberal internationalist security paradigm champions international — albeit state-based — 
responses to transnational issues. Indeed an increasingly globally aware Western civil 
society perceives a whole host o f issues as security risks and demands a governmental 
response to these. As Coker explains, governments are more interested in distant conflicts
223 Quoted in Andrew J. Williams, Liberalism and w ar: the victors and the vanquished (London Routledge, 2006), 
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because o f an increase in global consciousness.227 Such heightened awareness and 
involvement is in large measure media driven, a dynamic that goes back to the Crimean 
War. Examples o f such risks are the direct and indirect consequences o f disease (HIV/Aids 
primarily), environmental degradation, migration, WMD proliferation, terrorism, inequality 
and organized crime. 228
Fourth, there is the institutional side to the liberal security paradigm ranging from 
transformed alliances to think tanks. Western governments, sensitive to the transnational 
scope o f security risks, have tried to institutionalise responses, for example through listing 
all o f these risks on N A TO ’s agenda.229 N ATO is an institution that can pool the power o f 
the state for more flexible (coalitions o f the willing) and comprehensive (international 
contributions) responses than what is possible for any individual state. It combines the 
retention o f state-centricity (and is plagued by national caveats to missions) with 
institutionalizing o f security policies at the inter-govemmental level. The institutional side 
of liberalism is also reflected in the influence o f think tanks, which have often generated 
policy recommendations. Andrew Williams argues that such think tanks have propagated 
interventionist views and an active leadership role for the U K and the United States in the 
world.230
Tony Blair’s ten years as prime minister offer an example o f a liberal foreign and 
security paradigm in action. Demonstrating leadership and an active and interventionist 
foreign policy in defence o f liberal values have been leitmotifs o f Blair’s government. On 
the eve o f taking office, he told an audience in Manchester in April 1997 that: “Century 
upon century it has been the destiny o f Britain to lead other nations. That should not be a 
destiny that is part o f our history. It should be part o f our future. We are a leader o f nations 
or nothing.”231 Blair has consistently repeated this view: perhaps most famously in his 
speech in Chicago twenty-two days into the 1999 Kosovo War. In this speech, Blair argued: 
“we are all internationalists now.” More specifically:
We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By 
this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually 
dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international 
collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this
227 Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity, 27.
228 Ibid., chapter 3.
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doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour. Just as within domestic 
politics, the notion of community - the belief that partnership and cooperation are 
essential to advance self-interest — is coming into its own, so it needs to find its 
international echo.232
During those ten years, Blair has presided over Operation Desert Fox in Iraq 1998, the 
1999 Kosovo War, deployment o f  troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, the attack on 
Afghanistan in late 2001, and the controversial war on Iraq in 2003. The foreign policy has 
certainly been interventionist, and in the cases o f Sierra Leone and Kosovo in particular, 
more in defence o f values than pure interest. Having shown a remarkable consistency on 
international affairs, Blair recently reiterated this liberal agenda in his valedictory essay to an 
international audience in The Economist. Britain should be a player and not a spectator in 
all significant international issues: “the critical point is that we, Britain, should be closely 
involved in all these issues because in the end they will affect our own future. And the 
agenda constructed should be about our values — freedom, democracy, responsibility to 
others, but also justice and fairness.” 233
This is liberal internationalism through and through: it is state based, it is conceived 
at home and applied abroad and it inter-mixes a pursuit o f interests, specifically security 
concerns, with moral arguments and agendas. Though the Iraq War was controversial, 
Blair’s premiership has been less original than critical newspaper editorials might want us to 
think. His close relationship with the United States has been the default position o f every 
British prime minister since Edward Heath. In addition, the intermixing between morality 
and interest is a common theme in the foreign policies o f France and the United States as 
well. Indeed, since the liberal security agenda is a little bit o f everything it has become the 
conventional approach to security for most Western states according to Williams: “Since 
1990 the liberal idea that foreign policy must ultimately be designed around moral ends, 
and if possible always means, has become part o f the language o f international politics.” 234
This inevitably turns into a pragmatic contest between moral imperatives, interests 
and practical realities. Addressing how to strike such a balance, Chris Brown notes the 
widespread tendency to infuse such issues with moral absolutism: “The notion that action 
can only be described as ethical if motives are absolutely pure and untainted by self-interest
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is bizarre, and unsupported by any plausible moral philosophy.” 235 Rejecting such thinking 
as pop-realism, Brown goes on to argue that
If it is the case that the merest hint of self-interest is sufficient to undermine any claim 
that a state might be behaving ethically, then states never do behave ethically, because 
there is always some element of self-interest involved in state-action. If being partly 
motivated by self-interest becomes morally equivalent to being wholly motivated by 
self-interest, states then do indeed come to be seen as the kind of nakedly egoistic 
beings that virtually all ethical theories condemn.
As Brown argues, this is simply not the case, and the existence o f a mixture o f self-interest 
and moral motives in state action has always been a part o f the international sphere at least 
as long as it has been credible to call it an international society. What is relatively new, 
however, is the concept o f humanitarian interventions, which take place as the only ethical 
and increasingly legally justified circumvention o f sovereignty
Conclusion
In this chapter, the concept o f social imaginaries has been used to bridge the gap between 
the properties o f the West and the security paradigms that today are dominant in 
international relations. While it is rare to find these social imaginaries clear-cut in either 
individuals or states, they are useful for delineating the underlying moral and practical 
stakes inherent in worldviews that strongly influence politics at the basic level. They are 
also helpful in illustrating why some security policies run into difficulties already at the 
theoretical level, ultimately creating messy strategies on the ground. There is a large 
discrepancy between saving the world, and protecting one’s own country, and while 
communitarians and cosmopolitans can defend either view in a rigorous fashion, liberal 
internationalists are often trapped in an attempt to reconcile the two. Most Western foreign 
policies are o f some kind o f liberal persuasion these days. Still, this does not ease the 
tensions resulting from disagreements between liberals prone to agree with communitarians 
on the one hand, such as the French and the Americans, and to an extent the British, or the 
liberals who sympathize with cosmopolitans on the other hand, like the Germans, the 
Canadians and the Scandinavians. How these tensions manifest themselves on the ground 
in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is a topic for the last chapter, which discusses the 
implications for warriors. The next chapter discusses the instrumental character o f war 
today, which constitutes the military — as opposed to security — context for warriors.
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C h a p t e r  3 :  W a r  i s  i n s t r u m e n t a l
Introduction
How are we to think o f the relationship between combat and war? Whereas soldiers 
frequendy experience combat as a sublime and existential experience, technology and 
bureaucracy increasingly instrumentalize warfare. The sublime and existential dimension of 
combat follows from the life and death stakes, the hard work and suffering involved, and 
the climactic separation between those who can handle the experience and thus repeat it, 
and those who cannot. This arena distinguishes soldiers from warriors, whereas military 
service distinguishes soldiers from civilians. Combat is the kernel o f war; it is the sphere 
that has the most continuity with the past. As the character o f war changes with social, 
technological and political developments, the essential nature o f combat is constant; it 
retains its essential elements, which we can identify since Homeric times: sublime spectacle, 
danger, suffering and incomprehension. As Ernst Jiinger put it in his World War II diary: 
“War isn’t like a cake that the two sides divide up between them to the last crumb; there is 
always a piece left. That’s the piece for the gods and it remains outside the argument, and it 
elevates the fighting from sheer brutality and demonic violence. Homer knew it and 
respected it.” 236 The following chapter is about combat — the piece for the gods, whereas 
this chapter focuses on war becoming instrumental.
The instrumentalization o f warfare is a product o f  social and economic 
developments, which put a premium on instrumental rationality and an increasing respect 
for individual lives. Strategy is pursued with technological methods to reduce casualties. 
The West is also pursues political objective less ruthlessly than was the case a few decades 
ago, both in terms o f the destruction wrought on the enemy, and in terms o f the 
willingness to  sacrifice Western lives.
This chapter presents an analysis o f the instrumentality o f war. War registers on a 
continuum between the existential and the instrumental. War is existential in the sense that 
it manifests itself as a meaningful experience. Van Creveld says; “Throughout history, for 
every person who has expressed his horror o f war there is another who found in it the 
most marvellous of all the experiences that are vouchsafed to man.” 237 To say that war is 
instrumental, on the other hand, is to speak about two features: (1) the use o f war as a
236 Ernst Jiinger, Storm of Steel\ trans. Michael Hoffmann (London: Penguin, 2004), xix. Quoted in Coker, 
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means; an instrument, o f policy, which is to say as a strategic tool; and (2) a situation where 
the waging of war is characterized primarily by focus on its means (tactics and technology), 
rather than its aims (the strategic objective). The following argument is two-fold; it is 
argued that war no longer constructs existential meaning as it has done throughout history. 
It is also argued that the second feature o f war’s instrumentality is usurping the first, 
specifically in the American Way o f Warfare.
W ar without existential meaning
Existential war is war that constructs existential meaning for people. It is im portant to be 
aware that when we speak o f waging war, it is waged by whole societies, not necessarily 
states. This is a point emphasized by Colin Gray, and his example is from both W orld Wars 
where the most effective army, that o f the Germans, ruled the batdefield but nonetheless 
lost the wars.238 To this one could add the Vietnam War, where military resources favoured 
the Americans in the extreme, but nonetheless led to defeat at the hands o f a people utterly 
committed to victory.239 For an illustration o f what it means when war constructs meaning 
for people, we have to go no further than World War I, when both internationalist prone 
workers and suffragettes put their agendas aside and joined in the chorus o f  war 
supporters, who crowded every major European city.240 By the late 19th century, European 
society was very highly militarized, Michael Howard has argued, and the potency o f 
nationalism and democracy imbued entire societies with a desire for war: “It provided 
purpose, colour, excitement and dignity to peoples who had outgrown the age o f miracles 
and had not yet entered that o f pop stars.” 241
As never before, thousands — hundreds of thousands — felt what they should have felt 
in peacetime; that they belonged to a great nation... Each one was called upon to cast 
his infinitesimal self into the glowing mass, and there to be purified of all selfishness.
All differences of class, religion and language were washed away by the great feeling of 
fraternity... Each individual experienced an exaltation of his ego; he was no longer the
238 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 113.
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isolated person of former times; he felt incorporated into the mass, he was a part of 
the people, and his person, his hitherto unnoticed person had been given meaning.242
Indeed, war has been as much existential as instrumental throughout history. The 
difference today is that the existential dimension is miniscule in comparison to the 
instrumental dimension. This may very well end — as some has argued it will — 
eventually.243 But while we are waiting for history to re-assert itself again, we m ust take 
stock o f the present and investigate what it means that war is overwhelmingly instrumental 
in more positive terms (as opposed to merely the negative ones o f absence of existential 
meaning). How did war construct meaning in the 20th century? Zaki Laidi breaks down 
meaning into three constituent parts o f societal experience; project, foundation and 
unity.244
a) P roject
After the age o f ideologies — the intellectual powerhouses o f the 20th century - war is not 
used as a means to propel us from the present to the future anymore. The 20th century was 
in many ways a conflict between three ideologies, worldviews that inspired millions o f 
people and infused their actions with meaning. Liberalism, fascism and communism were 
irreconcilable; their fundamental principles contradicted to such an extent that peaceful 
coexistence was unviable. The three decades between 1914 and 1945 saw communism and 
liberalism together defeating fascism. The Cold War was another stage in this Western 
ideational civil war, and although not turning nuclear hot, it still became a standoff between 
the two remaining contenders; where liberalism emerged victorious.
However, as Howard argues, when the Cold War came to an end it became 
increasingly clear that liberalism was by no means out o f work, but became the vehicle to 
infuse Enlightenment values to the world outside the W est.245 However, this is less o f a 
coherent project than a tacit agenda, which is not explicidy pursued by policymakers. The 
scale o f this project is larger than any o f the previous ones, and as the previous chapter 
indicated, the West is existentially much worse equipped in terms of metaphysical 
convictions to see this project through. Charles Taylor argues that when people define 
themselves individually instead o f  in terms o f collective values or a common project, an 
undeniable loss o f meaning is generated. This in turn is accentuated by what he calls ‘the
242 Leed, No Man's Land, 42,43.
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eclipse o f ends’, or the abandonment o f a teleological perspective. When there are no ends, 
all becomes a matter o f means. As Laidi argues about humanitarian interventions, they can 
only divert the attention from a lack o f telos towards challenges about means, immediacy 
and emergency.246
Western states increasingly conceive o f security in terms o f risks. Different from 
stationary, tangible and localized threats, a risk is a scenario and its attendant policy proposal 
for dealing with it. Mikkel Rasmussen specifies that the aim is not perfect security but a 
forestalling o f risks to prevent them from becoming actual crises. The risk metaphor is a 
useful way to look at the West’s outlook on the world in military terms today. The whole 
paradigm o f “new wars” for example, can be aggregated to constitute a large, but 
fragmented and incoherent project for the West. But it is not treated as a project; it is 
managed as a risk, which is to say piecemeal, with reservations and more than a little 
attention to potential consequences, or ‘risk traps’, as Ulrich Beck calls them.247 These 
challenges to international order cannot be dealt with coherendy and massively as one 
gigantic project, which would be akin to civilizing, economically developing and 
institutionalizing liberal democracy throughout the rest o f the world.
b) F oundation
According to Zaki Laidi foundation is “the basic principle upon which a collective project 
rests.” 248 Since the fall o f religion and the growing suspicion towards science, there appears 
to be no recognised metaphysical foundation for Western society. Could it be as Nietzsche 
suggests, that: “Life is a consequence o f  war, society itself a means to war.” 249 The close 
relationship between the nation state and war is discussed in the work o f Clausewitz250, 
Hegel251, and contemporary military historians and strategists like Michel Foucault, 
Christopher Coker, Azar Gat, Colin S. Gray and Michael Howard.252 The role o f  war in 
shaping Western states has been dominant for the majority o f the Western political 
experience. Even a cursory view o f the frequency with which wars were pursued during the
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Middle Ages demonstrates the point. When feudalism was replaced by state formation, as 
Charles Tilly sums up, war made the state, and the state made war.253 At the level o f human 
nature, Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein debated the centrality o f war in their famous 
letter exchange on the question o f ‘why war?’254
The American thermonuclear strategist Herman Kahn has made a very general but 
illuminating overview o f a war cycle between limited and total wars going back to the 11th 
century.255 The religious wars o f the 17th century were extremely destructive and as 
deserving of the term ‘total’ as the World Wars o f the previous century. The following 
Peace o f Westphalia in 1648 became the foundation for the modem  international system. It 
was precisely the destructiveness o f that war which inspired the princes to reform the 
system in an innovative fashion. As Howard puts it, peace rather than war needs to be 
explained in the modem period. “We are all bom  Fascists, and have to be expensively 
educated out o f it. And when all the structures o f civil society painfully built up over 
generations disintegrate, whether through sudden catastrophe or gradual erosion, it is to 
those habits we naturally return.” 256 Gat concurs and concludes his opus on war arguing 
that there is nothing special about human violence and war; it is the rule in nature.257
The political revolutions o f 1989-1991 pronounced the end o f  war as foundation in 
the West. The end of the standoff with the Soviet Union meant the likelihood of nuclear 
War fell sharply, a prospect which itself had all but ended interstate war in Europe. Van 
Creveld has most vividly summed up the end o f interstate war thesis: “Like a man who has 
been shot in the head but still manages to stagger forward a few paces, conventional war 
may be at its last gasp.” 258 Another often-quoted exponent o f this idea, Michael 
Mandelbaum claimed in the late 1990s that: “Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, 
duelling or foot-binding are obsolete: it is a social practice that was once considered 
normal, useful — even desirable — but that now seems odious” .259 There are many problems 
with Mandelbaum’s claim, one o f which is that war probably does not have the coherence 
he attributes to it, as a cultural problem. As Gray argues, war is not one problem it is a 
hundred or a thousand problems, because war is not about itself it is about politics.260
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Furthermore, he argues, interstate war is very much alive, illustrated by the fact that the 
1991 Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo war, the 2001 Afghanistan War, and the 2003 Iraq War 
were ah interstate wars.261 If  we see Gray’s point in relation to Kahn’s table, we find that 
Western warfare has been directed outwards (except in the Kosovo case) since the end of 
the Cold War, and that they can be characterized as limited. The West is at peace with itself 
and war is no longer a foundation o f postmodern Western society, as it was throughout the 
Middle Ages and most o f modernity.
c) U nity /coherence
Sam Keen describes a fundamental dynamic o f friend-enemy relations when he says that 
before the weapon there is the image of the enemy.262 Robin Fox agrees, and argues “we” 
fight “them” because their difference from us threatens the coherence o f our identity and 
the validity o f the ideas we live by.263 Coherence is probably a better term than unity to 
describe trends at such an aggregate level o f international society. If  such a dynamic is 
fundamental to human life, a lot o f the existential impetus for war is generated by the social 
construction o f friends and enemies, inside and outside.
At the critical time in the history o f war o f the early 19th century, Hegel explained 
how war creates unity and coherence for the state. Recognizing the implications o f what 
seemed a whole people (the French) in arms, Hegel expressed in philosophical terms what 
sociologists and anthropologists in our time have referred to as self-other relations. The 
argument holds that the coherence o f a social unit becomes strengthened if  attacked by the 
outside. This logic underwrites anything from patriotism, nationalism and chauvinism at 
the national level, down to combat motivation at the squad level, and crowd behaviour 
irrespective o f war. Published on the eve o f the Battle o f Jena in 1806, Hegel expresses the 
implication of this principle for the state:
In order not to let [the citizens] get rooted and setded in this isolation and thus break 
up the whole into fragments and let the common spirit evaporate, government has 
from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war. By this means it confounds 
the order that has been established and arranged, and violates their right to 
independence, while the individuals (who being absorbed therein, get adrift from the 
whole, striving after inviolable self-existence \Fiirsichsein\ and personal security) are
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made, by the tasks thus imposed upon them by government, to feel the power of their 
lord and master, death.264
Clausewitz also subscribed to such a view: “Now in our days there is hardly any other 
means o f educating the spirit o f a people in this respect, except by War, and that too under 
bold Generals. By it alone can that effeminacy of feeling be counteracted, that propensity 
to seek for the enjoyment o f comfort, which causes degeneracy in a people rising in 
prosperity and immersed in an extremely busy commerce.” 265 Even though the mid and 
late parts o f the nineteenth century were remarkably peaceful, this was as Azar Gat has 
argued, largely because the great powers were preoccupied with domestic disturbances and 
a scramble for colonial possessions.266 However, as the 19th century drew to close, self- 
other relations reasserted themselves very strongly as the nationalist forces, which 
underpinned the balance o f power before 1914. Outside the West during the second half o f 
the 20th century, especially since 1945, nationalism has led to coundess liberation 
movements, both related to post-colonialism and not. This tribal communitarian logic does 
not even have to assume the grandeur o f nationalism to lead to war, as the troubles in 
Somalia, Chechnya, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kurdistan illustrate today.
As far as the West is concerned, this feature o f political life is all but co-opted into 
liberal democratic politics (terrorist groups like ETA and IRA apart). The consolidation of 
European national politics into such a remarkable successful project as the EU is a 
testimony to how far Europeans have been able to transcend national differences. War no 
longer leads to unity in the West. Western societal coherence, such as it is, results rather 
more from contingent factors like democracy, wealth and desire for material possessions 
and pleasures. As the previous chapter demonstrated, this leads rather more to 
individualism than societal coherence, but at least there is agreement on the undesirability 
o f war.
9/11 inspired a forceful, yet brief, solidarity with the United States, but the 
resulting military action was not a NATO operation so much as a coalition o f the willing, 
where most contributors offered highly specialized forces, which served under American 
command. Coalitions o f the willing are designed, in Rumsfeld’s words, to let the mission
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decide the alliance rather than vice versa.267 This is very different from the cemented 
Western alliance of the two World Wars and the Cold War. Furthermore, if Afghanistan 
was relatively uncontroversial, Iraq 2003 was positively divisive both within individual 
Western states and within the Western alliance.268
However, the loss o f unity does not only transpire at the political level. It is also a 
question of who in society is doing war. The Cold War saw the transition from conscript 
militaries to professional forces for most o f the European states. The major implication o f 
the professionalization o f the armed forces is, as conscript advocates have always argued, 
that the military and the armed forces are losing touch with each other socially. The end of 
conscription generates less interest in military affairs by the public, and this affects not only 
young people but increasingly their financially hegemonic parents in their 50s and 60s, who 
themselves have not experienced war first hand. This development has been called a 
‘revolution in attitudes towards the military’, (RAM).269 For all these reasons, the West is 
not a coherent constructor o f meaning in war.
Instrumental War I: War as instrument
As chapter two demonstrated, the Western experience is characterised by the increasing 
spread of, and commitment to, rationalism. It is a dominant mode o f strategic thinking as 
well. Strategy, as Clausewitz defines it, is the continuation o f policy with additional means. 
Therefore, strategy is the use o f the engagement in war in relation to policy goals, whereas 
tactics is about the use o f armed force in the engagement. Thus, any combat action is part 
o f the realm o f tactics.270 How one defines policy is a matter o f semantics, but it is certainly 
collective action towards achieving goals. It is means-ends thinking. This is agreed by a 
majority o f leading contemporary strategic thinkers. Barry Posen sees grand strategy as 
political-military means-end chain.271 Richard Betts echoes Posen, saying strategies are 
chains o f relationships between means and ends.272 Lawrence Freedman concurs: “Strategy 
is about the pursuit o f  political ends with military means in the international
267 Richard Norton-Taylor, 'A Lame Duck?' The Guardian, May 22 2003. [retrieved 17/11/2007]
268 See in particular Timothy Garton Ash, Tree world -.America, Europe, and the surprising future o f the West (New  
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270 Gray, Modem strategy, 17.
271 Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 13. Quoted in Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, 21.
272 Richard K. Betts, 'Is Strategy an Illusion?' International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 6. Quoted in Rasmussen, 
The Risk Society at War, 21.
78
environment” 273 There is no question that strategy is a prominent feature o f war, but the 
question is whether all war is subordinate to strategic thinking?
There are two arguments espoused by prominent thinkers on war and strategy on 
this topic. The first view, held by Colin Gray, is that war is about things that can plausibly 
be said to be political.274 Politics is about power, and power is the one property for which 
there is no substitute. Whatever agreements one enters into with neighbours or enemies, it 
is easier to thwart peace than for peace to be enforced: “In 1939 Hitler truly wanted war, 
that was a desire the international community was not well equipped to deny him.” 275 
Hitler’s rise to power illustrates the degree to which power imposes a unity to politics 
whether domestic or international, or even simply tribal: Power’s language is policy, bu t the 
power grammar changes between peacetime policy, and policy, which is supported by 
arms.276
Van Creveld agrees to an extent with Gray, but he argues that strategy is only 
relevant to war up to a certain point. When the intensity o f war becomes total — an all out 
effort for sheer survival — strategy is no longer a meaningful part o f the equation, since the 
only relevant goal is survival through victory. At this point the means and ends blur, and 
war approaches the purely existential rather than being waged strategically.277 It can be 
helpful to see a correlation between wars becoming existential and escalation to total war. 
German defensive warfare on the Eastern Front and Israel’s fight for survival in 1948 and 
to an extent in 1967 are examples o f wars where strategy apparendy ceases to offer 
guidance since the options are very limited. Given such circumstances, Van Creveld is 
right. War can transcend strategy, but it is not typical.
For the majority o f modernity, Western warfare has been strategic. It has been less 
than total, and it has been about politics and power. Once these two conditions are 
satisfied, war is within the Clausewitzian realm o f strategy. Strategy should be understood 
is instrumentality because it does not in itself explain why wars are happening. War is not 
autonomous, as Claus ewitz insisted, but is influenced by the cultural, social, economic and 
strategic context. This context explains why there is war and what any given war is about, 
strategy comes into its own as a defensive or offensive means to make sure the
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engagement takes place in the most favourable circumstance possible to translate combat 
actions into a political outcome.
Van Creveld has argued war can never be a question o f interest, contrary to Gray, 
because dead men have no interests.278 This is a valid point, but strategic interest and 
combat motivation are two different things, despite sharing the currency o f power. Gray 
says; “Some readers may wonder why it is that soldiers can fight so well in defence o f a 
cause that they do not value highly. The reason is not hard to find: War is about personal 
survival.” 279 However, Gray is also imprecise on this point. The reason soldiers keep 
fighting on is that combat is about personal survival. War is about policy and the reason why 
they are sent to fight. The two are qualitatively different things, even though one is most 
often embedded in the other. Only in the rare case when war becomes total is war about 
survival for the strategist and the soldier in equal measure. Otherwise, the concerns o f the 
strategist are not the same as those o f the soldier. The strategist’s job is to translate the 
causes o f war, whatever they may be, to favourable circumstances for the soldier to do his 
(tactical) job. Neither strategy nor tactics are about motivation. Strategic thinking does not 
explain war’s occurrence, nor does tactical thinking explain combat motivation.280
This is not to say that the relationship between strategy and politics has always been 
clear. Van Creveld demonstrates how during the early 20th century politics was completely 
excluded from the thinking o f the German general staff. Indeed there was little overall 
coordination o f warfare at all, making it an almost entirely self-referential series of 
operations. Naval operations and army operations were not coordinated in either Germany 
or the United States; their only common link was the Kaiser and the President respectively.
This was a time when strategy was inspired by the American Civil War and the 
Franco-Prussian War o f 1870-71, where railroads had proven decisive for logistics and 
strategic mobility. Consequently general staffs were typically staffed with talented railway- 
experts, people with a technical and bureaucratic mindset.281 The U.S. military academy 
West Point heavily focused on management and engineering, rather than strategic (in the 
Clausewitzian sense) thinking in its curriculum.282 World War I was a gridlock and saw 
limited scope for strategy short o f attrition. But during World War II technology had
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unlocked the potential of mobility, which in turn offered strategists relatively more agency 
at the operational level. This development in combination with the global scope o f the 
conflict greatly facilitated the return o f strategic thinking. Even so, the Allied demand for 
unconditional surrender on the Western Front, and a war o f extermination on the Eastern 
Front curtailed the scope for strategy, reinforcing the impression that this war was also one 
o f attrition. The Cold War became the strategic age par excellence, with the establishment 
o f strategic studies as a separate academic discipline, with such technical sophistication that 
strategists were more often than not civilian academics. However, strategic thinking was 
almost entirely focused on how to avoid thermonuclear war, rather than refinement o f the 
link between conventional capabilities and desired political outcomes.
Thus, it is perhaps no wonder that the discourse of war today is still largely focused 
on the means o f war, rather than the character o f war as a means towards political goals. 
There are many means in war that one can focus on instead o f the intractable challenges o f 
politics. Among these, technological development is the easiest one to control; it is about 
manipulating mechanical matter and the attendant frame o f mind that this involves. 
Strategy, which is about the manipulation o f people’s will and interests, is infinitely more 
difficult for no more profound reason than that people have their own conceptions about 
what their interests are and do not easily allow themselves to be convinced otherwise.
Instrumental War II: War by technological instruments -  the 
American Way of Warfare
American civilisation is of a purely mechanised nature.
Without mechanisation, America would disintegrate more swiftly than India.
Hitler’s Table Talk283
Today it is all but commonplace to equate the Western Way o f Warfare almost exclusively 
with American warfare.284 Wars pursued by Western states after the Falklands War o f 1982 
have all been American dominated. Grenada 1983, Panama 1988, Iraq 1991 and 2003, 
Somalia 1993, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999 and Afghanistan 2001 are all examples o f this, 
rhere are three major tenets to American warfare, all contributing to make it very 
nstrumental. Firstly, strategically it is virtually apolitical, fought with a managerial rather 
Fan strategic ethos. The method o f choice is attrition, with leads to a focus on tactics over
33 Hugh Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler’s Table Talk (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1953), 188.
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strategy.285 Secondly, technology has always been a favourable means, whatever the goal. 
Thirdly, during the 20th century airpower has developed into the pre-eminent American 
tool o f war.286
a) Apolitical w ar
The main reason why American warfare has tended towards the apolitical is an insistence 
on a clear division between the military and political establishments, as Samuel Huntington 
has argued is appropriate for a democracy.287 This sentiment was strongly reaffirmed 
recendy by Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff Admiral Mike Mullen in an open letter to 
serving officers.288 Politicians make decisions about military power and the military execute 
them. Unfortunately, this leads the military, in Gray’s words to “eschew politics, and in 
practice to discount consideration of, and preparation for, the character o f the context o f 
peace that should follow. This is a classic example o f an army having the vices o f its 
virtues.”289 Retired Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff General Richard Myers (2001-05) 
has also expressed this view: “N o military officer, even at the very top, can know all that is 
involved in the highest levels o f decision-making, which is inherendy political (in the 
generic, not partisan, sense).” 29" Myers echoed the newly appointed commander o f the US 
8th Army in Korea, in 1951, who when asked what American objectives in the war were, 
replied: “I don’t know. The answer must come from higher authority.” 291 An essentially 
apolitical attitude by even the very top military echelon is a continuous topic o f  debate, and 
is illustrated by the very strong reservations held by generals to publicly voice their 
objections against the wisdom o f attacking Iraq with only 150,000 troops in 2003, and also 
with respect to the ongoing strategy. Retired generals, like the half dozen in the 2006
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‘generals revolt’ who demanded Rumsfeld’s resignation, tend to speak out, but their words 
carry less weight.292
The main problem with such deference from senior military leaders is at the strategic 
level, where there appears to be a shortage o f debate about what the goals o f a war are. 
This is illustrated for example by the failure to appreciate the political and strategic 
character o f the Vietnam war by both civil and military leadership,293 and the military’s 
acceptance and institutionalization o f linking the Iraq war and 9/11 into a general Global 
War on Terror. If  the top military echelons could be excused for failing to think sufficiently 
strategic (and they should not), there is no such excuse for the civilian leadership. Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s focus on military transformation (which is essentially about means) at the 
expense o f strategic thinking about Afghanistan and Iraq was alluded to by former 
CENTCOM commander, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni:
There’s a difference betw een w inning battles, or defeating the enem y in  batde, and 
w inning the w ar... W hat strikes m e is that w e are constantly redesigning the military 
to do som ething it already does pretty w e ll... I f  w e’re talking about the future, w e  
need to talk about n ot h ow  you w in the peace as a separate part o f  the war, but you ’ve  
got to look  at this thing from  start to fin ish ... T he military does a dam n good  job o f  
killing peop le and breaking th in gs... But that is n ot the p rob lem .. . 294
If managerial/technological transformation is the major preoccupation with the civilian 
military leadership, the question is: who is going to do the imperative strategic thinking? It 
appears that instead o f strategic thinking the American military has relied rather more on 
managerial thinking, which is to say a systematization o f the preparation and conduct o f 
battle, rather than on what the war is for.
b) W ar by m anagem ent
From the Civil War experience onwards, engineering and managerial thinking appear to 
have been more important to American military leaders than political reflections. Having 
:onsolidated her borders, the pressing geopolitical challenges faced by Europeans did not 
ipply to the same extent in the United States. Two social developments accompanied this 
political reality; the mechanisation o f labour and the introduction o f management thinking 
:o labour and war. John Ellis has argued mechanisation o f labour followed from a shortage
92 Robert D . Kaplan, W hat Rumsfeld got right', The Atlantic July/August 2008.
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of manpower and growing needs for machines, absence o f worker guilds who would see 
machinery as threatening, and rapid innovation in mechanical thinking.295 Mechanical 
approaches to production were later integrated with Taylorist and later Fordist managerial 
thinking. As Coker explains: “What the US witnessed from the 1870s was the growth of 
what the distinguished economist John Kenneth Galbraith calls a “techno-structure” : the 
application o f science to production... What emerged was a technicist ideology promising 
a technological fix to every military problem.” 296
Experience in either of the two world wars did not contradict this technicist 
ideology; attrition decided both. Even the Korean War (though it did not end because o f  it) 
was waged through attrition strategy.297 Indeed, the American economy, production power 
and logistical skill contributed substantially at the strategic level to the outcome o f the three 
wars; securing victory through production in the two world wars, and a draw through the 
threat o f using the atom bomb in Korea. Only in Vietnam did what William Gibson calls 
‘technowar’ run into serious trouble.
The problems on the ground in Vietnam were heralded by the arrival in Pentagon 
o f a generation o f young, brilliant ‘whizz kids’ spearheaded by Kennedy’s Secretary o f 
Defence Robert Strange McNamara. McNamara’s career was indicative o f his quantitative 
approach. It started with McNamara developing systems analysis for the War Department 
to increase the efficiency and effectiveness o f strategic bombing against German and 
Japan.298 McNamara went on to become Professor o f Harvard Business School and later 
President o f Ford America before entering politics. He and his assistants brought 
quantitative, managerial and scientific techniques into the Pentagon, governed by a mindset 
perhaps best summed up by Henry Kissinger, who argued that since 1945 US foreign 
policy was based on “the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave 
transformations in ‘emerging countries’”.299 As Gibson puts it: “By adopting
microeconomics, game theory, systems analysis, and other managerial techniques, the 
Kennedy administration advanced “limited war” to greater specificity, making it seem 
much more controllable, manageable, and therefore desirable as foreign policy.” 300 Gibson 
describes a three-step process whereby the military became permeated with managerial
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thinking: Firstly, warfare was a problem of organizing quantities, which was seen by 
McNamara to epitomize the highest form o f human reasoning. Secondly, quantification 
was followed up by constructions o f models for production o f warfare, a process o f 
thinking inspired by analyses o f the behaviour o f firms in the capitalist economy. Thirdly, 
the enemy was conceptualized to behave according to the same logic.301
The two dominant forms o f war fighting in Vietnam illustrate the implementation 
o f this kind of thinking; search and destroy missions on the ground, and bombing from the 
air. Early in the war the American military leadership had learnt that two o f the major 
political challenges in the counterinsurgency war were outside o f reach.302 One was the 
failure to reform governance in the south led to a focus on the revolutionary enemy 
instead. The other was that in 1965 Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff General Earl 
Wheeler privately advised President Johnson that pacifying the countryside in South 
Vietnam303 was deemed to require somewhere between 700,000 and 1 million troops 
fighting for seven years.304 The only remaining solution became attrition on the ground 
backed up with what SACEUR General Wesley Clark, referring to the strategy behind the 
1999 Kosovo War, called ‘coercive diplomacy,’305 which is to say bombing as 
communication.
N ot only were these techniques unviable in themselves, but they contradicted each 
other as well. Aside from the many tactical problems,306 search and destroy generated 
operational concepts and promotion rewards governed by a tally of body counts, which 
became inflated. Even at inflated rates, the production o f body counts did not yield 
sufficient results. During the Tet offensive, which was a rare batde-type engagement where 
the Americans won easily, the attrition o f the enemy was far from sufficient. Indeed, even 
at Tet attrition rates: “The DRV could fight for up to thirty years before its manpower 
account would bankrupt. Vietcong forces could only fight for another three and a half 
years, a figure reflecting the order o f batde, but three and a half years o f fighting at Tet 
levels meant tremendous American casualties.” 307 In addition, Tet exposed that the
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American military leadership’s claim to the American public that Vietcong was beaten was 
a lie.
The search and destroy missions also came in conflict with the coercive diplomacy 
o f bombing. Bombing in support o f ground search-and-destroy operations was annihilatory 
in logic, where precision and actually hitting targets was essential. However, the strategic 
bombing campaign called ‘Rolling Thunder’, aimed at sending a message through 
regularised bombing which escalated and de-escalated to coerce the N orth Vietnamese into 
negotiation. In the latter case, it was more important that bombing took place at 
decipherable intervals rather than what the bombs hit. These two approaches logically 
subverted each other. Both interdiction bombing and search-and-destroy on the ground 
followed the principles of attrition, forcing the enemy to expend resources. While such an 
approach was nominally successful against the highly mechanised Germans in World War 
II, it had hardly any impact on the jungle bound Vietcong and the unindustrialised agrarian 
subsistence economy o f the N orth Vietnamese.308 The CIA found that that no conceivable 
conventional bombing campaign could deny the N orth Vietnamese sufficient supplies for 
their needs.309
Compounding these mistakes was a fundamental misapprehension on both sides of 
what the war was about for the opposite side. At root, the N orth Vietnamese saw the war 
as a national liberation struggle, whereas the Americans saw it as a strategic Cold War 
theatre influenced by Soviet and Chinese communism. American generals failed to identify 
how critical the political and willpower dimensions were to the enemy’s thinking. A 
conversation with an American correspondent recalled by the inventor o f the concept of 
air-mobility, General Williams, illustrates this well:
Sitting and talking to him, he made the charge. H e said, “Y o u  are doing m ore in  your 
helicopters to  prevent our side from  w inning this war than anyone else.” I said, 
“H o w ’s that?” H e said, “Well, let m e illustrate it this way. E verybody agrees that this is 
a war for the hearts and m inds o f  the people. H o w  d o  you expect our forces to  w in  
the hearts and m inds o f  the peop le w hen all they do is take o f f  from  one Arm y base 
and fly overhead at 1500 feet w hile Charlie is sitting dow n there and h e’s got ’em  by 
the testicles jerking, and every tim e he jerks their hearts and m inds follow . N o w , until
308 Ib id , 342-7.
309 Ib id , 353.
86
the Americans are willing to get down there with Charlie, he’s got their hearts and 
minds.”310
Reflecting upon this, General Williams agreed that “if you really want to be cost- 
effective, you have to fight the war the way the VC fought it. You have to fight it 
down in the muck and in the mud and at night, and on a day-to-day basis.” Yet, the 
general told the correspondent, “that’s not the American way, and you are not going 
to get the American soldier to fight that way.”311
This is not necessarily true for all American forces, as the relatively successful early
counter-insurgency campaign waged by US Army Special Forces proves.312 However, the 
Special Forces’ lessons and experiences were not what survived the war.
Today management thinking, attrition warfare and a failure to appreciate the 
political dimensions o f warfare continue to plague American efforts. To this the experience 
o f Vietnam has added another dimension of great importance; risk aversion, which
reinforces and is reinforced by management thinking. Risks are inherently based on
estimates o f likelihood, coupled with the gravity o f an actualisation o f a worst case scenario 
along a large spectre o f security areas from crime, WMD proliferation, terrorism through to 
migration.313 This does not generate much in the way o f political capital, which makes it 
very hard to convince the public that risks ought to be accompanied with willingness for 
sacrifice. That is an important feature o f why the war in Iraq was so unpopular with the 
public in most countries, and it helps explain why many NATO  countries in Afghanistan 
are unwilling to take up the fight with Taliban in the south. As far as military 
instrumentality goes, this reality generates risk aversion, both politically and militarily. In 
addition, risk aversion in turn reinforces the temptations o f the magic bullet, which is sent 
instead o f the men.
c) Technology and airpow er
The preferred means o f American warfare are technology and airpower. As Gray puts it, 
American leaders have tended to prefer sending in steel rather than men to  do military
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tasks.314 Commanding General in Iraq David Petraeus argued in 1997 “never send a man 
when you can send a bullet” .315 This is reflective o f an attitude that prioritises conventional 
warfare, which translates into strategic preference for annihilation,316 and attrition in 
tactics.317 The use o f steel instead o f manpower attempts to achieve several things at once; 
efficiency and effectiveness (more military effect per man); less exposure (to enemy fire); 
and less discomfort (long term field deployments). However, for all o f these virtues there 
are vices.
The tactical military effectiveness that is created is not easily translated into a 
desired strategic outcome in anything short o f conventional war, particularly since massive 
use o f  firepower alienates civilians who invariably experience what is euphemistically 
referred to as ‘collateral damage’. Martin Shaw calls this ‘risk transfer warfare’, where risk is 
transferred from the troops and over to the local population in the given warzone.318 
Furthermore, exposing oneself to risk and staying long term with the local population is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for success in any insurgency-like campaign. Today, 
most if not all, campaigns have insurgency-like traits. Intellectual generals like Petraeus do 
not fail to see the subtleties of counterinsurgency as the new counterinsurgency field 
manual, to which he contributed substantially, illustrates. However, within the American 
military, there is a culture for relying on firepower, which has led to strong exchanges 
between Americans and the British in particular, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.319
This firepower very often comes from the most mechanized and technology­
intensive o f all the branches o f military power; air power. Airpower’s prominence today is 
hardly surprising given how airpower won the naval Pacific campaign in World War II, and 
how air superiority in Western Europe was a precondition for the ultimately successful 
march on Germany. Standing on the beach soon after D-day Dwight D. Eisenhower’s son 
advised his father that the following campaign would never succeed without air supremacy,
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to which Eisenhower senior replied; “Without air supremacy I wouldn’t be here.” 320 In 
every subsequent war, airpower has played a defining role, and the success is illustrated by 
the fact that American ground forces have not been submitted to (hostile) air attack since 
the Korean War. Nonetheless, airpower has been much more successfully applied in 
conventional warfare than what has been the case in insurgency-like wars, o f  which 
Vietnam is the primary example.
Airpower’s lure is, as Mclnnes puts it, that it offers “gratification without 
commitment.” 321 Following the indeterminate results of strategic bombing in World War 
II, sceptics could argue, as Colin Gray has, that air power is merely a supportive arm, it 
cannot win a war alone: “the whole object o f the exercise is to influence the behaviour o f 
an enemy who needs to be controlled where he lives, on land.” 322 Gray’s point is supported 
by the 1999 Kosovo War; peace could only be established on the ground, and some would 
say that it followed as much from Russian diplomatic pressure, threats o f ground invasion, 
and economic blockade as much as from air bombardment.323 At any rate, the war gave 
proponents o f air power renewed energy. As did the role, airpower played in providing 
firepower for American Special Forces and the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2001.
The debates about the role o f technology in the US military has for the last couple 
o f decades revolved around concepts like ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), ‘Network 
Centric Warfare’ (1990s), and ‘Military Transformation’ (2000 onwards). 324 Andrew 
Marshall o f the Pentagon’s Office o f N et Assessments coined the term RMA and was 
influential in its wider spread following the first G ulf War. Marshall himself was inspired by 
the Soviets who had taken a lead in thinking about these issues in the 1970s, particularly 
Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov.325 Andrew Krepinevich’s definition o f RMA from 1994 is still 
standing as a formulation o f the pre-eminent structural effort in the American military: 
“W hat is a military revolution? It is what occurs when the application o f new technologies 
into a significant number o f military systems combine with innovative operational concepts
320 Quoted in Mclnnes, Spectator-sport war 80.
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and organizational adaptations in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct 
o f conflict.” 326
What are the material properties o f this revolution? The debate centres on how 
information will revolutionise warfare. Information is sometimes referred to as C4ISTAR, 
which means command, control, communications, coordination, intelligence, surveillance, 
target acquisition and reconnaissance, or in more simple terms; collection, integration and 
dissemination o f tactical (actionable) information about the enemy (whereabouts, 
capability, intention, direction) relative to friendly forces. Admiral William Owen, a staunch 
proponent o f RMA, has promised technology can conquer both the fog and friction o f war 
through technology: “That technology can give us the ability to see a ‘battlefield’ as large as 
Iraq or Korea — an area 200 miles on a side — with unprecedented fidelity, comprehension, 
and timeliness; by night or day, in any kind o f weather, all the time.” 327 It is hoped that this 
sensory capability will reduce the necessity to kill the enemy, because they will realize they 
cannot win. This was the sales pitch for transformation.
Three major critiques can be levelled at the RMA/Transformation idea. The first 
critique argues it is not a revolution. Van Creveld and Colin Gray are equally exasperated 
by the many “revolutions” in naval warfare and combined arms warfare, from the nuclear 
to the jet engine, from the computer to the cruise missile, and from space warfare to 
information warfare.328 Lawrence Freedman agrees that what is happening is evolutionary 
not revolutionary.329 Even though new technologies increase the speed, precision and 
destructiveness o f firepower, the essential principles o f combat remain the same. Van 
Creveld observes that the basic idea behind the U.S. Army’s 1980s forerunner to RMA, 
called AirLand Battle, is not very different from German operations in 1943.330 Indeed, 
when he asked some generals whether they could identify any significant difference 
between Norman Schwarzkopfs operations in the Gulf War o f 1991 compared with 
Patton’s operations in Western Europe in 1944-45, they could not.331
The second critique is that the RMA does not necessarily work. The recent 
victories against “Afghan military rabble” 332 and an Iraqi (2003) enemy that was
326 Krepinevich quoted in Gray, Another Bloody Century, 112.
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“extraordinarily incompetent” 333 to the point that one Marine commander argued Iraqi 
generals “couldn’t carry a bucket o f rocks” 334 do not necessarily prove much. With respect 
to a potentially more able and capable enemy Van Creveld emphasizes how most of the 
technologies in question can be used to produce countermeasures that are often as 
significant as the initial invention, neutralizing gains.335 Furthermore, whatever the ability o f 
the enemy, there are problems of information overflow - or bottlenecking - a characteristic 
challenge o f  command and control, which came up as bandwidth shortage in the 2003 Iraq 
War.336
The third and most serious critique of the RM A/Transformation debate, however, 
is whether it yields anything to strategy in any relation to the vast efforts, amounts of 
brainpower, and financial resources expended on it. Such a degree o f prioritization is 
matched only by the vastness o f RMA as a strategic ambition. What matters is not even 
servicing o f targets, but “the availability o f targets and the consequences o f hitting 
them.” 337 This is akin to a belief in having the ability to capture enemy troops electronically, 
and then to have them concede defeat (to the electronic sensors) permanently, so that any 
combat becomes unnecessary. Such a form o f technological hubris and ethnocentrism 
suggests that enemy forces want to play by the rules o f technicist warfare. The degree to 
which this is not the case can be illustrated by a comparison o f combat time in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Compare the transitions from, and aftermath of, major combat operations in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq (six years and counting + four years and counting) with the 
combat phases of those two campaigns (two months +  three weeks). A tally o f allied 
casualties in those times would yield a similar imbalance. Despite all its promises war by 
instruments does clearly not quite do what it promises.
Conclusion
When taking a measure o f what war has become it is very tempting to rephrase the 
question into; what have the Americans turned conventional war into? This is only partially 
unfair. The instrumentality o f war today is a product o f social and political developments 
on the one hand, and American military supremacy on the other. Among the social and
333 Ibid., 193.
334 Rick Atkinson, In the Company o f Soldiers; a chronicle o f combat in Iraq (London: Little, Brown, 2004), 4.
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political developments, the most significant factors are the end o f the Cold War and war as 
a source of meaning.
The American military superiority is a product o f massive funding and military 
research, and the absence o f a viable peer in this field. American military culture has always 
been about instrumentality: war as instrument and war bj technology. It is not necessarily 
more so today than 150 years ago, bu t the military superiority breeds hubris on behalf o f its 
utility. Freedman is undoubtedly correct to argue that it would be unwise not to exploit the 
advantages o f the information revolution in war, “as long as they are kept on tap, rather 
than on top” .338 As Freedman also recognizes, it is equally important to recognise General 
Earl Tilford’s observations that all o f America’s defeats since World War II came at the 
hands o f  enemies who had little or no air or naval forces, and whose ground forces were 
essentially light infantry.339
It is appropriate to refer back to Clausewitz, because he struck the right balance 
between asking what war is and saying what it ought to be about. Clausewitz established 
that war is about things external to itself. In Gray’s words; “war is about politics, it is not 
about fighting” 340 This is as much a normative statement as a descriptive one. It is not 
normative in the moralistic sense, but in the sense o f imbuing wisdom that is well worth 
heeding. The new American way o f warfare denies politics and equates war with fighting, 
continues Gray, and even equates fighting with the servicing o f targets.341 As Clausewitz 
put it:
Theorists soon found out how difficult the subject was and felt justified in evading the 
problem by again directing their principles and systems only to physical matters and 
unilateral activity. As in the science concerning preparationsfor war, they wanted to reach 
a set of sure and positive conclusions, and for that reason considered only factors that 
could be mathematically calculated.342
Clausewitz here directs our attention to the two major problems with instrumental war. It 
reduces war to  quantitative and physical properties on the one hand, and treats the enemy 
is an essentially constant and static property on the other hand, no t an agile and fluid one, 
vhich has his own, will, and frequently lots o f it. O f course, there are exceptions to this
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view, in the American military principally represented by the US Marine Corps; their 
persistent focus is on history and the human element over the tools o f war.
The instrumentality o f war has two lessons for us in this respect, one implicit and 
the other explicit. The first point has to do with the role o f warriors and how they are able 
to negotiate an existential lifeworld for themselves within a highly instrumentalized form of 
war. The second point is that the instrumentality o f war reaffirms Clausewitz’s claim that 
war’s nature is constant whereas war’s character is changing. It is appropriate to turn now to 
what Jiinger called the piece for the gods.
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C h a p t e r  4 :  C o m b a t  i s  E x i s t e n t i a l
Man, I think, is an infantry animal.
Kurt Vonnegut Jr.
Mother Night
Introduction
Combat is an overwhelmingly existential realm, and this has consequences for how 
warriors and soldiers experience it. While combat is more existential than warfare, it is also 
instrumental. For this reason, a caveat similar to the one featuring in the discussion o f war 
in the previous chapter is offered here as well. Combat is the sharp end of the instrument 
o f the state, its cash payment, as Clausewitz observed.343 Nonetheless, any closer analysis 
o f the lifeworld where this cash payment takes place is bound to encounter the tension 
between the existential and the instrumental.
Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now illustrates this very well. Special Forces 
Captain Willard is instructed to travel into Cambodia to find the enigmatic and wayward 
Special Forces Colonel Kurtz, and “terminate” his command. Kurtz is running the war 
with ruthless effectiveness in his private kingdom, but in an unrestrained and personal 
manner. His senior officers back in headquarters are rather more concerned about his 
“unsound method”; his cruelty, than the contribution to the war effort he evidendy 
produces. Kurtz has submitted entirely to the Dionysian forces in his soul and revels in 
destruction and gratification. For the military establishment, however, he has breached the 
codes and restraints on war, and thus the bounds o f civilization, and so he must be 
stopped.
Willard does execute the mission, but not without significant sympathy for Kurtz’s 
willpower and existential journey from the seemingly Apollonian instrumental dimension 
o f war to its Dionysian cruelty. Kurtz sees a lot o f this cruelty in the enemy who are willing 
to cut o ff inoculated children’s arms to demonstrate their willpower and conviction. 
Willard’s conundrum in whether to terminate Kurtz is wrought with further tension when 
he encounters Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore, a battalion commander with the 1st Air 
Cavalry. Kilgore’s conduct o f the war appears no less restrained Kurtz’s, but in contrast to 
Kurtz’s way, his still carries the blessing of the military establishment. Whereas heavy 
reliance on airpower and overwhelming firepower with the risk o f killing and alienating
343 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1984), 97.
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villagers is acceptable, heads on stakes is bad form, even if they are the heads o f the enemy. 
It is all a question o f method. Kurtz’s apparent unrestraint recalls Achilles’ private anti­
social — yet ultimately understandable - rage at the beginning o f the Iliad.
Apocalypse Now thus captures the dilemma at stake between war and combat, and 
how the essential properties of combat only reluctandy and unstably allow themselves to be 
subordinated to the instrumental will o f the state. It is good that a cause and a decision­
making body (government) and professional apparatus (military) that do not pursue 
violence privately, wantonly, randomly and without restraint or purpose govern war. On 
the other hand, the nature o f war and combat is extremely violent, which raises existential 
issues that have to do with sacrifice and purposeful infliction o f suffering. The pursuit o f 
victory requires such effort and willpower that its restraint must not overrule its 
ruthlessness. Yet the ruthlessness must not descend into barbarism either. For this reason, 
the world o f combat is a world unto itself, which is qualitatively different from the more 
cool-headed calculations that govern the instrumentality o f war.
The trinitarian nature of combat
A recurring theme in the literature on war across history, fiction and non-fiction alike, is 
that the experience o f combat is an existential event in any individual’s life.344 Combat has a 
trinitarian nature, which is composed of: (1) the human being, (2) the sublime encounter 
with combat and (3) the social structure of combat. The first chapter focused on the 
human element and clarified the distinction between warriors and soldiers. This chapter 
explores the two other dimensions o f combat in depth, and will revisit the human element 
from chapter one to address voluntarism. The argument here focuses more on the nature 
o f combat than warriors, and seeks to explain what it is about it that warriors find bearable, 
even attractive, for all its cruelty. In addition to arguing that combat is a realm apart, it will 
be argued that there is a reflexive dialectic between combat (the phenomenon) and the 
actors (warriors and soldiers) which both transforms the latter and creates a social structure 
o f combat. As all other human activity combat also has a social structure, which is more 
than anything is characterised by cohesion. Cohesion is a process that works for warriors 
and soldiers alike, by making combat somewhat bearable for soldiers, while making it an 
intoxicant for warriors.
344 Coker, Waging war without warriors, Jesse Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (Lincoln: 
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Both the combat sublime and cohesion are timeless essential features o f combat 
irrespective o f the context o f the war in question. Whereas war is above all a political 
instrument, in some measure controllable through rational means, combat is a realm 
dominated more by Dionysian elements, to use Nietzschean terminology.
Trinity I: C om bat is an encoun ter w ith the sublime
Theodore Nadelson argues that ordinary men who have seen combat remain attached to its 
“arresting elements, to its wonder,:”345 By wonder he means “the changed state o f mind 
caused by an encounter that shifts the usual and expected into something dramatic, 
dazzling, and bewildering. Wonder happens when an event unexpectedly lifts a comer of 
the ordinary universe to reveal another plane o f existence. For anyone who has been in 
serious combat, it claims the pivotal reference point for an entire life, and it strangely 
shadows — eclipses all that happened before or after.” 346 Nadelson here exposes virtually all 
sides o f the sublime o f combat: its wonder; a changed state o f mind; another plane o f 
existence; and a pivotal reference for life.
The point is that combat is a qualitatively different form o f activity from anything 
else in life. The organised, protracted and purposeful killing often in spectacular 
circumstances and the attendant sacrifice o f life it involves, have no parallel in civilian life. 
As Coker explains, for these reasons combat inspires awe: “W hat awe produces in the 
subject is a feeling o f vastness which covers anything that can be experienced as larger than 
the self, or the self s ordinary level o f experience or frame o f reference.” 347 ‘Awe’ is closely 
related to ‘sublime’. The etymology o f the Latin sub-limen, Olya Gayazova points out, is 
“usually understood to signify rising up to and over some llimen,’ some metaphorical 
‘threshold.’” 348 According to the Oxford 'English Dictionary, the sublime can either refer to 
persons; “their attributes, feelings, actions: Standing high above others by reason of 
nobility or grandeur o f nature or character; o f high intellectual, moral and spiritual level;” 
or, it can refer to “things in nature and art: Affecting the mind with a sense of 
overwhelming grandeur or irresistible power; calculated to inspire awe, deep reverence, or 
lofty emotion, by reason o f its beauty, vastness or grandeur.” 349
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Coker argues the use o f the concept awe in relation to war has to do with its 
spectacle and excess: “At the heart o f war lies an excess incompatible with the values we 
celebrate in peacetime. The warrior soul is at one with excess, with the sublime of 
destruction, with ‘awe’ — war is indeed awesome in a way peace is not.” 350 W hat does this 
awe do to us? Edmund Burke speaking o f the sublime in nature conceived o f it as having a 
paralyzing astonishing effect: “astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its 
motions are suspended, with some degree o f horror. In this case the mind is so entirely 
filled with its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that 
object which employs it.” 351 William Broyles uses similar language to say war is “the only 
way in which most men touch the mythic domain of their soul.” 352
Combat veterans speak o f combat as being “in it”, implying that combat does not 
inspire questions about what its meaning is to the degree war does, as Nadelson suggests: 
“Life in combat is not “about anything” but simply “is”.353 Danger makes us “more aware 
o f being alive by calling attention to our physical selves” he continues, and this is due to 
combat’s irreversibility. It inevitably becomes a group effort which for many is the high 
point o f their lives.354 This comes out very clearly in an extraordinary passage by the 
German World War I veteran and Pour le Merite winner Ernst Jiinger:
The great moment had come. The curtain of fire lifted from the front trenches. We 
stood up.
With a mixture of feelings, evoked by bloodthirstiness, rage, and intoxication, we 
moved in step, ponderously but irresistibly toward the enemy lines. I was well ahead 
of the company, followed by Vinke and a one-year veteran named Haake. My right 
hand embraced the shaft of my pistol, my left a riding stick of bamboo cane. I was 
boiling with mad rage, which had taken hold of me and all of the others in an 
incomprehensible fashion. The overwhelming wish to kill gave wings to my feet. Rage 
pressed bitter tears from my eyes.
The monstrous desire for annihilation, which hovered over the batdefield, thickened 
the brains of the men and submerged them in a red fog. We called to each other in 
sobs and stammered disconnected sentences. A neutral observer might have perhaps 
believed we were seized by an excess of happiness.355
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Jiinger was an unusual warrior, but this description resonates with many combat veterans. 
Reflecting on his experiences o f combat as a founding member o f the U.S. Army’s most 
elite unit, Delta Force, Eric Haney puts it thus: “I hate the destructiveness and waste of 
warfare, but I love the sensation o f it. In combat, mankind is seen in absolutes — at his very 
best or his very worst. There are no in-betweens. N o one has a place to hide.” 356 Now we 
must turn to the constituent parts o f the combat sublime: danger and suffering; 
incomprehension; and transformation.
i) Combat sublime is danger and 
suffering
Clausewitz says danger is a part o f the friction o f war; “without an accurate conception o f 
danger we cannot understand war,” 357 or combat. Danger and destruction combine making 
combat not just spectacular, but sublime. The essential quality o f combat that separates it 
from everything else is its inherent and willed danger, which is purposefully created by 
someone who goes to his or her utmost effort to kill and destroy.
Evan Wright embedded with Marine 1st Recon Battalion during the initial combat 
stage o f the recent Iraq war compared the danger and hardship o f the Marines in that unit 
with normal life: “In my civilian world at home in Los Angeles, half the people I know are 
on antidepressants or anti-panic attack drugs because they can’t handle the stress o f a mean 
boss or a crowd at the 7-eleven when buying a Slurpee.” 358 While Wright’s account o f his 
civilian life probably rings true for many in the contemporary West, there was a time when 
large segments o f the male population were called on to serve in war. S. L. A. Marshall 
relates a reflection that must have been pervasive among many o f his generation serving in 
World War II: “What normal man would deny that some o f the fullest and fairest days o f 
his life have been spent at the front or that the sky ever seems more blue or the air more 
bracing than when there is just a hint o f danger in the air?” 359 For General Sir John Hackett 
this means the soldier is serving under an “unlimited liability which lends dignity to the 
military profession” and which makes the military virtues like fortitude, loyalty, endurance 
and courage not luxuries but “functional necessities.” 360
Combat is suffering because o f climatic and topographical features, stress, hunger 
and sleep deprivation on the one hand and the extreme violence and atrocities associated
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with war and combat on the other. The landscape o f the First World War is symbolically 
captured by the mud o f Passchendaele, the Eastern Front o f the Second World War by one 
o f the coldest winters in memory, its ferocious fighting and its cruelty, and Vietnam is 
remembered for its endless search-and-destroy patrols, often in areas o f impenetrable triple 
canopy jungle.
Lieutenant Edwin Vaughan o f the Royal Warwicks describes how on Passchendaele 
Ridge, wounded were screaming in agony in the dark: “It was too obvious to me that 
dozens o f men with serious wounds must have crawled for safety into shell holes, and now 
the water was rising above them and, powerless to move, they were slowly drowning.”361 
Guy Sajer, an Alsatian fighting for the Germans in the Ukraine in the winter o f 1943 
recalled why their fighting tended towards white-hot hatred for the enemy after they had 
found their own, with:
faces smashed open with axes, so that the gold teeth could be pulled out; the hideous 
agony of wounded men tied with their heads inside the gaping bellies of dead 
comrades; amputated genitals; Ellers’ section, whom we had found tied up and naked, 
on a day when the temperature had dropped to thirty degrees below zero, with their 
feet thrust into a drinking trough which had frozen solid; and the faces of tortured 
men under the dark winter sky.. .362
Philip Caputo, a lieutenant with the U.S. Marines in Vietnam describes how on patrol the 
dense jungle made it impossible to see, which inspired the type o f fear we are programmed 
to feel in attics and dark alleys. A strong sense o f imagination was not your friend in such a 
place, Caputo understates, which geared up tensions. The dampness o f the jungle rotted 
and corroded everything; “bodies, boot leather, canvas, metal, morals”:
There was nothing familiar out where we were, no churches, no police, no laws, no 
newspapers, or any of the restraining influences without which the earth’s population 
of virtuous people would be reduced by ninety-nine percent. It was the dawn of 
creation in the Indochina bush, an ethical as well as a geographical wilderness. Out 
there, lacking restraints, sanctioned to kill, confronted by a hostile country and a 
relendess enemy, we sank into a brutish state.363
Decaying morals are generated not only by the indirect suffering that combat leads to, but 
also the brutalization that inevitably follows, sometimes leading to absolutely unspeakable
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cruelty. It is important to avoid too much abstraction when speaking about experiences to 
bear in mind the extremity o f warriors’ lifeworld. Another feature o f the combat sublime is 
its attendant incomprehension.
ii) Combat sublime is incomprehension
For Burke, whatever is dangerous and terrible is also sublime, but danger is not all. “To 
make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to  be necessary. When we know the 
full extent o f any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal o f the 
apprehension vanishes.” 364 The confusion and chaos that seems to rule in combat is hard 
to make sense o f if  one is not experienced.
Clausewitz held experience as necessary to compensate for incomprehension. “In 
war the experienced soldier reacts in the same way as the human eye does in the dark: the 
pupil expands to admit what litde light there is, discerning objects by degrees, and finally 
seeing them distinctly. By contrast, the novice is plunged into the deepest night.” 365 The 
darkness o f this deepest night is very strongly influenced by danger and suffering, since 
death and destruction virtually creates a new landscape, entailing hitherto unimagined 
deformations o f  the human body. The young lieutenant Jxinger conveyed how the horror 
itself leads to incomprehension:
Seeing and recognizing are matters, really, of habit. In the case of something quite 
unknown the eye alone can make nothing of it. So it was that we had to stare again 
and again at these things that we had never seen before, without being able to give 
them any meaning. It was too entirely unfamiliar. We looked at all these dead with 
dislocated limbs, distorted faces, and the hideous colours of decay, as though we 
walked in a dream through a garden full of strange plants, and we could not realize at 
first what we had all round us.366
Clausewitz and Junger allude to the difference in situational awareness between the 
experienced warrior and the novice. Sometimes this experience is accompanied by a 
brutally blase attitude, where even the dead can become a source o f physical comfort. 
Holmes reports one Wheeler to have used dead Frenchmen to protect himself against the 
cutting wind at Salamanca, and a Spanish Foreign Legionnaire sergeant used corpses as 
mattresses to protect himself while sleeping on wet ground.367
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Whatever the degree o f experience, however, combat veterans tend to see combat 
in a remarkably fragmented way, very often having great difficulty agreeing with their peers 
precisely what happened in a given action. This inherent perspectivism follows from the 
incomprehensibility o f combat, which further underlines what a challenging environment it 
is. A British tank commander fighting in the Normandy invasion became frustrated with 
having to report developments continuously: “I was told by the brigade major to report 
more precisely and more often what was going on. I replied that since I was shut up inside 
a camouflaged, stationary tank with its turret closed down I had precisely nothing, often or 
not, to report... Could he tell me what was going on?” 368
Another point raised by Gerald Linderman is the way in which war, and combat in 
particular, guards its secrets such that successive generations become attracted to its 
dangers: “Why, in war after war, do soldiers first approaching battle remain convinced that 
the loss o f their own lives is an impossibility? Why do so many soldiers, having discovered 
the realities o f warfare, still persevere in batde? Why, o f those whose experience o f training 
and battle appears virtually identical, do some but not others succumb to neuropsychiatric 
collapse? Or, following the war, suffer post-traumatic stress disorder?” 369 On the other side 
o f experience, since combat is incomprehensible, it is also likely that a warrior is unable to 
rest content that he has “seen it all,” especially if  the exhilaration becomes addictive. A 
combat veteran o f 175 patrols in the Korean War expected more: “I had the feeling I had 
missed the complete experience.” 370
Hi) Com bat sublime is transformative 
The more general point is; how can we make sense o f the ecstasy Jiinger describes above in 
relation to such danger and suffering as combat evokes? The answer is that the encounter 
with combat is transformative.371 It is transformative for all in the sense that the experience 
leaves marks for those who survive. Most frequendy, this leads to psychological trauma (of 
which there is a large and growing body o f literature). Yet, it is also transformative in the 
moment, for some in a positive sense. Combat’s extraordinary demands lead to  a 
transformation into warriors for those who are able to translate the encounter with the 
sublime into focus and concentration. In a very basic way, it separates those who are able 
to cope with it and those who do not. To appreciate this dimension o f combat is to move
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beyond such simple dichotomies as cowards and heroes. As Swank and Marchand found 
out, after sixty days o f protracted combat following D-Day, 98 percent o f surviving soldiers 
had become psychiatric casualties. The remaining two percent were diagnosed as 
“aggressive psychopathic personalities”.372 A warrior is not someone who is unbreakable, 
simply someone who has overcome the initial shock o f combat and turns it into strength, 
until combat exhaustion inevitably sets in. Having discussed what the combat sublime is, it 
is necessary to move over to what it does.
What makes combat transformative? It appears the duress and suffering o f combat 
reveals a reservoir o f strength and tenacity in some soldiers. This is not to deny that 
coercion, social pressure, alcohol, drugs or other forms o f pressure are irrelevant to this 
transformation.373 However, they are not enough, and tend to be equally distributed to all. 
Given the opportunity, some warriors go back for more combat, even though from 
society’s perspective they have done more than what could be asked o f them. They have 
changed. This is by no means a common reaction. A more normal reaction is well 
illustrated by Cavalry Sergeant Allan Paul following his first combat experience in Vietnam:
Honey, I was never so scared in my life... This was my first look at war, and it sure 
was an ugly sight. I helped carry some of the wounded away, and boy, I sure hope I 
don’t have to do it again. It was an experience you can never explain in a million 
words. The noise from shooting is enough to drive a person crazy. Even after the 
attack last night, we had to stay up and wait for a ground attack which lucky for us 
never came... I was surprised last night to see that the men here were willing to risk 
their lives to save a buddy’s. It really makes you have faith in people again, but I hope 
I don’t have to go through what I did last night in a long time (like never!).374
Sergeant Paul has been changed by his experience. It is unclear whether he will be 
ready to repeat the experience, but he is nonetheless changed. Jesse Glenn Gray notices 
this point: “They may write home to their parents and sweethearts that they are unchanged, 
and they may even be convinced o f it. But the soldier who has yielded himself to the 
fortunes o f war, has sought to kill and to escape being killed, or who has even lived long 
enough in the disordered landscape o f battle, is no longer what he was.” 375 Gray struggles 
to explain precisely the nature o f this transformation, but his conclusion is probably as
372 R. L. Swank and W. E. Marchand, 'Combat neuroses: development o f  combat exhaustion', Archives o f 
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close as anyone has given: “Man as warrior is only partly a man, yet, fatefully enough, this 
aspect o f him is capable o f transforming the whole. W hen given free play, it is able to 
subordinate other aspects o f the personality, repress civilian habits o f mind and make the 
soldier as fighter a different kind o f creature from the former worker, farmer or clerk.” 376
Combat does not directly change anyone into warriors; rather it presents the 
individual with an imperative to reveal a different part o f  one's nature and to defeat fear. 
The transformation o f a scared soldier into a warrior happens when the exposure to 
combat reveals character; it refines the randomly distributed character traits already in place 
within an individual into a hardened warrior. Random in this respect means that there is no 
sure way o f predicting that this is going to happen to any particular individual. The history 
o f war is full o f examples o f warriors who struggled to be accepted among their peers in 
training, but who became fully-fledged warriors in the field. Both the Marines and Army 
Airborne, for example, rejected Audie Murphy, because o f his slight build.377 Similarly, 
Medal o f H onor winner Tom  Norris struggled to keep up in Navy SEAL basic training 
(BUDS).378 The precise dynamics o f the transformation are hard to pin down precisely, but 
it appears to have a narrative structure. There is the initial stage o f fear, which some will 
overcome and others will not. Then there is the transformative moment; the encounter 
with the sublime, an inexplicable and unpredictable development. Finally, there is the 
achievement o f focus and mastery.
This process can be found in testimonies from veterans who have written about 
their experiences. Sepp Allerberger describes the transformation he experienced in his first 
combat action as a machine gunner:
Within me a strange metamorphosis was taking place. The low-brow who had risen 
from the trench would, during the next few hours of violent battle, become an 
infantryman, better still a warrior in the original sense of the word. Fear, blood, death 
were the ingredients in an alchemy that intoxicated and drugged its participants: it 
marked the end of my personal innocence and swept away all visions and dreams of 
‘my future’; swept away my life. I was being forced to kill. Killing on the battlefield 
was to be my trade. Fate required of me that I should perfect it to mastery.379
To overcome the combat sublime requires experience in mobilising a certain kind o f 
temper through willpower, Burke reminds us: “Indeed, so natural is this timidity with
3T6 Ibid.
3 7 Audie Murphy, To H ell and Back (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 8.
3 8 Dick Couch, The Warrior Elite - The forging o f S E A E  class 228 (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001), 274.
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regard to power, and so strongly does it inhere in our constitution, that very few are able to 
conquer it, but by mixing much in the business o f the great world, or by using no small 
violence to their natural dispositions.” 380 Mixing in the business o f the world is to acquire 
experience, and for a warrior that means combat. ‘Using violence’ to our natural 
dispositions is to use willpower to defeat the natural inclination to run away from danger. 
Allerberger had come to a place o f focus and concentration: “I had lost the feeling for 
time, anxiety, fear, compassion. I was a living football o f events, propelled by the boot o f 
an archaic survival instinct fuelled by the interchange o f fighting, hunger, thirst and 
exhaustion.” 381 According to J. Glenn Gray this is when the self is completely absorbed by 
the objects, it concerns itself with, which is what one veteran calls hyperclarity.382 Surfers 
call it the “green room ” - a state o f complete physical and mental awareness.383 It is a kind 
o f focus and concentration, which follows from experience and increasing skill in 
extremely challenging situations. It is not uncommon for warriors at this stage to consider 
themselves already dead, as did Audie Murphy at some points. This fatalism releases 
freedom of action to focus on the job at hand.384
Focus is not enough, however, because it can be translated into either passivity or 
activity. Mark Bowden’s study o f the Battle o f Mogadishu illustrates this difference in the 
actions o f experienced Delta Force operators compared with inexperienced Rangers. Delta 
SFC Howe’s combat experience had inculcated him with the knowledge that survival in a 
tight situation depended on translating this focus into initiative and pro-active soldiering: 
“You constantly assessed your position and worked to improve it.” 385 Listening to the 
radio and observing some o f his less experienced peers, however, he observed that not 
everyone shared this lesson: “Howe sensed that some o f those in charge were out o f their 
depth. There was just too much going on. He could see it in their faces. Sensory overload. 
When it happened you could almost see the fog pass over a man’s eyes. They just 
withdrew. They became strictly reactive.” 386
The warrior is never able to master the combat environment completely; nobody 
ever can. Nevertheless, he can master himself and his own reactions to translate the 
experience into something tolerable and exciting. To master or overcome this danger can
380 Kramnick, The Portable Edmund Burke 71.
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be an exhilarating experience, precisely because it takes so much to happen, as an American 
soldier in Huertgen Forest found; “Now the fight was at its wildest. We dashed... from 
one building to another, shooting, bayoneting, clubbing... The wounded and the dead... 
lay in grotesque positions at every turn. Never in my wildest imagination had I conceived 
that battle could be so incredibly impressive — awful, horrible, deadly, yet somehow 
thrilling, exhilarating.” 387 J. G. Gray again; “The novice may be eager at times to describe 
his emotions in combat, but it is the batde-hardened veterans to whom battle has offered 
the deeper appeals. For some o f them the war years are what Dixon Wecter has called “the 
one great lyric passage in their lives.”” 388
This discussion has centred on the second tier o f combat’s trinity; the encounter 
with the sublime. The third feature is the social structure o f  combat.
Trinity II: T he social structure o f  com bat
Social structure is a critical component for warriors repeatedly to expose themselves to 
combat. Combat inspires, provokes and reinforces small group loyalties. The combat 
soldier’s world is a social world whose degree o f integration is shaped by centrifugal and 
centripetal forces, which increase and reduce the density o f its fabric, its cohesion. 
Theoretically, the soldier’s loyalty is to the state before he deploys and experiences the 
immediate and closer loyalty to his unit. At this point, the degree o f identification with the 
primary groups increases and decreases depending on experiences.
i) Cohesion
Cohesion is a word that describes the strength o f the bond between those who have 
experienced combat together and the loyalty it involves. As in all other social processes that 
are predicated upon a degree o f exclusivity, the bond o f battle narrows the focus to the 
primary group, often to the exclusion o f all other concerns. Karmela Liebkind argues; 
“only extreme social situations such as battles in war may temporarily eradicate all other 
group affiliations but one.” 389
As soon as the soldier has joined his unit, the social world for all practical purposes 
becomes identical to that unit. His freedom, comfort and indeed his survival is all up to the
387 Linderman Gerald F. The World within War, pp 244-45 Quoted in Hillman, 142
388 Gray, The Warriors, 28.
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effectiveness and coherence o f that unit, as the combat motivation literature argues.390 
Symbolically the shape o f the soldier’s social world has centripetally shrunk from being 
identical with the state, to being identical with the unit. The rules, norms and values of the 
unit or the situation are what counts, not those o f the state as such, as Franklin Miller 
explains:
It took me a long time to throttle back from the TSfam years. In cNam, I didn’t have to 
wait for anything — I got everything instantaneously. Order an airstrike and wham! Fast 
movers appeared immediately. Crank up the radio and ask for artillery and bam! On its
way. I operated in a high speed environment that was stripped of normal rules,
bureaucratic red tape, indecision and bullshit. Those conditions didn’t exist, couldn’t
exist in that realm. A sense of urgency was attached to all actions, and with good 
reason.391
These processes are similar, only stronger, when the soldier is in actual combat. The social 
world shrinks even more; to the immediate primary group, usually a squad o f half a dozen 
to a dozen men. It all comes down to the here and now, the essentialised and crystallised 
experience. Military psychiatrist Jonathan Shay quotes one o f his patients, a Vietnam 
veteran who initially identified with the whole battalion. However, after failing to be saved 
by the neighbouring Bravo Company, the social horizon shrunk to only a few: “It was
constant now. I was watching the other five guys like they was (sic.) my children... It
wasn’t seventy-two guys [in the company] I was worried about. It was five guys.”392 These 
five men became the entire social world for the combat soldier. W hen combat ends and the 
squad retreats to the rear areas again, the social world centrifugally increases to encompass 
the whole unit again, although probably not to the same extent as before.
Shay also describes shrinkage o f the moral horizon. An obvious example is the way 
n  which people — as far as racism went — became colour blind in combat, but back in the 
•ear racism flared up again.393 Back in camp, furthermore, there are usually more officers 
md thus more spit-and-polish type discipline than out in the field, where such practices 
vould be ridiculous and counter-productive. Re-adjustment to the pettiness o f garrison
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procedures is very hard after the all-out win-or-lose o f combat, and other social tensions 
were easily provoked by such normative ruptures.394
The practice o f fragging (killing officers on one’s own side by hand grenade) is 
another example o f  how the social and moral world undergoes dramatic changes in the 
field as opposed to in camp. Fragging would be impossible in a base area because o f too 
many witnesses and difficulties enforcing loyalty among the instigating primary group. In 
combat, however, the brutalisation, danger and fierce peer loyalty regrettably makes this 
adverse effect o f combat possible. Paradoxically, both the existence o f fragging and stellar 
performance in combat are due to the same dynamic; cohesion.
ii) y \n  exclusive community
This closure affirms membership in an existentially exclusive community. Combat is an 
enduring and instant divider and unifier. Combatants are distinguished from non- 
combatants, warriors from soldiers, and friends from enemy. A Vietnam veteran and ex­
mercenary in Rhodesia explains how shared bonds and comradeship constitute this 
community:
There’s a love relationship that is nurtured in combat because the man next to you — 
you’re depending on him for the most important thing you have, your life, and if he 
lets you down you’re either maimed or killed. If you make a mistake the same thing 
happens to him, so the bond of trust has to be extremely close, and I’d say this bond 
is stronger than almost anything, with the exception of parent and child. It’s a hell of a 
lot stronger than man and wife — your life is in his hands, you trust that person with 
the most valuable thing you have. And you’ll find that people who pursue the 
aphrodisiac of combat or whatever you want to call it are there because they are 
friends, the same people show up in the same wars time and again.395
The dynamics of this comradeship is governed by inclusion and exclusion, where common 
suffering is the deciding trait. This logic can lead to unexpected outcomes, sometimes o f a 
negative nature.
Another potential effect is readjustment o f friend and enemy distinctions. The 
enemy can become appreciated as someone who is sharing a similar fate, which, if he has 
proven himself, leads to respect. Colonel Hackworth recalled a hardcore Vietcong 
reconnaissance-company commander prisoner who refused to talk to anyone. He was:
39-> Linderman, World Within War, 185-212.
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as defiant as Fd been warned and even more banged up. The worst of his many battle 
scars was a leg that had a depression in it almost as deep and wide as my fist. A huge 
chunk of flesh had been blown out and never sewn up. It would have been a bad, bad 
wound even if medical attention had been available. Still, it had healed and the guy had 
gone back to duty. This was one hardcore stud.
He didn’t want to talk to me, so I pointed to the old wound in his leg and through an 
interpreter asked if he had been hit. He said he had. “No hospital?” I asked. The 
prisoner shook his head almost scornfully. Then I showed him some of my wounds, 
which provoked the first bit of interest from the guy. He asked if they were from 
Vietnam. “No, no.” I replied. “Before. Korea. But this one,” I continued, showing 
him my leg wound, “this one came from the VC here in the Delta.” The wound was 
still red and raw, with big, vicious-looking stitch marks.
“Maybe I did it,” said the VC lieutenant, and he roared with a huge belly laugh.
“Yeah, maybe you did,” I replied.
The warrior-to-warrior exchange broke the ice. It was a common bond that 
transcended patriotism or nationalism or causes. We laid down our flags and allowed 
ourselves to be friends.396
The individual rotation and replacement systems in Korea and Vietnam generated 
another dynamic, which was adverse for both combat performance and cohesion. The goal 
was to give soldiers a fair chance to survive brutal combat through not having to survive it 
for years. O n the other, it weakened morale by making troops focus on their return date, 
rather than combat. It also removed the combat effective veterans from the scene when 
they were getting good. For the replacements, this was outright dangerous because 
continuous casualties provoked a reaction among survivors wherein they could not bear to 
lose more close friends. The solution was not to get to know new arrivals. This in turn 
eroded cohesion and made it difficult for new arrivals to adjust and learn since they could 
not integrate socially into the units until they had survived the first contacts with the 
enemy, which tended to kill inexperienced troops disproportionately.
Nevertheless, for some the loyalty to the fighting men persists, new guy or not. 
When Franklin Miller was receiving the Medal o f H onor from the President, Nixon asked 
| him what he wanted now — implying he could get any service he wanted. Miller replied that
• • 307 * * *| he would like to go right back to his unit. In a similar situation that was exactly opposite
!
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108
to the fragging incidents, Shay relates the story o f a soldier who had a lieutenant who was 
strongly loved by his men, and who did not want to leave them. He had to be forced out of 
the jungle under armed guard when he was due to rotate.398 This kind o f loyalty does not 
necessarily stop when the fighting stops. Grossman argues that guilt about leaving buddies 
behind frequendy became so strong that many could not bring themselves to find out 
whether their friends had made it out alive or not.399 For others, however, the option 
simply became to return for subsequent tours.
After having analysed two o f the tiers in the trinity o f combat; the encounter with 
the sublime (combat as a phenomenon) and the social structure o f combat (combat as a 
social process), it is appropriate to return to the first tier; the human element. Voluntarism 
is a critical difference between soldiers and warriors, and it is generated by the impact o f 
the two previous tiers o f combat upon warriors.
Trinity III: W arriors and com bat voluntarism
Two interrelated processes spawns the return to combat. The first is the warrior’s 
encounter with the exhilaration and satisfaction of combat leading to a desire for more. 
They become multiple volunteers. The second process is the very strong bonds formed 
between comrades in arms enduring and sharing the risks and suffering o f combat. The 
strength of social bonds established in combat exerts a strong loyalty on the individual 
warrior, also after having left the combat zone.
The process from a society’s decision to go to war to the individual soldier 
experiences combat is one o f numerous selection processes. Sometimes these are 
voluntary, whereas other times this is done under coercion through conscription. The first 
selection is between those who serve and those who do not. Among those who serve, only 
a minority are sent to combat units where some, but no t all, experience combat. For a 
select few soldiers, the encounter with combat is one o f empowerment rather than one of 
being overpowered, and they often volunteer to repeat it, if  they are not professionals at 
the outset. Satisfaction is a recurrent theme in their arguments as to why they go back. 
Philip Caputo admits outright to have enjoyed the compelling attractiveness o f  combat:
It was a peculiar enjoyment because it was mixed with a commensurate pain. Under 
fire, a man’s power of life heightened in proportion to the proximity of death, so that 
he felt an elation as extreme as dread. His senses quickened, he attained an acuity of
398 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam 17.
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consciousness at once pleasurable and excruciating. It was something like the elevated 
state of awareness induced by drugs. And it could be just as addictive, for it made 
whatever else life offered in the way of delights and torments seem pedestrian.400
What we find in Caputo’s words is not just the satisfaction and exhilaration o f combat, but 
a fear, or realisation, that life in peacetime, given survival, is not going to measure up. Alan 
Seeger, a Harvard educated American fighting for the French Foreign Legion in World War 
I shared precisely this sentiment. Seeger wrote to his mother in October 1914 that “every 
m om ent here is worth weeks o f  ordinary experience... This will spoil one for any other kind 
o f life.” After having fought for two years Seeger was killed in the first wave on the Somme 
in 1916, which was a fate he had reckoned with in a letter to a friend just before: “I am glad 
to be going in the first wave. If  you are in this thing it is best to be in it to the limit. And 
this is the supreme experience.” 401
Back in Vietnam, Franklin Miller had no difficulties appreciating this point o f view. 
Commenting on why he chose to volunteer four times to go back to Vietnam he simply 
referred to job satisfaction. As he had demonstrated an ability to keep his head cool under 
fire he was granted the responsibility o f leading patrols, while just a Private First Class: “As 
my leadership skills grew, I became more and more respected. Guys came to me for advice 
and assistance. I was looked upon as someone to be emulated, someone you could count 
on in tight spots. My self-esteem skyrocketed.” 402 Miller also argued that because o f these 
special skills he was given total freedom while on mission, escaping the hassle he was 
certain to face as an employee anywhere in the States. Thus he figured: “Job Satisfaction, 
plus Responsibility plus Respect plus Freedom equals A Pretty Outstanding Deal. So why 
in the hell would I want to leave?” 403 Moreover, Miller was very unwilling to leave, even as 
the war was winding down in 1972, when combat motivation was for most other troops at 
an all time low (as the antiwar movement put it “how do you ask someone to be the last 
soldier to die in Vietnam?”). He was so unwilling, in fact, that he had to be drugged down, 
under supervision o f “a very large man,” by medical personnel at a military hospital, 
strapped to a stretcher and put on a plane bound for the United States, where he woke up 
when it was too late to do anything about it.404
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This kind o f voluntarism does not have to do with personal satisfaction exclusively, 
however, it is also strongly in evidence with respect to individual missions, typically with 
respect to rescuing colleagues who are evading the enemy or have already been captured. 
“Leave no man behind” is an ethos shared by the American Special Forces community. In 
Somalia SFC Howe and his Delta colleagues did not rest on the morning following the 
battle o f  the previous night; they went back out again, something, which was not an option 
for the Rangers. The point is not that warriors are unafraid, but that they overcome their 
fear: “W hat distinguishes a warrior from a soldier” Coker emphasizes, “is not that one is 
courageous and the other isn’t: it is that for the warrior courage is habit forming.” 405 
Bowden describes the mindset o f Delta Force: “Howe was surprised to still be alive. The 
thought o f heading straight back out into the fight scared him, but the fear was nothing 
next to the loyalty he felt to the men stranded in the city. Some o f their own were still out 
there — Gary Gordon, Randy Shughart, Michael Durant, and the crew o f [downed 
Blackhawk] Super Six Four.” 406
Conclusion
The preceding discussion has established the existential properties o f combat, understood 
as a trinity between (1) the agency of the individual, (2) the phenomenology o f what 
combat consists o f for the individual; danger, suffering and incomprehension, and (3) the 
social structure o f combat, which is above all characterised by cohesion. These three 
features o f  combat work reflexively in affecting each other, creating the unique 
existentiality o f combat where warriors are made and broken. But what can be said about 
the interplay between war and combat?
Frontline soldiers experience tension between the experiences o f combat versus the 
relatively businesslike manner in which war is perceived by the public. Casualty aversion 
and technology offer better physical protection to soldiers suggesting to society that war is 
now almost safe. For this reason, soldiers do not receive the recognition and moral support 
they have in previous times, despite still experiencing existential hardship. However, 
recognition and social support are much more critical to sustain combat motivation and 
assuage sacrifices than the benefits technology can bring.
In the postmodern West, more than any time in history previously, the 
overwhelmingly instrumental character o f war insulates the largely existential character o f
405 Coker, Warrior Ethos, 99.
406 Bowden, Black Hawk Down, 300.
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combat from society. The West today is at peace with itself for the first time in history. 
War is happening only in countries far away and to such a limited extent that most people 
can ignore it, most of the time. The soldiers fighting are all professionals, and in many ways 
specialists. Limited war is a realm for those especially competent or especially interested. 
These two factors cushion and isolate society from direct experiences of combat. That does 
not mean that combat is not going on, nor that warfare is not happening. Instead it means 
that combat is insulated by military institutions that manage it in a way that does not involve 
or necessitate constant attention from the rest o f society.
In a democracy it is considered right and proper that military establishments handle 
military affairs. However, military establishments can only manage the ever-expanding 
instrumental side o f warfare. The Ministry of Defence or the Pentagon cannot cater for the 
existential and social exchanges between fighting troops and society, which involve 
recognition. The sacrifices that accompany combat are very much present in today’s wars 
as ever before, yet the wars are largely unpopular or ignored.
Combat 
War 
Society
Figure 2: Combat, war and society
During most of European history, the continent has been constandy plagued by 
war, and combat has not been insulated from society. During the Cold War the anticipation
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of total war led to conscription in many countries. Conscription did not make the majority 
o f the population experienced in combat, but it generated direct experience o f military life 
and institutions, along with the understanding that it involves. After the end o f the Cold 
War the number o f people direcdy involved with military institutions is very marginal, and 
the number o f people with direct experience o f combat much smaller still. Today a 
surrogate experience o f combat can be acquired through video games, films and artistic 
depiction. It is in this way war is virtual today, not in terms o f the high technological 
information technology through which pilots guide their missiles and guns. The argument 
that warfare is less real in the latter respect is a gross exaggeration; it is merely another 
instance o f distance, no different in effect from the use o f cannon in the past.
An example o f the way in which the experience o f violent political action has been 
insulated from society is the degree to which (in material terms) very limited terrorist 
actions against the West have been granted political importance and media attention. The 
attacks in New York, Madrid and London (2001, 2002, 2005) involved a total number o f 
casualties comparable to one single atrocity inflicted by the Taliban on ethnic Hazara 
civilians in Afghanistan in 1998.407 However, the political ramifications both domestically 
and internationally have been dramatic, most notably in the War on Terror. A possible 
reason for the terrorists’ success in achieving a strong reaction is not the character o f the 
attacks themselves, but the degree to which willed violent political action has been absent 
from prosperous and democratic Western societies for the last few decades. Quite simply, 
people in the West are not used to it and find it shocking.
Terrorism is thus an example o f “combat” breaking through the layer o f war 
(within which we expect it to stay) and applying violence directly onto civil society. The 
War on Terror in turn is an attempt to reapply the insulation and prevent terrorism from 
breaking out of the bonds o f warfare, and to remain within its grammar. A t least this is the 
idea prevalent in the United States, where September 11 is perceived as an act o f war. For 
Europeans however, terrorism is a problem for civil society, even in the international 
realm, and is ideally met with law enforcement means. The American debate about 
unlawful combatants is a way o f protesting that terrorists refuse to  stay within the grammar 
o f warfare, yet do not belong within the discourse o f criminal justice either.
The West has its own unlawful combatants as well, but they tend to get rather less 
attention. They are the Special Operations Forces and intelligence operators who
407 Kenneth J. Cooper, ’Taliban go on a bloody rampage’, Washington Post, November 28 1998.
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frequently bypass the laws o f  war regulating the use o f uniforms for example, and operate 
with theoretical (but in practice hardly believable) deniability, taking the risks o f being 
captured as spies rather than acknowledging their state-sponsored missions. They are niche 
warriors because they have a capacity, which terrorists tend to use as a force multiplier as 
well; they bring combat to bear where there is no war taking place. In many areas o f 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and to a lesser extent inside Pakistan and Iran, these operatives 
gather intelligence in missions that involve much o f the risk, danger and 
incomprehensibility that accompanies combat, but without all the trappings o f war, indeed 
without the company o f the benefits of the American Way o f Warfare.
This shadow war is paradoxical. It features Western troops that are extremely self- 
reliant when it comes to motivation; they receive little direct recognition from society, and 
rather more from themselves as a peer group. Yet the governments and the extended 
foreign relations committees that send them sanction their activities. They frequendy fight 
against terrorists whose entire lifeworld is predicated on being seen and recognised for 
what they do. The fight is also a public relations exchange for this reason. When there is 
combat between these two specialised groups it tends to work better for both parties when 
it is done outside war. Terrorists have a tendency o f being cornered and outgunned in war. 
Special Operations Forces on the other hand, tend to get caught up in other missions, like 
nation building, to which they are unsuited or wasted. They also tend to use airpower, 
which plays into the hands o f terrorists and insurgents by alienating the local populations.
This section concludes the context dimensions for warriors in the present day. The 
previous chapters have covered the social, political and military features that have a bearing 
on the degree to which Western societies want and need warriors. It has been a stocktaking 
o f the dialogue between civil society and the use o f force at macro level, culminating with a 
closer look at the sharp end, combat. With the exception o f the introduction chapter, this 
context section o f the thesis has not engaged very much with warriors per se. The 
conclusion o f the thesis will bring all the context dimensions and all the features o f the 
warrior covered together to answer the question. Before that happens, however, we must 
go back through history to ask how warriors have constituted themselves as warriors with 
respect to themselves, society and their enemies. It is im portant to understand that not only 
does society provide a (lateral) context to the thesis question, but warriors also have a 
(vertical context) legacy that strongly inform who they are today, who they want to be, and 
what society expects o f them. This historical analysis will be presented in two chapters, one 
covering the pre-modem age, and another analysing warrior in the modem era.
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C h a p t e r  5 :  A  h i s t o r y  o f  p r e - m o d e r n
W A R R I O R S
Introduction
Today’s Western warriors have come a long way to their present state o f organization and 
institutionalization, and in many respects these developments antecedent modernity, albeit 
in a non-linear fashion. In order to appreciate the lifeworld o f present day Western warriors 
it is necessary to reach back to their ancestors to determine which aspects o f their ethos 
have been present all along, and which are contingent. Rather than a chronological history 
of premodem warriors, this chapter highlights three ideal type warriors and their different 
contexts.
These ideal types have strongly shaped Western associations o f warriors. The social 
definition o f warriors is unthinkable without the lateral context o f society, and the vertical 
context o f history. The three periods discussed in this chapter were chosen because the 
warriors fit the criteria o f the warrior definition while highlighting distinct features that still 
resonate with today’s warriors. Homer’s Achilles is the archetype warrior, whereas Hector 
is an ideal type soldier-warrior who sacrifices himself for his community. Plato’s concept o f 
the guardian introduces the soldier as a disciplined and professional servant o f the state. 
The age o f chivalry sees a warrior class willingly submit to an ideal that imposes restraint on 
their warrior estate in the interest o f civilization, but which at the same time enhances their 
social and moral stature. In an example o f their present day resonance, Michael Evans 
describes how the setting both o f the real battle for Gallipoli and the later movie depiction 
Gallipoli (1981), played on the historical inheritance o f all three ideal types: “Gallipoli lends 
itself to romantic tragedy and legend by virtue o f its setting on the Aegean Sea and its 
proximity to the plains o f ancient Troy. For British and Anzac officers educated in the 
Greek classics and the poetry o f Byron, the idea o f fighting the Turks at the Hellespont and 
close to Troy combined legendary romance with an ideal o f Christian chivalry.” 408
The fact that the ideal types spring from very different sources and levels o f 
analysis makes them difficult to compare. Homer, for example, writes epically about 
individuals, Plato philosophises about the city, and the chivalric knights carved out their 
ethos between romantic literature, a particular feudal social structure and incessant wars.
408 Michael Evans, 'Remembering Gallipoli: A View from the new century', Quadrant Magazine XLV, no. 5 
(2001).
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This makes them very eclectic. Before moving on to the substantive discussion, however, it 
is necessary to unlock Weber’s concept o f the ideal type.
Weber conceived o f the ‘ideal type’ as a methodological means to isolate selected 
features o f  a phenomenon for purposes o f generalization and comparison. The ideal type is 
a reduction o f a phenomenon, which enhances its central properties. Perfect cases o f  an 
ideal type will rarely exist in the real world, although some examples will be nearer to it 
than others. An ideal type is necessarily reductionist because it discards those variables that 
are not relevant to the analysis.409 Coker offers three existential variables that improve the 
precision in comparing ideal type warriors. They are ‘agency’, ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘intersubjectivity’.410 Coker does not define these terms but sharpening them enhances the 
comparative clarity.
ylgengi is the degree to which the warrior has freedom of action on the battlefield, 
whether he can leave an imprint, his own authorship, upon the conduct o f war. I f  a warrior 
can affect combat personally in any way, for example through his own physical prowess, 
that is a manifestation o f agency. A situation, which reduces agency, is typically, where 
agency’s opposite; structure, is pervasive and dominant, whether those structures are class 
structures, technology, or any other structure o f power and domination that reduces 
freedom.411
Subjectivity is a more complex property, which has to do with two dimensions o f the 
communal ‘we-perspective’. Firstly, the subjective experience o f warfare (i.e. how do I/w e 
experience this situation/war?), as opposed to the purely material or ostensibly objective 
dimensions like weapons and terrain. Secondly, the social context o f fighting refers to both 
social institutions, such as aristocracy, military establishment, rites o f passage etc., and the 
reasons for war as conceived by the social group. The latter differentiates it from purely 
private, random violence. This can become somewhat problematic in chiefdoms where 
rulers more or less unilaterally decide for war. Nonetheless, there is usually a class o f rulers 
who benefit and legitimize the war effort. Subjectivity thus encompasses both ‘civil-military 
relations’ and ‘the experience o f war’, to use military-sociology vernacular. In short, it has 
to do with how warfare is invested with meaning. Here I will restrict this meaning to apply
409 Turner, Cambridge Companion to M ax Weber, 10, 258.
410 Coker, 'Is there a Western Way o f  Warfare', Coker, Waging war without warriors.
411 See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f the Theory o f Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1986), Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999). On agency and 
structure see also Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction o f Reality (New York: Anchor books, 
1966).
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to either the warriors themselves, or to the way in which the warriors are invested or 
divested with meaning by society.
Intersubjectivity has to do with the relationship with the enemy at the social level, and 
at the individual encounter level for warriors. It asks, for example, whether the enemy is 
respected or hated. Intersubjective relations are also relevant in society as such when 
warriors exist as a class with attendant antagonism towards other classes that affect the 
warrior lifeworld. Primarily, however, the focus is on wartime enemies.
To summarize, agency is about the warrior’s impact, subjectivity is about the 
meaning for the warrior and social group and intersubjectivity is about relations with the 
enemy other.
Homer and the Archetypical Warrior
Social and intellectual context: T he Iliad and m yth
The first and pre-eminent epic o f Western Civilization - written approximately 2750 years 
ago - and an astonishing poem o f war and warriors — is Hom er’s Iliad. Most commentators 
agree that at least large segments o f the written Iliad is predated by oral storytelling, and as 
such it is at the same time a work o f fiction and myth. Homer’s work has left a lasting 
imprint on the Western imagination, perhaps because myths are in George Steiner’s words; 
“among the subtlest and most direct languages o f experience. They re-enact moments of 
signal truth or crisis in the human condition.” 412
Classicist James Redfield warns us against making jumps between poem and culture 
too quickly. For this reason, the Iliad is not a reliable source for making objective claims 
about Mycenaean warfare. Nonetheless, in the history o f warriors Achilles and Hector have 
had a profound effect in shaping our concept o f what a warrior is, precisely because the 
poem engages with the existential features o f warfare in such a timeless and comprehensive 
manner. They are founding ideal types, in that they are the first warriors we get a wide- 
ranging exposure to. However, they were not a feature merely o f their age.
Steiner’s emphasis on re-enactment is important for this reason because myths like 
lie Iliad were not reproduced by simply being retold, they were re-enacted, which is to say 
:e-experienced. “Myth is perhaps fable”, writes George Bataille, “but this fable is placed in 
apposition to fiction if one looks at the people who dance it, who act it, and for whom it is
42 George Steiner quoted in Barry Sandywell, The Beginnings of European Theorizing. Reflexivity in the Archaic Age 
London: Routledge, 1996).
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living truth.” 413 For Alexander the Great, Achilles was living truth and, as Coker points, 
made attempts to emulate his hero: “Alexander spent his life, short as it was, trying to 
surpass Achilles, a task in which inevitably he failed, as every warrior must. Our fictional 
heroes are beyond reach because they are archetypes, no t flawed human beings. But at least 
Alexander died in the knowledge that after Achilles he must be considered supremely 
worthy o f emulation.” 414 As a language o f experience, the Iliad is descriptive, prescriptive 
and foundational. It is the master text o f war and warriors, in which we find the only 
archetype warrior, Achilles. There are many ideal types, but only one archetype. The Iliad 
enacts warriors for us before there was ever a systematic attempt at understanding them in 
conceptual terms.
Agency in  the Iliad
The question o f agency in the Iliad is multifaceted; unparalleled fighting skills are combined 
with intrusive gods in a society revolving around honour. At the face o f it, Achilles and 
Hector both enjoy virtually unbounded agency as fighters. They both have the power to 
turn the war in favour o f their side because o f their inspiring leadership and unsurpassed 
fighting qualities. Book one refers to Achilles as ‘swift’ and ‘the most violent man alive’.415 
He swears they will want him in the fight when ‘man-killing Hector’ enters the fray.416 He 
is right: Hector leads the Trojans to victory until Hera and ultimately Zeus intervenes. Zeus 
arranges it so that when Achilles’ lover Patroclus is killed, Achilles returns to rejoin the 
fight with savage ruthlessness and takes the Greeks to victory sacking Troy. The relative 
agency o f these warriors is further exemplified by their being able to come and go from the 
batdefield as they please. 417 Consequently, those who are there are fighting voluntarily.
chi lies the archetypical warrior
Achilles is the archetypical warrior because he fights for himself. He is what a warrior looks 
like if he has no structural constraints. That is not to say he fights in isolation, which would 
be poindess. Achilles is a character tom  between his desire for independence and his desire 
for recognition from his community. He cares deeply for recognition, which is illustrated 
by Agamemnon’s confiscation o f Chrysies, Achilles’ war bounty. This violation dishonours
413 George Bataille (original italics) quoted in Ibid., 18.
414 Coker, Warrior Ethos, 32.
415 Homer, The Iliad trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin, 1990), 79,82.
416 Ibid, 1.280-87.
417 For a discussion on the shape o f  batde in the Iliad, see; Hans Van Wees, 'Kings in Combat: Battles and 
Heroes in the Iliad', The Classical Quarterly 38, no. 1 (1988).
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him and effectively severs the reciprocity between warrior and society.418 It is not so much 
that Achilles has walked out on his community, as the other way around.
Once detached from the communal war effort Achilles has total freedom to 
disengage or re-engage in the fight at will. There is nobody to prevent him from indulging 
his temper and sense o f dejection. Although he is bickering with king Agamemnon, he 
does not respect the king at all, and there is little Agamemnon can do to control Achilles 
because of his fierceness. While in combat, there is no discipline, which Achilles must 
submit to, no tactical or technological feature o f the battlefield, which limits him in his 
conduct of warfare, or constrains his ability to leave his authorship on the war. The fact 
that Achilles is only concerned with honour shows the degree to which he has agency 
within war and society. Nonetheless, this concern with honour ties him to society; he 
cannot go home.
The community asks of some members that they leave the community and enter the 
anticommunity of combat. There they must overcome mercy and terror and leam to 
value their honour above their own lives or another’s. The community praises and 
honours those who have this capacity. As this praise is internalised it becomes a self­
definition. Achilles is trapped by this self-definition, which permits him neither 
reconciliation nor retreat.419
Achilles’ desire for recognition is unconditional. He cannot compromise his honour 
because it is his only recompense for his violent death — which he knows will come. This 
ioes not necessarily make him entirely self-referential. The link between altruistic heroism 
ind egoism is honour Redfield argues, quoting Pitt Rivers: “H onour felt is honour claimed, 
md honour claimed is honour paid.” 420
What Achilles demonstrates is self-respect. He stays true to his warrior ethos, and he 
s so confident that he is in the right that he would have nothing but scorn for anyone who 
vould judge him otherwise.421 In one section, he expressly forestalls any suggestion that 
he reason for his disengagement from the fight is his mother’s prophecy that he will die 
hortly after H ector.422 An example is Odysseus’ embassy to Achilles where Odysseus asks 
Hm to return to battle. Achilles blankly refuses and angrily castigates Agamemnon for 
tking more than the lion’s share o f the spoils, albeit not o f the combat, which is
48 James M. Redfield, Nature and culture in the Iliad: the tragedy of Hector (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994),
7
4J Ibid., 104.
40 Pitt Rivers quoted in Ibid., 129.
41 French, Code of the Warrior, 40.
42 Homer, Iliad, 16.67-85.
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dishonourable for a warrior in the Homeric world. A t this point Achilles himself is not 
fighting at all, but if  he did accept Agamemnon’s offers, he would compromise his warrior 
ethic; his conception o f what it means to be a warrior. Agamemnon’s offer is o f material 
goods, it is not an apology and admittance o f wrongdoing. Acceptance o f these goods 
would imply that Achilles fights for loot rather than honour, an honour Agamemnon as 
leader has symbolically withdrawn.423 That Achilles fights for himself is nowhere more 
evident than when he returns to battle after Patroclus’ death. Before that he had 
melancholically fantasised about what it would be like if  he and Patroclus were the only 
ones left on the batdefield.424
Subjectivity in the Iliad
Warfare is a constant feature o f life in the Iliad, and this leads to a warrior class o f heroes 
who effectively constitute an aristocracy and whose foundation is their members’ 
willingness to risk death and mutilation in combat, as Odysseus reminds us:
the men whom Zeus decrees, from youth to old age, 
must wind down our brutal wars to the bitter end 
until we drop and die, down to the last man.425
Honour is the existential quality that links warriors with society and it brings with it the 
paradox that warriors and community need each other but are at the same time a problem 
for each other, for honour propels the warrior into war, or at least reinforces his craving 
for combat. The community considers war an evil, but it needs security, and the human 
qualities required to create and maintain security lead to a warrior ethos — a moral code that 
ascribes courage and manliness in battle as a primary virtue to be conferred honour for.
Shannon French describes how warriors need an ethos because they are mandated by 
society to kill, which breaks with a fundamental taboo. In order to do so they must stricdy 
police themselves to kill only certain people under certain circumstances. Violators o f this 
code can be ostracized, shamed or even killed. The warrior ethos protects the warrior from 
psychological damage because it institutionalises society’s sanction on what is happening.426 
French emphasizes the restraining features o f the warrior ethos exclusively, but warriors 
can be equally ostracized, shamed and killed for not being aggressive enough, which is to
23 Redfield, Nature and Culture 105.
24 Homer, Iliad, 16.115-19.
25 Ibid., 14.105-07.
26 French, Code of the Warrior, 3,4.
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say for being identified as cowards. Redfield, however, observes that norms and values are 
not constraints on action but rather sources o f action.427
The warrior needs to navigate a rather precarious existential line, where 
aggressiveness and restraint are both rewarded, yet also punished if  they are not exhibited 
sufficiendy, or at the right time, which is to say in a controlled manner. The aggressive 
dimension o f the warrior ethos logically leads to a desire to find opportunities and 
situations in which to display the coveted warrior qualities. “Heroism is initially a social 
task; it then becomes a definite set o f virtues associated with the performance o f this task. 
The warrior’s virtues, further, entide him to claim a social status. But he can claim that 
status only if  he can show that he has the virtues, and he can demonstrate the warrior’s 
virtues only on the batdefield.” 428 This in itself can generate aggressive warfare, which puts 
society more at risk. This bears resemblance to the security dilemma between states today. 
As Redfield puts it;
When the background condition of life is war — when men feel themselves free to 
steal from anyone with whom they are not acquainted and to plunder and exterminate 
any town against which they have a grievance - men must place great trust in those 
close to them. Thus combat generates a tight-knit community. A Homeric community 
consists, in effect, of those who are ready to die for one another; the perimeter of each 
community is a potential battlefield. Under these social conditions, war is perceived as 
the most important human activity because the community’s ability to wage defensive 
war is perceived as the precondition of all other communal values.429
The elite fighters are those who step forward from the mass, the promachoi, “those who 
fight among the foremost” .430 They form an aristocracy and are called heroes precisely 
because they submit their fear o f death to their commitment to fight in battle. Sarpedon 
makes this very clear in his speech to Glaucus in book 12:
He quickly called Hippolochus’ son: “Glaucus, 
why do they hold us both in honour, first by far 
with pride of place, choice meats and brimming cups, 
in Lycia where all our people look on us like gods?
Why make us lords of estates along the Xanthus’ banks, 
rich in vineyards and plowland rolling wheat?
So that now the duty’s ours-
427 Redfield, Nature and Culture 70.
428 Ibid., 100.
429 Ibid., 99.
430 Ibid., 99.
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we are the ones to head our Lycian front, 
brace and fling ourselves in the blaze of war, 
so a comrade strapped in combat gear may say,
‘Not without fame, the men who rule in Lycia, 
these kings of ours who eat fat cuts of lamb 
and drink sweet wine, the finest stock we have.
But they owe it all to their own fighting strength — 
our great men of war, they lead our way in battle!”431 
Sarpedon in effect says it is better to die for something than nothing, and to achieve 
immortality through being remembered.432 The privileges o f aristocracy spring from 
bravery in battle as a reward granted in advance, which has to be repaid on the 
battlefield.433 The downside is the corresponding constant proximity to death:
All men are bom to die, but the warrior alone must confront this fact in his social life, 
since he fulfils his obligations only by meeting those who intend his death. The 
community is secured by combat, which is the negation of community; this generates 
a contradiction in the warrior’s role. His community sustains him and sends him to his 
destruction. On behalf of community he must leave community and enter a realm of
r  434rorce.
The heroes are not the only fighters; there are also others, who are not among the 
aristocracy, but constitute a multitude o f anonymous fighters. In the Homeric world it is 
taken for granted that the aristocracy is composed o f the fiercest fighters, the aristoi, and 
conversely that all aristocrats are warriors. Leadership is hereditary, and all the great 
families have a glorious history o f bravery and battlefield exploits. Homer does not 
problematize this social structure, which becomes plain in those rare instances when a 
character breaks from the formula. For example, Hector’s brother Paris prefers staying in 
bed with Helen to fighting, a decidedly un-heroic choice in the Homeric moral landscape.
The distinction between men is not merely between warriors and non-warriors, nor 
between warriors and fighters that are more anonymous: it distinguishes different levels o f 
warriors. Among them, Achilles is depicted as the finest (fiercest), because he is the most 
skilled and ruthless killer. However, Achilles is god-like, only part human since his mother 
Thetis is a goddess. Hector is the fiercest o f the (all-) human warriors. Conversely, for 
those who do not excel on the battlefield, they had better keep their mouth shut. When
431 Homer, Iliad, 12,359-81.
432 Redfield, Nature and Culture 101.
433 Ibid., 100.
434 Ibid., 101.
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Odysseus in book two is running around marshalling the army, there is a clear distinction 
between his tones when speaking to warriors; “Whenever Odysseus met some man o f rank, 
a king, he’d halt and hold him back with winning words: “My friend — it’s wrong to 
threaten you like a coward, but you stand fast, you keep your men in check!”” 435 On the 
other hand, when he speaks to commoners, he exposes the rigidity o f the social structure: 
“When he caught some common soldier shouting out, he’d beat him with the sceptre, dress 
him down: £CYou fool — sit still! Obey the commands o f others, your superiors — you, you 
deserter, rank coward, you count for nothing, neither in war nor council. How can all 
Achaeans be masters here in Troy?” 436 This responsibility is that o f the warrior leaders, and 
the leaders are consistendy named the best warriors, as Van Wees has charted on both the 
Greek and Trojan sides.437
Hector, the ideal type soldier-tvarrior
What does this mean for what today we would call combat motivation in Homer? D o the 
heroes fight for themselves because o f their aristocratic privileges, or do they genuinely risk 
their lives for their communities? The two leading heroes yield different answers to this. 
Achilles fights rather more for himself as has already been discussed. H ector on the other 
hand, is the leading representative o f his community, and the likely heir o f King Priam’s 
throne as the best o f his sons. He experiences difficulties reconciling his role as a family 
father with his role as the primary defender o f his community.438 If  Hector is to fight for 
his community, he cannot commit to his family. Conversely, if he chooses his family, the 
community will surely suffer, and thus in consequence his family as well. Hector has no 
choice, and he decides to  go for the first line o f defence, which at the end pits him all alone 
outside the walls o f Troy, to face off Achilles.
Does H ector’s embeddedness within the community make him more into a soldier 
type, a servant o f his community? He is less a warrior who loves war like Achilles does, 
than a soldier-warrior who fights for others, and the approval o f others — implicitly fearing 
their disapproval. Redfield argues Hector is a hero o f aidos, which is the fear o f nemesis. 
Nemesis is the moral disapproval o f others, which is a strong feature o f  the Homeric 
shame culture. In this context, disapproval follows poor performance in combat, which the 
whole o f Hector’s community attributes, including his fellow warriors. A comparison
435 Homer, Iliad, 2.218-21.
436 Ibid., 2.228-34.
437 Wees, 'Kings in combat': 19.
438Redfield, Nature and Culture 123,24.
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between Hector and his brother Paris accentuates this argument because Paris is insensitive 
to nemesis.™ Hector passionately tries to shame Paris out o f bed and into combat. 
Nevertheless, one cannot argue Paris is a complete coward, since he volunteers to duel 
Menelaus early in the poem, and here Hector in his first appearance rejoices because there 
seems to possibly be a way to avoid all-out war. That, however, is not what the gods want; 
they have set the scene for war, not duelling.
Hector in this way eventually finds himself in an impossible situation, alone outside 
Troy. Nevertheless, why does he not go to safety inside, since he cannot possibly expect to 
beat Achilles in one-on-one combat, and since he appears reluctant to fight the war unless 
it is necessary? After Andromache begs Hector not to return to the battlefield for the sake 
o f  his son and wife, he retorts forcefully:
“All this weighs on my mind too, dear woman.
But I would die of shame to face the men of Troy 
and the Trojan women trailing their long robes 
if I would shrink from batde now, a coward.
Nor does the spirit urge me on that way.
I’ve learned it all too well. To stand up bravely, 
always to fight in the front ranks of Trojan soldiers, 
winning my father great glory, glory for myself.
For in my heart and soul I also know this well: 
the day will come when sacred Troy must die.. .440
Then far off in the land of Argos you must live, 
labouring at a loom, at another woman’s beck and call, 
fetching water at some spring, Messeis or Hyperia, 
resisting it all the way — 
the rough yoke of necessity at your neck.
And a man may say, who sees you streaming tears,
‘There is the wife of Hector, the bravest fighter 
they could field, those stallion-breaking Trojans, 
long ago when the men fought of Troy.’ So he will say 
and the fresh grief will swell your heart once more, 
widowed, robbed of the one man strong enough 
to fight off your day of slavery.
439 Ibid., 110-19.
440 Homer, Iliad, 6.522-33.
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No, no,
let the earth come piling over my dead body 
before I hear your cries, I hear you dragged away!”441
Hector pronounces his reputation as a recognised warrior in a remarkably self-aware series 
o f choices. He is advised by the people around him to exercise caution, and to withdraw.
Polydamas calls for him to withdraw from the battlefield. Later, his father king Priam
desperately calls for him to withdraw within the city walls,442 and finally his mother too.443 
These are tests o f H ector’s warrior ethic. Faced with the choice o f staying home with his 
family or going to battle; faced with the choice o f withdrawing or keep charging the 
Greeks; and finally in the choice between withdrawing and facing Achilles, Hector always 
chooses combat. As he says to Polydamas;
If it really was Achilles who reared beside the ships, 
all the worse for him — if he wants his fill of war.
I for one, I’ll never run from his grim assault,
I’ll stand up to the man — see if he bears off glory 
or I bear it off myself! The god of war is impartial: 
he hands out death to the man who hands out death.”444
Having stood and fought, Hector has demonstrated agency and commitment to his 
community at the same time. He has stayed as true to his warrior ethos as Achilles did 
when he refused to fight. The fact that he loses to Achilles in mortal combat is in a sense 
unimportant, because as Agamemnon says, that Achilles is an excellent soldier is to some 
extent an accident o f the gods.445 As a warrior, Hector was all he could be.
Intersubjectivitv in the Iliad
The relationship between the gods and the humans and the relationship between the 
Greeks and the Trojans are the two major intersubjective dimensions o f the Iliad. In 
intersubjective relations between enemies in war, the primary question to ask is the 
intensity with which warfare is pursued, and whether the enemies respect or despise each 
other. Both questions are extremely important for the warrior’s lifeworld. With respect to 
the warring parties in the Iliad, the intensity o f the warfare waxes and wanes from limited, 
through ruthless, and back to more limited warfare, and finally increasing to total war; the
441 Ibid., 6.542-55.
442 Ibid., 22.44-89.
443 Ibid., 22. 93-107.
444 Ibid., 18.355-60.
445 Ibid., 1.211.
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sack o f Troy, which takes place outside the poem. This waxing and waning is dramatized at 
the individual level in particular. The primary example o f civilized courteous relations 
between enemies is Glaucus’ encounter with Diomedes in book 6. Inaugurated by the 
typical boasting, Diomedes extends a long speech to describe his lineage, to which Glaucus 
replies:
Splendid — you are my friend,
my guest from the days of our grandfathers long ago!
(...)
So now I am your host and friend in the heart of Argos, 
you are mine in Lycia when I visit your country.
Come, let us keep clear of each other’s spears, 
even there in the thick of battle. Look, 
plenty of Trojans there for me to kill, 
your famous allies too, any soldier the god 
will bring in range or I can run to ground.
And plenty of Argives too — kill them if you can.
But let’s trade armour. The men must know our claim: 
we are sworn friends from our fathers’ days till now!”446 
While not a typical scene, this encounter represents the ultimate respect between enemies, 
to the point that they arrange a separate peace in the midst o f fighting. The recital of 
Tydeus’ lineage preceding Glaucus decision for friendship indicates that Tydeus comes 
from a family o f noble, famous for courage in the field, and worthy o f respect.
Another indication o f the importance o f respect for the enemy is the constant 
boasting that prefigures individual duels. Boasting has two functions: The hero asserts 
himself and sets a high standard o f conduct, essentially promising o f himself brave acts and 
announcing that he will win before the fighting.447 Instead o f more passively expecting 
himself to do his best and then cashing in the glory if  he wins, the hero insists he will and 
risks the existential and physical failure this promise entails. “His excellence is not so much
a power which he has as a hypothesis on which he stakes his life. Combat is a kind of
experiment which falsifies the hypothesis o f one party or the other.” 448 A typical boast is 
H ector’s taunt to Ajax in book seven:
Ajax, royal son of Telamon, captain of armies,
446 Ibid., 6.257,58,68-77.
447 Redfield, Nature and Culture 129.
448 Ibid.
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don’t toy with me like a puny, weak-kneed boy 
or a woman never trained in works of war!
War — I know it well, and the butchery of men.449
Another function o f the boast is to increase the glory o f the victor, for fighting a confident 
and able enemy. Nietzsche recognized this particular point when he said, “You may have 
only enemies whom you can hate not enemies you despise. You must be proud o f your 
enemy: then the successes o f your enemy are your successes also.” 450
Even though the warriors in the Iliad generally respect their enemies, the tendency 
for escalation, for cruelty, threatens to spiral the violence upwards to such an extent that 
the hatred disrupts the norms o f how to treat the enemy. The source o f escalation in the 
Iliad is not straightforward; it can be either on a mere whim o f the Gods, o r as part o f  a 
deal brokered, for example between Zeus and Hera.
Escalation is also a result o f human actions, such as Hector’s killing o f Patroclus
which transforms Achilles’ already considerable rage into a killing frenzy. Achilles’ altered
fighting spirit is evident when he refuses to spare Priam’s son Polydorus, who is begging 
for his life:
Fool,
don’t talk to me of ransom. No more speeches.
Before Patroclus met his day of destiny, true, 
it warmed my heart a bit to spare some Trojans: 
droves I took alive and auctioned off as slaves.
But now not a single Trojan flees his death,
Not one the gods hand over to me before your gates, 
none of all the Trojans, sons of Priam least of all!
Come, friend, you too must die. Why moan about it so?
Even Patroclus died, a far, far better man than you.
And look, you see how handsome and powerful I am?
The son of a great man, the mother who gave me life 
a deathless goddess. But even for me, I tell you, 
death and the strong force of fate is waiting.451 
Achilles even implicitly admonishes Polydorus to appreciate being killed by him, the 
greatest o f heroes, rather than just anyone.
449 Homer, Iliad, 6.272-76.
4;>0 Quoted in Coker, Waging war without warriors, 38.
451 Homer, Iliad, 21.111-14.
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A third explanation for escalation is random force. Simone Weil describes force as 
the true hero and subject o f the Iliad: “force — it is that x that turns anybody who is 
subjected to it into a thing. Exercised to the limit, it turns man into a thing in the most 
literal sense: it makes a corpse out o f him.” 452 Weil’s understanding o f force is a structure, 
which denies agency to  the warrior; it is life denying, not only in a literal but also existential 
sense. Force itself inspires cruelty because the warrior subject to it sees no obvious reason 
to spare his enemy, much like Achilles reasons above.
True enough, all men are fated to die; true enough also, a soldier may grow old in 
battles; yet for those whose spirits have bent under the yoke of war, the relation 
between death and the future is different than from other men. For other men death 
appears as a limit set in advance on the future; for the soldier death is the future, the 
future his profession assigns him. Yet the idea of man's having death for a future is 
abhorrent to nature (...) if the existence of an enemy has made a soul destroy in itself 
the thing nature put there, then the only remedy the soul can imagine, is the 
destruction of the enemy. To respect life in somebody else when you have had to 
castrate yourself of all yarning for it demands a truly heartbreaking exertion of the 
powers of generosity.453
This kind of generosity is not particularly widespread, and the total destruction o f Troy is 
something Hector is well aware is coming. His expectation underlines the fact that respect 
for the enemy does not necessarily exclude the presence o f cruelty. Indeed, the hatred 
Achilles nurtures for Hector breaks the bonds o f  respect for the enemy, and he illustrates 
the dark side of the boasts:
The dogs and birds will maul you, shame your corpse 
while Achaeans bury my dear friend in glory!”454
Would to god my rage, my fury would drive me now 
to hack your flesh away and eat you raw — 
such agonies you have caused me! Ransom?
No man alive could keep the dog-packs off you, 
not if they haul in ten, twenty times that ransom 
and pile it here before me and promise fortunes more — 
no, not even if Darian Priam should offer to weigh out 
your bulk in gold!
452 Sian Miles, Simone Weil — A n  Anthology (London: Virago Press, 1985), 183.
453 Ibid., 201-04.
454 Homer, Iliad, 22.396-97.
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The dogs and birds will rend you — blood and bone!455
His rage at its highest frenzy, Achilles kills Hector, lashes his body to his chariot and drags 
him back to camp. Weil sees force to  entail this double quality, its “power o f converting a 
man into a thing is a double one, and in its application double edged. To the same degree, 
though in different fashions, those who use it and those who endure it are turned to 
stone.” 456 Achilles shames himself as much as he shames H ector by stepping out o f bonds 
with community’s norms. Redfield calls this Hector’s antifuneral: “The warrior’s act in 
battle wounds an alien community. The perfected negation o f community, further, inheres 
not in killing the enemy but in denying him a funeral, for by this means the alien 
community is not only wounded but is also denied the means o f healing itself.” 457
Only when Achilles is reconciled with Priam at the very end o f the poem are 
Hector and Achilles reintegrated in their respective communities; one in death, the other in 
life. It may not matter much, under the watchful eye o f the gods; all lives are brief 
interludes, a fact which Achilles is well aware of, being half god himself. As Weil says: “the 
death o f Hector would be but a brief joy to Achilles, and the death o f Achilles but a brief 
joy to  the Trojans, and the destruction o f Troy but a brief joy to the Achaeans.” 458 In the 
eyes o f undying gods and eternity, it may appear that humans, even heroes, are temporary 
distractions.
C onclusion
The Iliad is above all significant because it enacts all the basic features that characterise war 
and warriors. The main heroes Achilles and Hector both fight for honour, but in different 
vays. Achilles refuses to fight because his inevitable and foretold sacrifice is not sufficiendy 
aonoured. When he rejoins the fight, it is entirely on his own terms because o f Patroclus’ 
leath. Achilles’ relationship with society is racked with tension and never entirely resolved. 
Honour is what links the warrior’s sacrifice with society, but it is a complex property. Too 
nuch honour makes the warrior insolent and vainglorious, yet too litde discredits his 
sacrifice. Hector is held in the highest esteem already. His challenge is not recognition, but 
he cashing in o f this honour with batdefield prowess. He needs to face Achilles even 
hough he cannot expect to win; honour demands he stands up to fight even if  it means
45 Ibid., 22.408-17.
46 Miles, Simone Weil’ 204.
47 Redfield, Nature and Culture 183.
48 Miles, Simone Weil\ 198.
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certain death. Such is the responsibility o f defending the community. It is in this the central 
properties o f Achilles and Hector as ideal types he.
Plato invents the Soldier
Context: T he A ncient G reek  w orld
Moving on from the Homeric age to the age o f the ancient Greeks we are not so much 
leaving behind myth, as integrating it and gradually replacing it with philosophy and 
rationality. Myth cannot be replaced because o f its enduring role in conceiving existential 
properties of human life that cannot easily be captured in purely rational language. As Paul 
Feyerabend argues: “if  science is praised because o f its achievements, then myth must be 
praised a hundred times more feverendy because its achievements were incomparably 
greater. The inventors of myths started culture while rationalists and scientists just changed 
it, and not always for the better.” 459 Indeed, the achievements o f science were preceded by 
philosophy. Whereas myth tells stories, without a recipe for interpretation, philosophy is a 
more systematic attempt to reach answers to important questions like “what is right and 
wrong?”, “how should we live?”, “what is truth?” etc.
With Plato, philosophy is given a more clear delimitation from other forms o f 
discourses, and it inaugurates a more systematic approach to any subject at hand, including 
that o f war and warriors. Socrates is the first Greek on record to ask — rather than just 
assume — what is praiseworthy about a man fighting in batde. He gives a systematic analysis 
of the role of warriors in Plato’s Republic. Socrates, through a dialectic method, tries to 
answer the fundamental question o f whether a ‘better life is provided for the unjust man 
than for the just by gods and m en’ (362c)460. To answer this question he decides to erect an 
imagined city from scratch.
In Socrates’ dialogue with Glaucon, the two confront the issue o f how the city 
should be protected. This job is given to highly educated soldiers, professionals whose 
upbringing and life is centred on guarding the city. It is appropriate that Plato discusses this 
issue, because in the intervening years since Homer wrote his epics, social, political and 
j military developments had progressed far from purely warrior cultures to the more
regimented and disciplined qualities that we associate with soldiers and states. The dialogue 
is infused with war to an extraordinary degree. The term ‘war’ and its cognates, such as 
Vaging war’, ‘warrior’, ‘the art o f war’ and ‘enemies’ occur nearly ten dozen times, not to
^  Paul Ricoeur (original italics) quoted in Sandywell, Beginnings of European Theorizing, 10.
461 Quoted in Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5.
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mention others like ‘manliness’, ‘strife’ and ‘the hated’. It is reasonable to conclude, as does 
Leon Harold Craig, that The Republic’s treatment o f politics, philosophy and justice is 
“painted primarily in the colours o f war.” 461 Peace, in contrast, is mentioned less than a 
dozen times, and as a means to accentuate war more strongly.
Socially and politically the ancient Greeks inaugurated democracy, which from the 
beginning had a close relationship with warfare. Robin Lane Fox argues the polis probably 
arose sometime between 900-750s BC.462 The polis was centred on the people — the 
citizens — rather than territory. It was a citizen state and the citizens were free males, a 
community o f warriors who would fight for their state. Freedom and justice were very 
important for them. The city-states were thus contrasted with the earlier Mycenaean Age (c 
1100-900 BC) which was dominated by aristocrats in all major political decisions. The 
aristocracies were replaced by monarchies, or tyrannies as the Greek contemporaries called 
them, round about the 650s BC.463 A couple o f generations following the change to 
tyranny, the aristocrats united in pushing the tyrants away. The new freedom in practical 
terms involved elected magistrates, the rule o f law and growing political and legal 
autonomy for city-states. The elder statesman Cleisthenes’ constitutional reforms in Athens 
in the summer o f 508 BC moved sovereignty to the citizens, and inaugurated local 
government and decision by assembly.464 This was very different from modem democracy 
since political rights were excluded from slaves, women and foreigners. Nonetheless, Greek 
democracy was unparalleled in neighbouring Persia, Egypt and Carthage. It was to remain 
so for the coming one hundred and eighty years, despite frequent military challenges. 
Victory in war thus became a victory for law for the Greeks,465 and the victory o f law was 
victory for freedom, because the Greeks had willingly submitted to their own laws.
Perhaps the most famous Athenian o f all, Socrates, is better known for his 
philosophy than his fighting skill, but he was a renowned warrior in his time. A veteran of 
the Potidea and Amphipolis campaigns, at 45 Socrates found himself a hoplite withdrawing 
from a defeat at Delium, a sideshow o f the Peloponnesian War. In Plato’s Symposium 
Alcibiades gives an account o f the middle-aged philosopher moving with his characteristic 
swagger;
461 Leon Harold Craig, The War hover. A. Study of Plato's Republic (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1994), 
15.
462 Robin Lane Fox, The Classical World - A n  Epic History from Homer to Hadrian (London: Allan Lane, 2005), 
24-28.
463 Ibid., 40-58.
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So he looked around calmly at both his friends and the enemy; he was clearly giving 
the message to anyone even at a distance that if anyone touched this man, he quickly 
would put up a stout defence. The result was that he and his partner got away safely.
For it is true that attackers do not approach men of this calibre but instead go after 
those fleeing headlong.466
This firmness also characterised Socrates at his trial, where he argued he never broke ranks 
in the line, and therefore would not flee the trial where he was condemned to death.467
W arrior agency in P lato 's Republic: Suppressing thvm os
In Plato’s ideal city, the warrior’s agency is severely curtailed. Plato ultimately tries to 
domesticate warriors into being soldiers, specifically by manipulating their relationship with 
thymos, death and overall society. He instrumentalizes certain aspects o f the warrior and 
makes him a servant o f society, where others define his mission. This inaugurates a 
different kind o f fighting ethos, where loyalty to the state is more important than the 
warrior ethos. The warriors do not existentially police themselves and each other, but are 
monitored by a higher institution to which they must be completely loyal; the state. 
Leadership is transferred from the prima facie privilege o f the warring classes to a civilian 
decision-making class. Plato is in effect turning warriors into soldiers for the first time in 
history. Whereas there might have been soldiers o f some kind in the service o f warrior 
leaders before Plato’s time, this is the first time soldiers conceptually replace warriors 
within the social and political structure o f society. To say that soldiers conceptually replace 
warriors is to emphasize the theoretical rather than the historical nature o f Plato’s 
framework. He was after a 11 a philosopher, not a head o f state. Nevertheless, as the 
historical upheavals in Plato’s time illustrate, these dramatic changes from Homer’s world 
were not unthinkable, if somewhat idealistic. Indeed, Plato’s vision of the state as split 
Detween civil and military leaderships and the military as a servant o f the civil leadership is 
i vision that has become ingrained in modem Western thinking.
Early on in Plato’s treatment o f warriors, we are confronted with the somewhat 
tnigmatic concept thymos, which is one o f the three parts o f the soul (‘psuche’), the other 
w o being reason and appetite. The concept ‘thymos’ originally comes from Homer, where 
i is “a general term for both the seat o f feeling and thought and for the passions
46 Quoted in Victor Davis Hanson, 'Socrates Dies at Delium, 424 B.C. 1 in More What If? - Imminent historians 
inagine what might have been, ed. Robert Cowley (London: Pan Books, 2003), 9.
47 Ibid., 8.
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themselves, particularly anger,” 468 argues classicist Angela Hobbs, and it is perhaps best 
viewed “as the life force, and from it stem fierceness and energy (menos), boldness and 
courage (tharsos) and anger (cholos)” 469. Hobbs traces this understanding o f thymos to the 
tragic poets and particularly to “Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes, where it is said o f warriors 
before a battle that, ‘Their iron-lunged thymos, blazing with valour, Breathed out as if  from 
lions glaring with the war-god’s might.’” 470 In the Republic, Socrates generally argues that 
the guardians should be more soldiers o f steadfast courage and resilience than warriors 
whose hearts are filled with lust for war, as Achilles’ heart is. Specifically the guardians will 
need some natural qualities: speed, strength and courage.471 Courage is translated as 
‘andreia’, which “requires thymos: it is thymos which makes both men and animals fearless 
and indomitable.” 472
Thymos is the essence o f the warrior’s energy, aggression and courage. It 
distinguishes him from a soldier, and even more from a civilian. As a metaphor, we can 
consider it the self-produced fuel o f the warrior; and it is necessary for the kind o f 
aggression, ruthlessness and resolve, which the warrior needs in war. As Plato sees it, the 
problem with thymos is that, for all its necessity, it is hard to control and domesticate. It 
produces more aggressiveness and initiative than restraint, and Plato values the latter very 
much in this setting. Warriors are asked to, or allowed to, unleash their thymos against the 
enemy. However, immediately after combat they have to “switch o f f ’ as they return from 
the front: “we want them to be gende in their dealings with their own people, and fierce in 
their dealings with the enemy. Otherwise they won’t need to waste time looking for 
someone else to come along and destroy their city; they’ll be in there first, doing it for 
themselves.” 473
While the guardians’ thymos must be reigned in, they must actively “possess 
characters which combine thymos with its natural opposite, gentleness; further, they must 
be naturally inclined to display this gentleness to those they know, reserving thymos for 
strangers.” 474 The consequential challenge for the training regime naturally becomes how 
to achieve the perfect balance between stimulating thymos and civilising it. I f  thymos is
468 Hobbs, Plato and the Hero, 8.
469 Ibid.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid, 9.
472 Ibid.
473 Plato, ed . The Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 2.375c, 59.
474 Hobbs, Plato and the Hero, 9.
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over-stimulated, the possessor will be wild, hard and harsh.475 To avoid this, the thymos 
may be softened by combining physical training with literature and musical studies. The 
latter should not be overdone, or the Guardian will turn too soft, feeble and passive.476
The essence o f the warrior’s agency is thymos as it cannot be totally colonised by 
society. Achilles is the archetypical thymoedic character in literature. Indeed, thymos in 
Homer is virtually limitless.477 Achilles’ rage is o f course a product o f his community 
dishonouring him. Still, the rage also comes from within, from his interpretation and 
subsequent emotional response to wrongdoing. Compared to Hector, and indeed to most 
other warrior-characters in literature, Achilles stands alone as uncompromisingly self- 
referential. Plato, with his more sophisticated moral psychology than that o f the Homeric 
world, sees Achilles as “the archetypal exemplar o f  the thymos gone awry: a terrible 
warning o f what can happen to a man when he is not only characterised by his thymoedic 
elements... but is actually dominated by them, instead o f being ruled by his or someone 
else’s reason.” 478 Since Plato’s concern is with a city seen from the macro perspective, his 
warriors have a functional, not a mythical, role, and must be educated to behave 
accordingly, which is to say rationally. This has two important consequences: the 
instrumentalization o f war, which in turn paves the way for the soldier as a military 
institution.
W arrior subjectivity in Plato 's Republic: T he  challenge from  em otions and
death
Plato instrumentalizes both metaphysics and emotions to reduce the Homeric influence on 
young impressionable, aspiring guardians. For Plato, the human soul is in balance when the 
three elements are in harmony and ruled by reason; a worldview which is widely reflected 
in Plato’s concept o f philosophy. Homer, in contrast, does not emphasise reason, but 
celebrates the joy o f battle. This is a problem for Plato insofar as his susceptible young 
Guardians may, in their search for someone to look up to as an example, want to emulate 
the fierce Achilles rather than the tempered Socrates, as Plato’s near contemporary 
Alexander the Great did to such a high degree. Plato wants the guardians to emulate the 
self-controlled disciplined and reasoned Socrates, rather than warriors. Indeed Plato has 
Socrates rank the life governed by appetite last, the thymoedic life second, and the
475 41 Od quoted in Ibid., 11.
476 Ibid.
477 Ibid., 43-44.
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philosophic life -  informed as it is by superior experience, intelligence and reasoning ability 
-  first.479
Socrates is concerned that Homer unhelpfully paints too bleak a picture o f the 
underworld, making death scary. This does not inspire the guardians to become warlike.480 
For example, when Odysseus visits Achilles in Hades, the latter is a resdess and deeply 
unhappy wraith:
TMo winning words about death to me, shining Odysseus!
By god, I’d rather slave on earth for another man -  
some dirt-poor tenant farmer who scrapes to keep alive — 
than rule down here over all the breathless dead.481 
Whereas Plato has a different view o f the underworld from that prevailing in Homer, it is 
still illustrative o f the magnitude o f his ambition in the Republic that he wants to educate 
people metaphysically, ultimately for the well being o f the state. To this end, Homer must 
be censored. The warriors’ intimate relationship with death will not count for much, and 
must be transcended, which in turn means that the special covenant the warrior has with 
his community will be rewritten. That is precisely what Plato does; translating the warriors’ 
covenant into the guardian by social design. The creator of the state prescribes the 
guardians’ values, and they infused though education. They serve less for honour and more 
for prestige and duty, and they are soldiers instead of warriors.
There is also the weeping and wailing o f the heroes482 to get rid of, since in 
Platonic metaphysics there is no reason to dread the transition to the world o f pure forms. 
Considering the importance modem psychology attributes to the emotional dimensions of 
combat incurred post-traumatic stress disorders, Plato’s approach is instrumental in the 
extreme in depriving his guardians o f an emotional life, unless the emotions in question 
have a direct utility to their function as guardians.
Plato’s attempt to engineer soldiers inaugurates a slow domestication o f the warrior 
spirit within Western society. In this respect, he is the first thinker who explicitly and 
theoretically consider how humans can be trained to serve strategy. He professionalizes the 
guardians: ‘“Since the guardians’ job, then,’ I said, ‘is the most important, it must
479 Ibid., 24.
48° p iato, ed., The Republic, 71.
481 Homer, The Odyssey (trans. Robert Fagles), trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin, 1996), 11.555-58.
482 They do not weep and wail o f  fear, but rather o f  sorrow.
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correspondingly call for the greatest freedom from other activities, together with the 
highest levels o f expertise and training.”’483
Plato’s treatment o f warriors also features an existential side. The battle o f Delium 
made a strong impression on Socrates, which can be discerned in Plato’s work. In the Leim, 
Plato admonishes military drill for all citizens, including women and children, specifically 
for fluid combat environment (defensive or mopping up) where there is a risk o f fighting 
one on one.484 In the Republic, the guardians are trained from childhood onwards. Their 
fathers bring them to battle so they can see what combat is about first hand from an early 
age. For how can one merely pick up a shield or “any other instrument o f war — and 
immediately be ready to take your place in the battle-line, or in any o f the other sorts o f 
fighting which occur in time o f war?” 485 The guardians are billeted in barracks leading a 
suitably austere lifestyle, without frills or vain individuality. It is Plato’s ideal that everyone 
should do what they do best, and this aggregates to produce a better state for all as well. 
Despite this existential dimension, Plato is a reformer, and he instrumentalizes the 
guardians radically in comparison to the warriors’ more existential lifeworld in Homer. War 
recedes from a condition o f life into a tool for improving and safeguarding a particular way 
o f life; organised as a state. Thus, Plato is an important precursor to the Clausewitzian 
notion o f war as a trinity o f government, army and people.
Plato’s explicitly prescriptive argument further introduces a separation between the 
reality o f war and the discourse o f war, which has remained ever since. Since Plato, the 
power to define what war should be about is taken from the warrior aristocracy and given 
to ‘civilian’ leaders and to an extent from practitioners to theoreticians. Part o f this 
equation is the eviction o f the gods from the scene. The “civilian” philosophers replace 
them. Furthermore, war is conceived as controllable, not merely endured. The guardians 
are stripped o f all powers that do not concern their duty as guardians, and are put under 
the total influence o f their powerful rulers. While warriors were the property owning class 
n  Homer, Plato’s guardians will not be allowed to own property at all because o f the 
nherent risks o f a possessive mindset; “Once they start acquiring their own land, houses 
ind money, they will become householders and farmers instead o f guardians. From  being 
lilies o f the other citizens they will turn into hostile masters.” 486 According to Plato, their
■*3 Plato, ed., The Republic, 374e p.58.
w Hanson, 'Socrates dies', 19.
45 Plato, ed., The Republic, 374d p.57.
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lives will be freer and happier than that o f an Olympic victor,487 thus attractive, but there is 
no doubt that compared to the Homeric warriors the guardians are severely emasculated in 
virtually all respects.
W arrior intersubjectivity in Plato:
Plato’s discussion o f the ideal city and the guardians is quite brief on the treatment o f the 
enemy. However, two points stand out. One is a rather self-sure attitude as to the 
superiority of the guardian in combat with an enemy in superior numbers. Debating with 
Adeimantus, Socrates argues the guardians can take on large wealthy cities because they are 
accustomed to hardship and they have more knowledge o f war than “rich, fat people.” 488 
The asceticism o f the guardians can even be used advantageously in alliance building:
What if they sent an embassy to one of the other two cities, and said to them, quite 
truthfully, “Gold or silver are no use to us. We are not allowed them. But you are. Be 
our allies in this war, and you can have our opponents’ wealth.” Do you think anyone 
who heard this offer would choose to make war on dogs who are lean and fit, rather 
than side with the dogs against the fat, tender sheep?’ 489
The other point concerns the civilizing o f the conduct o f war. Socrates and Glaucon 
both subscribe to better than hitherto treatment o f the enemy, whether captive or dead. 
This holds especially true if  the enemy is a fellow Greek.
When Greeks fight barbarians, then, and barbarians Greeks, we shall say they are at 
war. We shall say they are natural enemies, and that hostilities of this sort are to be 
called a war. But in cases where Greeks fight Greeks, we shall say that they are natural 
friends, but in this situation Greece is sick, and divided against itself. We shall say that 
hostilities of this kind are to be called a civil war.’490
In cases o f civil war, Socrates and Glaucon agree that the guardians should provide a good 
example of civilized conduct. Enslavement o f fellow Greeks is thus discouraged, and so is 
plundering o f the enemy dead, which gives “cowards an excuse not to go after those who 
are offering resistance” 491 and is generally to be considered demeaning, mercenary, petty 
and womanish.492 On the other hand, the demands o f the guardians in the face o f the 
enemy stop nowhere short o f the utmost skill and courage. I f  they throw away their
487 Ibid., 465d p.165.
488 Ibid., 442b p. 114.
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weapons and give up they should be demobilized and reduced to the rank o f a farmer. If  
they are taken alive by the enemy then the enemy can do to them what they please.493
Conclusion
For Plato, warriors no longer remain exemplar in representing the most desirable qualities 
o f free men; fierceness in combat primary among them. Instead, this power o f definition 
becomes democratised. The warriors o f Homer’s Iliad need the recognition o f the entire 
society to become true warriors, but the power o f definition rests overwhelmingly with the 
warrior peers as the existentially dominant (indeed only) reference group and far less with 
the common people. In Plato’s world men chosen by selection and education can to a 
much higher extent achieve admirable qualities through rational thought and discourse. 
Paradoxically, for Plato was an anti-democrat, this leads to social mobility, increased 
democracy and it introduces meritocracy in war. Now the philosopher is highest on the 
food chain with the guardians second, because it is the philosopher who defines norms and 
values.
In Plato’s ideal state the guardians as instruments — rather than leaders — o f the 
state, must be willing to submit to the will o f their superiors, a far leap from Achilles’ 
unrestrained contempt for Agamemnon. Discipline, professionalism and restraint are 
keywords for the guardian’s attitude. To find an approximation towards Plato’s ideal we 
need not move further through history than to the hoplite, and thus Socrates himself, to 
find representatives o f this civic virtue.494 Hobbs ponders whether one could imagine 
Achilles in a phalanx, and concludes, “his yearning for individual glory might prove too 
much. AD in aU, the chances are that he would be a pretty disastrous inhabitant and 
defender o f the ideal — and perhaps any city-state.” 495 AchiDes is a warrior, not a soldier, 
and one of the distinguishing characteristics is the desire for individual freedom and 
honour, not only in the face o f the enemy, but relative to other soldiers on the same side as 
weU. While not exphcitly identifying the difference between soldiers and warriors, Hobbs 
puts it weD: “The state needs obedient soldiers, not overmighty warriors.” 496 The defence 
o f the city-state does in fact confer honour upon the participant, and it is true that the 
honour is coUective, but it is also individual as Socrates’ reputation testifies. Yet, warriors
493 Ibid., 468ab p. 168.
494 Hobbs, Plato and the Hero, 201.
495 Ibid.
496 Ibid., 202.
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typically desire more recognition than that which is granted to soldiers for ‘mere’ 
participation, since they usually contribute disproportionately to fighting.
The Platonic guardian is an ideal type o f what warriors would look like if they were 
perfectly domesticated and instrumentalized; if they were reduced to a function. There is a 
formidable challenge involved in uprooting so many o f the organic balances that we saw in 
Homer’s world. The balance between honour and sacrifice that occupied the doomed 
Achilles so much is an example of this. Plato’s drawing board version o f warriors has much 
to recommend it as far as society is concerned, but it requires a social structure that 
acknowledges other sources o f authority than war leaders. In the age o f chivalry, we are in 
many ways back to the existential properties o f Homer’s world, rather than that o f Plato.
A romantic Ideal in a Rough Reality: The Chivalric Knight
C ontext: T he M edieval W orld
It is commonly held that the medieval world was divided into three estates: those who fight 
(warriors), those who pray (clergy) and those who work (peasants). This idea was well 
known already in the late 9th century, when King Alfred o f Wessex expressed it.497 The 
notion o f the three estates predates chivalry, and it is important to appreciate how deeply 
war affected this society to understand the circumstances under which the chivalric warrior 
ascended.
Michael Howard has argued that the “origins o f Europe were hammered on the 
anvil o f war.” 498 Several reasons account for the prevalence of war in the Early Middle 
Ages. Externally there was pressure from tribal migration and invasions in various forms: 
the German tribes from the East, the Vikings from the N orth, and the religiously inspired 
Muslims who were propelled by the recently deceased prophet from the South and East.499 
Later, during the 11th century, these external pressures were largely assuaged, particularly 
for the Franks, but society was no less warlike because o f the instability of power and 
authority, as historian o f the Frankish Middle Ages Luchaire describes:
At that time the country had disintegrated into provinces, and the inhabitants of each 
province formed a kind of little nation that abhorred all others. The provinces were in 
turn divided into a multitude of feudal estates whose owners fought each other 
incessantly. Not only the great lords, the barons, but also the smaller lords of the
497 Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 3.
498 Howard, War in European History, 1.
499 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization, trans. Edmund 
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manor lived in desolate isolation and were uninterruptedly occupied in waging war 
against the “sovereigns,” their equals, or their subjects. In addition, there was constant 
rivalry between town and town, village and village, valley and valley, and constant wars 
between neighbours that seemed to arise from the very multiplicity of these territorial 
units.500
W hat Luchaire describes here is feudal society. Feudalism is a social structure characterised 
by a decentralizing — or centrifugal — dynamic. Land ownership was the source o f wealth 
and power and a popular saying held that there was ‘no land without a lord’.501 Society was 
stratified between small and big landowners, where the big landowners would give land in 
payment to smaller lords in return for loyalty and war service. This decentralizing o f land 
and loyalty repeated itself from the level o f the king all the way down to the 
disenfranchised peasants. In turn, the smaller lords enjoyed from the bigger lords: land, 
arms, money, a hand towards good marriage, and particularly later; protection o f privileges 
against the rising bourgeoisie.502 The problem for the bigger lords and kings was that their 
need o f assistance was constant if they were to rule with any continuity. The smaller lords 
would need favours only occasionally so could shift or withdraw their loyalties anytime, 
which frequently happened, and which lead to the centrifugal dynamic and instability.
Militarily and politically, kings and great lords dominated Europe throughout the 
Middle Ages and they and their appointees were social aristocrats equipped as heavy 
cavalry. Victor Davis Hanson has argued that it was no t cavalry that dominated warfare 
during this time, but the much more numerable infantry.503 While true in numerical terms, 
this underestimates the social standing and near absolute power o f the equestrian 
aristocracy during the feudal period. Gat underlines this in his definition o f feudalism as 
“the gravitation o f local-regional political and juridical power from the central authority to 
equestrian warriors and lords sustained by land allocation.” 504 For Gat, feudalism could 
only take place in societies that possessed the horse and made it a primary instrument o f 
war. These states were large but agrarian and rudimentary, lacking “the economic and 
bureaucratic infrastructure to support and administer the desired, but expensive, mounted 
troops by means other than land allocation in return for military service.” 505 Cavalry 
became dominant because o f the invention o f stirrups that made possible the shock charge
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with the locked-under-arm lance;506 increased the mobility and range o f the horse;507 and 
increased the prevalence o f skirmishes rather than set-piece batdes, particularly in relation 
to controlling a dispersed and uncoordinated domestic peasantry.508 The Western Frankish 
were the first to develop the form o f heavy cavalry that was associated with the chivalric 
knight, and one of the reasons for this is that they needed the mobility against the horse- 
dominated Islamic enemies that had conquered Spain.509
Both Gat and Hanson argue that the stirrup did not make much of a difference as 
an invention because infantry could defeat cavalry in batde, using longbows or pikes.510 
This is true if the stirrup is considered as a technological invention in isolation and 
particularly with respect to its role in batde. However, in the feudal context, the stirrup 
strongly empowered the heavy cavalryman who could easily dominate small groups o f 
disorgani2ed peasants and small holders in the countryside because o f tactical superiority 
and mobility - and such subjugation was essential before the knights could lead them into 
batde. The supremacy o f the knight arose outside batde. That infantry would play an 
important role once committed in batde is undisputed, but the infantry as a weapon there 
did not translate into social dominance, or command responsibilities. Indeed infantry in 
medieval batdes tended largely to be disenfranchised commoners rather than free 
farmers.511
A gency and the chivalric knight
In relative terms, the medieval period was one where knights enjoyed almost unrivalled 
agency. We have to return to Homer for a comparable account. This is not the highly 
regimented and patrolled soul o f the guardian in Plato’s Republic, nor is it the disciplined 
professionalism o f the Greek phalanx or the Roman legion. Chivalric knights were 
effectively lords — and sometimes actual kings — on the battiefield, with litde to constrain 
them. Mounted knights had freedom of movement, the support o f their retainers, and 
outside larger batdes relative impunity. This makes Victor Davis Hanson’s comparison
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with present day fighter pilots apt.512 However, membership access among chivalric knights 
was extremely limited. The feudal social structure direcdy influenced the degree to which 
power was personal (rather than associated with the state) and physical (rather than 
technological).
In the feudal warrior society considerable physical strength is an indispensable element 
in social power, but by no means its sole determinant. Simplifying somewhat, one can 
say that the social power potential of a man in feudal society is exactly equal to the size 
and productivity of the land and the labour force he controls. His physical strength is 
undoubtedly an important element in his ability to control it. Anyone who is unable to 
fight like a warrior and commit his body to attack and defence has in the long run little 
chance of owning anything in this society.513
Medieval warfare was clearly an extremely physical affair. It had a very limited killing zone, 
which extended to the maximum reach o f the longbow, about 300 meters, but more 
typically took place at the length o f the lance or sword. For this reason, knights were 
compelled to stay in great shape, and prowess with arms was the material counterpart o f 
the more general allegiance to manliness, courage, honour and loyalty, values discussed 
below in the subjectivity section.
Physicalprowess
Physical prowess was important for several reasons. One is that society was exceptionally 
violent, which generated a need for meeting force with force without hesitation and at any 
given moment. This kind o f situation lends several developments weight. It illustrates the 
importance o f a capacity for personal and physical violence for self preservation. The 
pacific monasteries certainly suffered from its absence. It also shows the necessity for some 
kind o f restraining code, whether the explicidy Christian Just War doctrine, or the more 
secular chivalric code. There was no social institution or power that could constrain 
individual knights since any affective outburst: whether violent or sexual, was 
commonplace, and not particularly frowned upon.514 The only possible means with which 
to limit cruelty was overwhelming physical force with an explicitly spelt out warrior code; 
chivalry. Indeed such readiness — even necessity — for violence among knights, whether 
cruel or relatively civilized, also translates into an implicit challenge to peers, which led 
knights everywhere to be deeply concerned with honour, which cannot be reduced to, but
5,2 Hanson, Why the West has won, 136.
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still resembles, reputation.515 Any knight would have to be prepared to fight for his 
honour, which was a reflection o f  courage and his willingness to shed the blood o f his 
enemy as well as his own. Honour became a currency, which abstractly reflected combat 
prowess claimed and demonstrated. Its repeated manifestation over generations was thus 
crucial for the nobility, both materially and existentially.
A second reason for the need for physical prowess was the way in which warfare 
was organised. Knights typically needed to rely on personal relationships o f loyalty, cajoling 
and persuading fellow lords to go on campaign. Lesser lords were free to decline, and there 
was no system o f punishment in place to force someone to fight unless it was in their 
interest. For this reason knights had to personally embody warrior values, leading by 
example from the front. Kings were no exception to this. In the Viking period (793-1066), 
six o f sixteen kings fell in combat.516 Leading from the front has always been very 
hazardous, so kings took their physical prowess as seriously as other knights. Thus it was 
said that the 10th century Norwegian King Olav Tryggvasson could juggle daggers and 
balance on an extended oar.517 Similarly, English King Henry V was said to be able to vault 
into the saddle in full armour.518 There are also extreme examples o f dedication and 
professionalism like the French knight Boucicat who could run up the inside o f a ladder 
using only his hands, in full batde armour, which would weigh somewhere in the range o f 
30-45 kg, and could somersault in the same.519 Such a level o f fitness is far beyond merely 
natural talent and knights underwent hard physical training from an early age, and fought 
until old age.520 In some cases, they would learn to jump, run and swim in armour. 
Weapons handling and horsemanship were both integral parts o f this training. The training 
was underpinned by a heavy meat rich diet, which in combination with the rigorous 
exercise made the knights physically bigger than their less privileged peers.521 I f  this makes 
the lifeworld o f a knight seem rather comfortable in comparison to the poor, 
disenfranchised and relatively defenceless peasants, an illustration o f the kind o f hardship 
knights sometimes underwent on campaign can even the picture. The Spanish Knight D on 
Pero Nino the Victorious was wounded in the leg in a skirmish near Tunis:
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Don Pero was in fever, his life was regarded as endangered and the doctors wished to 
amputate. He wanted to save the leg and insisted that they try cauterising the wound.
‘They heated an iron, big as a quarrel, white hot. The surgeon feared to apply it, 
having pity for the pain it would cause. But Pero Nino, who was used to such work, 
took the glowing iron himself and moved it over his leg, from one end of his wound 
to the other.’522
But it was not only on campaign the knights were able to show their skills and hardness. 
Parallel with the development o f the chivalric ethos, tournaments and jousts became the 
preferred arena for displays o f prowess and courage outside warfare proper.
Tournaments and jousts
Tournaments started taking shape between the mid 11th and 12th centuries.523 Jousts were 
set piece individual duels between knights. A tournament, on the other hand, was a semi­
organised fight between teams, such as between N orth and South England, or by 
nationality.524 The weapons were usually swords and lances, encouraging close quarter 
combat and discouraging missile weapons. Prisoners were taken for ransom, and 
conquered equipment was usually kept. The tournaments served as excellent practice for 
war, not least because they were usually composed o f kin and territory based teams, which 
increased the contingents’ cohesion by serving together in a situation barely short o f war. 
In fact in the earliest instances tournaments were hard to distinguish from skirmishes in 
real warfare. There are several examples o f high casualty figures, such as in Saxony during 
1175, when sixteen knights were killed over the year in tournaments. Worse, in Neuss in 
1241, about eighty knights were killed in a single tournament.525
During the 13th century, the tournaments became more restrained and stylized, with 
the introduction o f bated weapons, and much more strict rules o f admissions. Only nobility 
were admitted, ranging from having recognised coats of arms, to the extreme German 
example o f only allowing participants who could prove that their family had fought in 
tournaments for the last fifty years.526 The church had tried to stop tournaments from their 
inception, threatening ex-communication for those who fought, and refusal o f Christian 
burial for those who died. It was argued that the tournaments encouraged all o f the seven
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sins.527 This is probably a reasonable claim, but more importantly, it illustrates the degree 
to which knights felt unrestrained by the edicts o f the church. A possible reason for this is 
that the brutality o f warfare vis-a-vis heavily constrained rules o f engagement in 
tournaments would prove not only ridiculous, but would also deprive the latter o f their 
value as military exercises. Indeed, during the 13th century some knights, like Henri de 
Laon, complained that the tournaments were getting too soft, and could no longer serve to 
train and select those: “who have the courage to endure bodily hardship, which is what 
marks out the man who is fit to lead a com pany... the man who can support the weight o f 
his helmet and who does not pause for heat or breathlessness... to be soaked in one’s own 
sweat and blood, that I call the true bath o f honour.” 528 His concerns were probably valid 
because real war was savagely brutal, and knights did no t always feel constrained by either 
chivalry or the church’s invocations on campaign.
Subjectivity and the chivalric knight
The single most important subjective dimension o f medieval warfare is chivalry. However, 
it is important to be aware o f the limitations and paradoxes that surround chivalry. Chivalry 
was not a code that had the power to ensure that warfare was conducted in a humane 
manner, nor was its ethos subscribed to by all fighting men, or even by all knights. These 
limitations apart, chivalry was an imposing ideal, particularly for the upper nobility, and 
their social standing would surely suffer if they took this ideal lighdy. To criticize chivalry 
for not containing all the transgressions — and there were many — o f an extremely violent 
society is to enter a moral world o f absolutes which knights, who had to balance and 
reconcile social, political, existential and military responsibilities and interests, could ill 
afford to indulge in.
A leading historian o f chivalry, Maurice Keen puts the age o f chivalry as between 
the 11 th and early 16th centuries, between the first crusade and the Reformation. Chivalry 
in its abstract form has had many meanings, designating an order; knighthood; and an 
estate and a martial social class. For Keen, the definition reads; “Chivalry is a word that 
came to denote the code and culture o f a martial estate which regarded war as its hereditary 
profession.” 529 Wording his definition thus Keen is careful to include both the more 
idealised (‘code’) dimension, and its more practical manifestation (‘culture’). Indeed: 
“Chivalry cannot be divorced from the martial world o f the mounted warrior: it cannot be
527 Ibid, 94-97.
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divorced from aristocracy, because knights commonly were o f higher lineage: and from the 
middle of the twelfth century on it very frequendy carries ethical or religious overtones.” 530
With this in mind, a chivalric knight is an aristocratic mounted warrior who 
subscribes to a particularly Christian inspired warrior ethos. From the 12th century, a 
chivalric career would usually constitute an adventurous youth, an apprenticeship in 
tournament, and then war service in a far-away place.531 Geographically, chivalry started to 
be a notable way of life in France and then spread throughout Europe.532 An important 
forerunner and perhaps inspiration for the later explicit code o f chivalry was the 
experiences o f the knights who volunteered to fight against the Muslims in Spain.533 This 
was a war that accentuated the need for cavalry (because the Muslims fought almost 
exclusively on horse), and at the same time pronounced religious differences as well as the 
imperative to fight the invading infidels. In these historical developments, we can trace 
some sources o f the origins o f the chivalric ethos. There are three major components in the 
ethos that needs clarification; what were its dominant values; to which degree was it 
religious or secular; and, to which extent did the ideal translate into the real world?
The chivalric knight had to conform to a number o f ideals. The most important 
and overarching value o f all was honour, and its obvious social utility was explored above. 
In addition, loyalty and truth, courage, hardiness, prowess, largesse and humility were 
principle qualities.534 Various treatises on knights emphasized either o f these as the primary 
one. Loyalty was very important because o f the way the social structure encouraged 
multiple allegiances between lords and vassals. For the higher nobility control over 
territory, which they could not rule over in person, was very much a question o f delegating 
power to selected lords, which put trust at a premium. Hardiness was a necessity to 
perform well in war, over a lifetime. Largesse became more important in the medium and 
later stages o f the period, when it served as a distinction against the socially expanding 
bourgeoisie who, by contrast, did not live by the sword, and whose view o f material wealth 
was an inclination towards acquisition rather than largesse.535 There were actionable 
imperatives associated with these values. A chivalric knight should be prepared to defend 
the faith o f Christ against unbelievers; defend both his lord and the weak, for example by
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lceaving the castle and pursuing robbers; exercise their body and skills, particularly in 
horsemanship; and fight in jousts and tournaments to prepare mind and body for war.536
To which extent were the chivalric knights religiously inspired? Keen describes the 
origins o f chivalry as largely secular, but nonetheless the religious aspect is significant. 
Military, social and literary developments all coalesced towards the explicit code o f chivalry. 
Economically, owning and maintaining a large horse with entourage was something that 
raised the knight above the footmen. The martial function marked him as separate from 
the  clergy. Romantic literature and the chansons celebrated the social and military 
dlistinctiveness o f knights, and not least in the increasingly popular family genealogies, 
w hich emphasized noble lineage and martial honour.537 Nonetheless, Keen argues that 
w ithout its clerical component, chivalry would have been akin to a rather crude, though at 
times heroic, military professionalism. The Christian element thus elevated it above merely 
political matters, and later the Crusades constituted the highest expression o f this 
element.538 Knights were deeply steeped in Christian morality and observance, which the 
rich Christian symbolism o f the process o f dubbing to knighthood illustrates.539 
K nighthood was a Christian calling. At the same time, the knights were no more servants 
o f  G od than o f their secular lords, not even in the age o f the crusades.540
There is a Christian and a secular side to chivalry, rather than an either-or. O f 
course there are extremes in either direction, such as the strictly observant Templars. This 
conditionality o f the concept o f chivalry is reflected even more clearly in the case o f  the 
crusades, which in a sense were the external manifestation o f chivalry in action. Deciding 
whether the Crusades were fought for religious or political motivations is notoriously 
controversial.541 Part o f the historical relevance of the crusades to a study o f warriors 
comes from the fact that the crusaders were volunteers, which accentuates their individual 
commitments.542 For the clergy and the higher nobility, however, it is likely the crusades 
could not hold a lasting appeal if  they did not firmly believe they had a just cause, which 
generated a lot o f serious thought on the matter.543 Among the Templars for example,
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there was a genuine concern that their motivations be pure enough (i.e. not material).544 On 
the other hand, to use the phrase o f a leading historian o f the crusades, Jonathan Riley- 
Smith, the crusades were certainly more than ‘military monasteries on the m ove/545
One result o f the crusades was that they brought warriors and the clergy closer 
together under a common project, which made the chivalric knight something other than 
just an aristocratic warrior, with all the additional religious and ethical commitments and 
existential baggage a closer allegiance to Christianity entailed. On the other hand, it also 
made the church more militant, relative to its rather pacifist past.546 Recalling the servants 
o f G od’s vulnerability from external invasion o f Vikings and Saracens as well as from less 
than chivalric knights within Europe, the church would see an alliance with warriors as 
both giving it a military arm that could re-conquer the Holy Land abroad, as well as 
protecting the clergy militarily via the existential medium o f the code o f chivalry at home. 
In Lyndon B. Johnson’s vivid phrase, it would be better to have them inside the tent 
pissing out, rather than outside pissing in.547
Intersubjectivity and the chivalric knight
Intersubjectively speaking the chivalric knights had battlefield enemies in the Holy Land as 
well as in Europe, they had the intransigent church persistently trying to impose restraint, 
and they felt the social pressure o f the general civilizing process in Europe, which was 
strongly influenced by the new estate; the bourgeoisies. These intersubjective relations 
point in different directions, but have in common a general trend towards restraint.
As mentioned already, medieval society was incredibly brutal, and cruelty was 
commonplace both in the batdefield, in gratuitous outbursts o f violence and in 
punishment. Elias illustrates a 16th century Parisian tradition o f burning one or two dozen 
cats on Midsummer’s day. This is in no way worse than burning heretics or torturing 
people to death in penal spectacles, except for the very significant point that there seems to 
have been no functional side to this ritual; but instead an outright revelling in cruelty.548 It 
is probably reasonable to argue, as James does, that fighting men had more experience o f 
extreme violence and thus more capacity for it.
The social structure o f the age played a significant role in this cruelty. The absence of 
a money economy and the relative weakness o f government led armies on the march to live
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off the land, positively ravaging the countryside as they went.549 There was a surplus of 
men relative to land which attracted many to the prospects o f loot in war. Aside from the 
high nobility there was not necessarily a clear distinction between small lords and robber 
barons, mercenaries who lived off loot and the occasional paymaster.550 The brutality 
wrought on peasants in enemy territory was totally unrestrained, and struck those who had 
no way o f defending themselves the hardest.551 Among captives after battle, the rich nobles 
would usually be ransomed and could thus expect to be spared. The commoners, on the 
other hand, were literally worthless and would often suffer mutilation. Elias who quotes a 
contemporary chronicle illustrates the savagery:
“He spends his life,” we read of a knight, “in plundering, destroying churches, falling 
upon pilgrims, oppressing widows, and orphans. He takes particular pleasure in 
mutilating the innocent. In a single monastery, that of the black monks of Sarlat, there 
are 150 men and women whose hands he has cut off or whose eyes he has put out.
And his wife is just as cruel. She helps him with his executions. It even gives her 
pleasure to torture the poor women. They had their breasts hacked off or their nails 
torn off so that they were incapable of work.” 552
Prisoners o f war could also expect to be so mutilated as to be unfit for war or work, or 
simply to be executed. The Flemish and the Swiss, for example, typically did not take 
prisoners.553 This cruel treatment o f the weak strongly offended the church, and 
mercenaries typically became a target o f its wrath. The church was relatively powerless to 
outright condemn the higher nobles, so cooptation — to an extent through the code of 
chivalry — and alliance were more fruitful approaches. This was not necessarily a cynical 
reflection as the church could cite the motivation of the knights as superior to that o f the
554mercenaries.
In the crusades, the church and the knights saw eye to eye. It could be argued that 
in re-conquering the Holy Land, “the military orders — The Temple, the Hospital, and the 
Teutonic and Spanish orders — came to be just that, the strong right arm o f the militant 
church.” 555 For the knights, the crusades became an alternative outlet for violence, and 
“established itself firmly as the highest mode o f expression of the chivalric virtues of
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courage and endurance.” 556 The relations with the Islamic enemies were ambivalent. 
Captives were ransomed if there were prospects o f such, but commoners were either killed 
or sold into slavery, since the economy o f the Middle East was based on slavery in a way 
that the European was not. In their treatment o f captives, there was no appreciable 
difference between Western and Islamic armies. In the case o f invasions, it was no more 
common to outright slaughter populations — unless it was a siege — than in Europe. In both 
cases the local peasantry was necessary to work the land.557 Indeed, the similarities between 
Europe and the Holy Land in respect o f intersubjectivity are more striking than the 
differences. Just as in Europe, treatises were also made between Catholics and Muslim
558powers.
Warfare in this period often approached the intensity that a later age would call 
total war. Typically, total war is accompanied with a high degree o f cruelty and destruction. 
The widespread use o f chevauchees in the Middle Ages is testimony to this, and they are 
comparable to the strategic bombing raids six hundred years later. The English relied on 
chevauchees eleven times during the first 40 year o f the Hundred Years War; in 1339,1342, 
1345, 1346, 1355, 1356, 1359-1360, 1369, 1370, 1373 and 1380.559 ‘Chevauchee’ translates 
literally into ‘ride’ but is more accurately a raid, mainly constituting pillage, burning, rape 
and murder. Both King Edward’s chevauchee o f 1346 and King Henry V’s chevauchee in 
1415 were aimed at forcing the French side into a decisive battle, successfully as it turned 
out, at Crecy and Agincourt respectively.560
Reminiscent in some ways o f strategic bombing raids in World War II, the 
chevauchees were extremely brutal affairs, such as the Black Prince’s 1355 chevauchee, 
which laid waste to some 18,000 square miles. A t this time, the armies had to rely on 
pillaging to feed both their horses and men at the rate of several hundred tons a week.561 
This fact, aside from downright necessitating looting, also lent more effect to scorched 
earth tactics as well as discrediting the ruling prince, exposing his inability to protect the 
population.562 In addition many o f the commoners fought simply for a chance to loot, 
which frequently was the only possibility in their lifetime to enrich themselves. But it was 
not only commoners who had such motivations. There are plenty o f examples o f nobles
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who shamelessly plundered for personal profit. Keen offers the example o f the “English 
knight Sir John Harleston and a group o f captains who were all sitting together drinking 
from silver chalices, which they had looted from churches” .563
C onclusion
Given the complexity o f chivalry and the more determinate character o f  the crusades, what 
is the verdict on chivalry in terms o f its impact on knights? Was it all merely a romantic 
gloss or could it be granted status as an important existential feature that gave meaning to 
the life o f knights over and above the military and political concerns that have occupied 
feudal chiefs everywhere? Lynn does not credit chivalry with much value, arguing that the 
basic incompatibility o f chivalry relative to the brutality o f real war was too large for these 
two worlds to reconcile in anything better than hypocrisy. In his view, the tournament was 
invented to bridge this gap, essentially inventing an artificial form o f war to find an arena 
where chivalry could flourish.564
But the incompatibility of chivalry and real war is not necessarily that great. If  we 
apply the warrior definition,565 and bear in mind Keen’s emphasis on both code and culture 
as constituting chivalry we find that the chivalric ideal embraced as much the active 
aggressive values (courage, prowess, hardiness) as well as the more restraining ones (loyalty, 
humility, largesse). Today the notion o f chivalry is perhaps exaggeratedly associated with 
restraint exclusively, which leads to an under-appreciation o f the degree to which chivalry 
was applied, and not a merely an existential dress-up for peacetime and tournaments. At all 
times the knights had to be willing to commit to batde. W ithout this, all other military 
activity was bluff.566 Any warrior ethos that does not acknowledge such realities o f power 
will be bluff in turn.
As lords o f their estates, knights had responsibilities towards all people in their 
domain and this secular role frequently levied challenges that the idealist and scholastic 
clergy could afford not to worry about. Being leaders in war was always at the forefront o f 
their minds, and chivalry became a way o f reconciling the warrior’s status o f risking their 
lives in battle with ideals that recognbed security for all three estates. It added a welcome 
religious dimension to a sacrifice the knights were hereditarily accustomed to give anyway. 
The warriors thus benefited by being elevated in status and became inundated with the
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glory o f God, able to distinguish themselves from robber barons and the bourgeoisie who 
were more concerned with personal acquisition than the travails o f honour. The church 
gained a powerful ally and had some — rather than no — influence over warriors’ existential 
currency. The peasants gained from their masters’ acquisition o f a moral code which by no 
means was an absolute imperative, but which attributed them status as non-combatants. 
Transgression against peasants (though not the peasants o f the enemy) thus became a 
violation o f the chivalric code, which was significantly better than the alternative; abject 
indifference to the suffering o f the lowest estate.
Holding the status o f a chivalric knight, as well as that o f a warrior in general, was 
(and is) an existential process that very much relied on witnessing and display. Values 
claimed had to be values observed in action. Whereas military campaigns were fought in 
foreign lands, the tournaments were very much public spectacles. They became arenas 
where all chivalric values, codes and courageous feats could be displayed. Knights could 
show off for the women and, not least, their peers. There was much to show off: the 
magnificence o f their largesse, their courage at arms, and their noble lineages as displayed 
by their coats o f arms. O f course, there was also the opportunity to practice for war. War 
remained the ultimate challenge for the chivalric knight, and the tournament was a 
ceremonial occasion to reap some o f the glory that their role in war accorded them.
Another way to assess the properties o f chivalry is to discern the further historical 
development o f the notion. Was it discredited because o f its ostensible discrepancy with 
real war, or was it further refined? Elias describes how the civilizing process and the early 
developments o f  more permanent state formation affected the chivalric knights. A 
consistent and increasing internalisation o f restraint on affective behaviour was a parallel 
development with the arrival o f a money economy and state formation in the late middle 
ages.567 Increasingly rich great feudal lords were able to establish and maintain monopoly 
o f taxation and violence in their domains. This very significant constraint on the smaller 
lords was compensated by granting them privileged positions at the courts, which ensured 
their social standing above that o f the bourgeoisies, against whose increasing commercial 
power the aristocrats increasingly lost out. They retained martial responsibilities, but now 
as captains in the kings’ army rather than as independent knights.568 Elias calls this the 
domestication o f the knights, where they move from free nobility to  essentially being
567 Elias, Civilizing Process, 326.
568 Keen, Chivalry, 240.
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servants o f the king, effectively housebroken.569 It is because o f this development that it 
was often charged in the 14th and 15th centuries that chivalry was losing touch with its 
origins and became too preoccupied with display.570 Essentially chivalry fizzled out since it 
did not resonate with battlefield realities. Most o f its values continued to be cherished but 
in new contexts and in a diluted form.
Conclusion
M ost o f the variables addressed in this chapter repeat themselves in the coming chapter on 
m odem  ideal types, albeit in different forms. This includes the continuum between fighting 
for oneself, as Achilles does, through fighting for mixed motives, as do Hector and the 
knights, through to fighting as a public servant, as do Plato’s guardians. It also includes the 
continuum between unlimited agency and severe structural constraints.
With modernity the constraints on agency become more focused on technology 
and the scale o f warfare increases dramatically. Increasing enfranchisement o f warriors also 
decentralizes the subjective construction o f meaning to new classes o f warriors while the 
civil-military split becomes more pronounced, as power is divorced from personal presence 
on the battlefield. The chivalric knights played an important part o f this road towards 
modernity because they took on a civilizing device, chivalry, as much voluntarily as by 
pressure. They were already at the top o f the social pyramid o f feudalism, and imbued it for 
a time and to a degree with higher values than those exhibited by their contemporaries; the 
robber barons. The world o f the chivalric knights demonstrates a society in conversation 
with itself, much like Plato in his dialogues. This is perhaps the greatest contrast with 
Homer, whose heroes may doubt themselves, but not their social reality. The chivalric 
knights are for this reason social beings; attuned towards spectators other than their own 
peers and God. Their version o f chivalry was an attempt to etch out an answer to the 
question that the warrior definition raises, but does not answer; how much aggression, and 
how much restraint? Another angle on the importance o f chivalry can be taken by asking 
‘what was the alternative?’ The alternative was all too often apparent for anyone to see; the 
unrestrained violence o f freebooters and mercenaries. For this reason, any critique of 
chivalry was an implicit call for more chivalry.
An important part o f this story is the inter subjective dimension. It is quite likely 
that the civilizing impetus that we can see in the domestication o f knights into courtiers
569 Elias, Civilizing Process, 417,37, 66.
570 Keen, Chivalry, 200.
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would have been accelerated if it were not for the dramatically increasing scope for 
overseas engagements o f warriors on the eve o f modernity with the discovery o f America, 
and the explorations into Africa and Asia. The enemies found there were not as much 
familiar peers as Achilles and Hector are towards each other, nor were they a civilization 
with which a dialogue o f sorts was entered such as that between Islam and Christianity. 
Dehumanization was the result rather than an increase in restraint. The expansion into the 
rest o f the world by the West and the social and technological developments o f modernity 
necessitated a different type o f warriors, who in certain respects are continuous with their 
premodem ideal type warriors, but in other ways are contingent. It is now time to turn to 
modernity’s ideal type warriors.
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C h a p t e r  6 :  A  h i s t o r y  o f  M o d e r n  W a r r i o r s
Introduction
Some elements o f modernity indisputably make the battlefield a vasdy different lifeworld 
than it was for Homer’s figures or that o f the medieval knights: this instigates a break with 
prem odem  warrior ideal types in several respects, but retains continuity in others.
Technological development accelerated by the industrial revolution produced 
advances in heavy industry and logistics, which fashioned a battlefield dominated by 
firearms and high explosives. Some features o f this new world o f war could be discerned in 
Crimea; certainly the American Civil War; the Boer War; and the Japanese-Russo War. 
However, the Great Powers did not foresee the attrition slaughter o f the First World War, 
where these factors produced years o f bloodletting rather than decisive battles. The 
German stormtroops are important figures, as revolutionaries, against the machine- 
dominated world. They attempted to retain a focus on the human element rather than a 
total merger with technology. Nonetheless, they ended up being consumed by the “war 
machine,” with the notable exception o f Ernst Jiinger. The failure o f the stormtroops to 
carve out a sustainable lifeworld, within the storm o f steel, testifies to the alienating 
potential o f technology in war.
Another feature o f modernity, which breaks profoundly with the past are the social 
and political revolutions; from the Protestant Reformation to the French and American 
Revolutions. This created wholesale change in the formation o f the body politic: affecting 
also the shape and size o f armies, who were now composed o f citizens, rather than 
mercenaries and subjects. These citizens in principle fought for themselves as soldiers, not 
as aristocratic warriors; their motivations were more grandiose and abstract than before; 
freedom and the nation, rather than personal glory and loot. With the new revolutionary 
ideals came a more personal sense o f meaning in war, but this meaning also became 
perverted and turned into existential and total wars where aims in some cases were not 
limited to subjugation, but annihilation. If  the technologically dominated battlefield of 
World War I alienated warriors, technology had altogether changed these terms by the time 
o f the Second World War and the Cold War. These wars became total because of different 
vectors: unbounded political and social ambitions.
Finally, towards the end o f  the 20th century the grand narratives o f modernity were 
increasingly discredited because of the large-scale suffering and contradictions they had
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caused. This has led to an era o f limited wars: counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism have 
dominated the agendas o f the Post-Cold War and the militaries have become more 
specialised and downsi2ed. The Special Forces Warrior typifies the warriors of the 
postmodern world: specialized in both function and existential remit. In some ways, this is 
a return to aspects o f the prem odem  world because Special Forces warriors fight very 
much for themselves, and find meaning in the individual struggle o f the moment, rather 
than in the cause and promises o f the future. Ultimately, present day warriors have the 
benefit o f hindsight and can heed the lessons o f all o f their predecessors back to Homer, 
but particularly their modern counterparts like Ernst Jiinger.
Ernst Junger and the Stormtroop Ideal Type
C ontext
The stormtroop ideal type — embodied by its fiercest representative, Ernst Junger — 
portrays the warrior struggling to find agency and meaning within new modern structures, 
particularly technology. Junger’s experiences exemplifies the human element at an extreme 
where the chances o f survival are small, and the prospects o f a life affirming experience 
even less. The First World War was a meat grinder where soldiers served until the war 
ended or they were medically evacuated or killed. It was a total war in a confined killing 
space where politics and manoeuvre played marginal roles.
Max Weber had argued that the material conditions o f Western man, dominated by 
instrumental rationality, had become an iron cage.571 This metaphor, while generally 
illustrative o f the increasing rationalization o f Western societies in the 19th and 20th century, 
is even more apt to capture the first industrial war, and resonates with Jiinger’s own words:
There was nothing to see but the activity of machine work. As far as the eye reached, 
one shell hole gaped next to another, and man was driven away as from out of the 
crater landscape of a dead star. And when again and again, even though every square 
meter had been plowed up and plowed up once more, the steel curtain came down, 
then these events expressed the features of a cosmic, soulless force before which man 
almost disappeared.572
A leading man o f letters almost throughout the 20th Century, Junger (1896-1998) was a 
warrior and a stormtroop company commander who virtually grew up in the First World 
War. Even before the war in 1913, aged seventeen, Junger ran away from home to
571 Weber, Protestant Ethic, 123.
572 Ernst Jiinger, 'Matehalschlacht', Standarte I, no. 5 (1925). Quoted in Leed, No Man's hand, 156.
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volunteer with the French Foreign Legion, who had to return him from Algiers at the 
request o f  his parents.573 Junger again volunteered on the day o f the outbreak o f the First 
World War, but did not join the line until November 1914, when he joined the 73rd Rifles 
around Champagne. He won the Iron Cross First Class in January 1917, and the highest 
German award for valour, the Croix de Pour le Merite574 in September 1918. At the close 
o f the war, Junger had fought for nearly four years and had been wounded at least fourteen 
times — leaving out the “trifles” as he put it; ricochets and grazes. Despite the anonymity o f 
most o f the fighting, Junger had found himself targeted at least eleven times, where, of 
course, he prevailed every time.575 Very few warriors in the line had an equally 
distinguished record, and none m ore.576
Junger was almost obsessively motivated for the war, and remained so throughout. 
But he quickly realised the war was not going to be as he imagined; a place for manly action 
in “flowered blood-bedewed meadows.” 577 Instead the central image o f the war became for 
him as for many others that o f the sentry “with his spiked, grey helmet, fists buried in the 
pockets o f his greatcoat, standing behind the shooting-slit, blowing pipe smoke over his 
rifle butt.” 578 This image was regularly interrupted by extreme violence where the war 
“showed its claws, and stripped off its mask o f cosiness.” 579 Yet, Junger persisted in 
preferring the war with its claws to the stiflingly boring bourgeois peacetime life he had 
found so life denying.
A gency
In Storm of Steel (1920) Junger takes us into the heart o f Weber’s iron cage, quite literally. 
The war was already stationary when Junger joined, but it would go through phases o f 
increasing industrialization and mechanization, as he himself noticed. From the Batde of 
the Somme, Junger perceived the war to be a batde o f materiel, materialschlachty which from 
1917 turned into more mechanized warfare when the British introduced tanks on a 
significant scale.
573 Leed, N o Man's Land, 154.
574 This award was bestowed upon only fourteen lieutenants in the war. Gerhard Loose, Ernst Jiinger (New  
York,: Twayne Publishers, 1974), 22.
575 Junger, Storm of Steel, 288.
576 Other famous notables o f comparable distinction were Manfred von Richthofen and Erwin Rommel.
577 Junger, Storm of Steel, 5.
578 Ibid., 12.
579 Ibid., 7.
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The stormtroop concept
Stormtroops were shock troops specially trained, equipped, organised and motivated for 
storming enemy trenches covered by artillery curtains and other supporting fires that were 
walked up to the enemy trenches in synchronisation with the advance. The artillery barrage 
that preceded the stormtroop assault sounds very much like an objectification o f Weber’s 
iron cage metaphor: “A box barrage was used to isolate the objective, while a curtain of fire 
was placed on the French front trench until the moment when the assault troops were 
ready to move into that trench. At that point, the fire was shifted to the second trench. 
Once the first trench was cleared, the process was repeated with the artillery being shifted 
to the third and last French trench.” 580 As soon as the enemy trenches were taken, the 
stormtroops were immediately reinforced.
The use o f stormtroops was clumsily inaugurated already in 1914 in the Argonne 
forest. Further experimentation and training lead to tactical innovations: (1) advancing 
skirmish lines replaced by surprise assaults conducted by autonomous stormtroop squads. 
(2) Supporting fires like machine guns, infantry guns, mortars and flamethrowers were 
decentralized in squads for covering fire, and (3) trench clearing was done mainly by hand 
grenades.581 The selected stormtroops were young bachelors, maximum 25 years old, at the 
peak o f their physical prowess. In compensation for the risks and violence o f their 
missions, they were billeted in the rear, and enjoyed extensive rest periods between 
storms.582 Once engaged, it was essential that the various units interacted with precision 
and discipline, and not least that command was decentralized and the people who were 
conducting the missions, and taking the risks made decisions. Both these features had a 
long tradition in the German way o f warfare.583 Training was conducted behind the lines 
often involving live ammunition in to-scale replicas o f enemy trench systems, courtesy o f  
reconnaissance aircraft. This type o f fighting was tailor-made for the German, argued 
Jiinger, “with his feeling for discipline and order, analogous, one might say, to the musical 
coordination o f an orchestra.” 584 This approach lent itself well to give the lower echelons 
ownership over their successes and failures, which generated a sense o f agency for the 
stormtroops.
580 Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (London: Praeger, 
1995), 92.
581 Ibid., 49.
582 Ibid., 151.
583 Ibid., 172,76.
584 See Ernst Jiinger, Copse 125, quoted in Ibid., 43.
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Jiinger’s war
Storm of Steel provides us with an almost clinical detachment and objectivity in its observer. 
Junger writes with the coldness and precision o f a naturalist; excluding virtually any 
conceivable contextual dimensions o f the experience, such as the causes or progress o f the 
war, or any political questions whatsoever. He is not particularly interested in his fellow 
soldiers, although his account is not completely void o f emotional observations. People 
around him are being killed on every other page, yet there is little generic reflection on the 
horrible human waste. As Michael Hoffman observes; Junger was in it for himself.585 The 
question is firsdy whether Junger was able to find agency inside the storm o f steel within 
which to display arete, and secondly whether his experiences and observations can speak 
credibly for anyone but himself. The whole point with the stormtroop concept was, after 
all, to reintroduce the possibility o f breakthrough and manoeuvre into the war.
Marx had asked; “Is Achilles possible with gunpowder and lead?” 586 Junger 
answered: “That was my problem.” 587 Technology made the battlefield inhabitable, much 
less conquerable through skills, denying Junger the agency to emulate the greatest warrior. 
Although he was speaking about something else, namely his early experience o f being 
submitted to Prussian discipline, one passage from Junger portrays equally well the violent 
ballet between bullets and shells inside and between the trenches: “against the edges and 
comers of which I initially hurled myself violendy and to which yet I owe more than to all 
the schoolmasters and books in the world” 588 His combat accounts sees the same violent 
hurling against the edges o f the iron cage o f the war’s industrial battlefield, which 
necessarily left him very bruised, yet following his survival would boost his confidence 
immeasurably.
Jfinger’s restlessness and initiative generated an ethos that was fundamentally 
paradoxical: it was life affirming for him, but in a way that was not transitive to the general 
soldiery. He embodies one o f  the very few ways the modem warrior could regain agency 
for himself; by engaging with an aggressive style o f warfare. Yet the stakes were so high 
that the outcome stopped short o f a sustainable example for others; it could only remain 
self-referential and temporary, and even that at great cost. The evidence is plain from both 
Jfinger’s own experience and that o f his friends. He recounts a number o f aggressive raids,
585 Michael Hoffman, ‘Introduction’ in Junger, Storm o f Steel' ix.
586 G. Hillman, ed., Karl Marx: Texte Methode und Praxis (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1967), 3:35. Quoted in Nevin, 
Ernst Jiinger 42.
587 Ernst Junger, A.utor und A.utorschaft (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984), 258. Quoted in Nevin, Ernst Jiinger 42.
588 Quoted in Nevin, Ernst Jiinger 43.
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some o f which were voluntary extra-curricular activities, for example when he strikes up a 
friendship with an older, married NCO, Kloppmann; a man who had “distinguished 
himself by his great zest for battle. He was one o f those men in whom, in respect of 
courage, there isn’t the slightest deficiency anywhere, a man among hundreds.” 589 Together 
Kloppmann and Junger would pay visits to the French trenches at night, several times met 
with rifle fire and hand grenades. Junger describes the attractions o f such voluntary raids:
Eyes and ears are tensed to the maximum, the rustling approach of strange feet in the 
tall grass an unutterable menacing thing. Your breath comes in shallow bursts; you 
have to force yourself to stifle any panting or wheezing. There is a little mechanical 
click as the safety-catch of your pistol is taken off; the sound cuts straight through 
your nerves. Your teeth are grinding on the fuse-pin of the hand-grenade. The 
encounter will be short and murderous. You tremble with two contradictory impulses: 
the heightened awareness of the huntsman, and the terror of the quarry. You are a 
world to yourself, saturated with the appalling aura of the savage landscape.590
In one o f these raids with Kloppmann Junger returns with only three others, out o f a patrol 
o f fourteen going out.
The stormtroops had to mobilize a remarkable degree o f commitment to fight. This 
was especially the case late in the war, during the ‘peace offensive’ o f the spring 1918: when 
Ludendorff attempted to win the war through using the tactically superior stormtroops to 
break through the front decisively.591 Jiinger’s climax o f the war occurred around this time, 
when he was wounded seriously enough never to return to the front.
Jiinger’s last storm is like his war experience in a nutshell, demonstrating the elitism 
o f the stormtroops, and his own unique combination o f detachment and ferocious energy. 
H e led his three companies in the attack with the typical oudook; ominous yet detached: “I 
had a very impartial feeling, as if  I were able to view myself through binoculars. For the 
first time in the entire war, I heard the hissing o f individual bullets, as if they were whistling 
past some target.” 592 One o f these bullets caught Junger in the chest while he was jumping 
over a trench; bringing him crashing down, which inspired some curious reflections: “As I 
came down heavily on the bottom  o f the trench, I was convinced it was all over. Strangely, 
that mom ent is one o f very few in my life o f which I am able to say they were truly happy.
589 Jiinger, Storm of Steel\ 183.
590 Ibid., 71.
591 Gudmundsson, Stormtroop tactics, 152.
592 Junger, Storm of Steel, 280-81.
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I understood, as in a flash o f Hghtning, the true inner purpose o f my life.” 593 Yet, following 
a brief spate o f unconsciousness, Junger came to again at the same time as the British 
counterattacked, which made him feel his “life force beginning to glimmer again like a 
spark.” 594 In a confusing melee where people on both sides surrendered, Junger shot 
himself free as he headed for his own lines, where he was rolled in a tarpaulin to be carried 
away. Three separate individuals carried him alone: both the two first were shot in the 
head; the third made it out with Junger on his back.595
Strategically the stormtroops did not yield the results that were hoped for, primarily 
for three reasons. Firstly, the sheer human cost in manpower was too large. As Junger 
himself illustrates, even though stormtroops would often complete their mission, they 
would also suffer 50% casualties.596 Secondly, the coordination with supporting arms, 
which in many ways gave the stormtroops their unparalleled agency, also became their 
weakness, because if the fires were not timed exactly right the enemy would be weakly 
suppressed and would catch the stormtroops in the open. Thirdly, the lightly equipped 
stormtroops would have to quickly empty the first trenches so that the vital reinforcements 
from behind could get to cover, otherwise they would quickly run out of hand grenades. 
Such success was by no means a foregone conclusion in combats dominated by hand 
grenades.597 Junger vividly describes the stakes:
From all sides, bullets whistled round our steel helmets or struck the trench parapet 
with a hard crack... During those instants of waiting, you had to try to get to a place 
where you could see as much of the sky as possible, because it was only against its pale 
backdrop that it was possible to see the black jagged iron of those deadly balls with 
sufficient clarity. Then you hurled your own bomb, and leaped forward. One barely 
glanced at the crumpled body of one’s opponent; he was finished, and a new duel was 
commencing. The exchange of hand-grenades reminded me of fencing with foils; you 
needed to jump and stretch, almost as in a ballet. It’s the deadliest of duels, as it 
invariably ends with one or the other of the participants being blown to smithereens.
Or both.
Some have argued Ludendorff put so much stock in the stormtroops’ tactical skills that he 
sacrificed strategy for tactics as the Germans became so preoccupied with breaking through
593 Ibid., 281. He does not specify what this purpose is, but it is tempting to suggest the Nietzschean 
aphorism below.
594 Ibid., 284.
595 Ibid., 286-87.
596 Hugh Cecil & Peter Liddle, Facing Armageddon: The first World War Experienced (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), 
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the enemy trenches that the operational gains following from this were insufficiently 
followed up.598 The concept did not explain how sufficient reserves could be brought into 
the breach to prevent the counter-attackers from immediately tightening the noose — a 
predicament Junger was well acquainted with.
Even though the Germans lost the war and the stormtroop concept came out less 
than vindicated, Junger emerged personally victorious, as a first among equals. As Nevin 
puts it, his elevation to storm company commander individualised his perception o f the 
war, and effectively made him a chieftain:
His sheer endurance in the front line became an oblique performance of those deeds 
of singular renown known as aristeia. His merits accrued with his wounds, as the war 
assumed an ever more imposing, metallic indifference, of which the coming of tanks 
served as emblem. The introduction of steel helmets (1916) conferred a hard, uniform 
dullness, the tamhelm under which all individuality disappeared, but Junger proved 
himself a splendid anomaly amidst all the mechanization and the rutted trenches.599
For everyone but Junger the losses were a very heavy price to pay for agency. Reflective of 
the almost fantastic skill and luck that helped Junger survive, it was perhaps no wonder that 
his lessons o f the war referred primarily to himself. This is strongly captured in a hyper- 
Nietzschean aphorism o f his: “What doesn’t kill me makes me strong, and what kills me 
makes me incredibly strong.”600
Subjectivity
To Junger the war was no t a problem; it was just a fact. He was not someone who 
complained: if anything the war was a personal challenge he welcomed. In his work, two 
questions about meaning are raised: what was the meaning o f the war; and, if the war was a 
machine, what is the relationship between the warrior and this machine? Nowhere does he 
come to a clear-cut answer to these questions, and there is certainly evolution in his 
outlook. Yet, there is a sense in which the first question is answered by the premises o f the 
second.
W hat was the meaning o f the war ?
Taking the train home after being wounded for the first time, Junger saw the river Neckar 
flowing peacefully enshrouded by flowering cherry trees, and he felt a surge o f nationalist
598 Ibid., 275.
599 Nevin, Ernst Jiinger 41.
600 Quoted in Hoffman Junger, Storm of Steel, xix.
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sentiments: “What a beautiful country it was, and eminently worth our blood and our lives. 
Never before had I felt its charm so clearly. I had good and serious thoughts, and for the 
first time I sensed that this war was more than just a great adventure.”601 However, much 
later in the war, after having endured many years of it, this motivation was running dry and 
he was visited by a new mood:
A profound reorientation, a reaction to so much time spent so intensely, on the edge.
The seasons followed one another, it was winter and then it was summer again, but it 
was still war. I felt I had got tired, and used to the aspect of war, but it was from this 
familiarity that I observed what was in front of me in a new and subdued light. Things 
were less dazzlingly distinct. And I felt that the purpose with which I had gone out to 
fight had been used up, and no longer held. The war posed new, deeper puzzles.602
There is nothing unique about moving from nationalist motivation to  exhaustion; the same 
was experienced by millions and is reiterated in coundess memoirs. Yet, Junger did not 
stop at this, his motivation remained vibrant, but its character transformed. He did not 
conclude that the war was poindess, a nihilistic exercise. Instead, he found “new, deeper 
puzzles.” His subsequent writing can be seen as an attempt to figure these puzzles out.
A leitmotif in Jiinger’s reflections is that the experiences themselves generate 
meaning. The war experience was not an instrument (as Clausewitz would say) towards 
attaining something else; the experience was the point itself. In Coker’s words; “His fellow 
men-in-arms looked for some meaning outside the struggle — they did not understand that 
the war was the meaning o f their lives.”603 This is where Junger departs from m ost o f his 
peers; he absolves his surroundings from the responsibility to provide meaning for himself, 
and turns the responsibility on himself to the point o f almost evaporating the question 
altogether. Jiinger complained that his peers were asking the wrong question: “They take 
the war to be not an expression but a cause and in this way hope to find outside what is 
only to be found within.”604 His independence and steadfast motivation recalls Achilles, 
and makes him one o f the m ost self-referential warriors in Western history. Like Achilles, 
Junger does not ask what the war can give him, but what he can give the war. Thus he 
comes to conclude in Kanrpf als innere Erlebnis /  Bathe as Inner Experience; “what is important 
is not what we fight for, but how we fight.”605 Huyssen reminds us that this is not a
601 Ibid., 33.
602 Ibid., 260.
603 Coker, W ar and the 20th Centuiy, 119.
604 Quoted in Ibid., 119.
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chivalric reflection on the intersubjective relations with the enemy; it is an existential wager 
where combat is a transcendent event that defines the warrior.606
For all his motivation, there is also tension in Jiinger’s view. While he wants to rest 
content the war is its own reward, he seems impatient to see the war provide a meaningful 
trajectory towards the future. In an essay entitled “D er Wille” /  “The will” from 1926, 
Junger insisted “ [w]e must believe in a higher meaning than the one we were able to give to 
events, and we must believe in a higher destiny within which that which we believe we 
determine is being fulfilled.”607 This was a time with no shortage o f contenders for that 
higher destiny, but Junger remained sceptical o f reductive ideologies and mass movements. 
A brilliant aside from his Second World War diaries illustrates this; “the genius o f Hitler 
was to realise that the twentieth century is the century o f cults — which was why men o f 
rational intelligence were unable to understand or to stop him.”608
Junger never explicitly articulates the warrior ethos he stands for in writing, but his 
behaviour in the war is suggestive o f a budding warrior-aristocrat. Perhaps this label is not 
such a misnomer as Hoffmann insists it is.609 Norbert Elias describes how in 19th century 
Germany a self-conscious warrior code, expressed most visibly in duelling with its 
attendant scars, stamped a common code on the newly unified upper classes. From the 
student fighting fraternities, duelling spread to the upper middle classes and persisted into 
the twentieth century. The aristocratic dimension to this goes back to the time when lords 
personally subjugated their subjects, often through single combat.610 Junger displayed such 
an aristocratic warrior code. He clearly fought for himself yet he refused to accept that the 
war was either nihilistic or a purely private affair. Nevin is right to argue that Junger 
exhibits Germany’s pre-Hitler conscience, which was a conscience that carried a strong 
romanticism for war and the hardship war entails. Yet in this hardship, some warriors stand 
above others in endurance, skill and commitment:
It has been proven here that man is capable of enduring more than one could have 
supposed, that he grows with his means, and that his powers of resistance prevail 
again and again in this contest. It becomes ever more difficult to approach him; it 
demands a kind of preparation which borders on magic. One can say that in this arena 
in which mass national armies and gigantic concentrations of artillery hold the balance,
606 Ibid.
607 Quoted in Ibid.
608 Bruce Chatwin, What am I doing here? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), 312.
609 Hoffman Junger, Storm of Steel, ix.
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still a second and higher form of warfare begins to unfold: the war of twenty men who 
alone among the tens of thousands are changed by the gravitational pull of fire and 
earth, and are still capable of breaking into that elemental, and, in a far deeper sense, 
decisive stratum where one looks the enemy in the eye.611
In this remarkable passage Junger outlines the major properties o f what distinguishes 
warriors from soldiers: the exposition to combat; it’s more or less natural selection; which 
“borders on magic;” and the transformation that happens to the few; and finally, the direct 
confrontation with the enemy. This higher form o f warfare was embodied by the 
stormtroop, a “new breed o f fighter”612 o f which Junger himself was a leader. The war 
becomes, in other words, its own reward for this new breed o f warrior, and thus generates 
its own transcendent meaning. Nevertheless, how was the stormtroop to prevail in the 
industrial killing fields, as Marx had asked, was this a viable lifeworld for warriors?
The relationship between the warrior and the war-machine
The image o f the war as a machine raises not so much the issue o f technology itself as the 
relationship between human agency and mechanical forms o f interaction. As Leed puts it; 
“Actual technologies, the “stuff,” provide only the material and the occasion for the 
examination o f ineffable but highly significant matters: to what extent is “man” gaining or 
losing control over himself, over his fate, his environment?”613 The stormtroops were at 
the same time bom  of the war machine, yet the machine provided its principal enemy in 
both literal and existential terms. Since stormtroops were conceived to facilitate 
breakthroughs, their capabilities as warriors represented nothing short o f a human 
equivalent o f the tank. This provided an arena for either unquestioned heroism, or 
unmitigated disaster, or, frequently, both. For Junger, the former overshadowed the latter. 
It is not clear whether his repeated invocations o f the high morale614 among the 
stormtroops even late in the war could be attributed to his leadership, or whether this was a 
widely shared sentiment. Junger’s friend Ernst Toller, who had been evacuated because of 
psychological trauma, spoke for many who could not find any redeeming qualities in the 
war machine:
Instead of escaping the soul-killing mechanism of modem technological society, they 
learned that the tyranny of technology ruled even more omnipotently in war than in 
peace-time. The men who through daring chivalry had hoped to rescue their spiritual
611 Ernst Junger, Werke (Stuttgart,: E. Klett, 1960), vol I, 352. Quoted in Nevin, Ernst Jiinger 149.
6.2 Junger, Storm of Steel' 266.
6.3 Leed, No Man's Eand, 150.
614 See for example Junger, Storm of Steel, 140,84.
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selves from the domination of material and technical forces discovered that in the 
modem war of material the triumph of the machine over the individual is carried to its 
most extreme form.615
If anything, this further underlines the depth o f J linger’s commitment to the stormtroop 
lifeworld, but it raises doubts about the viability o f the stormtroop concept for anyone but 
the smallest group o f condottieri, as the stormtroops named themselves.616
For those who could survive years o f war, the existential question beckoned: had 
they not simply become embedded in the war machine and become machinery themselves, 
just like their role as human tanks would imply? As Coker observes, such an interpretation 
was not necessarily problematic for Junger. “If the whole o f life had become an 
industrialized phenomenon, war was merely the central hub o f the machine.”617 In 
addition, this did not necessarily lead to estrangement; it could just as well lead to a 
successful symbiosis.618 J unger’s world was a world o f total war, and he clearly believed 
such a symbiosis was achievable:
The hardiest sons of the war, the men who lead the stormtroop, and manipulate the 
tank, the aeroplane, and the submarine, are pre-eminent in technical accomplishment; 
and it is these picked examples of daredevil courage that represent the modem state of 
battle. These men of first-rate qualities with real blood in their veins, courageous, 
intelligent, accustomed to serve the machine, and yet, its superior at the same time, are 
the men, too, who show up best in the trench and in the shell holes.619
However, is this convincing? The industrialized killing field as a new arena where 
warriors can seek self-fulfilment, realizing their potential by becoming like Achilles 
achieving agency and recognition? Is Junger rare even among stormtroops? Was he right in 
announcing that the war had produced a new Gestalt o f warriors, “a “technological man” 
who was as “hard,” “callous,” and “unfeeling” as the machinery o f war itself’?620 It is 
tempting to attribute his call for a merger with the machine as less a prescription than an 
ex-post facto rationalization o f exceptionalism. A warrior as formidable as Junger could 
conceivably find meaning in any war, and the way in which he finds the meaning to reside 
in the war itself is as much a testimony to the barrenness o f the alternatives, as to a viable
615 Quoted in Leed, N o M an's hand, 30.
616 Nevin, E rnst Jiinger 63.. Ernst Junger and Basil Creighton, Copse 125; a chronicle from the trench warfare o f 1918 
(London,: Chatto & Windus, 1930).
617 Coker, W ar and the 20th Century, 121.
618 Ibid.
619 Junger quoted in Gudmundsson, Stormtroop tactics, 91.
620 Leed, N o M an's Land, 153.
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existential realm. Indeed, for those who survived, the rationalization o f what had transpired 
would retain the subjective impression o f having been shaped by a machine:
Never before has a generation stepped out into the light from a door so dark and 
immense as from out of this war. And we cannot lie, however much we wish to do so: 
the war, father of all things, is also our father. It has hammered, cast and tempered us 
into what we are. And always, as the whirling wheel of life turns in us, the war will be 
the axis around which it turns.621
“Arms or the man?” asks Nevin, “Is war decided by the will or the dynamo? Having set 
one against the other, Junger wants to affirm both.”622 The machine could produce two 
products: cast iron warriors, and dead and mangled victims, very few and very many 
respectively. Paradoxically, the war forges hardiness for those who survive, precisely 
because its life-denying character is such a profound challenge.
It is easy to see how this conclusion could slip into fascism, and some writers have 
tried to paint Junger as a fascist.623 However, Jiinger’s outlook is at once simpler and more 
complex than that. It is simpler in that it entails no cult o f the sacrifice; Junger more or less 
ignored the dead, except for observing them as dead matter in passing. Contrastingly, the 
cult o f sacrifice is pronounced in a whole other degree in one o f Junger’s Pour le Merite 
colleagues, Fedor von Bock, who became a Field-Marshal on the Eastern Front in the 
Second World War, and who lectured his soldiers that there was no greater honour than 
dying for the German Fatherland ("Our profession should always be crowned by heroic 
death in battle").624 Junger, on the other hand, was rather more interested in affirming life 
through combat than seeking its end.
Jiinger’s outlook is more complex as well: he struggled with whether agency in the 
midst o f the war’s “machine work” could be Hfe-affirming; even transcendent. 
Furthermore, could this affirmation be a collective solution, or merely an individual 
decision? This “drive for movement o f a singular individual and the limitation o f this 
impulse by the forces which hold him in his surroundings” 625 has been a recurring dilemma 
for warriors since Homer, and it is safe to say that Junger did not solve it either. If he did, it 
was only for himself; through effort, will and luck. O n the other hand, neither did he 
demand anyone else to present the solution to him. In his insistence on taking
621 ‘Kampf als Innere Edebnis’ in Jiinger, Werke, vol V p 13.in Leed, N o M an’s Land, 153.
622 Nevin , Ernst Jiinger 64.
623 See Huyssen, Twilight Memories, 130.
624 'Two Men, Two Faces', Time Magazine, September 21 1942. Available 
http://www.time.c0 m /tim e/m aga2 ine/article/0 ,9171,773573,00.html [retrieved 21 Jan 2008]
625 Jiinger, 'Materialschlacht'. quoted in Leed, N o M an's Land, 156.
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responsibility for his own experience; in his resisting becoming a figurehead for mass 
movements; there is very much an aristocratic touch to  Junger’s work. This aristocratic 
outlook comes out even stronger in his relations with the enemy.
Intersubjectivity
E rn st Junger; chivalric stormtroop
Unsurprisingly, the stormtroops relations with their enemies were not without paradoxes 
either. O n the one hand, the war’s cruelty was largely contained within a military lifeworld, 
which was a strongly shared predicament o f front line troops on both sides, with ample 
resentment towards those enjoying relative safety and comfort in the rear. Such a situation 
occasioned both friendly encounters and chivalric attitudes between belligerents, both o f 
which Junger recounts episodes. O n the other hand, the stormtroops were, as the name 
itself suggests, organised and trained for extremely aggressive assaults directly into the 
enemy line, where they frequently became enveloped. This sort o f action did not pair up 
well with mercy or hesitancy. Furthermore, in what had become a stalemate war o f 
attrition, killing enemy troops was a measure o f success.
In several instances, Junger describes friendly encounters across no-man’s land with 
attendant non-belligerent exchanges:
‘Hey, Tommy, you still there?’
‘Yup!’
‘Then get your head down, I’m about to start shooting at you!’626 
Junger explains that throughout the war he endeavoured to “view my enemy without 
animus, and to form an opinion o f him as a man on the basis o f the courage he showed.” 
Yet, this did not prevent him from doing his job: “I would always try and seek him out in 
combat and kill him, and I expected nothing else from him.”627 Prisoners, however, were 
well taken care of.
Junger frequently expresses admiration for the British enemy in particular. 
Sometimes he articulates a sportsmanlike admiration, although the fact that this was 
anything but sports is clear from the handiwork o f a brave British — “an amazing character” 
— who paid a visit to the German trench one night, running along the back o f the sentries, 
who suffered from restricted view due to their gas masks, and broke the skulls of eight o f
626 Jiinger, Storm of Steel, 45, 56, 57,125.
627 Ibid., 58.
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them before returning, equally unnoticed.628 Junger himself was no stranger to such 
ruthlessness. When opportune targets presented themselves he was generally set on killing 
rather than on mercy: Once he saw a British soldier break cover and immediately tore a 
rifle from a sentry, set the sights on six hundred; “aimed quickly, just in front o f the man’s 
head, and fired” and killed the man.629
The choice between aggression and mercy became even more pronounced in the 
attack. In theory, there would be no mercy in the assault, where encounters with 
counterparts equally deadly could be expected; “O f all the stimulating moments in a war, 
there is none to compare with the encounter o f two storm troop commanders in the 
narrow clay walls o f a line. There is no going back, and no pity.”630 If  anything, this image 
recalls the mix o f violence and chivalry in the jousts o f the Middle Ages. A further parallel 
to the jousts is the lethal shooting sport Junger and his friends invented, “quite exciting, 
though not without its perils,” which entailed picking up unexploded shells, “little ones and 
big ones,” in no-man’s land, setting them up some distance away and “bang away at 
them”.631 Clearly the risks they were willing to take to keep their skills sharp were in 
themselves potentially lethal.
One assault in particular illustrates the mixture o f  chivalric impulses and killing 
imperatives. Striding forward in the assault, pistol and riding crop in hand, Junger felt “we 
were in the grip o f a berserk rage. The overwhelming desire to kill lent wings to my stride. 
Rage squeezed bitter tears from my eyes.”632 Enshrouded by a “red mist,” (which he claims 
disinclines the fighter to take prisoners633) Junger stalks his first enemy, a wounded British 
officer: “A bloody scene with no witnesses was about to happen.” Up close he puts his 
pistol to the man’s temple, when unexpectedly the man pulls out his wallet showing 
pictures o f  his family: “It was a plea from another world. Later, I thought it was blind 
chance that I let him go and plunged onward. That one man o f all often appeared in my 
dreams. I hope that meant he got to see his homeland again.”634 A subsequent scene in the 
same assault sees Junger run into another English officer. Grabbing him by the tunic he 
hears a white-haired Major behind him urge to “Kill the swine!” yet, he lets this one go as 
well. Moving on and killing an Englishman quickly Junger for the third time runs into an
628 Ibid., 84.
629 Ibid., 126.
630 Ibid., 216.
631 Ibid., 54.
632 Ibid., 232.
633 Ibid., 239.
634 Ibid., 234.
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Englishman he urges to give up. This one refuses and is dispatched with hand grenades.635 
Such an episode repeats itself several times and Junger kills again. The last one, a young 
fellow, was hit in the temple: “It wasn’t a case o f ‘you or me’ any more. I often thought 
back on him; and more with the passing o f the years. The state, which relieves us o f our 
responsibility, cannot take away our remorse; and we must exercise it. Sorrow, regret, 
pursued me deep into my dreams.”636
Reflecting more generally on this, Junger argues that although battle is made sacred 
by the cause, the cause is made more sacred by its batde: “How otherwise could one 
respect his foe? Only the brave can understand that?”637 This is recognizable Junger, 
Nietzschean and self-referential. As Nevin reads it, this is an embrace o f chivalry, because 
despite the inhumanity and brutality o f the batdefield’s “iron harvest,”638 it cannot negate 
the possibility o f magnificence or glory.639
In terms o f combat motivation — or what Nevin calls “the civilian’s question, how 
could anyone continue to stand, let alone fight, facing imminent death?” — Junger does not 
evoke the familiar motivations o f the literature.640 Neither the cause, nor the small-group 
cohesion, nor an urge for survival or endurance features strongly. Instead, there is a pure 
warrior ethos; a voluntarism that stems from the encounter between man and the war: 
“Everything that can be expended in steel and fiery energies in a night a hundred men can 
affirm or confound. There’s nothing terrible to which a man cannot show himself superior 
in the end. And it’s exacdy the annihilating intensification o f means that also seems to fetch 
forth from him the ultimate in boldness and willpower.” 641 This has a strong tone o f 
romanticism: the more pronounced the endurance and overcoming; the stronger the 
suffering and the harder the opposition. Clearly, such an understanding and experience o f 
combat requires and welcomes an enemy that is respected. For Nevin, that is why Junger 
“could claim proudly, even in the face o f apparent defeat, that the storm troops he led were 
a match for any opponent in war, and harbingers o f an iron future.”642
That iron future became anything but; the quick unravelling o f the war followed by 
a rapid demobilization was no t welcomed even by the many stormtroops who had grown
635 Ibid., 237-38.
636 Ibid, 241.
637 Jiinger quoted in Nevin, Ernst Jiinger 67.
638 Junger, Storm of Steel' 235.
639 Nevin, Ernst Jiinger 61.
640 Newsome, 'The Myth o f  Intrinsic Combat Motivation'.
641 Quoted in Nevin, Ernst Jiinger 70.
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to love the war. A major feature o f intersubjectivity was where — and in what form — the 
passions o f war were to be directed once the war had abrupdy ended.
From storm to home fro n t 
It is a historic fact that many stormtroops — particularly stormtroops — became engaged in 
the Freikorps between 1918 and 1920. This development tells us some things about the 
stormtroops, which the war itself did not expose. O n the other hand, it is interesting to 
note that Ernst Junger did not join them, a man who by any estimation could have been 
their arch-representative.
The Freikorps was a large semi-professional unit o f volunteer soldiers who between 
January 1919 and April 1920 were a repressive force within the Weimar Republic. They 
partially worked for the government; partially comprised a resdess entity, which needed to 
be deflected towards the not quite pacified eastern boundary. Contrary to myth, the 
Freikorps had litde in common with the Nazi movements o f  the 1930s, a trajectory which 
has been portrayed by Nazi historiography, which hijacked the Freikorps model for their 
own purposes. As Ben Scott explains, the Freikorps volunteers were not interested in 
politics. They were interested in war; their oudook was not into an ideologically conceived 
future, but towards the batde-hardened past.643
Their unique identity as elite warriors set them apart from any group. After the war 
their identity remained bound up with all the dimensions, the war had evoked in them: 
heroic ideals; a fascination with technology; and an elitist individualism combined with a 
longing for belonging to a whole. The whole, however, had been tainted with the defeat in 
war, which also affected their sacrifices and newfound identity as demobilized ex- 
stormtroops. “Yet these men were in no mood to admit defeat, nor relinquish their arms, 
nor consent to a cessation o f hostilities. Consequently, they began to form into volunteer 
corps, organized and led by charismatic stormtroop officers.”644 What they had in common 
was to resurrect the front experience and to overcome the defeat handed to them by 
backstabbing civilians. “If  hot blood had cooled without a battle, it was put to boil again by 
revolutionary Germany, the insult o f  the “stab-in-the-back” defeat, and the prospect o f a 
renewal o f the trench spirit in combat against insurrectionists or eastern invaders.”645 
Indeed, their energies and activism became a vehicle towards deflecting and denying the
643 Ben Scott, 'The Origins o f the Freikorps: A Reevaluation1, University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History
1, no. 1 (2000): 1-2.
644 Ibid.: 5.
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painful disparity o f their warrior identity and the disappointing state o f domestic politics in 
Germany, and with it their role in society.646 As one o f the veterans o f that movement put 
it: “People told us that the War was over. That made us laugh. We ourselves are the War. 
Its flame bums strongly in us. It envelops our whole being and fascinates us with the 
enticing urge to destroy.”647
But where was Jiinger in relation to these warriors without war? The stormtroops 
embodied much o f what Junger would later prescribe as the Frontsoldatenstaat, where the 
“new man” would materialize; yet, he was not tempted to join them. For all his naturalist 
and self-referential outlook, Junger was not a man for the masses; his temper, curiosity and 
restlessness urged him ever forward, often into opposition. The Freikorps did not appear 
glamorous enough for the youngest Pour le Merite winner ever. He had little to prove and 
quickly settled into writing. In addition, Junger managed to keep his commission in the 
radically downsized Jkeichswehr, from which he resigned only in 1923. Thus, he did not, in 
Coker’s words, “deign to dirty his hands in the political violence o f the 1920s.”648
After some early flirtation with the Nazi movement, he also detached himself from 
them, rejecting their offer o f a chair in the Reichstag in 1933. Later he dipped into 
resistance against them, culminating in On the Marble Cliffs, an allegory novel on 
totalitarianism, close to a prophecy on the assassination attempt on Hider.649 Nonetheless, 
he rejoined the army in 1938 and won his second Iron Cross First Class during the invasion 
o f Western Europe. Except for a stint on the Eastern Front, he remained in Paris as a staff 
officer throughout the occupation.
Conclusion
In attempting to sum up Jiinger’s life and work, Gerhard Loose points to the 
contradictions, complexities and disparities: “the lack o f enduring commitment, the sudden 
and frequent changes o f posture, the rich and seemingly inexhaustible variety o f his 
concerns, all point to a man at play.”650 The idea o f combat as play is not unique with 
Junger, as George Steiner points out in his introduction to Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens, 
and was particularly pronounced in feudal combat. Total war, however, is an antithesis to 
play, and Jiinger’s playfulness is all the more remarkable for having taken place in spite of
646 Ibid.: 6.
647 Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, Sprengstoff (Berlin,: Frundsberg-verlag, 1930). quoted in Scott, 'Origins o f  
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this.651 Junger was the first among stormtroopers, but after the war he did no t represent 
them. A fiercely independent warrior, he embodied and insisted on an anachronistic 
chivalry in a form o f war, which was all about denying it, demonstrating the possibility, if 
not exactly likelihood of, agency and intersubjectivity in virtually impossible circumstances.
Citizen warrior ideal type
C ontext
The social and material structure o f the nation state contributed to make war the 
paradigmatic theme o f modernity, certainly o f the 20th century.652 The nation state was 
shaped by war and became war’s greatest vehicle in turn. Giddens has argued that society in 
the period of modernity equals the nation state.653 Where the nation state was the structure, 
citizens were the actors, and in a context o f war, they became citizen soldiers and warriors. 
These societies were not dragged into war through material factors like industrialization, 
which merely made killing more effective and mobilization for war more total. W hat stirred 
the masses into war were powerful ideas, which were consistendy conceived o f as more 
important than individual — and in some cases collective — lives.
Coker has usefully identified three different 20th centuries, consistent with the 
different speeds, scopes and ambitions o f the contending ideologies conceived in the 19th 
century but played out in the 20th: liberalism, communism and fascism. The first 
categorization o f the 20th century was continuous with the Enlightenment past: a liberal 
belief in progress through economic development.654 Rather than boasting a materialist 
worldview as Marxism did, it proved itself materially viable through success in war, 
especially as an intellectual structure that facilitated capitalism and growth in industrial 
production. Nonetheless, the liberal conscience was an ideational endeavour where citizens 
were asked to put principles before people, and ideas before interests.655
The second categorization o f the 20th century was one where man attempted to 
break free from history, to shape the world in revolutionary terms.656 The United States 
ard the Soviet Union were both vast states that had been bom  by revolution and shaped by 
ciyil war; the latter had been bom  in a world war to boot.657 After playing dominant roles in
651 George Steiner, ‘Introduction’ in Johan Huizinga, Homo Hu dens; A  study of the play element in culture (London: 
Temple Smith, 1970), 11. See also chapter 5.
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the Second World War they effectively divided Europe between them, and in the ensuing 
decades raced to divide the world. America’s liberalism proved more ambitious in scope 
and energised by a stronger crusading spirit than its British counterpart; it strove to make 
the world safe for democracy in both world wars and through the Truman Doctrine in 
Korea and Vietnam as well.
The third categorization o f the 20th century was one neither continuous with the 
present nor the past. It was dominated by the possibility o f species suicide by nuclear 
weapons. Christa W olf aptly called it “bomb induced futurelessness.”658 As it happened, 
these weapons did not prevent bloody proxy wars in the southern hemispheres, but 
remained in their own right a threat to civilization o f an altogether new existential nature, 
as the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated beyond doubt.
What all three centuries had in common was a tight knit relationship between war 
(medium), citizens (actors) and nation states (structure). World War II became the 
paradigmatic war that saw the three different 20th centuries as well as the three principal 
ideological contenders intersect. Citizen warriors carried the burden o f translating ideas 
into battlefield decisions by rising above self-interest659 in pursuit o f political programmes 
where, in Howard’s words; “every individual felt his value system as well as his physical 
survival to be threatened by alien forces with which there could be neither communication 
nor compromise.”660 The Second World War was for this reason, as well as for its 
tremendous scope, profoundly influential in shaping virtually all dimensions o f warfare, and 
the self conception o f citizen warriors, which today’s warriors define themselves against, 
for good or ill.
Agency
The warrior’s agency comes to a fundamental break with modernity. As Giddens argues, 
the concept o f agency presupposes some form o f  choice between different alternative life- 
worlds, where the commitment to fight is adopted rather than handed down from the 
demands o f a warrior class.661 This complicates modem  agency in comparison to its pre­
m odem  equivalent because the combination o f industrialization and the nation state greatly 
increases the ranks o f soldiers. A t the same time, the individual is literally only one among 
millions, which generates alienation. Despite this alienation, the citizen soldiers were 
expected to display unconditional loyalty to the nation-state. Auden captures this shift very
658 Quoted in Ibid., 15.
659 Ibid., 9.
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well. He contrasts the Epic (Homeric) hero with the modem  hero. Whereas modem heroes 
have a multitude o f moral choices, the epic hero concerns himself uniquely with displaying 
arete through his exceptional fighting skills. “The moral standard by which he lives is not a 
universal requirement, the Law, but an individual one, honour... He exists in the present 
m om ent when he comes into collision with another heroic individual.”662
World War II also demanded enormous amounts o f physical courage. It was a war 
largely characterised by attrition. Rather than an arena for heroic acts, the memoirs o f 
warriors reveal exhaustion, disillusionment, brutalization and trauma, in different but also 
in similar ways as during the previous war. Infantry constituted 14 percent o f the U.S. 
military’s manpower, but they absorbed 70 percent o f the casualties. Bomber crews 
suffered a large share o f the remaining casualties.663 Front line troops asked in a War 
Department poll in 1945 what they would like to change about the army, overwhelmingly 
replied: “relief from the hard grind o f combat.”664
Even though many found combat exhilarating and meaningful initially, Gerald 
Linderman’s comprehensive survey o f participant accounts indicates that there were several 
stages in this experience: from initial excitement to numbness; coarsening; and eventually 
brutalization.665 A widespread experience o f being left to fate spread in the infantry both in 
the European and Pacific theatres as the war grinded on unrelentingly, for years. Many felt 
that rather than being inspired by the cause, or seeing opportunities for individual 
achievement, the war was simply a job to do. The idea o f ‘the job’ was something that 
applied equally well for combat troops, rear echelon troops and for the nation as a whole 
alike.666
Nonetheless, even in the grinding massive machine that the war had become, there 
were warriors who rose to the occasion. Audie Murphy was an American replacement 
infantryman who entered service in N orth Africa. He did not see combat there, but stayed 
in unremitting combat throughout the Italian and Western European campaigns. Initially 
rejected by both the Airborne and Marines for his slight build he proved them badly wrong 
serving in the same platoon o f the 3rd Infantry Division throughout the war, to become the
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378.
663 Linderman, World Within War, 1, 39-41.
664 Ibid., 354.
665 Ibid., 82.
666 Ibid., 49-52.
175
most highly decorated American serviceman o f the war. When the war ended Murphy had 
not turned twenty years o f age.
W hat characterised him in particular was his loyalty to his friends and his unit, and 
his penchant for taking on the Germans singlehandedly. In respect o f his loyalty, Murphy 
struggled to transfer his love for his friends, who all got killed, over to replacements, which 
was a typical response from infantrymen whose comrades had become the entire world, for 
years.667 When close comrades died, the men would lose everything they had in the world. 
Nonetheless, Murphy remained loyal to his unit and once explained to  a nurse why he 
would not quit: “Oh, hell. As long as there’s a man in the lines, maybe I feel that my place 
is there beside him.”668
In the case o f the Germans, Murphy carried an increasingly personal hatred and 
anger based upon atrocities he had witnessed and friends he had lost. He was repeatedly 
decorated for individually storming German machineguns and positions, and he was 
batdefield commissioned to Lieutenant. Murphy earned every medal the American military 
could bestow upon him, including the Distinguished Service Cross, two Silver Stars, three 
Purple Hearts and the Medal o f Honour. His is one o f the most spectacular Medal of 
H onor citations, which states how he singlehandedly took on advancing enemy infantry 
using a .50 calibre machine gun while being positioned on top o f a burning tank destroyer 
which could blow up any moment. Exposed to fire from three sides, Murphy fended off 
Germans coming as close as ten yards. Halting their attack, Murphy returned to the rear 
with a wounded leg and reorganised his company to attack, saving them from 
encirclement.669 Despite his achievements, however, Murphy was deeply traumatized by his 
experiences and derived neither romanticism nor pleasure from them. A bout fear, he said 
he had it by the throat.670 He struggled with insomnia, depression and nightmares from his 
batdes.
However, not every warrior developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); as 
the extraordinary career o f the German fighter pilot Erich Hartmann illustrates. Hartmann 
was the highest scoring fighter pilot o f all time, with 352 aerial victories, 345 o f  which were 
against the Soviet Air Force, throughout 1,404 combat missions. As he passed 300 kills in
667 Ironically, since he was a replacement himself. Linderman describes well the difficulties experienced by 
replacements to become part o f the units’ cohesion, which was essential to survival. See Ibid., 288,89.
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August 1944, Hartmann was decorated with the German Knight's Cross o f the Iron Cross 
with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds. Surrendering his squadron Jagdgeschwader 52 to the 
American army on 8th May 1945, Hartmann was turned over to the Soviets and spent the 
next ten years in Soviet prison camps. The year after his return in 1955, Hartmann joined 
the W est German Air Force where he commanded their first all-jet squadron Jagdgeschwader 
71. He continued to serve until he retired early over disagreements with his superiors over 
the German Air Force’s adopting the fatally flawed F-104 Starfighter in 1970.671 
Technology allowed pilots like Hartmann to enjoy unparalleled agency in the war, and it 
suited the German penchant for celebrating individual warrior skill. However, in the 
context o f the war, careers like Hartmann’s were rare. The infantryman, like Murphy, 
represented a rather more typical experience o f citizen warriors.
Subjectivity
World War II has often been referred to as cthe good war’ from the perspective o f the 
Allies. However, it was considered no less worthwhile for the Axis powers, and despite the 
political and ideological infusion o f meaning before, during, and after the war, these 
reasons did not feature strongly in the minds o f those who fought. As Hynes argues, the 
stories told by warriors, citizen warriors included, are often a-historical in that they do not 
engage much in questions o f victory or defeat.672 Audie Murphy was utterly indifferent to 
VE-day, and was more concerned with the comforting prospects o f a warm bath and a 
proper bed, as well as the less comforting likelihood o f fighting the Japanese.673
Hynes explains how most who volunteered for World War Two did so because 
they simply wanted to witness and participate in “the great commotion”. Rather than moral 
reasons, they signed up because o f the powerful current o f war, where other people were 
enlisting, making it irresistible to join.674 Propaganda played some part in this: posters 
would portray soldiers sitting after the war facing some little girl’s question; “Daddy, what 
did you do during the war?” Such sentiments were also used to motivate men in the line, as 
Patton did before the Normandy invasion: “W hen it’s all over and you’re at home once 
more, you can thank God that twenty years from now, when you’re sitting around the 
fireside with your grandson on your knee and he asks you what you did in the war, you
671Ursula Hartmann, DerJagdflieger Erich Hartmann (Stuttgart: Motorbuch-Yerlag, 1978).
672 Hynes, The Soldier’s Tale, 11.
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w on’t have to shift him to the other knee, cough, and say, “I shovelled shit in 
Louisiana.””675
Indeed, both Fussell and Linderman note the degree to which the fighting men were 
unsure of — or indifferent to — the cause they were ostensibly fighting for. To be sure, an 
attempt was made to put ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ at the forefront, but these appeared 
notoriously hard to define, and to Fussell the effort appeared contrived: “few terms extend 
a m ore powerful invitation to imprecision and even total non-meaning than freedom and free, 
buzz-words which appear everywhere and constitutes the essential leitmotif o f wartime high­
mindedness.”676 Several attempts were made to fill in the meaning o f freedom, featuring 
Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and Thomas Mann, among others in a book from 
1942 677 tjie E astern Front Guy Sajer received a different lecture on what freedom is, 
from his much admired and loved company commander: “‘That’s why you’re fighting,’ 
Hauptmann Wesreidau, our captain, said to us one day. ‘You’re nothing more than animals 
on the defensive, even when you’re obligated to take the offensive. So be brave: life is war, 
and war is life. Liberty doesn’t exist.”678
For the men on the ground it was exceedingly difficult to get a sense o f what was 
going on in the war in general, much less to gain a sense o f ownership over its progress. 
However, personal contribution to the primary group becomes both possible and 
necessary, and this was where soldiers put their efforts. One soldier observed: “It took me 
dam near a whole war to figure what I was fighting for. It was the other guys. Your outfit, 
the guys in your company, but especially your platoon... When there might be 15 left out 
o f 30 or more, you got an awful strong feeling about those guys.”679 Combat became a 
matter o f survival, utterly detached from the political picture. While the initial 
indoctrination o f German troops was much stronger than for the Allies, after sustained 
combat on the Eastern Front it all came to the same, as Sajer testifies to:
We no longer fought for Hider, or for National Socialism, or for the Third Reich — or 
even for our fiancees or mothers or families trapped in bomb-ravaged towns. We 
fought from simple fear, which was our motivating power. The idea of death, even 
when we accepted it, made us howl with powerless rage. We fought for reasons which 
are perhaps shameful, but are, in the end, stronger than any doctrine. We fought for 
ourselves, so that we wouldn’t die in holes filled with mud and snow; we fought like
675 Ibid., 114.
676 Paul Fussell, Wartime - Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World W ar (Oxford University Press, 1989), 
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rats, which do not hesitate to spring with all their teeth bared when they are cornered 
by a man infinitely larger than they are.680
The question may well be asked, did the cause feature at all for the warriors? The 
answer is that the cause matters before and after combat. Ideology and indoctrination is 
particularly relevant before the fighting ensues, and it can lead to  dehumanization o f the 
enemy, but in terms o f motivation, there is little evidence that it features strongly during 
combat. An American soldier made a typical point: ‘Y o u ’re fighting for your skin on the 
line. W hen I enlisted I was patriotic as hell. There’s no patriotism on the line. A boy up 
there 60 days in the line is in danger every minute. He ain’t fighting for patriotism.”681
Nonetheless, the cause featured as a subtext, which was rarely addressed explicitly. 
Samuel Stouffer, the American sociologist who studied American soldiers during World 
War Two concluded that despite this general attitude there was “a tacit and fairly deep 
conviction that we were on the right side and that war, once we were in it, was 
necessary.”682 Samuel Hynes has made the same point: “But though “war between good 
and evil” doesn’t appear explicitly in the narratives it is there, behind the telling — an 
unexpressed conviction, so certain that it doesn’t need to be said — that this was a war 
worth fighting.”683 The Germans had a harder time rationalising the cause o f their fighting 
as good, although it can be argued that ideological indoctrination played a strong role in the 
beginning for some, like Henry Metelman who started as a firm believer but became 
increasingly doubtful o f the official line as the war went on.684 Towards the end, the 
ruthless behaviour in the east and Allied demands for unconditional surrender contributed 
to infusing the Germans with a genuine sense o f self-defence as the Allied armies 
surrounded Germany.
After hostilities end the reasons for the war can assuage a degree o f guilt and help 
rationalise what has been experienced: if  one is on the winning side. Many combat veterans 
resented flag-waving patriotism by civilians who did not understand what combat was 
about,685 and who were unreceptive to learning about it.686 However, there was an upside to 
it as well. Linderman concludes that the “civilian insistence on the worthiness o f the Cause,
680 Sajer, Forgotten Soldier, 382.
681 Quoted in Holmes, Acts of War, 276-77.
682 Quoted in Ibid., 277.
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victory over tyranny, did much to dispel veterans’ fear o f inefficacy.”687 This is a good 
point, as a comparison with Vietnam makes clear. Homecoming Vietnam veterans had the 
opposite experience from their World War II forebears. The cause they fought for was not 
celebrated but resented, which hardly contributed to post-war readjustment. Their 
homecoming experience thus probably resonated more with that o f German combat 
veterans following World War II.
Intersubjectivitv
Citizen warriors’ interaction and relations with the enemy have occurred both in state-to- 
state warfare and in various settings against non-state armed groups throughout the 
twentieth century. The first section engages with intersubjectivity in symmetric conflicts; 
the titanic conventional wars like World War II. The second section analyses 
intersubjectivity in asymmetric wars like insurgencies typical o f the Cold War years.
The people in symmetric warfare
The symmetric story is o f liberalism’s ideational civil war in Europe with illiberalism; 
specifically fascism and communism, between the 1930s and 1989.688 This was a symmetric 
war in the sense that it pitted nations and ideologies against each other. The ideologies had 
very clear mass appeal and a territorial definition, both made possible by the vehicle of 
nationalism. Crucially, however, the ideologies were incompatible and there could be no 
compromise since they were contests about the viability o f social and political systems, not 
merely military engagements.689 For this reason, the struggle became an existential one, 
which made the widespread mobilization o f whole peoples not only possible and desirable, 
but necessary.
Carl Schmitt has argued that warfare in the Westphalian period, after 1648, was 
“bracketed” within ethical and legal bounds, organised as interstate conflict, in the 
Gausewitzian sense, where the people, the army and government could be delineated. The 
state system made this possible, incorporating the state as an ethical and not just a political 
entity.690 The laws o f war were enshrined in this state system, and were for the most part 
respected, particularly between the Allies and the Germans in N orth Africa, and largely in
687 Ibid., 360.
688 See in particular Coker, War and the 20th Century, Coker, War and the illiberal conscience, Howard, War and the 
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W estern Europe as well.691 For example, when the N orth African campaign ended in May 
1943, each side agreed that the other had fought temperately and decently. It had been a 
“pretty clean war.”692 However, in the case o f the Eastern theatres (Europe and the Pacific) 
they were botched. The Soviets saw international law as a bourgeoisie invention, but signed 
up Last minute before World War II, whereas the Germans decided they should not apply 
in the East.693
The brutality was not only inherent in images o f the enemy, but also derived from 
the view in which the enemy held human life in general, including those o f their own side. 
The Soviets massacred tens o f thousands o f their own soldiers using N KV D  units to shoot 
stragglers and anyone not charging the enemy with sufficient aggression. In some cases 
they would use Mongols to clear minefields by trampling them down.694 Similarly, the 
Germans executed thousands for indiscipline, where police battalions behind the Eastern 
frontline practiced what their Soviet counterparts did, albeit at a lower scale.695 Linderman 
also documents how the Japanese treated their own wounded as wastage. As a captured 
Japanese medical officers put it: “We would leave them with a hand grenade apiece, and if 
they didn’t use the grenades, it would be a simple matter to slit their jugular veins.”696 For 
Japanese who were captured the consequence was to be disownment by their comrades 
and even their families at home. It was not simply that they were effectively dead; they had 
never existed.697
With such an attitude to incapacitated Japanese, and with the high degree o f racism 
in Japanese culture at the time, it is little wonder that the Pacific war descended into 
Barbary. The Japanese were initially able to exploit the American penchant for respecting 
the laws o f war, particularly in the first six months when they had the military initiative. 
However, following the Guadalcanal campaign o f late 1942, the Americans began 
readjusting to the brutality. Atrocity stories abounded. As airman turned infantryman 
Samuel Grashio said, it was “commonplace to find the bodies o f one’s comrades, tighdy 
bound, obviously tortured, disembowelled, with their severed genitals stuffed in their 
mouths.”698 In Burma, one o f Merrill’s Marauders, Bill Hoover, had found some o f  their 
num ber captured: “They’d be staked or strapped down, and [the Japanese] would rub some
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honey and food ... on them, around their mouth and eyes, and their eyes were forced open, 
and they were just laid out and left in the sun, with the bugs crawling all over them.”699
This savagery begat brutality from the Americans as well, particularly in that they 
stopped taking prisoners. One unit fought five island campaigns before they took their first 
prisoner.700 On top o f this, the hatred rose to such a pitch that many elected to kill the 
Japanese with their bare hands if they could, rather than shooting them.701 The Japanese 
refused to give up, and the Americans knew that behind them stood a nation with equal 
resolve, a fact that the Okinawa campaign had proven beyond doubt.702
When the war ended, many allied infantrymen felt a sense o f justice and relief: at 
having won and at not having had to invade Japan. The sense o f righteousness at the 
outcome came with the usual notions o f  the victor’s justice, but it was augmented by the 
moral shock o f the death camps. As Fussell puts it; “Hardly any boy infantryman started 
his career as a moralist, but after the camps, a moral attitude was rampant, and there was 
no disagreement on the main point. In the last few weeks o f the war close to five thousand 
labour camps and prisons were discovered, most filled with unspeakable evidence o f 
wanton cruelty.”703 The moral coding o f the war was evident at the top military leadership 
even before this point. General Eisenhower expressed on 10 July 1944 in a lunch meeting 
with the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, that upon victory he would 
prefer to liquidate the entire German General Staff (about 3,500), all Nazi leaders from 
mayor and up, and all members o f the Gestapo, but conceded that permanent deportation 
was also a possibility.704
A symmetric grammar o f killing is not only a feature o f an engagement between 
two or more parties; it is also a feature o f the relationship between peace and war. As 
Coker says, “modem morality is embodied at this mom ent in our history in inter- 
subjectivity,ms But what does this mean specifically? Coker turns back to Clausewitz: “If 
Clausewitz was right to insist that wars are only won not when one side prevails but when 
it prevails upon its enemy to concede defeat, then the manner o f effecting that defeat is 
likely to be crucial.”706 The differences in the grammars o f  killing between the Eastern and
699 Quoted in Ibid., 159.
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W estern fronts were bom  out by the ensuing peace. Both armies liberated German death 
caimps; however the Soviets raped their way into East Germany, which was subjugated for 
the next four decades as a Soviet satellite state. The Allied treatment o f Western Germany 
and Japan made for a stark contrast; involving reformed constitutions, democracy, and 
perhaps the two most successful economies in the post-war decades. The symmetry here 
goes both ways: because the West German and Japanese governments sensibly elected to 
embrace the visions o f the victorious parties, which made it possible to draw a line and 
move on.
The people in asymmetric warfare
Since the invention o f large conventional armies initiated by Napoleon, non-state actors - 
like the Spanish guerrillas — have in different manifestations used asymmetric tactics to 
compensate for military might. Clausewitz’s idea o f war as an act to compel the enemy to 
submit to our will manifests itself asymmetrically when it involves non-state actors like 
partisans, insurgents and terrorists. The latter actors can compel regulars to submit to 
defeat, but regulars cannot easily force irregulars to do anything. Precisely because they are 
irregulars, to identify, define, or much less capture or kill them is difficult. This is because 
the ‘calculus o f pain’ includes the local population, and can be manipulated by the 
combatants to achieve their aim.707 The asymmetry arises from the fact that government 
forces are always at a disadvantage; if they are not to lose credibility or actively alienate the 
local population, they must successfully pursue the violent non-state actors; at the same 
time they must successfully protect the local population.
Colonel David Hackworth’s experiences in Vietnam are symbolic o f Western 
engagement with unconventional opponents in the 20th century. These have typically been 
characterised by tactical successes, but strategic failure. Despite his distinguished combat 
record and battlefield commission as the youngest Captain in the Korean War, Hackworth 
understood early that guerrilla warfare, not push-button-warfare was the wave o f the 
future.708 Already in the mid-1950s he studied all he could find about guerrilla warfare: 
from the American Indian campaigns; the Revolutionary War; the Spanish American War; 
Soviet, American, French and Yugoslav guerrilla warfare in World War II; the British in 
Malaya; and the French in Indochina. He also kept an eye on a “young Cuban stud named
707 Ibid. And o f  course any number o f  other belligerent parties.
708 Hackworth, Aboutface, 304.
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Castro” while submitting (unsuccessful) applications to  the newly forming Special 
Forces.709
In 1962, Hackworth attended infantry school at Fort Benning and realised that the 
Army was teaching for the right war using the wrong instructions. Their emphasis was on 
Malaya, which to HackwortlTs mind related more closely to the Indian campaigns than to 
Vietnam. He was in good company, exchanging opinions with outspoken Green Berets 
such as the legendary Larry Thom e.710 The Special Forces warriors who had already fought 
in Vietnam warned that the Army was not fighting counterinsurgency at all, but 
conventional tactics with increased air-mobility. Instead, they called for new tactics for a 
protracted guerrilla war.711 For the coming thirteen years they were proven right, so much 
so that another outspoken critic o f  Army tactics; John Paul Vann, would argue that the 
U.S. had not been ten years in Vietnam; they had been there one year ten times.712
Hackworth deployed to Vietnam in 1965 with the 101st Airborne Division. He 
quickly discovered the difficulty o f finding an enemy who used civilians as well as the 
jungle for camouflage, patiently waiting for favourable terms o f engagement. The enemy 
was “like an audience at a play in which we, the counterguerrillas, were the unwitting 
actors: the VC sat in their darkened redoubts and watched and learned, while we played out 
our roles, warts and all, on a well-lit stage.”713 In that context Hackworth customised his 
battalion, realising airborne infantry (and marines) were the wrong type o f units for 
guerrilla warfare; they were too aggressive, impatient and unappreciative o f the finesses 
necessary to “out-g the g” as Hackworth put it.
The Special Forces and the Australians employed the more successful tactics. The 
latter particularly impressed Hackworth, with their use o f small patrols to find the enemy, 
and reinforcement platoons to do the killing.714 He recommended the army to embed 
troops with the Australians to learn from them, but this was rejected because it suggested 
the Americans did not know what was going on.715 The American military argued that 
airpower would pound the guerrillas into submission, which Hackworth doubted, having 
employed a lot o f airpower on a tiny spot in an engagement, to no effect.716
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In 1966, the army offered Hackworth the opportunity to accompany Army Historian 
S.L.A. Marshall across Vietnam to assess the progress o f the war. Relations soured between 
them, however, as Hackworth began suspecting Marshall’s methods and motives, and they 
had profound disagreements about the war.717 As they toured the country, Hackworth met 
former Chief o f Staff o f the Israeli Army, General Moshe Dayan, who travelled around the 
country with platoon and company sized units in the Highland jungles (unlike any 
American generals). Dayan was incredulous o f  the American style o f war; particularly their 
enormous expenditure o f firepower and eagerness to rush into combat, with its attendant 
consequences: “that the enemy almost invariably had the initiative on the battlefield, and he 
quoted Mao’s rules o f warfare verbatim, suggesting that until these simple guidelines were 
acknowledged by our leaders, the enemy would continue to have the upper hand.”718 
Marshall countered this, claiming: “N o one can take the kind o f punishment we’re dishing 
out and win,”719 which reflected an attitude manifested broadly throughout the army. The 
body count system was used as a measure o f success, which Hackworth argued made 
“everyone a bounty hunter and a liar.” The body count system had been an im portant 
measure of success for the British in Palestine and Malaya, but was not suited to Vietnam. 
In Malaya, a platoon could patrol the jungle for a year without seeing any enemy, whereas 
the Vietnamese had divisions and regiments, and no shortage o f sanctuaries.720
What was more; they had willpower where the Americans had firepower. 
Hackworth had a chance to talk to a large number o f Vietnamese prisoners from all levels: 
“When I asked how long they were prepared to fight, almost every prisoner, from the 
uneducated simple farm boys to the better-versed officers, said ten to fifteen to twenty 
years. They were going to win, they said, and they were prepared to stay in South Vietnam 
as long as necessary to do so. “Are you?” one asked.”721 Another illustration o f  this 
asymmetry was the amount o f effort the Americans spent on the subject “why Vietnam?” 
in training (one hour) relative to the N orth Vietnamese (50% o f training time).722
At this point in the war, Hackworth was disillusioned; nevertheless, he returned for 
another combat billet, reasoning his abilities could reduce the cost to “the young citizen 
soldiers who make up the “thin red line”” .723 Creating innovative new tactics and 
reorganising his battalion into a guerrilla formation, Hackworth had significant tactical
717 Ibid., chapter 16.
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successes, which General Abrams acknowledged, but which were not published throughout 
the army.724 Hackworth’s final performance in the Army was to publicly critique it on 
A BC’s ‘Issues and Answers’, where he expressed that the war was pursued in the wrong 
way; that the South Vietnamese were not doing their share, and that the troops were 
receiving the wrong training; and for all these reasons the war was unwinnable.725 Arguably 
showing moral courage, but narrowly avoiding court-martial, Hackworth was granted 
honourable discharge from the Army shortly after.
Two specific lessons emanate from Hackworth’s career and both relate to warriors. 
As a citizen warrior, Hackworth felt compelled to pursue the cause rather than living up to 
career expectations, turning down War College billets twice, thereby losing any chance to 
make general. His lesson for leaders was for them to “think from the moment they step on 
the first rung o f the leadership ladder. They should be encouraged to become students of 
w a r... Combat now and in the future will require leaders who are able to act independently, 
and who are not afraid o f taking risks. A knowledge o f  history and the ability to think and 
synthesize are the tools a warrior needs.”726
As far as the type o f warriors he would want in combat, Hackworth referred back to 
m en like Thome; “combat bums” who volunteered for several tours rather than returning 
stateside and the “multitudinous career-related activities that were expected.” These people 
were necessary Hackworth insisted, “what we’d always needed, to win this war were combat 
bums.727 Combat bums came in two (overlapping) categories; “those who would have 
marched to the sound o f guns wherever they were blazing (and/ or had become, as I had, 
obsessed with figuring out a way to win this particular conflict) and /o r those who had gone 
native.”728 Many o f those who had gone native were Special Forces, and they loved the 
food, spoke the language and had local girlfriends:
As a body, almost by definition, the Special Forces in Vietnam were combat bums and 
the best guys to fight the G in this war. But the Special Forces were also animals, 
which offended all the prancers, and they considered themselves an elite force, which 
offended most everybody else. General Abrams hated them. Yet if these Green Berets 
had been allowed to run the show, there’s litde doubt in my mind that the outcome of 
the war would have been quite different.729
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As a citizen warrior, Hackworth was able to combine physical courage with a 
commitment to both his men and to the cause, to the risk o f his physical safety and the loss 
of his career. Upon retirement, Hackworth was the m ost decorated American officer 
fighting in Vietnam.730 General Abrams said Hackworth was the best battalion commander 
he had ever seen in the U.S. Army.731 Despite his proven warrior credentials, Hackworth 
made it a mission to understand the enemy, and he successfully employed these insights at 
the tactical level, and fought hard — albeit in vain — to  have them implemented at the 
strategic level as well.
Conclusion
The twentieth century was the age o f the citizen warriors, and it is against their experiences 
and actions today’s wars and warriors are compared. From  the conventional clashes to the 
intricacies of counterinsurgency warfare, the demand for warriors has been constant, but the 
demands of them have changed. As Hackworth’s career illustrates, warriors fighting 
asymmetric wars need to be more cerebral and less kinetic, without losing sight o f the 
latter.732 The recipe Hackworth seems to be asking for is combat bums with history degrees 
and plenty of physical and moral courage. This is a tall order indeed, but military 
establishments have attempted to reflect this change, giving Special Operations Forces 
almost unlimited political support in today’s wars.
The Special Forces Warrior ideal type
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the signature examples o f warriors in the strategic 
landscape today. These units attract soldiers with combat experience who want to enhance 
their skills further and work with the best possible peers to develop a wide template of 
skill-sets. The continued social specialization o f the West, the dramatic reduction o f the 
size o f Western militaries, and the arrival o f new threats have all conspired to necessitate 
the existence and maintenance o f a lifeworld that can exploit and develop such warriors. 
The Special Forces ideal type has evolved historically from two related but different major 
roles. The difference is important in part because of the strategic environment they act in, 
and in part because o f the way they are organised.
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Special Operations Forces caught the eye o f the public in a series o f dramatic 
operations throughout the 1970s and 1980s when the revolutionary and post-colonial 
waves o f terrorism dominated international security: The Israeli raid on Entebbe (1976); 
the German hostage rescue in Mogadishu (1977); the SAS hostage rescue at the Iranian 
Embassy in London (1980); and the infamous debacle at Desert One (1979) are most well 
known. The forces employed in this role are often called ‘tier-one’, since they represent the 
m ost highly trained and carefully selected forces doing the most technically challenging 
tasks. They are SOF in the counter-terrorism (CT) role. Whereas counter-terrorism means 
everything and anything today, in the 1970s and 1980s it referred to precise small-scale 
actions against terrorism, typically in hostage rescue operations.733
Before the age o f revolutionary terrorism, however, SOF were active in counter­
insurgency wars throughout Asia, where they learned many o f the lessons that underwrite 
their selection procedures and operations today. During decolonisation, the British SAS 
had mixed successes but learned a lot about what insurgency is and how these forces can 
work in direct action, reconnaissance and as teachers o f  indigenous government or rebel 
forces. U.S. Army Special Forces had significant success in Vietnam between 1957 and 
1965, most notably when they were embedded in villages, organising local villagers to fight 
the insurgents, provide intelligence and contain infiltration. These are SOF in the 
counterinsurgency (Cl) role.
Agency
Special Forces warriors enjoy extraordinary freedom and support once deployed in the 
field. They can make an imprint on the war far exceeding that o f other soldiers in such low 
numbers. However, to achieve this privilege and trust the individuals have to volunteer 
repeatedly for high-risk service and prove themselves in gruelling selection processes, 
which in the case o f most tier one SOF, last for up to a year. In some cases, particularly 
with respect to maritime forces, the time between selection and combat readiness can be 
up to three years.734 The attrition rates in selection and education are such that the freedom 
and influence in the field can be said to be pooled unto very few people who have 
succeeded in paying the admission fees to the fraternity. Independence in the field requires
733 These types o f operations also go back to World War II, when there was a proliferation o f Special Forces 
which mostly focused on raids (SAS in North Africa, Brandenburgers in Belgium); undercover intelligence 
gathering (SOE, OSS and the Jedburghs in occupied Europe) but also at least one case o f a spectacular 
raid (Skorzeny in Operation Eicbe rescuing Mussolini in 1943).
734 E.g. US Navy SEALs, British Special Boat Service, German Kampschmmmer and Norwegian Marinejegere.
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the right character and an ability to take preparations professionally, with patience, 
thoroughness and attention to detail.
There is substantial romanticism associated with their lifestyle: and it has to do with 
the degree o f risk; independence from discipline and micromanagement; pride and a sense 
o f achievement — even superiority - for having overcome the challenges o f both selection 
and the dangers o f working behind enemy lines.735 SOG veteran Franklin Miller explains 
the rewards granted for skill:
The more special your abilities, the more privileges and benefits you receive, especially 
if you deal in high-risk ventures. The privileges and benefits might range from greater 
pay to setting your own schedule to total, unquestioned control of an operation or 
project. But always there is that special status... As long as you were out there doing 
your job, killing people or gathering intelligence, nobody fucked with you. They left 
you totally alone to do whatever you wanted. Any flaws in your character or 
personality were conveniently overlooked. You were doing something they couldn’t 
do, so you were unique. You were the player. The bandito. The gunfighter.736
The character of particular forces is strongly flavoured by their context o f evolution. 
The British, who are widely regarded to have the finest Special Forces in the world, derive 
some o f their heritage from the colonial fighting where conventional warfare was rare, and 
continuous operations far away demanded decentralised and independent decision-making 
and operational ingenuity.737 This encouraged a rugged individualist spirit, which today is 
reflected in the SAS’ absolute intolerance o f class structures.738 This spirit is also captured 
in the m otto o f the US Marines’ Recon Battalion’s inversion o f a popular proverb: For 
them “the strength o f the pack is the wolf.”739
In general, the American early Special Forces experience is more different from the 
British than one would immediately think, even though the War o f Independence was a 
guerrilla war that presumably would demand some o f the same qualities. John Ellis argues 
that George Washington was adamant that the Revolutionary Wars were motors o f a 
political rather than a social revolution. The goal was to maintain the status quo ante 
bellum, minus the British. For this reason, the forces were controlled relatively strictly, for 
unconventional forces.740 The most significant corporate experience for the US military
735 Roger Beaumont, Special Operations and elite Units, 1939-1988 (London: Greenwood Press, 1988), 5.
736 Miller, Reflections of a Warrior, 88.
737 J. Paul de B. Taillon, The TLvolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism (London: Praeger, 2001), 4,10.
738 David M. Last, Bemd Horn and J. Paul de B. Taillon, Force of choice : perspectives on special operations (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 23.
739 Wright, Generation Kill, front matter.
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came from the Civil War, where the warrior spirit o f today’s Special Forces was displayed 
rather more by the Confederacy, who lost the war. The British, in contrast, waged colonial 
policing warfare until the 1950s, only interrupted by the World Wars, where some 
campaigns like Burma reinforced the lessons.
The two different types o f Special Forces exercise agency in a variety of ways. The 
C T  operators are allowed to use all their time to hone their skills and choreograph 
exercises. Hostage rescue missions require a very precise coordination o f different 
elements, including helicopters (for insertion, sniper support and extraction); blocking 
forces (often Rangers or Marines); and the snatch teams themselves (1st tier SOF) in 
combination with ruthless, precise and decisive execution. Such choreography inspired 
Schoomaker to liken the Eagle Claw raid rehearsals to a ballet.741 Eric Haney believes 
willpower, resolve and determination are the qualities that make Delta as capable as they 
are.742 The 1970 Son Tay Raid aimed at rescuing American POWs inside N orth Vietnam — 
which failed because the camp had been evacuated — illustrates that agency does not 
necessarily equal freedom to roam around on the prairie like a cowboy; the preparations for 
that raid were extremely thorough and professional. Colonel “Bull” Simons ran the force 
through 170 full dress rehearsals in a mock camp, which was regularly dismanded and built 
up again to hide the activity from Soviet spy satellites.743
The upshot o f all o f this is that the consequences o f successful raids can be likened 
to  a full strategic resolution for good or ill. If the “strategic corporal” on a peace-keeping 
patrol can cause dramatic effects outweighing his rank, these missions are akin to the 
strategic corporal concept on steroids. Major General Shlomo Gazit (ret.) has argued that 
rescue operations constitute the “climax o f a war which must be resolved in a single 
military act. The diplomatic, psychological and military struggles to free the victims — all 
bear a remarkable microcosmic resemblance to war. And the success or failure o f such an 
operation makes the victory o f defeat in that war.”744 On the other hand, the political costs 
o f  failure — domestically and internationally — can be very considerable too, and often 
stronger than anticipated. Strong medicine; strong side effects.745
The October 3rd 1993 raid in Somalia illustrates this well. While the raid was 
tactically a success because it achieved its mission, albeit at unacceptable cost, the
741 Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah : the first battle in America's war with militant Islam (New York: Adantic 
Monthly Press, 2006), 225.
742 Haney, Inside Delta Force, 451.
743 Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The secret history of the Special Forces (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 30.
744 Quoted Taillon, Evolution of Special Forces, 125.
745 Beaumont, Special Operations, 42.
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subsequent withdrawal from Somalia generated a host o f unforeseen consequences. The 
m ost important o f these was the strong inculcation o f risk aversion at the highest political 
and military levels, which prevented intervention in the Rwanda genocide the subsequent 
year, and in Srebrenica the year after that. In Srebrenica, Norwegian helicopter pilot Tom  
Johansen was involved in plans to ship 32 helicopters worth o f SAS troops into Srebrenica 
to intervene, but the plan was rejected by the UN command in Zagreb.746 Another 
consequence was the emboldening o f A1 Qaeda. Osama bin Laden, who stayed in Sudan 
between 1991 and 1996, has said that A1 Qaeda imported veteran Mujahedeen to help oust 
the Americans from Mogadishu.747 When this succeeded he perceived that the United 
States would run away from any operation if a few of its soldiers were killed.748
The Cl tasked SOF also plan very thoroughly for their missions, but there is a 
much stronger premium on improvisation when they are in the field. Their missions are 
often as much diplomatic as tactical. Whereas the CT SOF use preparation, speed and 
violence o f action to force an outcome as close to their planned scenario as possible, 
counterinsurgency operations are predicated on the degree to which plans can be moulded 
into the ambitions and capabilities o f ostensibly friendly local forces.
US Army Special Forces are the only ones in the American military with 
compulsory language requirements, which enhances both their potential impact on an 
operation and their independence in the field. They also put a strong premium on cultural 
and situational knowledge and awareness — particularly in the preparation for missions. O n 
deployments, they work with locals in a capacity that combines teaching with leading, 
aiming to make friendly forces self-sustainable. Such missions are undertaken all over the 
world, not only in Afghanistan and in Iraq. These missions require maturity; judgement; 
independence; and sound social and political awareness. The average age o f an Army 
Special Forces trooper is close to 32 years, compared to nearly 19 in the entire U.S. Marine 
Corps.749 Accumulated experience in a typical 12-man A-team can approach a century and 
a half.750 The officers — typically Captains - in charge o f these teams can expect to lead 
planning and execution o f missions behind enemy lines on their very first assigned mission.
746 Tom Bakkeli, Norges Hemmelige Krigere (Oslo: Kagge Forlag, 2007), 215.
747 J. T. Caruso, "Al-Qaeda International' ', in Statement for the record before the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations by Acting Assistant Director, Counter Terrorism Division, FBI, 
U.S. Senate (Washington D.C.: 2001), 2,14, Peter Bergen; Douglas Wood, 'Bin Laden, millionaire with a 
dangerous grudge', CNN, September 27 2001. available at
http://www.cnn.com /2001/US/09/12/binladen.profile/index.htm l [retrieved 18 June 2008]
748 Professor Ken Menkhaus quoted in Nicholas Kristof, 'The Wrong Lessons o f  the Somalia Debacle', The 
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These forces are most effective when they are allowed to ‘go native’, which they largely did 
when they were responsible for catching over half o f the American military’s deck o f cards 
o f high value targets in Iraq.751
The agency o f the CT and Cl operators is even more apparent with respect to 
intelligence operators who work under cover. Their missions require an almost absolute 
freedom o f independent judgement and execution. The risks they endure are even more 
extreme than those experienced by SOF, since they are very lightly armed, hardly ever have 
air support and cannot even expect notional protection under the laws o f war. Donald 
Rumsfeld was impressed with the work o f  The Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), which is 
a unit composed o f individuals in the margins of the military and espionage worlds. So 
much so that he recommended the formation o f a unit referred to as Proactive, Pre­
emptive Operations Group (P20G ), which would embed themselves in local environments 
all over the world, including non-hostile ones — and over time develop local intelligence, 
gathering contacts and accumulating cultural familiarity.752
Subjectivity
The signature ‘special’ in SOF refers to the qualities o f the individuals who make up the 
units; their reputation for excellence as well as their specialized function. In most units 
there is an unabashed celebration o f warrior values and a commitment to fighting. The 
ruling worldview is that only a few people in any population are fit for the job, leaving no 
place for those who cannot carry their weight and actively contribute to the team. Selection 
is structured to select out unwanted candidates rather than selecting in.753 In this respect 
SOF subscribe to an almost fascist ethos, where strength, courage, manliness, winning, and 
action are celebrated. Nobody has a right to be a member. However, selection is not only 
about physical fitness and about military skills; it is a holistic evaluation o f the individual, 
made necessary because of the responsibility and agency enjoyed in the field. For example, 
the US Army Special Forces live by a creed, which denotes a heavy emphasis on public 
service and self-sacrifice.754 Demands for integrity are high since they live by an honour 
system where lying, cheating and stealing are completely unacceptable behaviour.
751 Robinson, Masters of Chaos, 189, 286. 610
752 Michael Smith, Killer elite : the inside story of America's most secret special operations team (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 2006), 249-50.
753 Anna Simons in Last, Horn and Taillon, Force of choice, 84.
754 Couch, Chosen Soldier, 1,2.
192
Selection
Selection is a way to predict who will function well in a combat environment. As a 
simulation o f combat, it has proven itself better than alternatives hitherto conceived. 
Psychologists are unable to predict who will perform well, so selection is critical. Most 
volunteers are strongly qualified, having already volunteered for military service, and in 
m ost cases for airborne and commando, or ranger training. Completion o f  the latter 
programmes increases candidates’ chances. Selection success for SAS candidates tends to 
be between 5 and 20 percent.755 US Army Special Forces success rate is at 22 percent756, 
and 15 percent in German GSG9757, whereas the first three selection rounds for Delta 
Force were 23, 8 and 22 percent.758
A Norwegian Marinejeger argued that anyone who succeeded in selection was a 
warrior, despite not having been to combat.759 This degree o f confidence in the selection 
regime is exaggerated. As Miller reminds us, not every Green Beret in Vietnam was “bad to 
the bone” and psychologically able to patrol behind the lines with the tremendous pressure 
that involves, while performing excellently if ambushed or otherwise compromised. What 
seems to be the case, however, is that the SAS’ selection procedure, which is widely copied 
around the West, seems to work better than any other predictor. When Delta founder 
Charles Beckwith liaised with SAS in the late 1970s to construct his own selection regime, 
the late Lieutenant General John Watts, then commanding officer o f SAS, told him that he 
did not know why selection worked, only that it had done so for twenty-five years.760 By all 
accounts it still does. The details o f the selection regimes in many Special Forces are 
available in published accounts.761
The SOF worldview is well summed up in the four “SOF-truths” coined by Major 
General David Baratto when he became the first chief o f operations at USSOCOM:762
Humans are more important than hardware 
Quality is more important than quantity 
SOF cannot be mass-produced
Competent SOF cannot be created after the emergency arises763
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M ost Special Forces entertain an underlying philosophy that selection reveals candidates. It 
does not make them. Warriors are bom, not made. This approach is in contrast to the 
philosophy of the US Marines, for example, where it is held that m ost people can be 
moulded into warriors.764
W hy they volunteer
The motivations behind Special Forces warriors are a combination o f extrinsic factors, 
such as 9/11; a desire for the lifestyle it entails; and an explicit desire to become warriors. 
There are also professional motivations for working with the best in the trade. Dick Couch 
has interviewed selection candidates for Army Special Forces at Fort Bragg. A favourite 
question he put to them was why they would put up with all the hardship, cold, exhaustion, 
and deprivation to join Special Forces. Many related it to having been moved by 9/11, 
intermixed between boredom with their existing occupation, whether military or civilian.765 
A sense o f adventure was important for some. One soldier from New Jersey elected the 
army over a college soccer scholarship after 9 /1 1.766 Another returned to the army after a 
stint in the civilian world because o f 9/11 and because he did not feel cut out as a “nine-to- 
fiver” .767
Some, however, are more self-conscious in their desire to work among warriors. An 
officer candidate with combat experience from Iraq signed up because o f 9/11 and the role 
he expected Special Forces to have in the war on terrorism. Another reason was “the 
quality o f the NCOs in Special Forces; they’re the best in the Army. These are the kind o f 
men I want to serve with and lead.”768 One 25-year-old combat veteran who had served 
two tours in the 75th Ranger Regiment realised on his second tour that “this is what I was 
bom  to do — to lead in combat and to teach others how to perform in combat. I’m  finally 
where I belong.”769
For those aspiring to be warriors, the selection cadre leave them in no doubt they 
have come to the right place. With a mixture o f enticement, encouragement, brazenness, 
and allure, the most senior training NCO in Special Forces, 1st SF Group Command 
Sergeant Major Van Atkins, with 28 years experience in the army, urges the men to keep 
making effort:
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Training’s hard, men; it’s supposed to be hard. Not everyone can be a Green Beret, 
but you can. You all showed that when you were selected. Suck it up; make it 
happen... In the groups and on deployment, you will get less sleep, be colder, carry 
more, do more — and you know what? You’ll have a helluva lot of fun doing it. Being 
a Green Beret is the greatest thing in the world... This is the best organization in the 
Army — in the world. So when it gets cold and you’re hurting, drive on. We have to 
play with pain in Special Forces... This is serious stuff. Your nation is at war. All of 
you are going to war — if not with a Special Forces ODA team, then with some 
conventional unit. So if you’re going to the fight, why not go with the best — where 
you can make the biggest contribution in fighting your nation’s enemy.770
The late Colonel Francis J. Kelly, a World War II veteran o f Omaha beach who 
commanded 5th Group in Vietnam June 1966 - June 1967, also expressed praise o f Special 
Forces N COs’ quality. Reminiscent o f Colonel Kurtz in Apocalypse Now, Kelly went 
through jump school at age 44.771 He argued that “The “special” about Special Forces is 
simply that the non-commissioned officers are the finest to be found anywhere in the 
world. If  today’s Special Forces NCO  has ever had any peer, it was probably the tough, 
self-reliant, combat-tested soldier who fought on the Indian frontier o f our own country 
during the 1870s.”772
Another cadre, First Sergeant Stewart Donnally impresses on the candidates that a 
warrior reputation needs to be earned: “Be clear on this thing, people. We are here to train 
warriors, and we are deadly serious about this. The reputation you established during 
selection will continue after you leave here.”773 Company commander Captain John Block 
reinforces his message:
If you don’t want to be a warrior, this is the wrong place for you and you’re wasting 
our time. If you want to be a warrior, then show us you want to be a warrior — a 
Special Forces warrior... The groups need every one of you... but we’ll not cut 
corners and we’ll not relax our standards. You have to perform, and you have to 
demonstrate character. Show us you want to be a Special Forces warrior, and forget 
about everything else.
Such unabashed warrior celebration was not always expressed. During the mid 1970s, 
following the standing down o f many special forces units after Vietnam, the 5th and 7th
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Speicial Forces Groups initiated development projects, building roads and medical facilities 
on Indian reservations. Although useful, this kind o f training made many transfer to 
infa:ntry units to get back to the action.774 This lesson was not lost on General Schoomaker 
w hen he commanded USSOCOM that “As SOF engage in additional peacetime 
operations, it is important to remember that we are, first and foremost, warriors.”775
However, the exertions o f basic training and selection merely ensure that minimum 
requirements are fulfilled. The real test is combat, not only experiencing it, but also being 
willing to keep volunteering for it. That shows the personal and existential commitment o f 
the warrior definition. There is no doubt that Special Operations Forces have such 
individuals.
One example of this is the career o f Finish-American Larry Thom e. Thom e had 
fought the Russians in Finland during the Winter War 1939-40, subsequently commanding 
his ow n guerrilla group conducting raids behind the lines in the war o f continuation 1941 - 
44. During one of these raids, Thom e and his men killed 300 Russians, without incurring 
losses.776 He won every Finish military medal, including the Mannerheim Cross, the 
nation’s highest award. Upon Finland’s surrender in 1944, Thom e signed up for the 
Germans, in a marine unit, which was wanted by the Russians, leading to Thom e’s post­
war arrest in Finland by the Russians. After escaping to the United States, he became a U.S. 
citizen and signed up for the U.S. Army as a private. He subsequently joined Special Forces 
where he received his commission in 1956. An excellent scuba diver, skydiver, boxer, skier 
and mountain climber, Captain Thorne naturally volunteered for the most elite unit o f the 
Vietnam War, the “Studies and Observation Group” (MACV/SOG). In October 1965, 
during SOG’s first cross-border mission into Laos, Thom e was accompanying a team 
insertion near Laotian Highway 165 in heavy fog. The helicopter did not return and Thom e 
was never seen again.777
The point is that people like Thome, who have a personal covenant with war, will 
seek out the units where the professionalism, risks and demands are the very highest, and 
in the contemporary strategic landscape, that is SOF. Thorne was even willing to start as a 
private in the U.S. Army before climbing his way back into the rank of Captain, despite his 
officer background. He is not the only warrior trading rank and privileges to stay in Special
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Forces. For example, many SEALs could not hope to reach far up the ranks if  they stayed 
in Special Warfare, since that was not a separate career path in those days. One long 
serving SEAL officer who had made this commitment explains: “You could reasonably 
stay" in [for your entire career] and have all your assignments within naval special-warfare- 
relalted jobs... Reasonable expectation after a twenty-year career would be to retire as a 
lieutenant commander... And all o f us entered into it knowing that. Just because this is 
whait we wanted to do for a living.”778
Intersubjectivitv
SOF must be prepared to work in so-called non-permissive environments. In the decades 
between Vietnam and 9/11, US Army Special Forces specialized in “foreign internal 
defence” missions: training friendly, often but not necessarily government forces, to a level 
of military skills that would make them independent o f outside help. Such missions 
underlined the teacher dimension o f the Special Forces skill-set. However, today with two 
ongoing wars, and a more widespread campaign against terrorist groups, the whole range o f  
skills are in demand.
Operating independently in foreign cultures
Some writers have underlined the degree to which SOF operate in a grey moral, juridical 
and political environment, where sound social awareness and political judgement are critical 
characteristics o f the operators.779 Couch describes how the concluding exercise o f US 
Army Special Forces, a massive role-playing event called Robin Sage, focuses heavily on 
testing how they handle establishing contact with a guerrilla force, which has a chief who is 
not easy to get along or cooperate with. Finding a balance between his interests and their 
mission is difficult. Troops returning from the field report that the real thing — anywhere in 
the world — is like “Robin Sage on steroids.”780
O ut in the field, the forces will often have to confront real dilemmas such as 
judging whether to stop cruelty against prisoners, or executions on behalf o f the laws of 
war, or to ignore such behaviour, and focus on good relations with the local big men, in the 
interest o f mission accomplishment. For these warriors, fighting blends in with diplomacy 
and development. Army Special Forces integrate development projects into their mission
778 Quoted in Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional warfare : rebuilding US. special operations forces (Washington, D.C.: 
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profile, as this is essential to win the hearts and minds o f neutral populations in disputed 
territories.
To decentralise mission execution like this can be a double-edged sword. It 
empowers these forces greatly, where their accumulated field experience is a necessity 
rather than an asset. They can manipulate all the vectors that have a bearing on the conflict; 
whether economic (giving out bribes, manipulating local economy, seizing funds), social 
(empowering one local tribe/strongm an while ostracizing others), political (protecting 
friendly figures and targeting or arresting unfriendly ones) or military (advisory role to 
friendly forces, or direct action against unfriendly ones). On the other hand, all this power 
and influence requires professionalism in a careful adherence to the rules o f engagement, 
laws o f war, and respect for the civilian leadership at home. If  powerful military institutions 
are not in place to manage operations, the operators work on trust alone. The concept o f 
Special Forces is for this reason potentially risky for any political leader in countries with 
less stringent civil-military structures than those in the West. While there is no immediate 
risk that Western Special Forces will turn on their own governments, this is far less true of 
the forces they train around the world, who will become powerful factors on any side after 
Western forces have left the area, or even before that.
For these reasons — and as deference to the risks they are taking — special operators 
have much more power in the field than their rank formally signifies.781 This bolsters their 
agency, but also places a lot o f responsibility on their shoulders. One way this responsibility 
is rewarded is through recognition from conventional troops or from home. Recognition, 
however, is not a straightforward dynamic since SOF are not allowed to reveal their 
personal identities to the public, nor even be recognised for extraordinary deeds.782
FRecognition
For some operators, lacking recognition from the public is understandable and acceptable, 
even romantic. During the preparations for Operation Eagle Claw, the Iranian hostage rescue 
operation on April 24th 1980, the Delta operators all wanted to be part o f one o f the 
boldest military actions in history:
The fact that their countrymen would not know who they were made it all the more
appealing. It made the heroism pure. They would not be celebrated, only their
781 Bakkeli, Norges Hemmelige Krigere, 48.
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achievement. None of these men would be in the ticker-tape parades or sitting down 
for interviews on national TV or have their pictures on the covers of magazines, nor 
would they be cashing in on fat book contracts. They were quiet professionals. In a 
world of brag and hype they embodied substance. They would come home and after a 
few days off go right back to work. O f course, within their own world, they would 
become legends. For the rest of their lives, behind them knowing soldiers would 
whisper, “He was on Eagle Claw.” That was honor worth having.783
Yet in other contexts, it can be tempting to welcome attention, which conflicts with 
blending in with the local population during missions, or at the very least cutting as discreet 
a profile as possible. The freedom to dress as they please; sport long hair and beards; rove 
around the area o f operations in customised vehicles; pack customised weapons; exhort a 
cool air o f independence and confidence; becomes its own style and distinction, which 
invariably draws admiring looks from “lesser orders o f soldiering”, i.e. normal infantry.784 
Occasionally seeing special operators in action, or even just exhibiting their typically causal 
cool attitude, inspires soldiers to volunteer to try out for the unit in question. O ther times it 
leads to resentment.785
In some cases, this difference in operational style — as in both meanings o f ‘style’ — 
can lead to friction between allied SOF elements. In Iraq, British Special Forces aim to 
keep a low profile using local battered vehicles and cheap clothes bought in the markets. 
Some o f them were shocked at their American colleagues who initially used brand new 
Dodge pickups.
“We used to laugh when we saw the Americans around the green zone,” one source 
said. “They would be wearing designer jeans, heavy boots and T-shirts - that was their 
idea of local dress. To a man they would all have pistols strapped to each leg with 
black plastic holster and webbing, and of course they would be wearing the latest 
shades. We called it ‘living the dream’.”786
Such conspicuous flashing generated unwanted attention to the British working alongside 
them, which was especially undesirable for the latter in a counterinsurgency campaign 
where the Americans had earned a “well deserved reputation for being trigger-happy” 
according to one SAS operator.787 Such aggressiveness is not necessarily unwarranted as the
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conflict level has been very high, with hundreds o f engagements. But the British have 
exhibited a more high risk approach to their confrontations with insurgents, and suffering 
heavy losses in doing so. By one count, British SOF had suffered seven dead and 47 
seriously wounded by September 2007, which exceeds 20 percent o f the SAS’ fighting 
strength.788
These displays o f distinction gamer respect from enemy forces as well as friendly 
ones. In Somalia, the Rangers were both despised and respected for their ruthlessness, but 
the clan fighters detected in them an unwillingness to die, apparent from their preference 
for travelling by helicopters or armoured columns at high speed. Clan fighters considered it 
unmanly to yield in a fight, even against overwhelming force, and would brave enemy fire 
often in suicidal frontal assaults.789 One o f these fighters, Sheik Ali, a professional gunman, 
respected the “black vests” that came with the Rangers as “especially ruthless killers.”790 
One Delta operator, Sergeant First Class Paul Howe in turn respected the clan fighters as 
“smart street fighters” who were “disciplined” and “determined.”791 This dimension of 
SOF is underappreciated, since their very difference, existentially speaking, is much more 
than just their instrumental role. It leads to recruitment, effort, a sense o f brotherhood 
among the operators, and the critically important small group cohesion in combat.
C onclusion
Ultimately, SOF represent a sub-culture where the warrior ethos is celebrated unabashedly 
and explicitly as necessary and desirable. Such an ethos further pronounces the ‘special’ in 
these forces, such that their speciali2ation is increasingly existential rather than 
instrumental. Are SOF warriors? The answer is a definite yes insofar as the warrior ethos is 
cultivated in these units. There is a pragmatic existential truce between society and SOF as 
the latter’s culture is insulated by secrecy and the wider military, which allows them to 
cultivate masculine values in a way frowned upon by the rest o f society. The US Marines 
illustrate the civil-military tensions better because they are a more open organisation. In 
one illustrative example, Lt. General James Mattis, who commanded Marine expeditionary 
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, faced fierce criticism for admitting that he found combat a 
lot o f fun: "Actually it's quite fun to fight them, you know. It's a hell o f a h o o t... It's fun to
788 Ibid.
789 Bowden, Black Hawk Down, 110.
790 Ibid., 180.
791 Ibid., 234.
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shoot some people. I'll be right up there with you. I like brawling.”792 In another example, 
Lieutenant Nathaniel Fick explains how the US Marine Corps had to drop a recruiting 
campaign with the words “Nobody likes to fight, but somebody has to know how.” It was 
dropped because the Marines do like to fight.793
Conclusion
The late modern warrior ideal type, most recendy embodied in the Special Forces warrior, 
has evolved out o f an age that has produced a great variety o f military experiences. When 
Western SOF rapidly dissembled organised resistance in the 2001 Afghanistan campaign, 
their achievement was celebrated as a successful combination o f the human element and 
technology. Airpower and mule-equipped SOF appeared to combine the best of the 
fighting spirit o f the erstwhile stormtroops and the values o f citizen warriors.
However, what we are seeing is that the human terrain in Afghanistan is perhaps 
more challenging than in any previous wars. World War II veterans would tell those 
fighting in Vietnam that one did not know what war was before one had fought the 
Germans. The Vietnam veterans in turn replied, justifiably, that a war without frontiers or 
clearly identifiable enemies was a challenge o f a different nature, but in no way preferable. 
Today’s warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan face an even more complex human terrain where 
the local population is to be won over through developmental nation building efforts. This 
has led to admissions in the American military o f lacking cultural and ethnographic 
knowledge in previous counterinsurgencies, like Vietnam. To counter this the American 
military is stepping up Human Terrain Teams, which are “specifically designed to address 
cultural awareness shortcomings” by giving brigade commanders social scientists to advise 
on the ““human terrain” — the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic and political 
elements o f the people among whom a force is operating.”794 Such teams will undoubtedly 
contribute to cultural and local awareness. However, they still constitute an add-on device 
to provide a human intelligence service, which ought to have been integrated as a 
foundation throughout command from the very start.
At the same time, some operators sent to Afghanistan are instructed not under any 
circumstances to allow themselves to be taken prisoner, because they would face public
792 'General: It's 'fun to shoot some people", CN N, February 4 2005. Available 
http://edition.cnn.com /2005/U S/02/03/general.shoot/ [Retrieved 27/04/2008]
793 Fick, One bullet away 33.
794 Jacob Kipp et al., 'The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st century', Military Review 
September/October (2006): 9.
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beheading.795 Consequendy, the operational scope of action stretches from extreme 
violence to development efforts — often in the same village. If  Ernst Jlinger found himself 
struggling to define a Homeric realm, latter day SOF find themselves having to carry a 
citizen ethos into a medieval warlord dominated war scenario, using technology to 
compensate for numbers, and no Homeric duel in sight. Indeed, the fighting taking place in 
Helmand is as fierce as anything since World War II, but without the feeling o f an 
overriding threat. The fighting could be said to be privatised and specialised as much in the 
social and existential sense, as economically and instrumentally. This is unsurprising given 
how specialization is one o f the major vectors o f modernity, and it would be odd not to 
expect it to materialize in war. Precisely how this plays out in the relationship between 
warriors and society is the subject o f the next chapter.
795 Bakkeli, Norges Hemmelige Krigere, 66.
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C h a p t e r  7 :  D o e s  t h e  W e s t  S t i l l  N e e d
W a r r i o r s ?
Introduction
It is now time to answer the research question directly. Does the West still need warriors? 
The warrior definition (chapter 1), the social and security context (chapter two), the war 
and combat context (chapter three and four) and the premodem and modem warrior ideal 
types (chapter five and six) come together in this chapter. While the first part o f the thesis 
provided theoretical context, the previous two chapters provided a historical context. This 
chapter is about warriors today and in the near future.
Warriors’ lifeworld has a cultural grammar, Coker tells us. A grammar is composed 
o f meaning and function. W hat is the meaning and function o f warriors in today’s strategic 
landscape and society? This corresponds to their existential meaning and their instrumental 
function. A related dimension is the inverse o f the question: not what are warriors for the 
West, but what is Western society for warriors?
The presentation o f the Special Forces warrior ideal type has already answered part 
o f the instrumental question. The instrumental utility o f SOF is readily apparent, and this is 
primarily where we find Western warriors today. Hitherto, however, the discussion o f the 
instrumental utility o f warriors has focused on the micro level, particularly in chapter one, 
five and six. This leaves the macro level analysis o f instrumental utility for this chapter.
To identify the existential meaning o f warriors for society is much more difficult, 
for several reasons: Firstly, Western society is increasingly instrumentalized and specialized, 
where the existential questions are little addressed by society as a whole. They are instead a 
matter o f subculture devotion and entertainment. Even religion (every society’s most 
substantial existential discourse and most coherent reservoir o f meaning) is threatening to 
become a subculture, in the form o f a faith community. For believers in the West, religion 
is immanent: G od is mediated into humanity rather than as in other parts o f  the world — 
notably the Islamic — where religion still offers transcendence, and G od mediates 
humanity.796
Secondly, within the military realm there is an extraordinary shortage o f self- 
awareness on these issues, presumably because such issues border on philosophy,
796 Luc Ferry, Man Made God: The meaning of life, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
2002).
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encourage introspection and generally shake up seemingly self-evident reigning values. To 
do these things is incompatible with the instrumental rationality that necessarily governs 
most military activity. Some exceptions exist, such as the US Marine Corps’ very strong 
historical self-awareness, and the cultivation o f warrior ethos in Special Forces, which 
inevitably leads to attention towards the human element. Nonetheless, even in Special 
Forces instrumental rationality governs virtually all activity, as a Special Forces instructor 
who was talking about attention to drill and detail recently reminded some candidates in 
selection: “This is Special Forces, not some liberal arts feel good programme; we don’t 
have time for your self-esteem. If  it’s not right we have to get it right. We are at war.”797 A 
third reason is that we are living in an age characterised by a strong degree o f cultural and 
moral relativism, which is due both to the erosion o f major value systems (religion and 
other grand narratives) and to discrediting or erosion o f the celebration o f higher moral 
values (glory, honour, physical courage) after extremely destructive world wars.
As a consequence o f these social developments, the celebration o f warrior values in 
semi-closed military subcultures is often regarded as stubborn retention o f more or less 
reactionary values, which a society no longer dominated by war can afford to ignore, or 
even resent. Aside from the civil-military gap, this pulls warriors between the imperatives 
of military instrumentality on the one hand and a kind o f moralising against the use of 
violence from the civilian world, on the other hand. Ancient values like honour, sacrifice 
and recognition still play an intuitive and meaningful role in the military lifeworld. While 
some warriors fight for themselves, they do not fight for personal gratification; but for 
personal recognition.
The existential role of warriors in society
W arriors at the in ternational level — am bassadors o f  W estern  society?
The contemporary West is a group of largely established liberal democratic societies. As 
such it is one o f the first societies where political decision making can de-facto abolish 
warriors, whether they are deemed needed or desired, or neither. For some, this represents 
progressive thinking along the lines o f the abolishment o f slavery, foot-binding and 
duelling, practices that are judged incompatible with the progression o f civilization today.798 
The military also acknowledges a cultural gap between the two civilian and military worlds. 
Thomas Ricks’ 1998 book on the U.S. Marine Corps reveals a military culture increasingly
79 Couch, Chosen Soldier, 314.
79lMandelbaum, 'Is Major War Obsolete?' 34.
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at odds with civil society, to such an extent, that some Marines interviewed at the time 
predicted that the next big war would be a kind o f cultural civil war inside the United 
States.799 Since then the events following 9/11 have re-introduced warriors on the scene 
with no risk o f mission drought. This contrasts with the 1990s. In a popular comedy Major 
Payne from 1995 the main protagonist, Major Payne, is told that, despite being a “mean 
killing machine,” he is not needed in the Marine Corps anymore because o f cutbacks, and 
that the “battles are fought in the halls o f Congress these days” .800
Today there are wars, however, but their rationales cross over each other from self- 
defence and deterrence to peace enforcement and development. Even before these issues 
are securitized by different security paradigms, they are reflective o f different social 
imaginaries, or different ways o f saying ‘we’. Being reveals itself in war, says Levinas,801 or, 
in other words, who we are reveals itself in war. This is only partly true today, or if it is true, 
a neutral observer may well conclude the ‘we’ is schizophrenic. The complex picture o f the 
West at war reflects many ambitions and desires on behalf o f many groups, with less 
coherence and will as a result. Consider the war in Afghanistan, in relation to Coker’s 
insight about social existence: “What do all societies say? All social discourse can be 
reduced to “I am.””802 If one is an Afghan trying to surmise the being and intentions o f 
Western expeditionary forces there, there are several competing impressions, which say 
different things. In addition to the social contrast o f seeing our wars from the receiving 
end, it can also be useful to bear in mind Clausewitz’s insight that war is (meant to be) a 
force to compel the enemy to do our will.803
As a given example, an Afghan farmer can have several incompatible simultaneous 
military experiences o f the West. (1) He can have his opium poppies eradicated by poppy 
eradication teams that are mostly composed o f Afghan national army with Western 
advisers. They do not offer any alternative means o f income for him, which leads to 
frustration and resentment. (2) The farmer can be visited by intelligence operators who 
approach him as a tribal elder to extract information, a visit that can lead to suspicion, 
curiosity or even optimism and pride for being treated with respect and listened to. (3) He 
or members o f his family may fall victim to collateral damage because o f the proximity o f 
fighting he is not personally interested in, or much less involved with. This will also lead to
799 Ricks, Making the Corps, 292.
800 Castle, 'Major Payne', (United States: Universal Pictures, 1995).
801 Hillman, A. Terrible Love of War, 2.
802 Coker, War and the illiberal conscience, 92.
803 Clausewitz, On War, 75.
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anger, resentment and frustration. (4) In another scenario, however, the farmer may be 
fearful o f  foreign fighters and too distrustful o f Western soldiers’ staying power to take 
their side in the ongoing hearts and minds campaign. (5) The farmer may be confused by 
the geopolitical consequences o f a sharp delineation with neighbouring Pakistan, an area as 
much Pashtu as his own, and for that reason meaninglessly divorced for purposes o f trade 
or family relations. Finally, (6) he can be equally confused about infrastructure projects like 
well-building, or medical care provided on the one hand by military personnel (American), 
with plenty o f resources but less care for his future than for his contribution to stability by 
not joining the Taliban. Aid can also come from civilian agencies who do not wear 
uniforms and carry guns, and perhaps have less money, but whose programmes are more 
invasive to his social and family structure (gender relations, potential missionary activity, 
and calls for reform o f local decision making into more democratic forms). The whole 
presence o f foreigners has an unmistakable military headline, which suggests that some 
kind o f coercion is taking place.
The question then is: who is the Western warrior in Afghanistan who says “I am”? 
W hat being reveals itself at war in Afghanistan? A cynic might argue that Afghanistan is a 
frontier space constituting a free-for-all for anyone with an adventurous spirit and a 
predisposition for exporting their skills and resources; whether violence or development. 
Perhaps this is what the specializing vector identified in chapter two spawns; foreign and 
security policy by subculture. If  such is the case, the outcome is almost inevitably a societal 
inward turn for warriors into isolation. There is a parallel to both the knights o f the Middle 
Ages and to Jiinger in that warriors must find meaning for themselves. If  they can find 
meaning in the war itself, then it is still a way to assert being, or thymos as Plato called it. 
Yet this thymotic element is threatening to become so privatized and isolated as to not 
being so much a part o f the social fabric as a tolerated nuisance. This means that clarity o f 
purpose is more than a strategic property, it also helps to define who and what Western 
warriors are when they represent their countries in combat.
W estern  w arriors at the dom estic level — thym os and recognition today
Does the distinction between warriors and soldiers have any meaning in Western domestic 
society? Francis Fukuyama is one o f few people who have addressed this. He revokes 
Plato’s concept ‘thymos’804 and Alexandre Kojeve’s reading o f Hegel on recognition and 
the master-slave relationship. For Kojeve, man is distinct from animals because o f our
804 See chapter five.
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sociability, which sometimes lead us to violent conflict over objects that have no practical 
value, but social value, such as flags. O ther human beings desire these objects; to fight for 
them and win leads to recognition by the contenders. Furthermore, man is different from 
animals in a more profound respect as well: he is able to overcome his fear o f death and 
risk life. In battle, this logic leads either to death for one party or both, or for a power 
relationship o f lordship and bondage, where one party has submitted his will to the victor 
for fear o f his life.805
By risking his life, man proves that he can act contrary to his most powerful and basic 
instinct, the instinct for self-preservation... And that is why it is important that the 
primeval battle at the beginning of history be over prestige alone, or an apparent trifle 
like a medal or a flag that signifies recognition. The reason that I fight is to get another 
human being to recognize the fact that I am willing to risk my life, and that I am 
therefore free and authentically human.806
This dynamic, repeated in coundess varieties, leads to the master-slave relationship, which 
in some respects has historical precedent in pre-modernity where warrior leaders by 
necessity were society’s leaders.
For Fukuyama, the desire for recognition is the political part o f our personality 
because it drives men to assert themselves over others. He sees thymos — or the confidence 
to bemi - as central to recognition, since it asserts itself when recognition is not granted. 
“Thymos is something like an innate human sense of justice: people believe that they have a 
certain worth, and when other people act as though they are worth less — when they do not 
recognise their worth at its correct value — then they become angry.”808 Thymotic assertions 
of self worth exists in the West today as well, m ost visibly in criminal gangs who fight over 
colours and turfs, like the Crips or the Bloods.809 These gangs apparendy fight to assert 
courage and manliness, but what about the rest o f us? Or as Fukuyama’s asks, does liberal 
democracy satisfy thymos?810
Fukuyama argues that one o f the first principles o f liberal democracy is the idea o f 
equality; an idea less at home in the communitarian social imaginary than the liberal and 
cosmopolitan ones. Nietzsche had asked whether recognition that can be universalised is
805 Fukuyama, End of History, 147.
806 Ibid., 150.
8071 am indebted to Rt. Hon. Dr. Richard Chartres for this understanding o f  thymos, personal conversation.
808 Fukuyama, End of History, 165. original italics.
809 Ibid., 18.
810 Ibid., 289.
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worth having in the first place.811 Self-confidence is important in this sense, because it 
comes from reaching a certain standard. For warriors, such a standard is often selection 
initially and combat eventually, and comparison happens automatically between peers, and 
between recruits and veterans. Performing well repeatedly in combat is a standard unto its 
own as recognized as other universal signifiers: decapitation o f enemies to demonstrate 
victory, say, or the universal taboo against not showing hospitality that all cultures share. A 
central feature o f this issue is the question o f who esteems.812 In the military world, the 
individuals who are already experienced are those whose esteem is most coveted. Gaining 
respect from proven combat warriors ranks very high. To some extent, this also repeats 
itself at the national level, where the British are often held in very high esteem for their 
military professionalism.813
Recognition is central to the social dynamics in warrior cultures, because physical — 
and increasingly also intellectual — performance, is central to operational success.814 
Individuals tend to be competitive, seeking achievement relative to the peer group. In 
m odem  psychological parlance; this is an environment full o f A-type personalities. One o f 
the reasons for some military units’ relative isolation from society is precisely that they 
cultivate such a culture, whereas the idea that some individuals perform better than other, 
is increasingly unpopular in a civil society that is sceptical o f hierarchical ranking of 
people’s qualities or contributions. As Fukuyama argues, a civilization where nobody has a 
desire to be better than others is ill equipped to meet challengers who have a strong faith in 
their own relative cosmic position, particularly if it comes with unwillingness to risk lives.815
And if men are unable to affirm that any particular way of life is superior to another, 
then they will fall back on the affirmation of life itself, that is, the body, its needs, and 
fears. While not all souls may be equally virtuous or talented, all bodies can suffer; 
hence democratic societies tend to be compassionate and raise to the first order of 
concern the question of preventing the body from suffering. It is not an accident that 
people in the democratic societies are preoccupied with material gain and live in an 
economic world devoted to the satisfaction of the myriad small needs of the body.816
This sentiment exactly is sarcastically expressed in the movie Black Hawk Down when 
captured businessman Abdullah ‘Firimbi’ Hassan castigates General Garrison; “You
811 Ibid., 301.
812 Ibid., 303.
8,3 Interview Norwegian Marinejeger, [anonymous].
814 Kiszely, 'Post-modem challenges'.
815 Fukuyama, End of History, 315.
816 Ibid., 305.
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Americans don’t smoke anymore. You live long, dull and uninteresting lives.”817 If  warriors 
were to be thus concerned with long lives and the myriad small needs o f the body, very few 
would volunteer for combat. However, if these are the concerns o f “most people,” the 
notion that volunteering for combat and risking life is worthy o f esteem will be increasingly 
challenged. Why not enjoy life’s luxuries instead; become a business consultant and travel 
to five star hotels making business deals, enjoy an expensive life style and retire early? The 
financial world is, after all, a world full o f A-type personalities as well.
Weber’s iron cage juxtaposed with Hegel’s understanding o f the reciprocity 
between recognition and courage in the warrior type helps to explain this. Weber argued 
that as instrumental rationality came to govern increasingly more and larger spheres o f the 
lifeworld, the other action types became relatively more important. Yet for Hegel the 
warrior is a human type, which will not go away, however society is organised. “The 
military exists because the warrior is a human type, and the warrior is a human type because 
the act o f self-sacrifice, o f meeting force with force on behalf o f an idea, is one o f the ways 
men apprehend themselves as free agents... Wars are the result o f the frustrations that 
peace brings to the warrior in his drive to act out the freedom of his being.”818 Sensing that 
the public is less and less understanding o f warriors’ seemingly irrational desire to risk life 
for recognition and excitement, these individuals need the recognition from their peers 
even more. Nevertheless, is this degree o f self-referential cultivation o f the warrior ethos 
sustainable? There are three ways o f seeing this.
W arriors among sleepwalkers
One way o f ascertaining this situation is to argue that the public’s lack o f understanding is 
exaggerated. This can be called the ‘warriors among sleepwalkers’ or ‘wake-me-when-the- 
war-comes’ public. Despite a vocal minority who are hostile to the idea that armed force 
can be a force for good, the majority o f the public supports the armed forces, albeit in a 
relatively modest, even latent, way. In this reasoning the public does not feel war looming, 
despite the expeditionary campaigns being waged, and feel they can largely afford to 
withdraw their attention from military affairs. This is not out o f hostility to the military, but 
rather follows from the military’s standing as corresponding to its perceived utility in 
meeting a perceptible threat. Some flashes o f action, like the SAS’ liberation o f the Iranian 
Embassy in London, function more as a reassuring reminder (or realisation) that the 
appropriate capabilities are sustained by the authorities.
817 Scott, ’Black Hawk Down’.
818 Verene, 'Hegel's Account o f  war', 151.
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Conversely, when the sleepwalkers themselves are called to the fight, the whole 
military profession may be called into question by those who are unwilling to fight. This 
was Ed Cobleigh’s experience as a combat pilot in Vietnam. Assessing his own motivation, 
Cobleigh noted that he went through three stages: the first was about the cause, preventing 
communist takeover of the south. The second was fighting to avenge killed friends and 
colleagues; after six months, he judged that it was not worth fighting for the south. In the 
final analysis, however, Cobleigh decided that he was there because he liked it; strapping up 
in  his F-4 Phantom to “volunteer for personal intimate combat.”819 Flying in combat was 
highly emotionally rewarding for him.820 What particularly galled Cobleigh, however, were 
the anti-war demonstrations in the United States: “the war was publicly supported when 
only three demographic groups were fighting in it; professional soldiers like fighter pilots 
and the U.S. Army’s Green Berets, white southerners, and urban blacks... College 
freshmen suddenly had to contemplate the awful possibility o f giving up their surfboards 
for M-16 rifles. Night jungle patrols are not nearly as much fun as rock concerts.”821 
Warriors like Cobleigh became immersed in a passionate cultural struggle. I f  the majority o f 
the American public had supported their warriors more vocally, the implication would have 
been that those who refused to fight were cowards. Today the pendulum has swung back 
to  strong support of the military, but given all-volunteer militaries there is still a sense in 
which the public can be uninterested.
Would-be warriors without war
A nother reading o f the relationship between warriors and the public is that the desire for 
adventure and recognition is more or less constant, and that rather than doing without 
recognition people have found other ways o f channelling it, in the absence o f war. Karl 
Jasper’s reading o f Hegel is consistent with Kojeve: Focusing on the warrior rather than 
war, where peace is only achievable if the warrior has other outlets:
Fighting — risking one’s life so as either to meet force with force or else to use force to 
win power and booty — is a primordial phenomenon of human life. The primordial 
element is the fierce fighting spirit. Unleashed, it engenders the self-transcending lust 
of flinging one’s life away and the savagery that rates other lives no higher, vents itself 
in pillage and rape after victory, and finally abates in the climactic feeling of power, to 
spare the conquered and let him serve as a slave. This abatement led Hegel to interpret
8,9 Ed Cobleigh, War for the H ell of it; A . fighter pilot’s view of Vietnam (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005), 55.
820 Ibid., 165.
821 Ibid., 179.
210
the productive meaning of life-and-death struggles. The warrior is a human type, but 
not everyone is a warrior.822
Financial trading and extreme or competitive sports are alternative avenues that lead to 
social status, without (comparable) risks. This interpretation suits the 1980s and 1990s 
when the limited operations in Latin America, the First Gulf War, the Balkans and Africa 
did not quite add up to war in the conventional sense. Another distraction became 
widespread during this time, as Private Military Companies (PMCs) expanded dramatically. 
PMCs became a platform where adventurous people and ex-soldiers could find 
opportunities for combat operations in the absence o f war. Just as many left the US Army 
Special Forces in the 1970s because o f their relative change o f focus from combat to 
development programmes, so have many well-trained soldiers in the West left their state- 
based positions to go over to the private sector. This happens a lot today with the 
increasing market opportunities in Iraq in particular. Many private actors have undisputed 
warrior credentials and cannot be discredited simply as profit hungry adventurers. Instead, 
they have found an arena, which provides the same risks and danger, but they trade some 
o f the recognition that follows from dangerous public service for financial returns. Given 
the salaries enjoyed by the average infantry soldier in Western militaries this is hardly 
surprising, from an individual point o f view, particularly if  the recognition was not very 
strong in the first place. This situation is one where the human material for warriors as well 
as the thymotic desire for recognition remains constant, but where the absence o f war leads 
them to seek other oudets for action.
W arriors and society in successful symbiosis
A third interpretation o f the relationship between warriors and society is that things are not 
particularly unsatisfactory for either warriors or society, but this does not mean there is no 
tension between the two lifeworlds. Western militaries today welcome anyone with a desire 
to serve, as they are overstretched and see some o f their best soldiers retire or move into 
the private sector. Thus, there is no shortage o f opportunities for those who want to serve 
their country. Some military units are indeed secluded from the civilian world, but this is 
the m ost meaningful way o f cultivating their warrior ethos where willingness to kill and 
sacrifice life are essential. Such lifeworlds should not admit members uncritically, as was
822 Karl Jaspers, The Future of Mankind (Chicago: 1951), 45. Quoted in Jon Stewart, The Hegel myths and legends 
(Evanston, 111.: Northwestern UP, 1996), 150-51.
211
exemplified by Timothy McVeigh’s rejection from US Army Special Forces during 
selection, when some features o f his psychological profile caused alarm on tests.823
The question o f where recognition comes from — who esteems — remains an issue 
in this interpretation. Western warriors are more like the Japanese Ninjas than the Samurai 
in respect o f recognition. The Samurai bushido honour code required honourable 
behaviour in all aspects o f their craft, including that which reflected on their employer. The 
Samurai were required to present their intentions and mission publicly. The Ninja, by 
contrast, operated completely in secrecy, using any necessary means to accomplish their 
mission; lying, cheating and stealing if necessary, as well as running away to fight another 
day. The mission came before anything else, and this required strict anonymity and 
invisibility in public. Because o f these different warrior codes, Samurai sometimes found it 
necessary to hire the services o f Ninjas to accomplish their goals.824
Western SOF today adhere to an honour code somewhere between the Samurai 
and the Ninjas, when it comes to the laws of war. These laws are respected, for the most 
part, albeit not necessarily in all covert missions, where the mission is held to be more 
important than the mode o f operation. In recognition terms, SOF are nearer to Ninjas than 
Samurai, because they must maintain an anonymous and invisible profile. In some cases, 
their deeds are acknowledged; for example, when they received the highest awards for 
bravery, or when they retire or get killed. Unfortunately, the fact that some warriors have 
been on deniable missions in, for example, Laos and Cambodia, has led to downgrading of 
awards to shield the existence o f the missions.825 This is particularly unfortunate since 
receipt o f the very highest awards leads to a great deal o f  esteem from the general public 
and fellow warriors alike.
All three interpretations resonate in part in the sense that a large segment o f the 
public is relatively uninterested in the military. Nonetheless, there are warriors in Western 
militaries who remain satisfied with a half-anonymous existence, conducting missions, 
which may not become public for a long time. To ascertain if this is indeed a happy 
relationship between warriors and society, we must address the degree to which formerly 
martial values are still held in esteem. Courage and manliness are two such values, and as it 
follows from the warrior definition, they have not lost their currency among warriors.
823 Couch, Chosen Soldier, 135.
824 French, Code of the Warrior, 224-25.
825 Plaster, SOG, 54.
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W arrior values in society
British gender researcher David Morgan has argued that despite far reaching social 
developments throughout the West, where values like heroic masculinity and courage have 
eroded and military institutions are adopting some civilian values (e.g. gender equality and 
tolerance o f gays, privatisation826) the image o f the warrior is still a key symbol o f 
masculinity.827
Courage
Courage, argued Lord Moran in his book Anatomy of Courage, is neither a quality possessed 
by some and not by others, nor is it a constant. Instead, it is akin to a capital sum of which 
each man possesses a variable amount.828 William Ian Miller seems to read Lord Moran’s 
bank metaphor only to imply depletion,829 but courage can also be replenished through 
inspiration, leadership or even despair, boosting the holdings. Courage is elusive to define 
but it appears to be long since associated with acts in war, as is elegantly captured by 
Samuel J ohnson:
We talked of war. JOHNSON. “Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having 
been a soldier, or not having been at sea.” BOSWELL. “Lord Mansfield does not.” 
JOHNSON. “Sir, if Lord Mansfield were in the company of General Officers and 
Admirals who have been in service, he would shrink; he’d wish to creep under the 
table... No, Sir; were Socrates and Charles the Twelfth of Sweden both present in any 
company, and Socrates to say, ‘follow me, and hear a lecture on philosophy; and 
Charles, laying his hand on his sword, to say, ‘follow me, and dethrone the Czar;’ a 
man would be ashamed to follow Socrates. Sir, the impression is universal; yet it is 
strange.”830
Nonetheless, this is only partially helpful to ascertain what courage is about, because 
courage in war is a great many things. As Miller says, “fear o f death is a large house with 
many rooms.”831 These rooms include the courage o f aggression and initiative like a charge; 
enduring the destructiveness and noise o f artillery in a trench; and to knowing that any 
approaching civilian may be a suicide bomber; every piece o f road hiding an improvised 
explosive device. A t sea, the terror can be equally forceful as many sailors, whether in the
826 Gerald Frost, ed., N ot Fit to Fight: The cultural subversion of the armedforces in Britain and America (London: The 
Social Affairs Unit, 1999).
827 David H J Morgan, Discovering Men (London: Roudedge, 1992), 165, 72.
828 Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London: Constable, 1946), x.
829 William Ian Miller, The mystery of courage (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 62,64.
830 George Birkbeck Hill, Boswell’s Fife of Johnson (Bigelow. Brown, 1799), 10 april 1778 pp 926-927.
831 Miller, The mystery of courage, 206.
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Allied navies or in the merchant marines, during World War II suffered from the 
knowledge that their ship could become torpedoed by submarines at any moment, for 
years.
Then there is the distinction between moral and physical courage. Physical courage 
can get depleted by repetition, as military psychologists and psychiatrists are increasingly 
appreciating, all individuals have a limit to their psychological endurance of combat, and as 
Montgomery pointed out, nobody is strong in all conceivable combat situations requiring 
courage.832 Moral courage, by comparison, can increase with repetition.833 Indeed, to take 
stock o f courage in a precise definition proves futile for Miller, because like novelist and 
Vietnam veteran Tim O ’Brien, he finds that “to determine these attributes is to get a bead 
on something that tends to fade to black in the defining; the fear is that courage partakes 
too much o f circumstance and contingency ever to be fixable.”834
O ’Brien also grapples with the concept o f courage, especially in his 
autobiographical novel If I Die in a Combat Zone*35 Captain Johansen, a firm believer in the 
virtue o f courage, and an undisputed bearer o f  those qualities, intrigues him. For Johansen, 
the degree to which he possesses courage is something that occupies his attention gready 
(“I’d rather be brave than almost anything”) even after he singlehandedly charges across a 
rice paddy to shoot an entrenched Viet Cong in a ditch at point blank range.836 The charge 
is the archetypical military courageous action. It naturally leads people to ask whether they 
would have what it takes to do something similar:
Would you have cracked before going over the top on 1 July 1916 or before the 
landing craft disgorged you onto an atoll in the Pacific or a Normandy beach? Would 
you have been able to suppress the knowledge that at least a good portion of your job 
was to take up some pathetically small amount of an enemy machine-gunner’s time 
and capital so that the chances that some of your comrades would make it to that gun 
would improve by .01 percent? If you had seen it that way could you have done it at 
all? And what if, instead of being the first wave into no-man’s land on July 1, you had 
been in the second or the third, that is, you had known exactly what awaited you? Yet, 
those who were given these orders and duties, with very few exceptions did not refuse 
them.837
832 Ibid., 54, 60, 65.
833 Ibid., 65.
834 Ibid., 31.
835 Tim O'Brien, If I  die in a combat o^ne, box me up and ship me home (London: Marion Boyars, 1988).
836 Miller, The mystery of courage, 32.
837 Ibid., 74.
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Another character O ’Brien encounters is the platoon leader, a Green Beret called Mad 
Mark, whose bearing is very much that o f a warrior who embodies both the style issues 
associated with some special forces operators838 and the ‘natural soldier’ qualities discussed 
by Dyer.839 His characterisation by nickname as mad was;
not hysterical, crazy, into-the-brink, to-the-fore madness. Rather, he was insanely 
calm. He never showed fear. He was a professional soldier, an ideal leader of men in 
the field. It was that kind of madness, the perfect guardian for the Platonic Republic... 
it was his manner, and he cultivated it. He walked with a lanky, easy, silent, fearless 
stride. He wore tiger fatigues, not for their camouflage but for their look. He carried a 
shotgun... itself a measure of his professionalism, for to use it effectively requires an 
exact blend of courage and skill and self-confidence... a man must work his way close 
enough to the prey to make a shot, close enough to see the enemy’s retina and the 
tone of his skin... You must hit at once, on the first shot, and the hit must kill. Mad 
Mark once said that after the war and in the absence of other US wars he might try the 
mercenary’s life in Africa.840
Mad Mark is someone who has the thymotic confidence to be, who walks around with a 
confidence other soldiers cannot fail to notice and which inspires emulation in some. Yet 
he is not doing it for the sake o f vanity or a desire to kill in itself. “He did not yearn for 
battle. Yet neither was he concerned about the prospect... he did precisely what the 
mission called for: a few patrols, a few am bushes.. .he did not take the mission to excess. 
Mad Mark was not a fanatic. He was not gung-ho, not a man in search o f a fight.”841 To be 
perceived as courageous is essential to such a bearing. As O ’Brien puts it, going to war 
“makes a fellow think about courage, makes a man wonder what it is and if he has it.”842
iS/Lanliness
The notion o f manliness is intimately tied to the martial form o f courage. Miller argues a 
theory o f courage comes embedded with a theory o f manhood.843 The Greek word 
‘andreia’ means courage, or literally ‘manliness’. Courage, manliness and manly virtue are all 
defined in opposition to the womanish and effeminate.844 An example o f this is found in 
the Icelandic 13th century N jal’s saga, where the wise elder Njal, despite wisdom, is
838 See p. 197
839 See p. 13
840 O'Brien, I f I die in a combat %one, 86.
841 Ibid., 87.
842 Ibid., 140. in Miller, The mystery of courage.
843 Miller, The mystery of courage, 13.
844 Ibid., 233.
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slandered as “old beardless”, which separates him from the bearded majority o f men.845 A 
similar nexus exists between manhood and beards in Afghanistan today, inspiring Western 
Special Forces and intelligence operators to grow a beard while on deployment.
Van Creveld argues that the existence o f war is closely related to gender relations. 
At a deep and basic level, wars happen because “men like to fight, and women like those 
men who are prepared to  fight on their behalf.”846 The reason this is so, Van Creveld 
continues, is because men are left in an existential void by not having a clear reason to exist 
in the same way women do by giving birth. War is a way for men to sublimate this inability, 
or indeed the absence o f anything comparable, and it becomes the exclusive preserve o f 
men. As Margaret Mead has argued, in most societies, things are considered important 
insofar and to the extent, they are the providence o f  men. War is the chief providence o f 
men, certainly as far as displays, construction and reproduction o f manliness are concerned. 
War is a realm where manliness and courage are desirable and necessary, and where such 
displays know no normative or material constraints.847
The poet Robert Bly implicidy acknowledges Van Creveld’s point, saying that the 
default position among Western women used to be to hate war but love warriors. 
However, following Vietnam that is no longer true, as most women in the West “see no 
reason to distinguish the warrior from the soldier or the soldier from the murderer. It was a 
madness associated with the warrior that — during the [Vietnam] war — destroyed the very 
fabric o f  culture which it was once the job o f the warrior to preserve.”848 In this, Bly may 
have had many supporters in the anti-war crowd; however, he goes on to argue:
Women in other countries may see that differently. A Russian woman from Kiev, 
whose generation of women have lived for many years without men their own age, 
said to me, “All the young men who were left after the battle for Kiev went to 
Moscow to defend it. Not one came back.” She went on, “I know that women in the 
United States are angry with the men because they are too aggressive, and so on. We 
don’t feel that way. If the Russian men had not had great aggression in them, the 
Germans would be in Moscow right now. The matter of aggression looks differently 
when you have been invaded.”849
845 Anonymous, NjaFs Saga, ed. Robert Cook (London: Penguin, 2002), 57, 69, 74,156, 210.
846 Van Creveld, The transformation of war, 221. see also Martin L. Van Creveld, The Culture of war (forthcoming: 
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848 Robert Bly, Iron John: Men and Masculinity (London: Rider, 2001), 158.
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As this example shows, the currency and esteem warriors are held with, fluctuates in society 
and through history. Max Hastings argues, as does Kipling, that warriors are 
“unfashionable people in democratic societies during periods o f peace.”850 Today, he 
continues, martial courage is becoming less esteemed in the West in parallel with a 
welcome decline in large-scale war. “Less happily, however, it is because some people in 
the twenty-first century recoil from any celebration o f military achievement.” 851 Indeed as 
British military psychologist Norman Dixon has observed: warriors and their achievements 
can be admired or despised, not necessarily coherently, in both conscious and unconscious 
ways.852 These fluctuations can stem from the proximity o f war, the social attitude towards 
war and warriors, and to economic or technological development.
Bly has complained that the advent o f technologically dominated militaries has 
facilitated another subversion o f warrior qualities. His point explicitly addresses questions 
o f masculinity: “The disciplined warrior, made irrelevant by mechanized war, disdained and 
abandoned by the high-tech culture, is fading in American men. The fading o f the warrior 
contributes to the collapse o f civilized society.” 853 A similar point was expressed at length 
from perhaps the most self-conscious warrior culture, the U.S. Marines. Marine Brigadier 
General Victor H. Krulak wrote in a 1957 letter to the Corps’ Commandant that the people 
o f the United States needed the Marine Corps to produce warriors in an age where war 
planning was very focused on airpower, missiles and nuclear weaponry:
First, they believe that when trouble comes to our country there will be Marines — 
somewhere — who, through hard work, have made and kept themselves ready to do 
something useful about it, and do it at once. They picture these Marines as men — 
individual components of a lean, serious, professional outfit... Second, they believe 
that when the Marines go to war they invariably turn in a performance that is 
dramatically and decisively successful — not most of the time, but always. Their faith 
and their convictions in this regard are almost mystical. The mere association of the 
word “Marines” with a crisis is an automatic source of encouragement and confidence 
everywhere... The third thing they believe about the Marines is that our Corps is 
downright good for the manhood of our country; that the Marines are masters of a 
form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant 
stable citizens, - citizens into whose hands the nation’s affairs may be safely 
entrusted... throughout our country the word “Marine” is synonymous with
850 Hastings, Warriors, xi.
851 Ibid., xviii.
852 Norman Dixon, On the psychology of militaiy incompetence (London: Pimlico, 1994), 202.
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manhood, character, pride and resolution — characteristics which every father and 
mother want to associate with their son. The people believe these three things. They 
believe them deeply and honesdy — to the extent that they want the Marines around — 
in either peace or war. They want them so much that they are ready to pay for them — 
and to fight for them too, if need be.854
For Krulak, the Marines are the vanguard of martial masculinity; its realisation, 
embodiment and regeneration. But much has happened to masculinity ideals since the 
1950s, and Krulak’s description resonates with far fewer today. Still, for some Marine 
recruits, Krulak’s statement rings true at the moment o f decision to join up. Nathaniel Fick, 
a 21-year old Dartmouth classics graduate, wanted “to go on a great adventure, to prove 
myself, to serve my country. I wanted to do something so hard that no one could ever talk 
shit to me.” The Peace Corps, preferred by some o f his friends, was not what he had in 
mind. Instead he “wanted something more transformative. Something that might kill me — 
or leave me better, stronger, more capable. I wanted to be a warrior.”855 Whereas the other 
services offered benefits, the Marines offered nothing. Instead, they asked, “Do you have 
what it takes?”856 W hat it takes, according to the Marines, are values which are not often 
spoken out loud in the civilian world; “honour, courage, commitment.” 857
The Marines do deliver on their promise o f challenges and a test o f manhood. 
Marine Captain Rodney Chastant, who was killed in action in Vietnam at the age o f 25, 
replied to a letter from his mother who had tried to convince him not to sign up for 
another six month in country:
Try to understand that you raised a son who likes the excitement and challenge he 
finds here... It is not easy to say I opt for six more months of heat, sand, and 
shooting. I know there will [be] the nights that I suffer the loss of another friend. And 
nothing can make a man feel so alien or alone as [a] walk by the seashore as he tries to 
adjust to the loss of another friend in this godforsaken country. But that is part of the 
draw, the attraction, the challenge. Here there is a job to be done. There are moral 
decisions made almost every day. My experience is invaluable. This job requires a man 
of conscience... I am needed here Mom... The young men coming in need the 
leadership of an older hand. I am that hand. I relish the opportunity.858
854 Letter o f Victor H. Krulak, November 14, 1957, in Krulak papers Personal Papers Collection (PPC)#486, 
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136. quoted in Resic, Vlmerican Warriors, 185.
218
Chastant’s letter reveals some o f the ambivalent attraction to the supreme challenges that 
arise in war, and particularly leading men in war. They are such that recognition o f 
manliness increase the more difficult and dangerous the circumstances.
Field Marshall William Slim said; “I don’t believe there is any man who, in his heart 
o f  hearts, wouldn’t  rather be called brave than have any other virtue attributed to him.”859 
I f  this is true then martial courage and its embedded view o f masculinity is still alive in 
society, albeit perhaps in the same sort o f hibernation as interstate war is.860 The preceding 
discussion shows how contextual martial values are, which suggests that warrior admiration 
or suspicion is equally contextual. In this sense, the existence of warriors, although 
specialised and somewhat isolated, represents a reservoir o f continuity in a certain image of 
masculinity which some sections o f society may challenge at times, but none seems willing 
to eradicate.861 These values do no t need translation because they both resonate with new 
generations, whether raised on films or oral stories, or H om er even, because they are 
continuous with the past and with other cultures in the present.
T he  w arrior journey from  society to  anti-com m unitv^  and (sometimes) 
back: H ero  o r victim?
The warrior role involves two unique challenges identified in the warrior definition: killing 
and risking death. The legitimate purposeful killing o f another human being, or many, is 
unique to the military profession, and for warriors, the voluntary repetition o f this act 
makes them particularly exposed to the social and psychological consequences o f violating 
a basic human taboo. Similarly, in contrast to virtually all other people, the risk o f death 
looms large in warriors’ lifeworlds, which also instigates trauma.
Joseph C. Campbell has charted the mythic journey o f ‘the hero’ in his The Hero with 
a Thousand Faces. He argues the prime function o f mythology and rite is to carry the human 
spirit forward, and that the hero is “a man o f self-achieved submission. But submission to 
what? That is precisely the riddle we have to ask ourselves today and that it is everywhere 
the primary virtue and historic deed o f the hero to have solved.”863 As the warrior 
definition in chapter one made clear, the warrior’s lifeworld is a constant struggle between 
submission (to restraint, to rules o f engagement, to orders) and aggressive initiative (to kill 
and destroy, to overcome fear and inhibition). Outside the soul, but inside the body politic,
859 Quoted Holmes, A cts of War, 306.
860 Kiszely, 'Post-modern challenges': 21.
861 See discussion p. 27
862 ‘Anti-community’ is Redfield’s expression for the realm o f  combat and death. See p. 118
863 Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 16.
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the cycle between death and birth is equally important. Only birth can conquer death, 
through continuous recurrence.864 N ot only must warriors overcome their inhibitions; 
society must also reproduce warriors.
For individual warriors Campbell portrays a journey that has an inherent capacity to 
construct meaning, as it goes through several stages from innocence through challenge to 
homecoming: amounting to a whole that regenerates the individual as someone who has 
changed, and hopefully survived the trials. Campbell’s entire spiritual journey will not be 
covered here; instead, some relevant points to the warrior’s lifeworld are selected. The 
journey has a narrative structure from society (stages one and two) to war (stages three to 
five) and back to society (stage six). A modem example o f this narrative structure applied 
to war and warriors can be found in the movie The Deer Hunter.*65 As the movie and any 
number o f memoirs illustrate, for all the developments in the character o f  warfare this 
existential journey remains constant.
The first stage is the call to adventure. For Western warriors, this call has frequently 
taken place sub-consciously well before adolescence through exposure to films in 
particular, but also through war stories told by older generations. James Webb describes 
how this kind o f  storytelling has animated many young Scots Irish to follow the example of 
their fathers and grandfathers to answer the call.866 Later, these stories were disembedded 
from the particulars o f family stories to the universal of films. In 20th century memoirs, 
particularly by Americans, war movies from previous wars feature very often. Warriors in 
World War II saw the movies from World War I, such as Alvin York. The warriors in 
Vietnam were very often inspired by John Wayne movies: The Sands of Im  Jima is 
mentioned very often, despite the ridicule it received from actual Iwo Jima combat 
veterans.867 Today, Vietnam era films, such as Apocalypse Now, Deer Hunter, Platoon and Tull 
Metal Jacket, inspire warriors. As Anthony Swofford puts it:
Vietnam war films are all pro-war, no matter what the supposed message, what 
Kubrick or Coppola or Stone intended. Mr. and Mrs. Johnson in Omaha or San 
Francisco or Manhattan will watch the films and weep and decide once and for all that 
war is inhumane and terrible, and they will tell their friends at church and their family 
this, but Corporal Johnson at Camp Pendleton and Sergeant Johnson at Travis Air
864 Ibid, Lawrence J. Hatab, Nietzsche's Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence (London: Routledge, 
2005).
865 Michael Cimino, 'The Deer Hunter', (United States: EMI Films, 1978).
866 James H. Webb, Bom fighting : how the Scots-Irish shaped America (New York: Broadway Books, 2004).
867 Linderman, World Within War, 312-15.
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Force Base and Seaman Johnson at Coronado Naval Station and Spec 4 Johnson at 
Fort Bragg and Lance Corporal Swofford at Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base 
watch the same films and are excited by them, because the magic brutality of the films 
celebrates the terrible and despicable beauty of their fighting skills.868
In itself, the emulation urge has not changed qualitatively since Alexander the Great 
sought to emulate Achilles. A t least since Achilles, there has always been a greater warrior 
to emulate, someone to measure one’s manliness, courage and gravitas against. The call to 
adventure disrupts the possibility to clearly distinguish between combat motivation derived 
from the social world or from individual inspiration long before the young man is mature 
enough for war.
The second stage is the refusal of the call It should be commonplace to acknowledge 
that few young men leave the comfort o f their community unreservedly without feeling 
fear, reluctance or doubt. Achilles, the greatest warrior o f all, did not want to heed to the 
call, but was outsmarted by Odysseus. Odysseus himself had been prophesized not to 
return home to Ithaca for twenty years, and he was loath to leave his wife and child behind 
to go to war. Instead, when an embassy came to pick him up, he faked madness, dressing 
up in rags and ploughing the same furrow repeatedly. However, he had to give this up 
when the suspicious and cunning Palamedes threw Odysseus’ son in front of the plough.869 
Later, having failed to avoid war himself, Odysseus went to seek out Achilles, believing that 
his assistance might shorten the war. Achilles’ mother disguised him as a girl and placed 
him in hiding, among his female cousins, on the island o f Skyros. Odysseus cunningly 
brought them gifts: including beautiful garments, a spear and a shield. When they started 
opening them he hid nearby and suddenly cried out that the palace was under attack. At 
that point the girls shrieked and escaped. Achilles, however, picked up the spear and shield; 
and went to the gate to  defend the grounds. Odysseus met him there and led him off to
870war.
There is a conflict between the urge to prove oneself on the one hand, and the 
obvious danger this involves on the other. Coming home from war an undisputed hero is 
an over-rated and troubled experience for many warriors,871 but it is not over-rated in the 
eyes o f the innocent, foolhardy and admiring young, who feel unproven. For this reason, 
the elders cannot, for all their experience, succeed to counsel the younger not to go; the
868 Anthony Swofford, Jarhead (London: Scribner, 2004), 7.
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terrible destructiveness, the suffering and grotesqueness o f it all merely increases the 
romanticism by raising the threshold o f the test o f combat, making it more unique and 
exclusive, and, thus, more romantic. Rolf Ivar Jordbruen, a Norwegian 18-year-old, 
volunteered to fight for the Germans on the Eastern Front, despite having received a letter 
from his brother who was already fighting there, saying: “D on’t ever conceive o f signing 
up. The Front is hell on earth and you will never come back from it alive.”872 O n the other 
hand, many do heed the warning, calculate rationally about the prospects o f death and 
mutilation and choose not to go. For any individual it is a personal choice whether to turn 
one’s gaze away from the bum  wards o f  a military hospital, and towards medal ceremonies 
and stories o f close combat survived and recognized.
Another issue relating to answering the call is what Redfield (chapter 5) calls leaving 
the community and entering the “anti-community” o f death. Hector did this, leaving his 
family behind to defend them from the frontier o f the community rather than standing 
directly by their side. This is also what warriors do when they leave behind their immediate 
family to represent the larger community, trusting that the latter take care of the former in 
their absence. Such a decision is not easy, as the biblical Latin quote tells us: “Time Jesum 
transeuntem et non revertentem”: “Dread the passage of Jesus, for he does not return.”873 
In many cases, this prophecy comes true when warriors do not return from the batdefield, 
or when they metaphorically do not return as the same person who left; emotionally 
scarred, physically disfigured, or socially dysfunctional for life.
The third stage is that o f supernatural aid: an encounter with a protective figure. In 
the modem military, the aid o f a protective figure takes the shape o f a mentor rather than 
that o f a supernatural figure, although the awe in which senior battle hardened veterans are 
held by their younger proteges is not far from Campbell’s meaning. O ’Brien’s admiring 
gaze at Johansen and Mad Mark is one example, and there are many others.874 This mentor 
guides the young warrior by preparing him for combat, the better to master it himself and 
to be able to help others in turn, so that later he too achieves mentor status. In turn, the 
mentors are no less shy o f displaying their warrior credentials, whether in the form of 
decorations, a particularly confident gait, or a manner o f wearing uniform and hairstyles 
outside regulations. As Hastings puts it: “A cynic might suggest that some eager warriors
872 Jordbruen, Helvetepa Jord — en norsk frontkjempers historie, 16. My translation from the Norwegian.
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are exhibitionists o f an extreme kind. A cynic would be right. This does not diminish 
warriors’ claim upon our regard, but may make us a trifle more sceptical about their 
motives.”875 Such motives are not morally reproachable as far as an individual or country 
never goes to war for only one reason. Fighting for oneself is perfecdy compatible with a 
role as mentor to budding soldiers and warriors.
The fourth stage is the crossing of the first threshold,’ This is the experience o f combat, 
analysed in chapter four. Combat is the unique qualifier, that ‘badges’, ‘rates’, or, in the 
language o f modem bureaucracy, ‘certifies’ a warrior as a warrior in his own eyes and those 
o f others. It is the climax o f the existential journey towards becoming a warrior, and 
repeated confrontation with this threshold is the essence o f what being a warrior is about. 
It is at the same time the principal facilitator and opponent o f the journey towards the 
conclusion o f their meaning. Overcoming the combat experience is a necessary enabler; its 
failure, either in withdrawal or in injury or death, finalises the quest by obliterating it.
The fifth stage is apotheosis, the climax o f the war experience. Symbolically, society 
marks this occasion by bestowing medals. Whereas the medal and awards system is 
notoriously prone to inflation, quotas and corruption, the very highest awards are still 
widely considered well deserved. The British Victoria Cross and the US Medal o f H onor 
and Distinguished Service Cross, or Navy Cross, are among these. As one Major put it; 
“The only medals I admire are the Distinguished Service Cross and the Medal o f Honor. 
All others are tainted by too often being awarded to people who do not deserve them.”876 
Very often, these medals are awarded posthumously. The stipulations behind these medals 
go right to the heart o f the warrior definition. As sociologists Joseph Blake and Suellen 
Butler have argued, these medals are intended to reinforce “a latent role structure among 
combat soldiers” .877 For anyone familiar with the esteem the winners are held in military 
circles, it could be claimed that the role structure they inspire is rather overt. Instead, it 
might be considered whether they convey a latent role structure to the rest o f society. Blake 
and Butler divided the medals into “war-winning” and “soldier-saving” awards, which 
highlight the willingness to kill and willingness to sacrifice life aspects o f the warrior 
definition. Often, however, the costs to the spirit o f experiencing such actions are very 
high. Concluding his book on warriors, Hastings makes the melancholic observation that
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for some, such as Audie Murphy and Guy Gibson, their achievements brought them little 
happiness.878
The w arrior’s reintegration in to  society
The sixth stage is ‘return and reintegration into society’. This stage is particularly important 
in this respect and deserves extensive discussion because it very clearly reveals the dialectic 
between warrior and society in the relationship between sacrifice and recognition. In some 
cases, the reintegration into society is unproblematic. However, both military psychiatry 
and the public are becoming increasingly aware that high numbers o f veterans return with 
serious psychological trauma, which in many cases leads to social dysfunction, homicide 
and suicide.
The summer o f 2002 was very bloody at Fort Bragg, N orth Carolina, which is 
home o f the 82nd Airborne division, the Army Special Forces and Delta Force. Three 
soldiers returning from Afghanistan killed their wives; two o f them also killed themselves. 
Several theories were offered, such as the police’s claim that a certain frequency o f  spouse 
killings is statistically to be expected. Others claimed side effects from the anti-Malaria drug 
Laram was to blame. W hat all three killings had in common, however, was that the 
husbands had recently returned from combat in Afghanistan, which at the time was the 
first sustained action since Vietnam.879
Studies lend support to suspicions that combat trauma can lead to both killing and 
suicide. Hastings observes that seven out o f  111 Victoria Cross winners in the 19th century 
committed suicide, almost a hundred times the rate in the rest o f society.880 One study 
found that veterans from wars between 1917 and 1994 are about 2.17 times more prone to 
suicide than other citizens.881 Figures from the current ongoing wars are similar where male 
veterans aged 20 through to 24 are between twice and four times more likely to commit 
suicide compared to their civilian peers.882
Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (DSM III) finally recognised post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) in 1980. The complex diagnose called PTSD today has historically 
been attributed to the soldier’s weak “nerves” or character, or to group properties like
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dysfunctional unit cohesion.883 DSM III, however, refers to PTSD as “the experience o f an 
event that is outside the range o f usual human experience.”884 This is a commendable 
development in relation to treatment and recognition o f trauma by veterans. However, 
there seems to be an under-appreciation o f the emotional and symbolic significance o f the 
homecoming and reintegration process in both the military and society. After all, society, 
whether as government or as an aggregate o f its communities, organises militaries to send 
soldiers and warriors to war and is ultimately responsible socially, symbolically and 
existentially for the baggage they bring back.
There are some indications that problems for veterans become really serious only 
after they return home. While militaries have long recognised the temporary disabling 
effects o f  the shock o f combat, the idea that some suffer long-term — even permanent — 
damage is relatively new, and still controversial. More veterans from the Falklands have 
died from suicide than died in combat during the war. One o f these, SAS veteran skydiver 
Charles Bruce, was the first operator to parachute into the Falklands where he saw some 
terrible things, including wounded young men who had been so badly burnt that they tried 
to cut their own throats. Bruce remained haunted by his experiences and committed suicide 
in 2002 by diving out o f a plane at 6,000 feet without a parachute.885
Figures from the Vietnam War, however, are controversial. One study by the 
Centre for Disease Control concluded in 1990 that fewer than 9,000 Vietnam veterans had 
committed suicide throughout the early 1980s, implying that their suicide rates were similar 
to those o f civilians.886 Other studies, however, show that the prevalence of PTSD among 
combat veterans has been very high. For example, one twin study showed that for twins 
where one served and the other did not, the PTSD frequencies were 16.8% and 5% 
respectively, in a population o f 2,042 pairs o f  twins.887 It would be bizarre if such traumas 
did not translate into suicides beyond average rates. Indeed, subsequent studies have shown 
suicide rates among Vietnam veterans to be much higher among combat veterans, and 
higher still among those combat veterans who were diagnosed with PTSD.888
883 Simon Wessely Edgar Jones, ’A paradigm shift in the conceptuali2 ation o f  psychological trauma in the 
20th century \  Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21 (2007).
884 Quoted in Hillman, A  Terrible Love of War, 65.
885 BBC, 'Falkland veterans claim suicide toll', 13 January 2002, Kim Sengupta, 'Falklands ceremony is too late 
for 'abandoned' veterans', The Independent, June 18 2007.
886 P Rhodes DA Pollock, CA Boyle, P Decoufle and DL McGee 'Estimating the number o f suicides among 
Vietnam veterans', American Journal of Psychiatry 147 (1990).
887 J. R. Goldberg and W. R. True, 'A twin study o f  the effects o f  the Vietnam war on post-traumatic stress 
disorder', Journal of the American Medical Association 263, no. 9 (1991).
888 H. & Haas Hendin, A. , 'Suicide and guilt as manifestations o f  PTSD in Vietnam combat veterans', 
American Journal of Pychiatry 148 (1991), T. Kramer, Lindy, J., Green, B., Grace, M., & Leonard, A., 'The
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Interestingly, the higher incidences o f PTSD among combat veterans do not 
contradict the distinction between warriors and soldiers, but instead confirms the argument 
that combat is a qualitatively unique experience. In one group o f veterans interviewed, a 
sub-group who coped well was identified; its members shared certain characteristics: They 
were typically able to control their emotions in combat and remain calm; they did not de­
humanize the enemy through hatred or rage. This meant they committed fewer 
transgressions, resulting in less guilt issues.889 These individuals exhibited emotional 
maturity and “experienced combat in Vietnam as a dangerous challenge to be met 
effectively while attempting to stay alive.”890
For many veterans, the homecoming from Vietnam was particularly difficult, as 
they experienced a society where a very vocal minority subjected them to anger and abuse, 
including spitting.891 This reality affected those who did not suffer from PTSD as well as 
those who did. Several factors compounded such experiences. Firstly, the transition from a 
high intensity combat environment to normal peacetime life was for many difficult in terms 
o f “throttling down”892 in general, irrespective o f trauma. Secondly, leaving behind the 
intensive unit cohesion, which safeguarded the individual’s life, was in itself difficult. 
Despite knowing rationally that the other veterans were no longer necessary for protection, 
the social and emotional attachment remained strong. When combat veterans tried to 
replace the combat primary group with family life at home, they often experienced 
withdrawal from the latter.893 One o f Jonathan Shay’s patients related a typical experience:
I had just come back, and my first wife’s parents gave a dinner for me and my parents 
and her brothers and their wives. And after dinner we were all sitting in the living 
room and her father said, “So, tell us what it was like.” And I started to tell them, and
I told them. And do you know within five minutes the room was empty. They was
(sic.) all gone, except my wife. After that I didn’t tell anybody I had been in 
Vietnam.894
A t the very least, family members would find it difficult or impossible to appreciate and
relate to the experiences o f the returnee, even with a sympathetic attitude. The individual
replacement system compounded all these factors; soldiers experienced the transition to
comorbidity o f  post-traumatic stress disorder and suicidality in Vietnam veterans', Suicide and Life-Threatening 
Behavior 24 (1994).
889 Herbert Hending and Ann Polinger Haas, 'The Aftermath o f  Combat in Vietnam', in Living With Terror, 
Working With Trauma: A  Clinician's Handbook, ed. Danielle Knafo (Rowman & Littlefield 2004), 162-4.
890 Ibid., 164.
891 Robert Greene, The Homecoming Mass Market Paperback ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990).
892 Miller, Reflections of a Warrior, 237.
893 Haas, 'The Aftermath o f Combat in Vietnam', 165.
894 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam xxii.
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civil society — and in many cases alienation — alone rather than with their unit. The 
reintroduction to society is, as this indicates, a social process, which is difficult to isolate 
with psychological diagnoses. The latter can be helpful in giving the individual a medical 
and official recognition o f the trauma. In general, however, psychologists cannot facilitate 
reintroduction into society; it is a social process, which, throughout history, has been 
arranged with some degree o f ceremony, even cleansing, to symbolise repatriation, and a 
shift in lifeworlds as dramatic as the outbound journey was.
W hat happens w hen the w arrior refuses to  fight?
It is imperative to recognise not only human potential, but also the limitations of the 
human element in war, even in the case o f warriors whose allegiance to war is stronger than 
most, yet also limited and fallible. The case o f warriors refusing to fight is sometimes a 
consequence o f combat trauma as discussed above, but it is not necessarily the case. In 
Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now, there is a chilling moment when Special Forces
Captain Willard is briefed about his upcoming mission to kill the rampant Special Forces
Colonel Kurtz. While listening to a tape where Kurtz is raving, Willard is told by the
mission commanding General that “Sometimes the dark side overcomes what Lincoln
called the better angels o f our nature. Every man has got a breaking point. You and I have. 
Walter Kurtz has reached his.”895 The breaking point is the point where a soldier or a 
warrior breaks down to such an extent that he cannot function in combat, or the opposite; 
that he sheds all restraints, and wages war in a personal unrestricted manner, as Kurtz does. 
Some refuse to fight because o f disillusionment with the cause896, or because they have 
strong reservations with the particular way, in which the campaign is waged.897 Others still 
refuse to fight because they feel the public is not supportive and that their sacrifices are not
898
Whatever the reason, warriors have throughout history laid down their arms and 
said “enough.” There are both intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions that influence the 
circumstances wherein warriors lay down their arms. It is very important that the warrior’s
895 Francis Ford Coppola, ’Apocalypse Now', (United States: Zoetrope Studios, 1979). Script available at 
http://corky.net/scripts/apocalypseNow.html
896 This was particularly widespread in Vietnam. Famous examples are 2004 presidential candidate John Kerry 
and Ron Kovic, from Oliver Stone’s film Bom on the Fourth of Julyi based on Ron Kovic, Bom on the Fourth of 
July (1976, N ew  York; McGraw-Hill); Samuel Hynes, The Soldier’s Tale (1997, London; Penguin), 178
897 British SAS soldier Ben Griffin, who quit over legality and tactics concerns in Iraq, particularly with 
respect to co-operating with Americans. He is the first SAS operator ever to quit on moral grounds. Sean 
Rayment, l£SAS soldier quits Army in disgust at ‘illegal’ American tactics in Iraq.’ ', Daily Telegraph 11 March 
2006.
898 Again this was widespread in Vietnam. Hynes, The Soldier’s Tale, chapter 5; Grossman, On Killing, 271-80.
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inner world (intrinsic) and outer world (extrinsic) remain largely in sync, because when that 
balance is disturbed, it becomes very difficult to maintain the motivation: not only to fight, 
b u t also to fight according to one’s warrior ethos.899 The intrinsic dimensions are those that 
follow directly from the warrior definition, i.e. the warrior’s personal and existential 
commitment to master warfare and be willing and able to kill and sacrifice his life in 
combat, within the institutional confinements all soldiers are responsible. These intrinsic 
dimension are largely individually conceived bu t they are strongly influenced by the social 
surroundings and composition o f the unit one is a member of, and the cause that unit is 
ultimately serving. In other words, even though a warriors’ commitment to fight is not 
equal to  a commitment to the cause,900 the individual motivation is significantly bolstered 
by belonging to an elite unit where recognition comes from peers rather than from the 
public. If, on the other hand, the public frowns upon the contributions o f the fighting men, 
and the unit the soldier belongs to is socially or tactically dysfunctional901, there is a much 
higher chance that the warrior wants to quit. All of this is compounded by the not unusual 
experience o f extreme cruelty, which for example in Vietnam was a common tactic with the 
Vietcong.902 Multi-tour veteran Nelson found that “ [t]he war tore me up because I tried to 
apply the professional concept to V ietnam ... Vietnam dealt the death blow to the concept 
o f  the warrior. In Vietnam — their concept o f war goes back for centuries... in their 
concept, booby-trapping little kids is part o f war.”903 Countering the consequences o f such 
multi-dimensional compounding effects on individuals is o f course extremely difficult to do 
from a military organisation point o f view.
Extrinsically, the formation and maintenance o f unit coherence is important to 
keep the motivation up in general, and assuaging combat trauma in particular. According to 
Jonathan Shay, “ [destruction o f  unit cohesion by the individual-rotation policy in Vietnam 
cannot be overemphasized as a reason why so many psychological injuries that might have 
been healed spontaneously instead became chronic.”904 The SOF approach to selection 
focuses very strongly on social skills because it is an imperative that the individual operator
899 Coker, Warrior Ethos, 61
900 Examples are Americans fighting in Vietnam to the very end, or Germans in World War 2, even though 
the wars were clearly un-winnable.
901 The military psychiatrist Jonathan Shay quotes one o f  his patients, a Vietnam veteran who initially 
identified with the whole battalion. But after failing to be saved by the neighbouring Bravo Company, the 
social horizon shrunk to only a few men: “It was constant now. I was watching the other five guys like they 
was (sic.) my children... It wasn’t seventy-two guys [in the company] I was worried about. It was five guys.” 
Shay, Achilles in Vietnam 24. These five men became the entire social world for the combat soldier.
902 See for examples; Hansen, Owen and Madden, 'Parallels, 26-27, Robert Mason, Chickenhawk (London: 
Corgi Books, 1984), 183, Plaster, SOG, 89, A1 Santoli, To Bear any Burden (London: Abacus, 1986), 109-10.
903 Hanson et al., Parallels, 28
904 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 198
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is a strong team player. The units typically train together and the operators get to know 
each other well long before they fight. They go to war together and leave the theatre 
together, as a unit. This was the Australian SAS’ approach in Vietnam, which worked far 
better than the American approach with individual replacements to units.905 This lesson has 
been learned however, and has been practiced both by the British after the Falklands War 
and the American units fighting in the first Persian Gulf War.906
Having now discussed the existential role o f warriors in society, we must turn to 
the instrumental need for warriors at the macro level.
The instrumental role of Warriors at the macro level; warriors in 
security paradigms
The question o f warriors’ instrumental utility at the political and strategic levels relates 
closely to the social imaginaries and the security paradigms in chapter two, specifically how 
ambitious these paradigms are, and on behalf o f whom.
Can w arriors exist in a cosm opolitan security paradigm?
The cosmopolitan security paradigm establishes a vast agenda for warriors while subverting 
their existential lifeworld. The concept o f human security and the increasing altruism in 
global affairs conspires to define an imperative to intervene in human suffering, most 
notably in cases o f genocide, but also in cases o f natural disasters, and even alleviating 
poverty. This is in practice very difficult, as the problems with agreeing on a course o f 
action against the ongoing genocidal activities in Darfur exemplify. Another example is the 
recent cyclone in Burma, where the dictatorship did not allow aid nor emergency agencies 
to support the hundreds o f thousands o f suffering civilians. Intervention in such cases can 
amount to what Alex de Waal and Ohnmar Kin reject as “gunboat philanthropy,” using 
force to protect.907
The cosmopolitan security agenda easily presents issues that necessitate 
intervention, but struggles to define the political and operational details o f how to do it. 
Philip Allott’s definition o f politics captures this very well. He defines politics as “the more 
or less organised social struggle to translate private interest into public interest.”908 While 
the cosmopolitan security paradigm easily identifies tasks that ought to be in the public (or
905 Holmes, A cts of War, 264, Terry O ’Farrell, Behind Enemy Lines — A n  Australian SA S Soldier in Vietnam 
(Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2001), 168.
906 Grossman, On Killing, 273
907 Alex de Waal and Ohnmar Kin, 'Against gunboat philanthropy', Prospect, May 29 2008.
908 Lecture Cumberland Lodge to members o f Department o f International Relations
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global) interest to solve, it struggles with translating the particulars o f how private efforts 
will contribute to this.
This is where the warriors enter the picture: It might seem obvious what military 
power can do to alleviate suffering in the immediate term. However, it is not obvious who 
has ownership o f the situation when an international armed response deteriorates into 
taking part in an ongoing civil war in Darfur; or how much war fighting is legitimate and 
necessary to force a dictatorial regime to yield control over the civilians over whom they 
rule. Further compounding this problem is the question o f sacrifice. While governments o f 
a human security persuasion may be happy to provide funding and material resources in 
pursuit o f the causes, it is an entirely different question as to whether they are willing to 
risk — or absorb — losses o f  soldiers by the dozens, or hundreds, or in the end even 
thousands. The Battle o f Mogadishu in 1993 raised awareness o f a series o f issues: even aid 
work requires military power; the application o f that power is prone to mission creep from 
relief aid to repairing the failed state. This may require protracted fighting, using elite 
warriors with attendant sacrifices, without necessarily solving the issue; and it may involve 
using more destruction than is compatible with the political and moral superstructure o f 
the mission.
Another thing Mogadishu established was a more existential point: even the United 
States could not stomach significant losses in such a cause, and the American military is still 
living with the spectre o f casualty aversion even for issues that have a clear national security 
heading. There is a parallel to the British wars in the Punjab in the Imperial days. The 
British too used force as a means towards a moral goal. Severe retaliatory punishment for 
raids would lessen the need for excessive use o f force in the future; it would educate the 
natives. As Kathryn Tidrick summarises: “to be cruel in order to be kind, is to inflict 
legitimate punishment rather than to practice illegitimate oppression.” 909 The difference 
today, however, is that the W est is unwilling to be cruel to be kind, because there is no 
imperial metaphysical world-view to sustain the convictions and confidence that 
underwrites cultural ruthlessness. This can involve views that the West should not dictate 
terms to local people (often expressed about the Iraq War); or that the natives are 
undeserving o f the sacrifices involved in helping them (Somalia); or some hesitant 
combination o f the two (Afghanistan today). Coker observes that an implication o f such a
909 Kathryn Tidrick, Empire and the English National Character (London: I. B. Tauris 1990), 11-12.
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metaphysical immanence is a preoccupation with the present; ‘restoring’ order and to 
‘keeping’ the peace where there was none.910
The question is whether the sheer enthusiasm o f warrior types can compensate 
from the lacking convictions in society. The challenge is not to find warriors willing to 
volunteer — that was not a problem in Mogadishu or any subsequent military operation 
known in the public record. Risk aversion has often affected the top political and military 
leadership, and it is implicitly inspiring the Powell-doctrine which itself was conceived as a 
reaction to the seemingly wasteful expenditure o f soldiers in Vietnam. Instead, the 
challenge is to find a way o f circumventing the communitarian nexus composed o f  
sacrifice, recognition and ownership. Sacrifice depends on recognition o f the sacrifices and 
their relation to the polis, and ultimately acceptance o f their necessity. A clear ownership o f 
the political costs and benefits o f the operation, and its attendant sacrifices ties the nexus 
together.
The political and military leadership o f states are less willing to risk its military 
forces in pursuit o f a cause clearly for the common good, rather than for (state) self-interest. 
Aside from the free-rider problematique this inevitably creates, another issue is how global 
problems are translated into local solutions, which they must be, somehow. One would 
perhaps think that the citizen warrior ideal type would be the best suited to resolve issues 
that have to do with public interest. However, I argue that this is not the case, precisely 
because o f the communitarian nexus mentioned above, which the citizen warrior ideal type 
depended on.
In practice, this means that the warriors who are willing to take the risks o f 
intervention must receive more o f an ownership o f the situation than they do in the normal 
civil military relationship between soldier and state. Achilles is an example o f a warrior who 
fights for himself, and so is Ernst Junger. They find meaning in the war itself and do not 
ask that the cause meet a specific threshold o f legitimacy or political expediency. The same 
can be said o f the knights o f the Middle Ages. Yet, one can obviously not write blanket 
checks to warriors to set about resolving complex international emergencies free o f 
direction and control. This would amount to sheer buccaneering. Two potential solutions 
present themselves: one to use private military companies (PMCs) contracted by the 
cosmopolitan employer, for example the UN or the International Criminal Court, to 
enforce human security. This is a classical Adam Smith approach to the issue o f translating 
private interest into public interest. While private actors necessarily have private agendas,
910 Coker, Humane warfare, 130.
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and perhaps rightly so, such challenges should be compared with the consequences o f 
inaction (the present day situation) rather than a theoretical assessment o f the inherent 
problems o f capitalist enterprise. While there are obvious challenges with profit seeking 
actors establishing long-term prospects o f any resolution, issues o f genocide are extremely 
pressing and their solutions cannot be reasonably subject to comprehensive long-term 
review. The strength o f this option is that it retains the voluntarism o f Achilles, Jiinger and 
the knights, but it may be suffering from the absence o f a strong honour code, or warrior 
ethos, which all three exhibited. The existence o f a warrior ethos, or, at the minimum a 
strong sense o f professionalism, becomes the challenge associated with this option in the 
absence o f fully fledged, state based command and control infrastructure.
Another option, which has been relatively successful in counterinsurgency 
operations, is the Special Forces option o f decentralised camps: they rely mostly on local 
forces as security and enforcement personnel led by highly professional Special Forces. The 
precondition for this to work is a high degree o f decentralisation and trust by the 
employers, because a sense o f ownership is critical to balance the sacrifices and to avoid 
micro-management. To some degree, such an option involves states since the SOF in 
question would still be under state based command, and for this reason, such a scenario 
will be discussed under the heading o f the liberal security paradigm.
W arriors in the com m unitarian security paradigm
Warriors have represented their community in warfare throughout the ages. In a fairly 
straightforward model, a community basically maintains warriors as protectors o f itself as a 
community and its interests beyond security. This periodically involves war; the risk o f 
death, mutilation and trauma. The warriors are willing to suffer this risk because o f the 
transparency o f the social setup. In return for their risks they receive recognition from their 
community for their courage if  they live, and for their sacrifice if they are wounded or 
killed. This recognition enhances their social status, legitimises their killing, and softens the 
suffering by attributing qualities that are deemed o f a higher order, like courage.
The challenges to this basic framework come from several sides, today most clearly 
from the cosmopolitan social imaginary. Cosmopolitans are typically more averse to the 
application o f  military power, which inevitably threatens someone's human security, and a 
cosmopolitan social imaginary does not deem one life more or less worth than another. 
Also, the cosmopolitan social imaginary uproots the reciprocity between the protectors and 
the protected, which in turn subverts the dynamics o f sacrifice and recognition. However,
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cosmopolitans often accept that military power is sometimes necessary to protect the 
common good, again, as in the cases o f Sudan and Burma. W hether the immediate 
problem at hand (genocide and natural disaster) is mitigated, there always remains the 
larger question of making the community sustainable by nation building in such a way it 
can self-repair such issues in the future, usually through the promotion o f democracy as a 
basic condition for success. Western forces are in Afghanistan and Iraq today not because 
there is an imminent threat there, but because they are investing in what is hoped to 
become sustainable societies, which should be notionally democratic. The transition from 
immediate problem solving to large scale political change is known as ‘mission creep’, and 
the cosmopolitan security paradigm naturally leads to it, because it ambitiously aims for 
human security, for all. The hostile actors are usually a regime or an insurgent group, and 
the logic is that the other surrounding peoples are disinterested and ought to be protected 
from the hostdles first, and from indirect effects o f fighting second. As Coker has 
demonstrated, this inevitably leads to expectations that all o f our warfare should be 
pursued in a more or less humane fashion,911 whether it is inspired by the communitarian 
or cosmopolitan security framework. However, where does this leave us in respect o f 
warriors?
We still retain the old fashioned communitarian security paradigm’s insistence on 
protecting the state. 9/11 evidences there are still threats to national security. The invasion 
o f Afghanistan was a communitarian operation initially, headed by the United States in 
pursuit o f its national security, an interpretation sanctioned by NATO, but where the 
United States rejected the latter’s initial involvement. As the campaign in Afghanistan 
shifted over to a multilateral nation-building focus, many warriors were transferred to fight 
in Iraq. However, warriors are still needed for the same type o f mission in the future, 
because o f Colin Gray’s point about the future being the past; i.e. interstate war is not 
dead.912 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the communitarian security paradigm is 
unchanged, and has simply added some cosmopolitan features. The humane logic, which 
Coker describes, completely penetrates the communitarian security paradigm now, to such 
an extent that ruthlessness is no longer a part o f Western warfare as it was during World 
War II, for example. For this reason, the communitarian security paradigm must reinvent 
itself, and with it the use o f warriors in pursuit o f national security.
9,1 Ibid.
912Colin S. Gray, 'Clausewitz rules, OK? The future is the past— with GPS', Review of International Studies 25 
(1999): 167.
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Yet, the threats are proliferating. Whereas Afghanistan was yesterday’s safe haven 
for terrorists, such a role can be undertaken by any number o f ungovemed places 
throughout the global south, simply because o f lacking state security infrastructure. Philip 
Bobbitt has argued A1 Qaeda is an early embodiment o f a new strand o f terrorists, who 
have few (realistic) territorial ambitions, and whose field o f operations is the entire 
world.913 Western warriors must nonetheless intervene periodically, wherever terrorists 
achieve critical mass in terms o f resources, camps and other support structures, in short, 
whenever they get a postal address, like in October 2001. What is equally clear is that the 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the West does not have the political 
will; the financial; nor manpower resources; the patience; or strategic vision to do nation 
building in all places that require intervention. This is true even if  only by the relatively 
narrow agendas defined by the communitarian security paradigm; much less the human 
security doctrine espoused by cosmopolitans. W hat role will there be for warriors then?
The combat phase o f the Afghanistan operation represents a model for the future, 
certainly for communitarian security. This model will entail strategic raids. They are 
strategic in the sense that the whole campaign is sought concluded by a single large-scale 
raid. Such a raid is not a tactical raid like Operation Eagle Claw, but a campaign that can 
last for a few weeks or months with potentially very large military commitments. This is a 
destructive and disruptive model rather than a constructive one. Such raids only aim to 
neutralise the threat that is brewing, like invading a country to demolish the immediate and 
medium term critical mass assumed by terrorists for example. Crucially, however, it does 
not attempt to go on to the bigger issue o f long-term nation building.
While this recipe is hard to accept for cosmopolitans in that it is essentially selfishly 
oriented towards national security, it also has major political advantages. Firstly, it is 
compatible with the Powell doctrine: by using overwhelming force to achieve tangible 
objectives. It is less costly in casualties and resources, as evidenced by the two current wars 
where most of resources spent and casualties suffered happened after the end o f major 
combat operations. Secondly, it does not promise an end state that it cannot achieve 
(democracy), which reduces allegations o f hypocrisy so widespread today among critics o f 
(and within) the West. Thirdly, while innocent people are inevitably killed in such a raid, 
the long term destruction indirectly inflicted on civilians is vasdy reduced because o f the 
short duration o f the mission. A further consequence is that it sends a message that 
Westerners will not, for good or ill, resolve other peoples’ problems o f political power and
913Bobbitt, Terror and consent, chapter 1.
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organisation. Fourthly, a clearly defined operation like this shows resolve and can 
potentially work as a deterrent for this reason, if not against the terrorists, then more 
plausibly against regimes. If, conversely, a terrorist group realises that for them to be 
comprehensively attacked, the West will also need to mobilise for nation building as a 
continuation o f the mission, they will know the threshold for intervention is very high 
indeed. For all these reasons, the concept is politically sellable, but inevitably it will be more 
happily received by those o f a communitarian persuasion.
This option is, admittedly, isolationism in the twenty first century. It is an approach 
nobody will be inclined to be passionate about, but the alternative ambitious idealism 
which has been attempted for the last decade seems increasingly discredited in the public 
realm. Yet the public will not cease in demanding action against brewing or realised threats. 
For warriors, this new isolationism does not leave them with less o f a role, but rather o f 
two more defined ones. Firstly, the direct action o f strategic raids will require warriors o f all 
three modem types: citizen warriors fighting for their country; stormtroopers charging into 
hostile territory to potentially be surrounded; and special operations forces who rely on 
flexibility and independence to reinforce local resources. Secondly, and much more 
challenging for warriors is that they will carry the burden o f finding out where threats are 
fermenting, which requires long term undercover human intelligence gathering o f an 
essentially diagnostic character,914 perhaps the most dangerous work done by warriors 
today. W ithout airpower, extraction possibilities and friendly military infrastructure, 
courage and ingenuity buttress this work alone. The latter type o f operation is extremely 
difficult to maintain, but there is a dramatically increased interest in the viability o f such 
operations after shortages o f human intelligence from Afghanistan led to a failure to 
forestall the threat emanating there during the late 1990s.
W arriors in  the liberal security paradigm
For warriors, a future in the liberal security paradigm is at the same time both the most 
likely and in some respects the least desirable option. The liberal security paradigm has 
been the umbrella under which both the recent wars were fought: they included a mixture 
o f communitarian threats (WMDs, terrorist sanctuaries with risk o f repetition, anti-drug 
enforcement) and cosmopolitan agendas (end o f sanctions regime in Iraq, nation building, 
anti-drug enforcement) and liberal agendas (regime change). Western leaders espoused 
neither a clearly articulated communitarian security strategy, nor a commitment to human
914 See p. 190
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security. Rather, they articulated a liberal internationalism, which rests somewhere between 
the two.
While the liberal security paradigm is politically and morally easier to live with than 
either the communitarian (too selfish) or the cosmopolitan (too ambitious and intangible) 
for politicians, the operationalriation o f it is very difficult. This is because it invites an 
expanded security agenda (cosmopolitan light), but remains state centric. It provides state 
military resources, but not enough. Indeed Western postmodern militaries are trying to 
adapt from their Cold War mode to a new focus on creating and maintaining conditions, that 
are if  not sufficient then at least favourable for the wellsprings o f peace. According to 
Swiss Major General Gustav Daniker, this involves a paradigmatic shift from warfighting 
to policing where the strategic condition is a product o f accumulated tactical victories, or 
rather stabilities, from which to establish longer-term political settlements. This is a 
European model suited to European preferences for less kinetic operations and more use 
o f Gendarmerie and Carabinieri type forces, hence Daniker’s moniker ‘guardian soldiers’ 
for the type o f troops needed. The strategic aspirations for such conditions give warriors 
plenty o f  missions but do not define them clearly. Afghanistan is a good example o f the 
latter. A host o f parallel operations are going on there without a clearly articulated strategy 
to prioritise between them, and these include major combat operations in the south. More 
concretely, the operations going on in Afghanistan now include the following non- 
exhaustive list o f projects:
1. Counterinsurgency against Taliban, primarily in the south and east. The Taliban 
have access to sanctuaries in north-western Pakistan. Counterinsurgency against 
an enemy that has access to sanctuaries is notoriously difficult to win, and 
extremely demanding o f manpower. The campaign involves intense warfighting, 
and warriors are committed in infantry, intelligence and Special Forces roles. 
Counterinsurgency-like operations are also waged in the north; however, the 
insurgent groups there are less consolidated than Taliban in the south. ISAF 
coordinates all these operations.
2. Counterterrorism campaign throughout Afghanistan against A1 Qaeda, including 
prevention o f terrorism (conducted by anyone) inside Afghanistan and export o f 
operatives. This campaign also includes retributive action against the top 
leadership o f A1 Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. This 
operation involves first tier Special Operations warriors in Afghanistan under the 
banner o f Operation Enduring Freedom. Focus was later shifted to Iraq.
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3. Counter-drugs and organised crime campaign throughout the country, since 90% 
o f hard opiates reaching Europe come from Afghanistan. This operation conflicts 
with the counter-insurgency campaign because it antagonises farmers who have 
no other source o f income. This campaign involves infantry warriors and soldiers, 
albeit in an ill-defined way, leaving it to the troops themselves to  decide how to 
prioritise between poppy eradication and winning hearts-and-minds.
4. Nation-building pursued by Western governments in concert with N GO s, where 
the relationship between military forces and N G O s is conflicted. The United 
States uses the military in development projects, while the Europeans tend to 
separate development and military forces to avoid a conflation o f roles and 
identities to protect the former. US Army Special Forces are involved in hearts 
and minds campaigns where development is a means rather than an end. Most o f 
this work is also owned by the international community through ISAF.
5. A counter-proliferation mission where the fear is that terrorists will get hold o f 
WMD from nuclear Pakistan. This is a relatively tangible mission, but it suffers 
from a shortage o f intelligence following from the inaccessibility o f Pakistan’s 
northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).
It is hard to argue that any o f these operations are superfluous, given a liberal outlook and 
a precautionary attitude towards proliferation o f terrorism. Nonetheless, greater strategic 
clarity would be advantageous for the soldiers and warriors who are left to resolve the 
contradictions between campaigns and missions on the ground. Meanwhile, the higher 
military and political leadership speak in vague terms o f effects based operations, where 
desired effect is defined as reaching some acceptable ‘condition’ rather than a tangible 
objective. This is largely a pragmatic admission that constructing a fully-fledged democracy 
supported by civil society is outside reach in Afghanistan. The liberal security paradigm as 
practiced today is very much a ‘muddling through’ model, where the strategic planning is 
relatively short term, which is a weakness compounded — perhaps even caused — by the 
relatively short election cycles in Western democracies.
The liberal security paradigm tries to have it both ways, and it is for that reason 
necessarily pragmatic and utilitarian, which corresponds well to the ideational heritage o f 
the liberal social imaginary. The liberal inspired militaries o f the West are today 
overstretched, with more campaigns than men available to do sustainable rotations. 
Ultimately this means that even warriors are not barred from cost benefit analyses.
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Selecting them for special units and thus robbing line units o f their best soldiers has been 
contentious at least since World War II.915 Critics ask whether the loss o f valuable 
manpower coupled with the high costs in training and materiel are worth the benefits that 
the special units offer. Are the warriors put to better use in specialized units than if  they are 
dispersed around line units where they can help normal soldiers contribute more? This was 
the reasoning behind Pentagon’s decision to deactivate the Ranger companies in Korea. 
They stated that the ‘fighter’ ought to be distributed around with the men, not bunched 
together leaving line units “bare o f inspiration” . The continued need for such units, 
however, led to establishment o f more ad hoc Raider companies, one o f which was led by 
the 20-year-old Hackworth.916
Another potential consequence is that the unit dense with warriors becomes such a 
valuable commodity that they are very reluctantly risked, even for the type o f missions that 
they are organised and trained for. Explaining why he aborted the Iranian hostage rescue 
mission when they were down to five helicopters on Desert One, Colonel Charlie Beckwith 
said to the press “I have been there before. I was not about to be a party to half-assed 
loading on a bunch o f aircraft and going up and murdering a bunch o f the finest soldiers in 
the world.”917 A similar line o f thinking is applied to Medal o f H onour winners, who — 
sometimes against their will as in Franklin Miller’s case — become more valuable for PR 
purposes than in combat and find themselves unwillingly evacuated from the combat 
zone.918 This is in one sense another variety o f risk aversion, so common in the West today. 
It illustrates a paradox: we organise warriors into specialised and prioritized units that 
recognise their qualities and utilise their potential, and these units are to be sent into harm’s 
way, precisely because it is expected that the individual operators — all multiple volunteers — 
be up for both the job and the risks, yet they are often not used. I will use a mini-case to 
illustrate the problems o f risk aversion and the hesitancy with which warriors are deployed 
today through three lessons coming out o f the fight against A1 Qaeda.
Contemporary mini-case; warriors in counter-terrorism
The remarkable success o f American Special Forces, CIA operatives with large amounts o f 
cash, and American airpower in defeating Taliban in Afghanistan surprised most
915 Horn et al., Force of Choice, 11; Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy, (1996, London; Greenwood Press), 155- 
56
916 Hackworth, About face, 148, Robert Leckie, Conflict; The History of the Korean War, 1950-1953 (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1996), 239,40.
917 Charlie A. Beckwith, Delta Force (1985, Glasgow; Fontana), 290.
918 Miller, Reflections of a Warrior, 231-235
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commentators. The A-teams from the 5th Special Forces Group of the US Army Special 
Forces led the Northern Alliance to oust Taliban from their city strongholds in Afghanistan 
in the autumn o f 2001. Before this campaign, the early years o f the Vietnam War is 
probably the nearest to a directly identifiable strategic impact from such forces successfully 
working virtually alone. Forty years later, the rapid takedown o f Taliban took place in a 
climate o f almost unlimited political capital and support for Special Forces, and is 
illustrative o f the success possible if  they are given relatively free reign. Nonetheless, 
despite the success in toppling Taliban, the hunt for A1 Qaeda was largely unsuccessful. 
The operation as a whole has illustrated three fundamental lessons that go to the core o f 
special operations today. Firstly, time is o f the essence, acting sooner is better than later. 
Secondly, with operational freedom and logistical support special operations forces and 
intelligence operators can achieve very substantial strategic results in very low numbers. 
Thirdly, whatever the skills o f the operators on the ground, they are only as good as their 
leadership and organisation allows. In the case o f Afghanistan earlier trends o f flawed 
leadership and overly complex organisation have repeated themselves.
L esson O ne: sooner ra ther than later: the h u n t for Bin Laden before 
Septem ber 11
Osama bin Laden received a great deal of attention during the Clinton administration. 
Clinton issued a series o f directives sanctioning CIA and Special Operations Command to 
use lethal force to take out bin Laden during the 1990s. The military was instructed to 
develop proposals for how this was to be done, and the Joint Chiefs o f Staff produced 
thirteen specific plans, but failed to recommend any o f them.
One example was a proposal by the top-secret unit Intelligence Support Activity 
(ISA), to kill Bin Laden in Khartoum in the mid 1990s. However, at this early time, 
executing him was vetoed.919 Attempts at snatching bin Laden to take him to trial began in 
1997 and was to be conducted by the CIA. The plan was to assault the Tamak training 
camps just south o f Kandahar. Full scale rehearsals took place in the United States between 
20 and 24 May 1998. However, the operation was deemed as too risky since bin Laden 
would most likely be killed, leading public opinion to see it as an illegal assassination.920
Following the 7 August 1998 A1 Qaeda embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 
Clinton publicly responded with cruise missiles, but behind the scenes signed Presidential 
Findings authorising the assassination o f bin Laden and his main lieutenants. Clinton
919 Smith, Killer Elite, 207.
920 Ibid., 208-09.
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ordered several missions at this time, planned by ISA and other SOF. Between fifteen and 
thirty SOF were killed or injured in rehearsals. Richard Clarke has argued that the Joint 
Chiefs failed to recommend any o f the proposals. The Special Forces community 
misinterpreted the Chiefs’ unwillingness as inability on the part of the White House to 
stomach the ruthlessness and risk necessary.921
O n two other occasions, snatch teams were prepared to fly into Afghanistan to get 
Bin Laden, but Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs, General Henry Hugh Shelton — himself a 
Special Forces soldier and former SOCOM commander — refused to back them on the 
grounds that women and children could get killed in the operation. Another explanation 
was that there was a lack o f “actionable intelligence” . One senior special operations officer 
rejected this reasoning, and told the 9/11 Commission; “if  you give me the action, I will 
give you the intelligence.”922 Similar reluctance was displayed by the CIA, who, on legal 
grounds, were unwilling to use lethal force before 9/11. Smith outlines what is essentially a 
catch-22 situation; “The Joint Chiefs were tasked to set up operations that needed 
‘actionable intelligence’ but were not prepared to put [ISA] or any other special operations 
forces on the ground to collect it unless it somehow already existed.”923 General Pete 
Schoomaker, who had been called out o f retirement following 9/11 to become army chief 
o f staff, said “Special Operations was never given the mission. It was very, very frustrating. 
It was like having a brand-new Ferrari in the garage, and nobody wants to race it because 
you might dent the fender.”924
L esson two: a lo t can be done w ith only a few
The take-down o f Taliban controlled Afghanistan took only 45 days for Northern Alliance 
troops supported by some 316 US Special Forces, and an unknown number o f l st-tier SOF, 
who used airpower as a decisive force multiplier.925 A number o f intelligence layers and 
operatives spearheaded the insertion and main operation. The plan was heavily influenced 
by MI6 and Director o f Special Forces UK, Brigadier General Greame Lamb, who 
persuaded CIA that the British operations in Oman in the 1970s would constitute a good 
model for the assault on Afghanistan. Initial contacts with the Northern Alliance harked
921 Ibid., 210,11.
922 Quoted Ibid., 210.
923 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, 
The 9 /11  Commission report: fin a l report o f the National Commission on Terrorist A ttacks upon the United States, Official 
government ed. (Washington, DC: 2004), Smith, Killer Elite, 212, Bob Woodward, Bush at war (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2002).
924 Richard H. Shultz, 'Showstoppers: Nine reasons why we never sent our Special Operations Forces after al 
Qaeda before 9/11 ', The Weekly Standard 9, no. 19 (2004).
925 Sean Naylor, N ot a good day to die - the untold stoiy o f operation Anaconda (London: Penguin, 2005), 19.
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back to MI6’s good relations with their leader Ahmad Shah Massoud since 1981. Massoud, 
nicknamed the “Lion o f Panjshir,” had been assassinated by A1 Qaeda two days before 
9 /1 1.926 CIA exploited this connection to go into Afghanistan almost a week after 9/11 
with a team called Jawbreaker, composed o f ten CIA operatives where some were ex-SOF 
personnel. At the same time, M I6/SIS also went in with a team, which was called “the 
Increment,” composed of ex-SAS and ex-SBS personnel who worked direcdy for 
M I6/SIS.927 Once these teams had established relations with the N orthern Alliance, ISA 
was infiltrated. ISA in turn prepared for the arrival o f components which were split by 
CENTCOM ’s Rear Admiral Albert M. Calland III into two commands: Task Force Dagger 
in the North, composed largely o f personnel from US Army’s 5th Special Forces Group; 
and Task Force K-Bar in the South, composed o f ISA and Allied 1st Tier Special 
Operations Forces.
Liaising and leading the Northern Alliance, Task Force Dagger’s Special Forces 
teams effectively rolled south using airpower, bribes and cavalry charges to secure Mazar-i- 
Sharif (November 9), Kabul (November 13), Herat and Jalalabad (November 14), Kunduz 
(November 25), and Kandahar (December 6). The operation was a textbook executed 
unconventional warfare campaign, using the best o f Western forces (airpower, 
communications, and leadership), with local forces doing most of the fighting.
The subsequent counter-insurgency campaign to pacify the country has been 
infinitely more difficult and is still going on. Another difficult mission was the strategic 
ambush o f A1 Qaeda forces who, ousted from their strongholds, were on the move 
towards other safe havens, principally inside Pakistan’s FATA. This mission was largely 
unsuccessful, despite heavy reliance on 1st tier SOF.
Lesson three: SO F are only as effective as their leadership and organization
allow
Among publicly known special operations executed by American conventional and SOF, 
leadership and coordination issues have plagued operations at all levels. In contrast to the 
unified commands and direct access to government decision makers o f British and German 
SOF, for example, American units are still suffering from convoluted chains o f command, 
and command structures that occasionally allow conventionally minded leaders to
926Smith, Killer Elite, 217.
927 David M. Last and Bemd Horn, Choice o f force : special operations fo r Canada (Montreal McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2005), 166,67, Gary C. Schroen, First in (New York: Presidio Press, 2007), Smith, Killer Elite, 
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command these forces. Two occasions in the Afghanistan campaign illustrated this 
particularly clearly.
The first was the hunt for bin Laden in the Tora Bora cave complex on 
Afghanistan’s eastern border. British forces were reportedly twenty minutes behind bin 
Laden when senior leaders called them off to let American forces go in for the kill. 
Unfortunately, the American SOF components were several hours away, letting bin Laden 
slip into Pakistan.928 Another critical mistake was not to use conventional allied forces to 
block the exit routes to Pakistan, because o f risk aversion among the generals.929 The 
Afghan forces that were used fought half-heartedly and appeared to have mixed loyalties as 
well.930 Sometimes the weaknesses o f SOF, as compared with conventional forces, are very 
plain: covering a lot o f ground whether in ambush or raid mode is something they cannot 
do without reliable larger forces.
The second occasion involved the more carefully prepared Operation Anaconda. 
Conventional forces were brought in to work as blocking forces in the Shah-i-Kot valley 
on the border with Pakistan in early 2002 when several hundred A1 Qaeda, including 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, were holed up there. SOF reconnaissance teams on the mountain 
peaks provided intelligence and directed air strikes killing several hundred, but the exit 
routes to the south, southeast and southwest remained open and eventually allowed many
931to escape.
This chapter has pulled together the topics from the previous chapters to discuss 
the West’s need for warriors both existentially and instrumentally. The following 
conclusion will address the research question directly, and argue that we do indeed need 
warriors.
Conclusion
Standing at the dawn o f Western theorizing, perhaps Achilles was privileged. His arete, as 
Auden explained, was confined to the here-and-now.932 Subsequent warriors have been 
backward looking, conscious o f Achilles’ immortal legacy, while at the same time adjusting 
from the role o f defining society to “merely” defending it. Yet, today we must ask 
ourselves if  we are theorising Achilles away, while the rest o f the world still nurtures 
warriors o f a less self-conscious and more committed kind. Nothing like Achilles’ lifeworld
928 Smith, Killer Elite, 226.
929 Derek Leebaert, To dare and to conquer: special operations and the destiny o f nations, from A.chilles to A .I Qaeda, 1st 
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will ever materialize again, so warriors must resign themselves to a complex relationship 
with civil society, often characterised by friction. Indeed, warriors have become gradually 
de-naturalised through social developments over the last three thousand years. While 
Western society has succeeded to engineer warriors into instruments, it has not rendered 
their task any less useful. As a result the personal and existential commitment to combat is 
more socially fragile today than in the past, since it is more voluntary (and thus retractable) 
than ever before.
If society shuns warriors and their deeds too much, recruitment will drop and 
resentment will increase. Reintegration o f combat veterans into society will also become 
more difficult. Yet, in equal measure, civil society cannot shamelessly celebrate the warrior 
ethos, given the principal role it ascribes to killing. Uncritical celebration o f warriors leads 
to hero worship that undercuts civilian leadership, and can even promote fascist values, as 
Germany o f the 1930s illustrates.
The West has an overwhelming need for warriors, in some ways more than ever. 
Combat, undercover, and human intelligence work presendy are the m ost dangerous 
assignments where warriors are needed. Such missions support campaigns across the range 
o f foreign policy: from development; diplomacy; peacekeeping and peace building; 
counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism; and full intensity war fighting. Relief workers, 
diplomats (irrespective o f employer), commercial entrepreneurs, tourists and adventurers 
have one thing in common: If  captured, abducted or illegitimately arrested, they need help. 
They need warriors who are able to succeed in complex insertions to the operational area; 
can fight themselves into range; if necessary shoot free hostages; and safely escort them out 
o f jungle sanctuaries, inner city hideaways or mountain redoubts. This is just one example 
o f an instrumental role for warriors, which will never go away.
To say that the West needs warriors thus involves both the instrumental and the 
existential side o f the question, because the West needs them in both realms. 
Instrumentally the West needs warriors in fighting regiments and brigades where warriors 
represent talent and initiative as well as restraint, essentially the critical members o f the 
human element in the fight. The instrumental side is about the direct benefit such 
individuals bring to the tangible tactical and strategic objectives defined by military and 
political leaders.
More generally, in respect o f the West, the question o f whether the West still needs 
warriors existentially is much less straightforward to answer. Chapter four defined combat
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as composed o f an essentially timeless nature. The existential need for warriors in the 
contemporary West springs in part from their resonance with qualities like manliness and 
courage, which, while underplayed in contemporary Western civil society, are as relevant in 
other parts o f the world as they have been in the premodem West. These values are forged 
in combat now as in the past. Like all values, they take a long time to disintegrate, but a 
longer time still to cultivate again if they are not nurtured. As personifications o f manliness 
and courage Western warriors are less representative but more pronounced as role bearers 
at the social level than their historic predecessors, who practiced in societies that largely 
expected and respected their manifestation, both instrumentally and existentially.
Another feature o f the existential role o f warriors relates directly to who ‘we’ are. 
D o W  include the global ‘we’, or does the ‘we’ necessarily relate to citizenship? The 
different social imaginaries provide different answers to this question. A further dimension 
of this question is that warriors largely work for themselves. This is both strength and a 
liability for them and for Western societies. The strength relates to their independence o f 
motivation. Since warriors fight at least in part for themselves, their existential character is 
particularly suited for the postmodern age, which is characterised by not only economic 
and technological specialisation; but ideological and social fragmentation as well. A more 
self-centred and atomised self, disembedded and unburdened by most social constraints, 
seems to have replaced the days o f coherent national and international worldviews. In this 
independence, there also lies liability. How independent warriors’ motivation really is will 
only become clear when they are asked to sacrifice themselves explicitly for the good o f 
human kind, without reference to a particular polis. The academic combat motivation 
literature, and the extremely rich literature o f personal experiences o f war and combat, is 
both contradictory and inconsistent on this issue. Little wonder it is, because so was 
Homer, with Achilles’ and Hector displaying very different combat motivations. This is 
what Spiller refers to as the hidden side o f combat.
Combat motivation is notoriously difficult to pinpoint, and its attachment to 
political causes and communities more difficult still. In addition to individual motivations 
the different political and military cultures approach the issue o f combat differently too. 
The American Way o f War, for example, is not the same as a wider Western Way o f War, 
even though the American trends are the most dominating ones in the Western strategic 
landscape because o f their overwhelming technological and manpower dominance. An 
American warrior ethos shaped by an American culture of war, is thus not identical to
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those found in the rest o f the West either. Indeed identifying the existence and properties 
o f national warrior ethoses adds further subjective complexity to the warrior concept.933
A major reason why we cannot penetrate the hidden side o f combat from a social 
perspective — bearing in mind that the naming and shaming o f warriors as warriors happens 
at the social level - is that soldiers and warriors tend to downplay the political and 
instrumental cause for which they are fighting when they think and talk about their 
experiences. This is certainly no mystery. The cause does not feature in any tangible way on 
the ground level; bullets, grenades, roadside bombs, fear, sweat, grit, noise and deprivations 
do. As Sergeant H oot puts it in the movie version o f Black Hawk Down; “Once that first 
bullet goes past your head, politics and all that shit just goes right out the window.”934
Warrior social imaginaries: Marines vs. SOF
Military units, like all societies, have social imaginaries, which P.J. O ’Rourke observed when 
he joined U.S. Marines on a trip to Iwo Jima in July 2003 to make a television 
documentary. O n the island, he had a chance to eavesdrop on a warrior culture 
reproducing its own social imaginary. The main purpose o f the trip was a morale booster 
for young Marines recognized for stellar performance and attitude. Going to Iwo Jima “is a 
way for new Marines to imbue themselves with the spirit o f the Corps.”935 O ’Rourke 
realised that the batde for the island defines the Marine social imaginary. Iwo Jima has 
replaced Montezuma in their imagination. The battle cost 6,281 American and some 20,000 
Japanese lives. The largest force o f Marines ever put together fought it; 27 out o f 353 
Medals o f H onor won by Marines during World War II were earned during the battle o f 
the island.936
The Marine social imaginary defines a warrior culture, but even more so it is like a 
family. One drill instructor summed up his work at boot camp thus: “The Marine Corps is 
like a family, and we teach family values.”937 In an age o f widespread casualty aversion and 
instrumental warfare, the Marines are atypical in their strong focus on their past, 
comparable in some ways to the British regimental system. David Hackworth, who was not 
a Marine, learnt in his first year in Korea that “in war a soldier or a leader is about as
933 To identify these would require a great deal o f  further empirical research, which is beyond the scope o f  
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indispensable as the hole left by a finger in a glass o f water.”938 The Marine celebration of 
the memory o f Iwo Jima counteracts this feeling and ensures a dominant place for past 
sacrifices in their social imaginary, because they happened to the family. This strong 
communitarianism turns meaning inward, a logical reaction to the erosion o f patriotism as 
a source o f meaning in America and even more so in the rest o f the West.
Marine basic training remains a harrowing experience; a shock to teenagers who are 
used to control their lives. “I was bom  down there,” observed Brigadier General Randy 
West to Thomas Ricks, as they looked down at Parris Island from a Marine jet. Indeed, 
most Marines can remember the name o f their drill sergeant from 40 years ago.939 However 
today’s recruits are spared some o f the abuse endured by some in the Vietnam generation 
who were; “ordered to insert their penises into the breeches o f their weapons, close the 
bolt, and run the length o f the squad bay singing “The Marine Corps Hymn.””940
Basic training illustrates both instrumental and existential features o f the 
relationship between warriors and society, because this is where the Marines begin to make 
warriors out of young civilians. Instrumentally, the instructors teach the recruits basics to 
prepare them for the harshness o f combat. Existentially, boot camp turns civilians into 
Marines, socializing them away from their various civilian social imaginaries into the 
reigning Marine imaginary. The recruits arrive with widely different backgrounds. Some 
give up privileges to become Marines while others, like recruit Winston, who claimed he 
had shot ten people before joining at age 19, said: “Ain’t nothing the Marine Corps could 
put in front o f me that could scare me more than my neighbourhood.”941 While there are 
many civilian social imaginaries, there can only be one Marine imaginary, and part o f the 
boot camp experience is to make this social imaginary part o f their blood; lived and not 
merely thought. At the same time, the Marine Corps is constantly questioning itself about 
what this social imaginary should entail in relation to the social world that owns and 
controls them.
A legendary Marine with strong opinions on these issues was Lt. Gen Lewis 
“Chesty” Puller (1898-1971). Puller fought in the Banana wars and some o f the bloodiest 
fighting o f World War II and Korea to become the m ost highly decorated Marine in 
history, with five Navy Crosses and one Distinguished Service Cross. Retiring in 1955 
Puller requested reinstatement in 1965 for Vietnam, but his request was denied due to his
938 Hackworth, About face, 274.
939 Ricks, Making the Corps, 44.
940 Quoted in Ibid., 90.
941 Ibid., 70.
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age. Perhaps because he was a warrior defined by combat, Puller was not well equipped to 
show compassion to Marines with less ability to endure it. Recovering from wounds in a 
Guadalcanal field hospital Puller advised a shivering, babbling and whimpering enlisted 
man: “There’s no such thing as shell shock or battle fatigue. All in the mind. Until I got in 
this war, I never saw a bit o f it. We fought up and down Haiti and Nicaragua without it. 
You’ll be okay.” Rather than recovering, however, Puller later found the man crying over a 
photograph o f his girlfriend. This made Puller threaten that the Marines would put up 
pictures o f shirkers in post offices, and the girlfriend would surely know, and never speak 
to him again, which made the man return to combat.942
Later Puller witnessed for the Marines court-martialled in the Ribbon Creek 
incident in 1956, where a drunken drill instructor in the middle o f  the night marched a 
platoon into a creek at Parris Island, where six drowned.943 Espousing both the 
instrumental needs o f combat and the social imaginary o f his generation o f Marines, Puller 
argued rough training was justified because “the definition o f military training is success in 
training... without discipline an army becomes a mob. In my opinion the reason American 
troops made out so poorly in Korea was mostly due to lack o f night training.’’944 However, 
the Marines have since changed a lot, and drill instructors today hold the view that the drill 
instructor had both failed and betrayed his responsibility towards his men.945 David 
Hackworth, a warrior very much o f Puller’s calibre, served as a young man at the time this 
cultural shift was taking place. Yet, even after Vietnam, Hackworth maintained that 2 % 
casualties in training was a defensible insurance policy against underperformance in 
combat.946
These incidents reflect the moulding o f the warrior ethos. It is cross-pressured 
between the values o f civil society and the instrumental needs o f the job warriors perform. 
These stories do not just reflect debates about training, but an evolving discourse on how 
to form warriors, and with which means. These means are commensurable with the degree 
to which society feels in need o f warriors.
The Special Operations community has perhaps better defined a social imaginary 
that fits the spirit o f the age. More in tune with the increasing individualization and 
fragmentation of society, they select for types who are, in their view, already constituted as
942 Linderman, World Within War, 355.
943 Ricks, Making the Corps, 48.
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warriors through their given character. The candidates have only to be tested to prove this, 
and subsequently trained. Such an approach to warriors is more market oriented: offering 
an attractive life style with high membership fees, but with less unit responsibility to  shape 
and mould warriors from the start. The basic formation is outsourced to the regular army, 
who grudgingly have to give up their best when they most need them.
When SOF were more focused on hostage rescue missions they were more o f a 
“boutique.” However, this is changing and now they have to be a “market stall,” more 
outward reaching both to recruit and to integrate ever more competence from the civilian 
world, given the complexity o f wars among the people.947 It is in this sense, rather than in 
the technocratic sense, that information warfare is so important today. Western warriors 
cannot be specialised away from this reality, they have to be generalised into it. For this 
reason, the increasing openness about all thing special forces related is a welcome 
development. The British, for example, recendy decided to de-classify unit membership 
when SOF are killed in action. This reduces the isolation o f SOF and allows them to 
celebrate their social imaginary in public to achieve not just the standing Marines have in 
the United States, but also to represent warrior values like courage and sacrifice publicly.
W arriors in W estern society
Western societies need warriors, but it is not immediately clear that they want them. Only if 
the civilian world and the military can appreciate each other’s social imaginaries can 
warriors kill with a good conscience and feel that their sacrifice is for some larger meaning, 
as the word sacrifice implies. The liberal and to a greater extent the cosmopolitan social 
imaginaries tend to be either implicidy or explicidy sceptical o f the utility and legitimacy of 
military force, and this is a worldview which is bound to sit uncomfortably with the 
lifeworld of warriors. Warriors in this sense are “high maintenance.” Despite their 
instrumental and seemingly existential independence, the sacrifices called for in combat, 
and the confidence needed to  kill all require strength o f character. This is especially the 
case when such sacrifices are unfashionable, or the campaign they take part in is unpopular. 
It would be tempting, but unadvisable, for society simply to let warriors be warriors; give 
up trying to recognise the values gap between these two worlds; forget about society’s 
responsibility to the existential side o f the equation; use them instrumentally when that is 
necessary; and leave them to cultivate such ideals as are commensurate with their trade in a 
detached subculture. The formation and maintenance of such character is a social process,
947 Kiszely, 'Post-modern challenges', Smith, The utility of force
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however, both in the macro sense o f overall society and in the micro sense o f  warrior peer 
groups. This means that completely self-contained cultures cannot conserve and cultivate 
warrior ethos.
Because Western societies have been subject to dramatic social change over the last 
few centuries, they are well advised to maintain the warrior ethos in military institutions, 
and provide a home for warriors in more concrete terms; whether it is units like the 
Marines or ones that are more specialized. The security paradigms that policy makers 
espouse ensure that there will be no mission drought in the near future. There is also 
nothing to suggest that war in its different manifestations is disappearing, nor that less 
dangerous forms o f war will replace the current form o f combat, which requires warriors. 
Western societies are fortunate to still produce individuals who are willing to submit to the 
will o f the public and accept the risks and hardships to play an existential as much as an 
instrumental role. We must conclude that if anything the West has too few warriors, not 
too many, and that those who commit to war and combat are needed more than ever, 
precisely because they are so rare.
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